Hamidian v. OccultoHamidian v. Occulto
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Vanaskie
*352 MEMORANDUM
VANASKIE, District Judge.
On April 15, 1993, Plaintiff Antoinette M. Hamidian (“Hamidian”) commenced the above-captioned civil rights action pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
Hamidian claims that on April 19, 1990, she was driving her vehicle at the intersection of Corner and Apple Streets in Dun-more, Pennsylvania when Occulto was driving his vehicle in the opposite direction at the same intersection. 1 (Dkt.Entry #37, p. 1.) Hamidian asserts that upon seeing her at the intersection, Occulto blocked her exit from the street, exited his vehicle and initiated a “street confrontation.” (Dkt.Entry #37, p. 2.) At the time of the confrontation, Occulto was not in uniform, did not have a badge or identification card, and was driving his personal vehicle.
As Occulto approached her vehicle, Hami-dian maintains she took her foot off the brake and allowed her car to “nudge” forward. 2 (Dkt.Entry # 37, p. 2.) With Occulto still approaching, Hamidian contends she was required to make a snap decision, “namely, believe the unknown stranger who was trying to get into her car ... or leave the scene immediately.” (Dkt.Entry #37, p. 3.) Ha-midian decided to leave the scene. Id.
Occulto then telephoned the Dunmore Police station and requested that the Police Department check the license plate number of the vehicle to determine its owner. (Dkt.Entry # 27, p. 3.) Upon learning Ha-midian was the owner of the vehicle, Occulto, accompanied by Patrolman Dee, also of the Dunmore Police Department, arrived at Ha-midian’s home and questioned her about insurance and registration.
Shortly thereafter, Hamidian received three (3) citations in the mail charging her with (1) failing to give information and render aid,
II. DISCUSSION
Occulto contends in his Motion for Summary Judgment that Hamidian’s claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are time-barred and that her claim for malicious prosecution is untenable in that Hamidian failed to establish that the criminal charges filed against her were initiated without probable cause. (Dkt.Entry # 27, p. 13 and Dkt.En-
*353
try # 39.) Additionally, Occulto argues that he is protected from a
A. False Arrest and False Imprisonment
It is well-established that claims brought pursuant to
B. Malicious Prosecution
1.
While a claim for malicious prosecution also bears a two-year statute of limitations period, the statute does not begin to run until the underlying criminal proceedings have ended in plaintiffs favor. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d at 348-349; Barnes v. City of Coatesville, Civil No. 93-1444, 1993 WL 259329 (E.D.Pa. June 28, 1993). In the present case, the criminal proceedings against Hamidian ended on December 31, 1991, and she filed the present action on April 16, 1993. Consequently, Hamidian’s malicious prosecution claim is timely filed. Therefore, the merits of that claim must be addressed.
In order to bring a successful
The fatal deficiency in Hamidian’s
Although afforded the opportunity to submit supplemental briefing on this issue, Hamidian has failed to cite a single case that has rejected a judicial officer’s determination of guilt as conclusive on the question of probable cause in a Section 1983 action. 7 It must be noted, however, that our independent research has disclosed that a District Magistrate’s decision may not be conclusive on the question of probable cause in a malicious prosecution claim under Pennsylvania law. See Cap v. K-Mart Discount Stores, Inc., 357 Pa.Super. 9, 515 A.2d 52 (1986) (conviction by “justice of the peace” ultimately reversed on appeal is not sufficient proof of probable cause to defeat an action for malicious prosecution); MacDonald v. Schroeder, 214 Pa. 411, 63 A 1024 (1906) (question of whether conviction by a magistrate, later reversed, is conclusive evidence of probable cause or only prima facie evidence of probable cause); Martinez v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 477 F.2d at 1017 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (plaintiffs conviction before Justice of the Peace, though reversed by Court of Common Pleas, is under Pennsylvania law only prima facie proof that the charging party had probable cause).
While Hamidian does not adequately address this issue, it is clear that the overwhelming authority, including decisions in our circuit, follows the general rule that the neutral and experienced determination by a judicial officer of a person’s guilt conclusively establishes the existence of probable cause, thereby defeating a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution. To disregard this unbroken line of federal authority on the basis of a peculiar rule under state law would threaten a body of consistent federal law. Such disregard would result in a non-uniform application of malicious prosecution claims in federal civil rights cases and precipitate inconsistent determinations as to whether an individual’s constitutional rights have been violated. This is especially true in the present case since the relevant Pennsylvania state court decisions do not address a determination of guilt by a Court of Common *355 Pleas not assailed on the grounds that it was procured by fraud, perjury, or any corrupt means.
Because Hamidian chose to bring her suit in
federal court
under
2.State Law Claim
Upon review of Hamidian’s sparse, non-count complaint, it is unclear whether she intended to assert a state law claim for malicious prosecution. Construing the complaint liberally and providing Hamidian with the benefit of the doubt, however, fairly permits a finding that Hamidian did assert a state law claim for malicious prosecution. This being so, the Court will exercise its discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim pursuant to
Because of the Pennsylvania authority that a determination of guilt by a judicial officer is not conclusive evidence of probable cause, summary judgment on the state law claim is improper. As the parties have consented to a trial by a Magistrate Judge in the event Occulto’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, the case will proceed to trial before the Magistrate Judge on Hamidian’s state law claim for malicious prosecution.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Defendant Occulto’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Dkt.Entry # 25.) An appropriate Order will be issued.
ORDER
In accordance with the accompanying Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant Occulto’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Hamidian’s state law and § 1983 claims for false arrest, false imprisonment and § 1983 malicious prosecution claim; summary judgment is DENIED with respect to Hamidian’s state law claim for malicious prosecution. (Dkt.Entry # 25.)
2. The case will proceed to trial before Magistrate Judge Thomas Blewitt on Hami-dian’s state law claim for malicious prosecution.
3. This Memorandum and Order disposes of Dkt.Entry # 25.
4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to reflect this disposition on the docket sheet.
Notes
. Apparently, Hamidian was traveling the wrong way on a one-way street. It is undisputed, however, that the street was not properly posted as a one-way street.
. At this point there is a conflict in the evidence as to whether Hamidian struck Occulto when she “nudged” her car forward. Occulto claims he was struck by plaintiffs vehicle and Hamidian claims he was not. (Dkt.Entry # 27, p. 2 and Dkt.Entry # 37, p. 3.)
.
The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within two years:
(1) An action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution or malicious abuse of process.
. Although fully aware of Occulto’s argument that her claims for false arrest and false imprisonment were time-barred, Hamidian presented no argument or discussion on this issue.
. See Pa.Rules of Conduct for District Justices 1007(A) (1982).
. The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1963) provides:
The conviction of the accused by a magistrate or trial Court, although reversed by an appellate tribunal, conclusively establishes the existence of probable cause, unless the conviction was obtained by fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means.
In the present case, Hamidian does not allege the convictions by the District Magistrate or the Court of Common Pleas were obtained by fraud, perjury or any other corrupt means.
. Hamidian cites only three cases on this issue, none of which even remotely addresses the conclusiveness of a judicial officer‘s finding of guilt on the probable cause element of a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim. Instead, the cases cited by Hamidian deal with a police officer’s potential immunity from Section 1983 suits and the collateral-estoppel effect of a state court conviction on a litigant’s ability to bring a Section 1983 action for false arrest.