Hamid R. KASHANI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alan NELSON, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 84-2960.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Dec. 12, 1985. Decided June 12, 1986.
793 F.2d 818
The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Ripple, Circuit Judge, filed concurring opinion.
William E. Marsh, Ind. Univ. School of Law-Indianapolis, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff-appellant.
Mary Reed, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee.
Before COFFEY, FLAUM, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
COFFEY, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiff appeals the district court‘s dismissal of his complaint seeking judicial review of the district director of Immigration and Naturalization Service‘s denial of his request for political asylum and for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Immigration and Naturalization Service from
I.
The plaintiff, Hamid Kashani, an Iranian national, entered the United States on January 4, 1976 with non-immigrant student status pursuant to an “F-1” visa authorizing his entry to attend the School of Engineering at Purdue University in Lafayette, Indiana. Kashani completed his studies on July 10, 1982 and on October 14, some three months later, filed a Request for Asylum with the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS“) pursuant to
“Any person who is outside any country of such person‘s nationality or, in the case of the person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion....”
To establish a “well-founded fear of persecution,” Kashani alleged in his application that he would be executed if he returned to Iran because of his activities in the now outlawed Rastakhiz Political Party, including his actions as an investigator for the Headquarters for Fighting Against Profiteering, a division of the party; his outspoken opposition to the Ayatollah Khomeini, the current leader of Iran, and the Ayatollah‘s National Secret Service; and his work as a journalist. Additionally, Kashani contended that he did not practice a religion or belong to a religious group and that the Iranian government, “is known to have mass murdered ... those who allegedly do not adequately belong to a religious group.”
On October 20, 1983, a year after Kashani filed his Asylum Request, the District Director denied the request because Kashani “failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion....” On that same day, the District Director notified Kashani that he was required to depart from the United States, at his own expense, on or before November 20, 1983.
On November 20, 1983, Kashani filed a “Verified Complaint for Judicial Review and Motion for Preliminary Injunction” in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana alleging that the District Director abused her discretion in denying his asylum request and that she failed to consider relevant evidence and based her decision on non-relevant grounds. Kashani asked the district court to enjoin any further deportation proceedings and to grant his request for asylum. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that “[a]n applicant for asylum does not have the right to appeal the District Director‘s decision in the district court.” Kashani urges us to reverse the district court‘s determination that it does not have jurisdiction, arguing that since the District Director‘s denial is not made during a deportation proceeding, the denial does not fall within the Court of Appeal‘s exclusive jurisdiction over deportation orders and may be reviewed by the district court.
II.
Section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, (
“establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien‘s status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General deter-
mines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of Section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.”
The regulations implementing § 208,
If the alien is subject to deportation proceedings, he may file an asylum application with the Immigration court.
Judicial review of orders of deportation and exclusion are governed by
“An order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien has not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him as of right under the immigration laws and regulations or if he has departed from the United States after the issuance of the order. Every petition for review or for habeas corpus shall state whether the validity of the order has been upheld in any prior judicial proceeding, and, if so, the nature and date thereof, and the court in which such proceeding took place. No petition for review or for habeas corpus shall be entertained if the validity of the order has been previously determined in any civil or criminal proceeding, unless the petition presents grounds which the court finds could not have been presented in such prior proceeding, or the court finds that the remedy provided by such prior proceeding was inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of the order.”
Kashani bases his argument that the district court has jurisdiction to review the merits of the district director‘s denial of an asylum application and to enjoin deportation proceedings on our decision in Carvajal-Munoz and the Eleventh Circuit decisions in Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir.1984)2 and Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir.1982) (“HRC“)3. In Carvajal-Munoz, our court addressed the issue of whether the Immigration Judge‘s denial of an asylum application is reviewable in the court of appeals. Relying on Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 84 S.Ct. 306, 11 L.Ed.2d 281 (1963) and Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 88 S.Ct. 1970, 20 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1968), we determined that an Immigration Judge‘s denial of an applicant‘s request for asylum made during a deportation proceeding was an “integral part” of the deportation proceeding and that review of the Immigration Judge‘s asylum denial would further
Kashani‘s argument is based not only on our holding in Carvajal-Munoz that the District Director‘s denial of an asylum application is not reviewable in the court of appeals because it is not made during a deportation proceeding but also upon the Eleventh Circuit‘s finding of district court jurisdiction to enjoin the District Director from engaging in a “pattern and practice” of denying aliens their right to petition for asylum. Kashani reasons that since the District Director‘s denial is not made during a deportation proceeding, the district court has jurisdiction to review the merits of the District Director‘s denial of his asylum petition and to enjoin further deportation proceedings. The INS argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction to enjoin further deportation proceedings or to review the merits of the District Director‘s denial of Kashani‘s asylum petition because Congress never intended that district courts would review the merits of the District Director‘s denial; according to the INS, the alien must initially exhaust his administrative remedies with a renewal of his application for asylum in the ensuing deportation proceeding before attempting judicial review. The INS additionally argues that the political question doctrine precludes judicial review of the merits of the district director‘s denial.
Initially we address Kashani‘s argument that Jean and HRC stand for the proposition that the district courts have jurisdiction to review the merits of the district director‘s denial of asylum petitions and to enjoin further deportation proceedings. The Eleventh Circuit specifically held that it limited its jurisdictional holding to complaints alleging a “a pattern and practice” by Immigration officials to deny aliens their right to petition for asylum and pointedly refused to allow district court jurisdiction to review the District Director‘s denial in individual cases:
“[I]nsofar as the first three counts set forth matters alleged to be part of a pattern and practice by Immigration officials to violate the constitutional rights of a class of aliens they constitute wrongs which are independently cognizable in the district court under its federal question jurisdiction. Although a court of appeals may have sole jurisdiction to review alleged procedural irregularities in an individual deportation hearing to the extent these irregularities may provide a basis for reversing an individual
deportation order, that is not to say that a program, pattern or scheme by Immigration officials to violate the constitutional rights of aliens is not a separate matter subject to examination by a district court and to the entry of at least declaratory and injunctive relief. The distinction we draw is one between the authority of a court of appeals to pass upon the merits of an individual deportation order and any action in the deportation proceeding to the extent it may affect the merits determination, on the one hand, and, on the other, the authority of a district court to wield its equitable powers when a wholesale, carefully orchestrated, program of constitutional violations is alleged.
In concluding that the district court had jurisdiction over the first three counts, we wish to emphasize the factual uniqueness of this case. Our holding is not to be construed as permitting a constitutional challenge in the district court based on a procedural ruling in a deportation proceeding with which an alien is dissatisfied. We refuse to condone any such end-run around the administrative process. Casting as a constitutional violation an interlocutory procedural ruling by an immigration judge will not confer jurisdiction on the district court. Such a result would indeed defeat the congressional purpose behind the enactment of Section 106(a)—the elimination of dilatory tactics by aliens challenging deportation orders in piecemeal fashion. Congress resolved this problem by consolidating jurisdiction over challenges to final orders of deportation in one court, the court of appeals. We do not intend by our holding today to emasculate that solution, and given the narrowness of our holding, we do not expect such a result.”
HRC, 676 F.2d at 1033 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see also, Jean, 727 F.2d at 980. Thus, as the Eleventh Circuit made explicit, HRC and Jean merely stand for the proposition that an agency‘s wholesale, carefully orchestrated program to deny statutorily guaranteed rights constitutes a wrong that is “independently cognizable in the district court under its federal question jurisdiction.” Jean, 727 F.2d 980. Jean and HRC do not stand for the proposition that district courts have jurisdiction to review the merits of the denial in an individual case that does not allege a pattern and practice of immigration officials to deny statutorily-guaranteed rights.
We now turn to the INS’ argument that Congress intended that aliens exhaust their administrative remedies by renewing their petitions for asylum in deportation proceedings, rather than seeking judicial review of the merits of the District Director‘s denial and injunctive relief in the district court. Kashani directs our attention to the presumption of reviewability embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act: any person “adversely affected or aggrieved” by agency action is entitled to “judicial review thereof,” as long as the action is a “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in the act.”
“Whether and to what extent a particular statute precludes judicial review is determined not only from its express language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved.
* * * * * *
The presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is just that—a presumption. This presumption, like all presumptions used in interpreting statutes, may be overcome by specific language or specific legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent. The congressional intent necessary to overcome the presumption may also be inferred from contemporaneous
judicial construction barring review and the congressional acquiescence in it, or from the collective import of legislative and judicial history behind a particular statute. [T]he presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action may be overcome by inferences of intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole.
* * * * * *
[T]he court has found the [clear and convincing evidence] standard met, and the presumption favoring judicial review overcome, whenever the congressional intent to preclude judicial review is ‘fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.’ In the context of preclusion analysis, the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard is not a rigid evidentiary task but a useful reminder to courts that, where substantial doubt about the congressional intent exists, the general presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is controlling.”
Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2454, 2456, 2457, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984) (citations omitted). Thus, we must examine the judicial review and asylum provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act to determine whether Congress intended to preclude judicial review of the District Director‘s denial of an individual alien‘s asylum petition.
An examination of the Act reveals that it is silent on the question of whether the merits of the district director‘s denial of an alien‘s asylum application may be reviewed in the district court. Accordingly, we turn to the legislative histories of the judicial review provision and the provision for asylum. Section 1105a, granting the court of appeals exclusive jurisdiction over orders of deportation and exclusion, was enacted “to frustrate certain practices which had come to the attention of Congress, whereby persons subject to deportation were forestalling departure by dilatory tactics in the courts.” Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 224, 84 S.Ct. 306, 311, 11 L.Ed.2d 281 (1963).
“Other aliens, mostly subversives, gangsters, immoral [persons], or narcotic peddlers, manage to protract their stay here indefinitely only because their ill-gotten gains permit them to procure the services of astute attorneys who know how to skillfully exploit the judicial process. Without any reflection upon the courts, it is undoubtedly now the fact that such tactics can prevent enforcement of the deportation provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act by repetitive appeals to the busy and overworked courts with frivolous claims of impropriety in the deportation proceedings.”
Foti, 375 U.S. at 225, 84 S.Ct. at 311. Of particular concern was litigation arising out of discretionary determinations by the INS.
The INS argues, and we agree, that allowing district court review of the District Director‘s denial of applications for asylum and the granting of an injunction of further deportation proceedings would delay deportation proceedings and, contrary to Congressional intent would allow the sort of dilatory tactic that Congress sought to con-
Thus, our review of the legislative history of the Refugee Act reveals that Congress intended to establish a systematic scheme for admitting refugees but failed to reveal any evidence of congressional intent to allow review of the District Director‘s denial of an asylum petition. Moreover, the regulatory scheme in effect at the time the Refugee Act was enacted, which was substantially the same as the present scheme, see Stevic, 104 S.Ct. at 2499 n. 20, and Carvajal-Munoz, 743 F.2d at 564 n. 3, furthered the § 1105a goal of expediting deportation proceedings and consolidating judicial review in the court of appeals.
“A primary purpose is, of course, the avoidance of premature interruption of the administrative process. The agency, like a trial court, is created for the purpose of applying a statute in the first instance. Accordingly, it is normally desirable to let the agency develop the necessary factual background upon which
decisions should be based. And since agency decisions are frequently of a discretionary nature or frequently require expertise, the agency should be given the first chance to exercise that discretion or to apply that expertise. And of course it is generally more efficient for the administrative process to go forward without interruption than it is to permit the parties to seek aid from the courts at various intermediate stages. The very same reasons lie behind judicial rules sharply limiting interlocutory appeals. Closely related to the above reasons is a notion peculiar to administrative law. The administrative agency is created as a separate entity and invested with certain powers and duties. The courts ordinarily should not interfere with an agency until it has completed its action, or else has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. As Professor Jaffe puts it, [t]he exhaustion doctrine is, therefore, an expression of executive and administrative autonomy.’ This reason is particularly pertinent where the function of the agency and the particular decision sought to be reviewed involve exercise of discretionary powers granted the agency by Congress, or require application of special expertise. [J]udicial review may be hindered by the failure of the litigant to allow the agency to make a factual record, or to exercise its discretion or apply its expertise. In addition, other justifications for requiring exhaustion in cases of this sort have nothing to do with the dangers of interruption of the administrative process. Certain very practical notions of judicial efficiency come into play as well. A complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in the administrative process. If he is required to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts may never have to intervene. And notions of administrative autonomy require that the agency be given a chance to discover and correct its own errors. Finally, it is possible that the frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative process could weaken the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedures.”
McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194-95, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1662-65, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) (citation omitted). To determine whether requiring aliens to exhaust their administrative remedies would promote judicial and administrative efficiency, we turn to the regulations and compare the application procedure before the district director with the procedure before the Immigration Judge. Initially, we note that a more complete record is made in the proceeding before the Immigration Judge. Unlike the procedure before the Immigration Judge, the record developed before the District Director does not contain the BHRHA advisory opinion unless the District Director bases his decision in whole or in part on the advisory opinion and the alien does not have the right to challenge the advisory opinion unless it is part of the record.
In light of the overall statutory scheme, the judicial interpretation of the Act, and Congress’ failure explicitly to provide for district court jurisdiction to review the District Director‘s denials of petitions for asylum and to enjoin further deportation pro-
Indeed, we hasten to note that our holding is also supported by the political question ground urged on us by the INS. The political question doctrine, one of the principles of justiciability governing the jurisdiction of the federal courts, is based upon the separation of federal powers and will be invoked when any one of the following circumstances is present:
“a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court‘s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
The power to control the admission of foreigners is an inherent attribute of national sovereignty and the Supreme Court has long recognized that the political branches of the federal government possess concurrent authority to establish and implement substantive and procedural rules governing the admission of aliens to this country.5 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-11, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 1019-21, 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 654, 659, 12 S.Ct. 336, 337, 338, 35 L.Ed. 1146 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States [The Chinese Exclusion Case], 130 U.S. 581, 609, 9 S.Ct. 623, 631, 32 L.Ed. 1068 (1889). Indeed, “[a]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations.” The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606, 9 S.Ct. at 630. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “[t]he power over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review,” Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 n. 21, 96 S.Ct. 1895, 1904 n. 21, 48 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1892, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976) (narrow standard of judicial review applies to decisions “made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration“), and are “largely immune from judicial control.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210, 73 S.Ct. 625, 628, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589, 72 S.Ct. 512, 519, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (immigration matters are “so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference“).
An examination of the legislative history of the Refugee Act reveals that Congress wished to replace the ad hoc use of the parole authority, which was used to admit refugees, with more formal procedures so that it might expand Congress’ role in the admission process and to provide for planning for the impact of refugees on local communities. S.Rep. at 5-13, 1980 U.S.C. C.A.N. at 145-53. The President was required to consult with Congress to establish “normal flow numbers” of refugees. S.Rep. at 5-8, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 145-58. Persons granted asylum are placed in a conditional admission status and are eligible for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident after being physically present in the United States for at least one year after being granted asylum.
The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, concurring.
This case presents a very difficult issue of statutory interpretation. The court‘s opinion is a thorough and balanced examination of the question which correctly represents, on the basis of all available evidence, the intent of Congress. I write separately only because I have substantial reservations about the court‘s alternate treatment of the issue under the political question doctrine, a discussion which is unnecessary to the court‘s basic statutory analysis.
In my view, this litigation does not present an appropriate opportunity to declare definitively that the matter of asylum is “committed to the political branches of government.” The full implications of such a statement are difficult to ascertain on this record. It is sufficient to say that the matter of political asylum, closely tied to the conduct of this country‘s foreign relations, is an area where the political branches have traditionally exercised great discretion and where we would expect Congress to be quite explicit if it intended that the judiciary play a role.
COFFEY, Circuit Judge.