delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff Brian Hamer appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County entered in a declaratory judgment proceeding granting him some but not all the relief he sought under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 201 et seq.).
The pertinent facts are as follows. Approximately one year before the filing of his declaratory judgment action, plaintiff requested access to certain records in the possession of the defendants Norman Lentz, the administrative secretary of the General Assembly Retiremеnt System (the retirement system), and the Board of Trustees. After a number of letters between the parties failed to secure plaintiff’s access to the records, he filed a declaratory judgment action on August 15, 1985, seeking the identity of all former members of the General Assembly who currently receive pension payments under the retirement system; the annual pension received by each former member of the General Assembly during the most recent fiscal year; the salary received by each former member of the General Assembly immеdiately prior to retirement, the date of retirement from the General Assembly, and the length of service in the General Assembly; and the сumulative pension received by each former member of the General Assembly from the date of retirement to the most recеnt practicable date.
On February 26, 1986, the trial court entered an order supplementing a February 3, 1986, order granting plaintiff’s motion for summаry judgment. The latter order, drafted by defendants, provided that defendants produce the most recent monthly computer printout setting fоrth the identity of persons receiving pension benefits through the retirement system, as well as the monthly benefit payable to each suсh person. The order further stated that defendants were to disclose “a document” setting forth the retirement date for each suсh person receiving pension benefits. Compliance with the court’s order was required by March 19, 1986. Finally, the court stated that its order was “a final and appealable order.”
As a result of the trial court’s refusal to grant plaintiff’s request for information concerning thе cumulative pension of former members from the date of their retirement to the present and the names of all such legislators, аs well as the length of time of service upon which their pensions are based, on March 5, 1986, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in this court. On appeal, plaintiff contends that: (1) the records still at issue are not exempted from disclosure under the FOIA; (2) no fiduciary duty prevents defendants from complying with the disclosure requirements of the FOIA; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in failing to require partial disсlosure within seven working days of entry of its order; (4) defendants should be strongly reprimanded for their failure to comply with the FOIA; and (5) this case should be remanded to the trial court for the purpose of determining attorney fees pursuant to the FOIA.
Defendants initially argue that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff’s appeal. Specifically, defendants allege that the order appealed from “neither resolves the issue of attorney’s fees nor contains a 304(a) special finding necessary to make the remaining issues aрpealable” and, accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed.
Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (87 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) requires that where multiple partiеs or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, no appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or mоre but fewer than all the parties or claims unless the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying еnforcement or appeal. “In the absence of such a finding, any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liаbilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties.” (87 Ill. 2d K 304(a); see Ferguson v. Riverside Medical Center (1986),
In the instant case, Rule 304(a) is applicable because all claims have not been adjudicated; the issue of attorney fees was not ruled upon аnd is still pending in the trial court. (See Hernandez v. Fahner (1985),
As discussed above, the order here states that “This is a final and appealable order.” Plaintiff argues that this language “comes close” to the Rule 304(a) finding, apparently equating the word “final,” and the trial cоurt’s “intention” to make the order “final” to expedite his FOIA action, with the word “enforceable.” We do not agree with plaintiff’s construсtion of this language. As we stated in E.M.S. Co. v. Brandt (1968),
In light of the above disposition, we do not address the remaining issues raised by plaintiff. We briefly note, however, that should this cause be appealed a second time to this cоurt, the parties, upon submission of a proper motion, may incorporate their briefs filed herein on the second appeal and make any additional supplements to the record.
For the foregoing reasons, therefore, the instant appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Appeal dismissed.
SULLIVAN, P.J., and LORENZ, J., concur.