490 Mich. 1 | Mich. | 2011
Lead Opinion
We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine the scope of an employer’s vicarious liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment affecting public services under Michigan’s Civil Rights Act (CRA).
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August 2001, Livingston County deputy sheriffs arrested plaintiff, Tara Katherine Hamed, on a warrant for unpaid child support. Because plaintiff also had outstanding warrants for probation violations in Wayne County, the Livingston County deputies later transferred plaintiff to the custody of Wayne County. Wayne County deputies transported plaintiff to the Wayne County jail. When plaintiff arrived at the jail, Deputy Reginald Johnson was the only officer on duty in the inmate registry area.
The circuit court granted defendants summary disposition in two separate orders and dismissed all of plaintiffs civil rights claims. It concluded that plaintiffs hostile-environment claim failed because defendants had no prior notice that Johnson was a sexual predator. The circuit court also dismissed plaintiffs quid pro quo sexual harassment claim on the basis that defendants are not vicariously liable for the criminal acts of sheriffs department employees.
Plaintiff then appealed the circuit court’s decision only with regard to her quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. The Court of Appeals reversed and applied this Court’s analysis in Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc,
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo whether the Court of Appeals erred by reversing the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition.
A. QUID PRO QUO SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER THE CRA
The CRA recognizes that freedom from discrimination because of sex is a civil right.
Discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment. Sexual harassment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature under the following conditions:
(i) Submission to the conduct or communication is made a term or condition either explicitly or implicitly to obtain employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing.
(ii) Submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting the individual’s employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing.
(Hi) The conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment, public accommodations, public services, educational, or housing environment. [Emphasis added.]
The first two subdivisions of MCL 37.2301(i) describe quid pro quo sexual harassment, while the third subdivision
A plaintiff alleging quid pro quo sexual harassment affecting public services must show by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that he or she was subjected to any of the types of unwelcome sexual conduct or communication described in the statute and (2) that the public service provider or the public service provider’s agent made submission to the proscribed conduct a term or condition of obtaining public services or used the plaintiffs submission to or rejection of the proscribed conduct as a factor in a decision affecting his or her receipt of public services.
When the harassment was committed by an agent and the plaintiff is pursuing a civil rights claim against the principal, as in this case, a court must always “determine the extent of the employer’s vicarious liability .. . .”
B. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
The doctrine of respondeat superior is well established in this state: An employer is generally liable for
Here, there is no question that Johnson’s sexual assault of plaintiff was beyond the scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff. The sexual assault was an independent action accomplished solely in furtherance of Johnson’s own criminal interests. It cannot be said that any of the institutional defendants benefited in any way from Johnson’s criminal assault or his exercise of unlawful authority over plaintiff. In fact, Johnson’s behavior was expressly prohibited by defendants’ rules regarding treatment of detainees and defendants’ anti-discrimination policies, to say nothing of the criminal law. In short, there is no fair basis on which one could
The general rule that an employer is not liable for acts of its employee outside the scope of its business, however, does not preclude vicarious liability in every instance. This Court has consistently recognized that an employer can be held liable for its employee’s conduct if “the employer ‘knew or should have known of [the] employee’s propensities and criminal record’ ” before that employee committed an intentional tort.
We applied this principle in Brown v Brown, in which we held that the employer was not vicariously liable for a rape committed by its employee because, under the circumstances, the act was unforeseeable.
[An employer] cannot reasonably anticipate that an employee’s lewd, tasteless comments are an inevitable prelude to rape if those comments did not clearly and unmistakably threaten particular criminal activity that would have put a reasonable employer on notice of an imminent risk of harm to a specific victim. Comments of a sexual nature do not inexorably lead t,o criminal sexual conduct any more than an exasperated, angry comment inexorably results in a violent criminal assault.[30 ]
In summary, we have consistently held that an employer’s liability for the criminal acts of its employees is limited to those acts it can reasonably foresee or reasonably should have foreseen. This is because we should not expect employers to assume that their employees will disobey the law. Criminal conduct is inherently arbitrary and highly unpredictable. As we noted in Brown, even law enforcement agencies, which are trained in detecting and preventing crime, cannot pre
Michigan’s well-established rules governing respondeat superior are further justified by the societal burden that imposing liability for unforeseen criminal
Applying the foreseeability analysis in this case dictates the conclusion that defendants are not legally responsible for Johnson’s criminal acts. The majority of complaints against Johnson during his employment with defendants
Plaintiff urges us to ignore these traditional common-law principles and extend the reasoning of this Court’s decision in Champion, which referred to the Second Restatement of Agency’s “aided-by-agency” exception to the rule of respondeat superior.
In Champion, this Court addressed, as a matter of first impression, whether an employer could be held vicariously liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment under the CRA. In that case, the plaintiff worked as a security guard, and her immediate supervisor scheduled her work, trained her, oversaw her performance, and was responsible for disciplining her. During a
The Champion Court rejected the defendant’s argument, reasoning that “under defendant’s construction, an employer could avoid liability simply by showing that it did not authorize the sexually offensive conduct.”
[the defendant’s view] fails to recognize that when an employer gives its supervisors certain authority over other employees, it must also accept responsibility to remedy the harm caused by the supervisors’ unlawful exercise of that authority. From his scheduling decisions that allowed him*19 to work alone with [the plaintiff] to his ordering of her into a remote part of the building, [the supervisor] used his supervisory power to put [the plaintiff] in the vulnerable position that led to her rape. In fact, there is little doubt that [the supervisor] would have been unable to rape [the plaintiff] but for his exercise of supervisory authority.[41 ]
Citing multiple federal cases, the Champion Court held that “an employer [is] strictly liable where the supervisor accomplishes the rape through the exercise of his supervisory power over the victim.”
Four years later, this Court again considered a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim in Chambers v Trettco, Inc.
After our decisions in Champion and Chambers, this Court considered the doctrine of respondeat superior generally in Zsigo v Hurley Med Ctr.
We rejected the plaintiffs theory of vicarious liability and any notion that Michigan common law recognized the aided-by-agency exception or that this Court had adopted it in Champion.
D. CHAMPION WAS WRONGLY DECIDED
Because Zsigo involved intentional tort claims, it did not provide an opportunity to address the validity of Champion in the civil rights context.
First, we note that Champion’s holding was contrary to the plain language of the CRA. As we explained in Chambers, the CRA specifically incorporates common-law agency principles in its definition of “employer.”
The Champion Court compounded its erroneous holding by relying on federal caselaw.
Finally, we note that Champion is contrary to both prior and subsequent caselaw. Before Champion, this Court had never held that an employer could be vicariously liable for the unforeseeable criminal acts of its employees. Subsequent caselaw attempted to limit Champion's applicability, but that caselaw merely demonstrated Champion's dubious validity. Chambers recognized that the CRA incorporates common-law agency principles, and Zsigo made it clear that the aided-by-agency exception is not a part of this state’s common law. Thus, contrary to the mandates of Chambers and Zsigo, Champion requires the application of an exception to respondeat superior in the context of quid pro quo sexual harassment claims that is not a part of this state’s common law.
E. STARE DECISIS
Our inquiry does not end simply because we have concluded that Champion was wrongly decided. Rather, we must determine whether overruling Champion is the most appropriate course of action. This is a decision that we do not undertake lightly and will make “only. . . after careful consideration of the effect of stare decisis.”
First, despite our attempt in Zsigo to limit Champion to claims involving quid pro quo sexual harassment
Indeed, Champion’s distortive impact, which is manifested when a plaintiff attempts to circumvent traditional rules of respondeat superior or otherwise attempts to avoid governmental immunity by framing a claim under the CRA, is apparent in lower court decisions of this state and further demonstrates Champion’s unworkability.
Second, with regard to reliance interests, we cannot conclude that Champion “has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone’s expectations” that overruling it would upset any real-world reliance interests.
Further, when the decision at issue involves statutory law, the best indicator of society’s knowledge of the law, and what society reasonably relies on, is the language of the statute itself.
Finally, further justification for overruling Champion can be found in the adverse practical consequences that would result from extending the case to the present matter. As we explained in Zsigo, “it is difficult to conceive of an instance when the [aided-by-agency] exception would not apply because an employee, by virtue of his or her employment relationship with the employer[,] is always ‘aided in accomplishing’ the tort.”
We therefore conclude that Champion was wrongly decided and that overruling it would not interfere with legitimate reliance interests. We overrule Champion because it is inconsistent with longstanding Michigan law that employers, including public-service providers, are not vicariously liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment on the basis of the unforeseeable criminal acts of their employees.
E RESPONSE TO THE DISSENTS
We disagree with the dissenting justices regarding whether Champion was correctly decided and should be overruled. Although the dissenting justices concede that Champion was unprecedented, they adhere to Champion’s reasoning to conclude that the exception to common-law agency principles is necessary to give effect to the broad purpose of the CRA and the Legislature’s intent in enacting it. Yet the dissenting justices’ conclusion that Champion was correctly decided for this reason ignores the fundamental flaws inherent in Champion. Notably, the dissenting opinions, like Champion, do not cite any language from the CRA to support
Not surprisingly, using the faulty premise that Champion’s reasoning is correct, the dissenting justices advocate a straightforward application of Champion. This approach ignores an irreconcilable tension in our law. Although Champion and this case are similarly framed civil rights cases involving allegations of quid pro quo sexual harassment, the conflicting dispositions in the courts below demonstrate the tension between the multiple precedents of this Court at issue in this case. The circuit court below relied on Zsigo to grant summary disposition to defendants, recognizing that Zsigo established “a very clear bright line rule” that an employer is not liable when an employee unforeseeably acts outside the scope of his or her employment, as was the case here. The Court of Appeals reversed, relying instead on Champion, which had never been applied outside the employment context, for the proposition that a public-service provider may be vicariously hable when its employee uses his or her “authority over a subordinate as a means of subjecting that subordinate to abusive and unlawful conduct.” Thus, in this case, we are presented with conflicting principles: those of the traditional common-law rule that have guided Michigan law for more than a century as articulated in Zsigo and those underlying the rule of Champion, which inexplicably departed from the requirements that have always been held as necessary to impose respondeat superior liability. The existence of these conflicting precedents and principles cries out for clarity and compels our decision to overrule Champion.
The most basic error in the main dissent’s stare decisis analysis is its misunderstanding of why Champion is unworkable. The dissent posits that the aided-by-agency exception is “narrowly tailored” because it applies only when an agency relationship aided a supervisor in committing a wrongful act.
Finally, we find unpersuasive the main dissent’s reliance on decisions from other jurisdictions that have applied the aided-by-agency exception in the context of their civil rights laws. If liability is to be imposed under Michigan law on an employer for sexual harassment committed by its employee, that liability must be mandated by the Michigan CRA.
IV CONCLUSION
Michigan law has never imposed liability on an employer for the unforeseeable criminal actions of its
MCL 37.2101 et seq.
Wayne County jail regulations require that a female officer be in attendance when female inmates are present. The officers who transported plaintiff to the jail informed a supervisor that Johnson was the only deputy on duty. The supervisor advised the officers to leave plaintiff with Johnson.
See MCL 750.520c(k).
The only remaining defendants are Wayne County and the Wayne County Sheriffs Department. Plaintiff received a default judgment against Johnson; Johnson, while a defendant in plaintiffs action, is not a party to this appeal. Thus, for the purposes of this opinion, our references to “defendants” encompass only the institutional defendants.
See Zsigo v Hurley Med Ctr, 475 Mich 215; 716 NW2d 220 (2006).
Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich 702; 545 NW2d 596 (1996).
Hamed v Wayne Co, 284 Mich App 681, 693; 775 NW2d 1 (2009).
Id.
Hamed v Wayne Co, 486 Mich 996 (2010).
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
See Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 159; 645 NW2d 643 (2002).
Id.
Danse Corp v Madison Hts, 466 Mich 175, 181-182; 644 NW2d 721 (2002).
Herman v Berrien Co, 481 Mich 352, 366; 750 NW2d 570 (2008).
Danse Corp, 466 Mich at 182.
MCL 37.2102(1).
MCL 37.2202 (employment); MCL 37.2302 (public accommodations and public services). For purposes of this opinion, we assume, without deciding, that the Wayne County jail is a “public service” as defined by MCL 37.2301(b).
Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 310; 614 NW2d 910 (2000).
See id. (stating the test for quid pro quo sexual harassment in the employment context). For purposes of our analysis, we also assume, without deciding, that plaintiff can establish the elements of quid pro quo sexual harassment affecting public services.
Id. at 311.
Id. We reached this conclusion in Chambers because MCL 37.2201(a) “expressly defines ‘employer’ to include agents,” thereby incorporating common-law agency principles into the act. Chambers, 463 Mich at 311.
See, e.g., Zsigo, 475 Mich at 221; Bradley v Stevens, 329 Mich 556, 562; 46 NW2d 382 (1951); Martin v Jones, 302 Mich 355, 358; 4 NW2d 686 (1942); Davidson v Chinese Republic Restaurant Co, 201 Mich 389, 396; 167 NW 967 (1918).
Zsigo, 475 Mich at 221.
Barnes v Mitchell, 341 Mich 7, 13; 67 NW2d 208 (1954), quoting Riley v Roach, 168 Mich 294, 307; 134 NW 14 (1912).
2 Restatement Agency, 3d, § 7.07, p 201.
See Barnes, 341 Mich at 13-16 (examining cases discussing scope of employment).
McClements v Ford Motor Co, 473 Mich 373, 381; 702 NW2d 166 (2005), quoting Hersh v Kentfield Builders, Inc, 385 Mich 410, 412; 189 NW2d 286 (1971) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
This analysis does not, as the dissenting justices assert, abandon prior caselaw to hold that “an employee’s conduct is only foreseeable to an employer if the employee had recently committed the precise conduct at issue.” Post at 56 n 20. This criticism mischaracterizes the inquiry that must he undertaken, which has its roots in well-established caselaw. See McClements, 473 Mich at 381; Hersh, 385 Mich at 412.
Brown v Brown, 478 Mich 545, 554-555; 739 NW2d 313 (2007).
Id. at 555. Brown did not, as the dissenting justices state, “conclude[] that an employee’s prior violent criminal acts are generally sufficient to put a defendant on notice of the employee’s propensity to commit similar violent acts . . . Post at 57. Rather, Brown made clear that knowledge of prior violent acts potentially provides an employer notice of an employee’s violent propensities. Brown, 478 Mich at 561. The dissenting justices attempt to broaden the holding in Brown to justify their position that defendants’ knowledge of Johnson’s dissimilar prior violent act suffices to create a question of fact regarding foreseeability.
Id. at 554, citing MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322, 335; 628 NW2d 33 (2001).
Brown, 478 Mich at 556. An “avoidability test” is the type of test the dissenting justices favor. In their view, defendants’ policy prohibiting male deputies from being alone with female inmates demonstrates, in itself, that the sexual assault was preventable and foreseeable. However, reliance on the policy alone to impose liability obliterates any real foreseeability requirement; an employer’s policy is irrelevant to assessing what the employer knows with respect to a specific employee. The consequence would be imposition of vicarious liability every time an employee disobeys the employer’s policy, regardless of whether the act was unforeseeable under the actual circumstances.
Rather, as we have explained, a defendant’s specific knowledge of past misconduct and propensity to act in conformity with such conduct must be the focus of a foreseeability analysis. This analysis, which the dissenting justices term a “newly imposed foreseeability analysis,’’post at 58, merely recognizes that foreseeability has always been the touchstone for when vicarious liability will be imposed. The criticism by the main dissent is not surprising, given that Justice Cavanagh has previously expressed support for what effectively amounts to the imposition of strict liability in lieu of a foreseeability analysis. See Brown, 478 Mich at 570-580 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting); Anderson v Pine Knob Ski Resort, Inc, 469 Mich 20, 30-35; 664 NW2d 756 (2003) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
For a catalogue of some of the difficult questions that would confront an employer operating under the dissenting justices’ rule, see Brown, 478 Mich at 566-570 (Maekman, J., concurring). “The rule proposed by the dissent, and the unanswered questions arising from that rule, would create confusion and uncertainty among employers throughout this state .. . .” Id. at 566. And employers would not be the only ones to suffer; employees would suffer as well because, were the dissenting justices’ rule to become law, what rational employer would ever hire anybody with any history of problems in his or her background? “Why would any rational employer expose itself to the vagaries of litigation-by-hindsight ... where it fails to predict unpredictable behavior if this could all be avoided by simply firing [or failing to hire] every odd or rude or quirky employee?” Id. at 569-570. The rule the dissenting justices propose would result in those with imperfect criminal histories, or even merely a history of arrests, becoming increasingly unemployable.
The dissenting justices misrepresent the seriousness of Johnson’s past conduct, stating that he “had a specific history of violent and abusive behavior toward inmates.” Post at 56. In fact, Johnson had engaged in a single physical altercation with a male inmate in 1988, 13 years before the sexual assault in this case. Unlike the circumstances here, Johnson did not initiate the altercation with the male inmate.
Cf. Brown, 478 Mich at 555.
The dissenting justices dismiss our foreseeability analysis, concluding that Johnson’s past violent act and sexual assault of plaintiff more
Champion, 450 Mich at 712 n 6.
Id. at 705-707.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 712 n 6. 1 Restatement Agency, 2d, § 219(2), p 481, provides that
[a] master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
Champion, 450 Mich at 712 (citation omitted).
Id. at 713-714. Since our decision in Champion, the drafters of the Third Restatement of Agency have excluded the aided-by-agency exception included in the Second Restatement of Agency.
Id. at 713.
Chambers, 463 Mich 297.
42 USC 2000e et seq.
Chambers, 463 Mich at 316.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 312.
Zsigo, 475 Mich 215. This Court did consider a single intervening civil rights case concerning quid pro quo sexual harassment, but the resolution of that case did not require application of the doctrine of respondeat superior because the plaintiff failed to establish that sexual harassment had occurred. See Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274; 681 NW2d 342 (2004).
Zsigo, 475 Mich at 221-224.
Id. at 223-224.
Id. at 224 n 19, quoting Champion, 450 Mich at 704.
Zsigo, 475 Mich at 227.
Although Justice Young recognized that the exception to respondeat superior that Champion created was “hard to square. . . with any conventional notion of agency, and ... stands as an isolated, inexplicable
See Chambers, 463 Mich at 310-311.
See Zsigo, 475 Mich at 223-224.
The common law remains in force until it is affirmatively modified. Const 1963, art 3, § 7. The Legislature is presumed to know the common law, and any abrogation of the common law must be explicit. Dawe v Dr Reuven Bar-Levav & Assoc, PC, 485 Mich 20, 28; 780 NW2d 272 (2010).
Champion, 450 Mich at 713. While the dissenting justices are correct that the purpose of a statute may be a relevant consideration, post at 38 n 3, what they fail to recognize is that this is correct only in so far as the purpose of the statute is derived from the actual language of the statute. See Mich Ed Ass’n v Secretary of State (On Rehearing), 489 Mich 194, 202-203; 801 NW2d 35 (2011) (“The clear purpose of [the statute], as
See Danse Corp, 466 Mich at 181-182.
Application of traditional respondeat superior principles also does not foreclose other avenues of legal recourse, including pursuit of direct criminal and civil liability against the perpetrator.
See Champion, 450 Mich at 712 n 8, citing Karibian v Columbia Univ, 14 F3d 773 (CA 2, 1994), Kauffman v Allied Signal, Inc, 970 F2d 178 (CA 6, 1992), Horn v Duke Homes, 755 F2d 599 (CA 7, 1985), Craig v Y & Y Snacks, Inc, 721 F2d 77 (CA 3, 1983), Katz v Dole, 709 F2d 251 (CA 4, 1983), Henson v City of Dundee, 682 F2d 897 (CA 11, 1982), and Miller v Bank of America, 600 F2d 211 (CA 9, 1979).
Chambers, 463 Mich at 315-316.
Significantly, the drafters of the Third Restatement of Agency chose to exclude the aided-by-agency exception, thereby implicitly recognizing that the exception is not consistent with generally accepted common-law agency principles. While the dissenting justices dismiss this authority as unpersuasive, they ignore the fact that the aided-by-agency exception is not a “widely accepted exception to the general rules of agency.” Post at 43-44. Only a few jurisdictions have adopted the exception wholesale into their common law, such that it applies to a typical tort claim. And, as we
Haynie v Dep’t of State Police, 468 Mich 302, 314; 664 NW2d 129 (2003).
Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 464; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).
Id.
Id.
The Court of Appeals decision in this case is one example, see Harried, 284 Mich App 681, as is the plaintiffs attempt in Zsigo to hold the employer vicariously liable for its employee’s unforeseeable criminal act. See also Diamond v Witherspoon, 265 Mich App 673, 690-691; 696 NW2d 770 (2005) (presuming strict vicarious liability and rejecting governmental immunity in the context of a quid pro quo sexual harassment case under the CRA when a police officer subjected detained
Robinson, 462 Mich at 466.
Id. at 467.
See id. (stating that “it is well to recall in discussing reliance, when dealing with an area of the law that is statutory..., that it is to the words of the statute itself that a citizen first looks for guidance in directing his actions”).
Zsigo, 475 Mich at 226.
In Zsigo, this Court noted that to adopt a rule contrary to that of the traditional common law would mean that the rule “applies to a broad range of employees whose duties grant them unique access to and authority over others, such as ... correctional officers,” which “could virtually ‘eviscerate[] the general scope of employment rule.’ ” Zsigo, 475 Mich at 230, quoting Poe v Forrest, 2004 VT 37, ¶ 59; 176 Vt 476, 505; 853 A2d 48 (2004) (Skoglund, J., dissenting) (some quotation marks omitted; emphasis added; alteration in original).
Artful pleading would also allow a plaintiff to avoid governmental immunity under the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq. A school district, for example, could not be vicariously liable in tort for a teacher’s sexual molestation of a student because the GTLA would bar the claim. However, if the plaintiff styled its claim as a CRA action, the school district could be vicariously liable under a theory of quid pro quo sexual harassment affecting public services. Plaintiffs preferred approach, under which public-service providers would be strictly liable for precisely the same conduct as that for which they would typically be immune, is inherently inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent. If the Legislature had intended such a result, it should have clearly abrogated the common-law rule for purposes of the CRA.
See Brown, 478 Mich at 557-558, and the discussion at page 15 of this opinion.
Because we have decided that defendants cannot be held vicariously liable for Johnson’s criminal act under the CRA, we need not address defendants’ alternative arguments that the Wayne County jail is not a “public service” within the meaning of the CRA or that the circuit court improperly permitted plaintiff to amend the complaint.
Post at 38 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). Likewise, the author of the other dissent cites no specific language and provides no analysis in support of her accusation that our decision is somehow “contrary to the rule of law” or “results in the dismantling of the [CRA].” Post at 60 (Hathaway, J., dissenting). Rather, as we have explained at great length, our decision honors both our common-law tradition and the language of the CRA and is consistent with that statute’s purpose.
The dissenting justices’ concern in this regard is related to their failure to recognize plaintiffs claim for what it really is: an attempt to hold a governmental entity liable for an employee’s criminal action and unforeseeable intentional tort.
Indeed, the dissenting justices concede that the “bulk of [their] analysis” relies only on Champion, post at 42 n 7, which we have explained at length is a decision not supported in Michigan’s law generally, and thereby effectively admit that no other binding Michigan law supports their conclusion other than Champion. Simply because Champion was a unanimous decision decided 15 years ago does not mean it was correctly decided or that its reasoning is correct today. Not only do the dissenting justices ignore the plain language of the CRA, they also
Post at 41.
In fact, contrary to the dissenting justices’ position, Zsigo did undermine the primary rationale of Champion. The Zsigo Court did not entirely “dispatch the exception created in Champion,” post at 41 n 6, because Zsigo was not a civil rights case.
Post at 42. The dissenting justices’ position that Champion was correctly decided on this basis relies primarily on the dissenting opinion in Zsigo, which is not binding precedent. The dissenting justices in this case disregard this criticism, asserting that the dissenting opinion in Zsigo is an “example” of Champion’s workability. Post at 42 n 7. Yet, the rationale of the dissent in Zsigo lacks any persuasive value because, like the main dissent here, the Zsigo dissent repeatedly advocated adopting the aided-by-agency exception and the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in Doe. This Court has already explicitly rejected both as inconsistent with Michigan law.
Petersen v Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300, 313-320; 773 NW2d 564 (2009) (opinion by Marilyn Kelly, C.J.).
Robinson, 462 Mich 439.
Post at 42-43 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting).
The main dissent counters that application of the Vermont Supreme Court’s three-pronged test would amount to "a narrowly tailored ap
Post at 48-49. The main dissent also misconstrues our citation of Diamond and Salinas. Those cases do not demonstrate Champion’s workability. Rather, they are examples of “artful pleading” in which the plaintiffs sought to circumvent traditional rules of respondeat superior by framing their claims under the CRA. See note 74 of this opinion.
Notably, the main dissent ignores the mandate of Chambers to consider the language of the Michigan CRA of paramount importance when interpreting the Michigan CRA as opposed to any guidance that federal caselaw may provide. Chambers, 463 Mich at 313-314.
Post at 49 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s decision to overrule Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich 702; 545 NW2d 596 (1996), a unanimous decision of this Court.
I. SUMMARY OF CHAMPION
In Champion, the plaintiff’s supervisor offered job security in exchange for sexual favors, and when the plaintiff refused, the supervisor used his authority to
In concluding that the plaintiff could pursue a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim against the defendant, Champion explained that a contrary result would “create an enormous loophole in the statute” that “would
II. CHAMPION WAS CORRECTLY DECIDED
The majority claims that Champion “was contrary to the plain language of the CRA,” ante at 22, and, thus, was wrongly decided. Although I generally agree with the majority that the CRA incorporated the common law of agency, the exception to common-law agency principles established in Champion was necessary to give effect to the broad purpose of the CRA and the Legislature’s intent in enacting it. See Henson v City of Dundee, 682 F2d 897, 910 n 21 (CA 11, 1982) (recognizing that “[t]he common law rules of respondeat superior will not always be appropriate to suit the broad remedial purposes” of civil rights statutes).
In light of this understanding of the CRA’s purpose and the Legislature’s intent in enacting the CRA, I believe that Champion properly advanced the legislative intent by ensuring that clearly discriminatory conduct is eradicated. The majority’s interpretation, however, bars plaintiff from pursuing a claim in furtherance of this goal and ignores “the legislative intent that employers, not the victims of sexual harassment, bear the costs of remedying and eradicating discrimination.” Champion, 450 Mich at 714. The majority erroneously discards Champion’s interpretation of the leg
Moreover, the majority’s reliance on Chambers to support its conclusion that Champion was wrongly decided is misplaced. In fact, Chambers expressly acknowledged Champion's holding as a valid part of Michigan’s common law related to quid pro quo sexual harassment under the CRA. See Chambers, 463 Mich at
Similarly, the majority erroneously interprets Zsigo as supporting its conclusion that Champion misinterpreted the CRA. The Zsigo majority expressly recognized that the Champion Court, like many other courts, applied an exception to quid pro quo sexual harassment claims that is very similar to the aided-by-agency exception. Zsigo, 475 Mich at 227 n 28 (listing state and federal opinions adopting the aided-by-agency exception in sexual harassment cases). While I continue to adhere to the Zsigo dissent’s conclusion that a narrowly tailored interpretation of the aided-by-agency exception should be applied outside the context of sexual harassment cases, that disagreement with Zsigo is of no moment in this case, given that the case before us is obviously a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. Thus, under Chambers and even under the majority opinion in Zsigo, Champion’s exception applies to this case.
Furthermore, as the dissent in Zsigo aptly explained, it is entirely possible to adopt a narrowly tailored interpretation of the aided-by-agency exception in order to avoid swallowing the general agency rules. Zsigo, 475 Mich at 239-243 (MARILYN KELLY, J. dissenting).
In summary, Champion properly relied on the legislative intent and the purpose behind the CRA when it adopted a widely accepted exception to the general rules
III. STARE DECISIS
In light of the preceding analysis, it is clear that Champion furthers the Legislature’s intent when it enacted the CRA. As a result, Champion was correctly decided and no further stare decisis consideration is needed. However, even accepting the majority’s faulty conclusion that Champion was wrongly decided, I do not agree that its decision to overrule Champion is supported by stare decisis principles.
The United States Supreme Court has explained that the doctrine of stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808, 827; 111 S Ct 2597; 115 L Ed 2d 720 (1991). As a result, “a stare decisis analysis should always begin with the presump
Several of the criteria discussed in Petersen weigh particularly heavily in favor of upholding Champion rather than overruling it: (1) Champion provided a practical and workable rule, (2) Champion has not been robbed of significant application or justification because it remains a highly significant and relevant guidepost in the area of civil rights law, (3) other jurisdictions have adopted exceptions similar to the one in Champion, and (4) overruling Champion is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests. See Petersen, 484 Mich at 320.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals opinions the majority cites in support of this claim, ante at 26-27 n 68, are either irrelevant or demonstrate Champion’s workability rather than its unworkability.
In Diamond v Witherspoon, 265 Mich App 673; 696 NW2d 770 (2005), and its companion case, the Court of Appeals rejected a city’s claims of governmental immunity and permitted the plaintiffs to bring quid pro quo sexual harassment claims under the CRA based on the same city police officer’s sexual conduct during traffic stops. The
The other opinion the majority cites in this regard, Salinas v Genesys Health Sys, 263 Mich App 315; 688 NW2d 112 (2004), actually demonstrates Champion’s workability and exhibits the “meaningful demarcation” that the majority so desperately seeks.
Finally, Champion itself explained that its holding “does not extend unlimited liability to employers . . ..”
Champion also remains a highly significant and relevant guidepost in the area of civil rights law, which weighs in favor of upholding it. Champion remains relevant because it properly recognized that failing to impose liability on an employer when its employees use supervisory powers delegated by the employer to commit quid pro quo sexual harassment is a “far too narrow” construction of agency principles. Champion, 450 Mich at 712. As Champion explains, “immunizing an employer where it did not authorize the offending conduct would create an enormous loophole in the statute.” Id. at 713. Therefore, Champion correctly concluded that when an employer delegates authority to an employee, the employer must accept the responsibility of remedying the harm caused by misuse of that authority, which is consistent with the “legislative intent that employers, not the victims of sexual harassment, bear the costs of remedying and eradicating discrimination.” Id. at 714. Thus, Champion provides
Further supporting the conclusion that stare decisis does not support overruling Champion is the fact that numerous other jurisdictions have adopted the aided-by-agency exception in the context of civil rights cases. See Petersen, 484 Mich at 320 (opinion by MARILYN Kelly, C.J.). To begin with, as Champion stated, application of the aided-by-agency exception is a “nearly unanimous view” in the context of quid pro quo sexual harassment committed by supervisory personnel. Champion, 450 Mich at 712.
Although the majority is correct that we are not bound by federal caselaw, it can be instructive, particularly when the federal and state statutes at issue are similar. See, e.g., People v Victor, 287 Mich 506, 548; 283 NW 666 (1939) (endorsing the use of federal caselaw in applying Michigan’s Due Process Clause). Notably, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that the federal Civil Rights Act has a “broad remedial purpose[],” Arizona Governing Comm for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v Norris, 463 US 1073, 1090; 103 S Ct 3492; 77 L Ed 2d 1236 (1983), to “achieve equality . . . and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group,” Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424, 429-430; 91 S Ct 849; 28 L Ed 2d 158 (1971). Given that the legislative intent and purpose behind the CRA and the federal Civil Rights Act are strikingly similar, the United States Supreme Court’s decision to adopt an exception to further that purpose in Ellerth and Faragher is persuasive authority in favor of upholding Champion.
Furthermore, regardless of whether “[o]nly a few jurisdictions have adopted the [aided-by-agency] exception wholesale . . . such that it applies to a typical tort claim,” ante at 24 n 63, many of our sister states have — as this Court did in Champion — adopted comparable exceptions in the realm of civil rights sexual harassment cases in order to accomplish goals analogous to those in the CRA.
Finally, the fact that the majority’s decision in this case is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests weighs heavily in favor of upholding Champion. See Petersen, 484 Mich at 320 (opinion by Marilyn Kelly, C.J.). As discussed at length in this opinion, Champion properly recognized the significant public interest embodied in the CRA and adopted a narrow exception to traditional agency rules that accurately reflects the legislative intent to require employers to bear the costs of remedying and eradicating discrimination. By overruling Champion, the majority instead places that burden on the very people whom the CRA is intended to protect and who are powerless to prevent the discrimination that the CRA is intended to eliminate. The detriment to the public interest created by the majority opinion today is obvious and weighs heavily in favor of affirming Champion.
In summary, Champion (1) provides a practical and workable rule in furtherance of the purpose of the CRA, (2) has not been robbed of significant application or
IV THE MAJORITY REACHES THE WRONG RESULT UNDER ANY STANDARD
The majority’s application of its own standard is hopelessly flawed. The majority immunizes defendants from liability in this case by concluding that Johnson’s acts were unforeseeable. Ante at 16. The majority supports this conclusion by claiming that, even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Johnson’s past violent conduct toward members of the public and inmates merely amounted to “a propensity to disobey work-related protocol.. . .”
The majority’s characterization of Johnson’s conduct is extraordinarily one-sided, however. First, Johnson’s conduct was clearly not “unpreventable” because defendants had a policy in place that required a female officer to be present anytime a female inmate was in the jail.
Second, as the majority concedes, Johnson’s alleged threatening calls to his landlord and the physical altercation with an inmate reveal Johnson’s tendency to react violently when provoked. One would think that working as a deputy in a jail would entail frequent provocation by inmates. Accordingly, tendencies such as those displayed by Johnson, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, present a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether his subsequent violent rape of an inmate was sufficiently foreseeable to hold defendants vicariously liable.
The majority strains to support the weight of its misguided holding by citing the majority opinion in Brown v Brown, 478 Mich 545; 739 NW2d 313 (2007).
Although the Brown majority’s analysis created a dangerous rule whereby “no infirmity of character, shown by speech, [is] sufficient to allow a jury to decide whether, in light of the employee’s conduct, the employer had a duty to act,” id. at 576 (CAVANAGH, J.,
V CONCLUSION
I disagree with the majority’s decision to overrule Champion because that case was correctly decided and furthers the legislative intent and purpose of the CRA. Moreover, the doctrine of stare decisis weighs against overruling Champion. Furthermore, the majority misapplies its newly created standard in this case and usurps the role of the jury when it concludes that defendants are entitled to a favorable decision as a matter of law. Accordingly, I dissent.
The concurring justices joined the analysis in full. See Champion, 450 Mich at 714 (Boyle, J., concurring).
Although many opinions address this issue in the context of workplace supervisor-subordinate relationships, those opinions are applicable to this case because the analysis is largely rooted in the recognition that a supervisor wields substantial authority over a subordinate, just as a sheriffs deputy, acting under color of law, holds significant authority over a jail inmate.
This Court has recognized that the purpose of a statute is a relevant consideration when applying the statute in a broad array of cases. See, e.g., Adair v Michigan, 486 Mich 468, 477; 785 NW2d 119 (2010) (stating that “the primary and fundamental rule of constitutional or statutory construction is that the Court’s duty is to ascertain the purpose and intent as expressed in the constitutional or legislative provision in question”) (emphasis added). Indeed, the members of the majority in this case recently found the purpose of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act worthy of lengthy consideration inMich Ed Ass’n v Secretary of State (On Rehearing), 489 Mich 194; 801 NW2d 35 (2011).
The majority’s suggestion that the language of the CRA does not support this interpretation of the act’s purpose is remarkable, given that this Court’s opinions in Eide, Miller, and many other cases have similarly summarized the CRA’s purpose. See, e.g., Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 379; 501 NW2d 155 (1993) (quoting the CRA and concluding that “[t]he Civil Rights Act is aimed at the prejudices and biases borne against persons because of their membership in a certain class, and seeks to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases”) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see, also, MCL 37.2102, MCL 37.2202, and MCL 37.2302.
Ironically, the majority in this case also relies on policy considerations, claiming that Champion creates an unfair “societal burden” and an unbearable financial burden on employers. Ante at 14-15, 28-29. It is odd that the majority opinion finds it appropriate to rely on these policy considerations while simultaneously rejecting Champion for its consideration of the policy concerns reflected in the CRA. Setting that contradiction aside, however, what is even more telling is the fact that Champion’s policy considerations were rooted in the legislative intent and purpose of the CRA. Indeed, the CRA’s title expressly states that the CRA is intended to “prohibit discriminatory practices, policies, and customs ....” Title of 1976 PA 453. The majority opinion in this case does exactly the opposite in furtherance of policy considerations that do not appear in the CRA. Nowhere did the Legislature indicate that the “societal burden” or the financial burden on employers is a valid consideration when interpreting and applying the act. In fact, the CRA indicates that the Legislature intended that governmental employers bear the cost of eliminating sexual harassment, not avoid it, as shown by the specific inclusion of state and political subdivisions and their agents as employers covered by the act. MCL 37.2103(g) and (h) and MCL 37.2201(a); see, also, Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 195; 649 NW2d 47 (2002) (noting that there are areas in which “the Legislature has allowed specific actions against the government to stand, such as the Civil Rights Act”).
Although the majority is correct that Zsigo held that the aided-by-agency exception is not a part of Michigan’s general common law, the majority’s efforts to counter this dissent’s interpretation of Chambers and Zsigo are unavailing because both of those opinions recognized that Champion’s exception applied in the context of quid pro quo sexual harassment cases, as the majority acknowledges. See ante at 21; see, also, Chambers, 463 Mich at 311 (citing Champion for the premise that “[v]icarious liability exists in the case of quid pro quo harassment because the quid pro quo harasser, by definition, uses the power of the employer to alter the terms and conditions of employment”), and Zsigo, 475 Mich at 224 n 19 (recognizing that Champion applies “in the context of quid pro quo sexual harassment under MCL 37.2103G)”). Indeed, the fact that the majority finds it necessary to expressly overrule Champion today further demonstrates that Chambers and Zsigo did not dispatch the exception created in Champion. The majority’s refusal to accept the
The majority erroneously implies that I only rely on nonbinding dissenting opinions of this Court to support my conclusion that Champion was correctly decided. Although I think that the Zsigo dissent provides an example of a narrow, workable interpretation of the aided-by-agency exception, the bulk of my analysis in support of my conclusion that Champion was correctly decided rests on the reasoning from Champion’s well-established and unanimous opinion, which was not overruled by either of the majority opinions in Chambers and Zsigo. Surprisingly, the majority disparages my analysis for relying on Cham
In Petersen, then Chief Justice Marilyn Kelly provided a nonexhaustive list of criteria for consideration when a court engages in a stare decisis analysis, hut no single criterion is determinative, and a given criterion need only be evaluated if relevant. Petersen, 484 Mich at 320. The majority’s implication that my stare decisis analysis is invalid because I apply Petersen is misplaced, given that Petersen’s test simply expands on the test from Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 464; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). Further Petersen is more respectful of precedent, and thus is more consistent with the principles of stare decisis. See Petersen, 484 Mich at 315-319 (opinion by Marilyn Kelly, C.J.).
Although Chief Justice Kelly also recognized that reliance on the rule in question may be a valid consideration when engaging in a stare decisis analysis, the majority’s extensive reliance on this factor to support its decision to overrule Champion is misplaced. In my view, this factor is of little importance in this case because no one plans on being sexually harassed or employing persons who commit sexual harassment. Thus,
Moreover, the majority’s claim that Champion allows plaintiffs to engage in “[a]rtful pleading,” ante at 29 n 74, in order to “avoid governmental immunity by framing a claim under the CRA,” ante at 26, is misplaced and, frankly, offensive. See, also, ante at 31 n 78. Plaintiff in this case, and presumably the plaintiffs in other sexual harassment cases, bring actions under the CRA because the sexual harassment infringed on their civil rights. By assuming that plaintiffs bring CRA claims to manipulate the judicial system, the majority throws salt in these plaintiffs’ raw wounds.
Moreover, as discussed earlier in this dissent, the three-prong test established in floe, 2004 VT 37, and favored by the Zsigo dissent further establishes a “meaningful demarcation” of an employer’s liability for an employee’s improper use of delegated supervisory authority.
Contrary to the majority’s claims, the distinction exemplified by Salinas is quite clear: if an employee is merely presented with an opportunity to commit sexual harassment by having the employer’s permission to be in a certain location, the employer is not vicariously hable because the employee did not use any employer-delegated authority to aid in the creation of the opportunity to commit the sexual harassment. But if, as in Champion and the case at bar, the employee actively uses the powers delegated by the employer to direct the victim to a location or otherwise create circumstances that aid in the commission of sexual harassment, vicarious liability may attach.
The majority also states that because “the drafters of the Third Restatement of Agency have excluded the aided-by-agency exception included in the Second Restatement of Agency,” ante at 19 n 42, Champion no longer reflects the preferred approach and I “ignore” this “changeD in the law,” ante at 31-32 n 79. To begin with, as the comments to the Third Restatement of Agency explain, the Third Restatement now addresses “[t]he purposes likely intended to be met by the ‘aided in accomplishing’ basis [for imposing vicarious liability]... by a more fully elaborated treatment of apparent authority and by the duty of reasonable care that a principal owes to third parties with whom it interacts through employees and other agents” elsewhere in the Restatement. 2 Restatement Agency, 3d, § 7.08, comment b, p 228. Thus, there has arguably been no “changeD in the law,” given that the Third Restatement of Agency addresses the same concerns represented by the aided-by-agency exception from the Second Restatement of Agency. And, regardless, the Restatement has no precedential value and, thus, is not “the law.” Champion, on the other hand, obviously has substantial precedential value as a well-established, unanimous opinion of this Court. Accordingly, any support for overruling Champion that the majority derives from the fact that the Third Restatement of Agency no longer expressly includes the aided-by-agency exception is unpersuasive, especially when, as noted later in this opinion, other jurisdictions continue to apply that exception.
Although the majority mistakenly attributes this premise to me, see ante at 35, it was actually the unanimous Champion Court that concluded that its holding was consistent with the majority of other jurisdictions. I do, however, agree with Champion’s conclusion, given that, as explained in footnote 15 of this opinion, the United States Supreme Court and many states apply Champion-like exceptions in the context of civil rights cases.
See, e.g., Farmers Ins Group v Santa Clara Co, 11 Cal 4th 992, 1016 n 14; 47 Cal Rptr 2d 478; 906 P2d 440 (1995) (acknowledging that the applicable statutes “indicate that respondeat superior and scope of employment principles are supposed to play an integral role in fixing an
The majority attempts to downplay Johnson’s prior violent conduct toward inmates by emphasizing that it was directed at a male inmate who had provoked Johnson. Although inconvenient to the majority’s analysis, it is notable that defendants considered Johnson’s actions “misconduct” and reprimanded him for it. Therefore, it appears that defendants did not consider Johnson’s violent conduct toward an inmate as insignificant as the majority would have us believe.
The majority bristles at my characterization of its test as “new.” See ante at 14 n 32. However, given that the majority overrules Champion, which it admits would otherwise apply to this case, classifying its test as “new” is entirely accurate, in my judgment.
Although I continue to adhere to my dissent in Brown, 478 Mich at 570-580 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting), I will apply the majority opinion from Brown because, even under the Brown majority’s excessively narrow
Justice Black concurred in the result. See Hersh, 385 Mich at 416.
The majority claims that the “dissimilar” nature and the “temporal distance” between Johnson’s past violent conduct and the rape at issue immunizes defendants from foreseeability as a matter of law. First, these arguments abandon the reasoning from Hersh because, in that case, the attacker’s conviction for manslaughter occurred 10 years before the attack in question, and the defendant in Hersh “was not aware of [the attacker’s] specific convictions ....” Hersh v Kentfield Builders, Inc, 19 Mich App 43, 45 n 1; 172 NW2d 56 (1969). Thus, contrary to the majority’s analysis today, the caselaw does not hold that an employee’s conduct is only foreseeable to an employer if the employee had recently committed the precise conduct at issue.
Second, these arguments also demonstrate that the majority’s new test for quid pro quo sexual harassment cases creates a moving target that is impossible for plaintiffs to hit. In Brown, the majority claimed that the attacker’s aggressive sexual comments were not sufficient to make it foreseeable that the attacker would later rape the target of those comments. In this case, even though Johnson had committed a violent act against an inmate in the past, the majority claims that this conduct occurred too long ago and was too dissimilar to the conduct at issue. The majority makes no effort to explain why the acceptable 10-year gap in Hersh is substantially different from the 13-year gap in this case and only summarily argues that Johnson’s prior violent act against an inmate was too dissimilar to his violent rape of plaintiff while she was an inmate. Ante at 16-17 n 36. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, I fail to see a difference between a violent physical altercation with an inmate and a subsequent violent rape of an inmate that is sufficient to justify deciding this case as a matter of law. Rather, given the substantial similarities between the facts of this case and the facts in Hersh, I believe that this Court’s unanimous conclusion in Hersh that “[w]hether the employer knew or should have known of [the employee’s] vicious propensities should not be determined by any court as a matter of law, but by the jury” is equally applicable to this case, even under the majority’s flawed new test. Hersh, 385 Mich at 415. But under the majority position, this is apparently not so, given that the majority seemingly believes that an employee’s act of committing a rape is only foreseeable if the employer knows that the employee actually raped someone in the recent past. The unworkabilify of such a requirement is obvious.
Specifically, Hersh, 385 Mich at 413, stated that “ ‘[t]he employer’s knowledge of past acts of impropriety, violence, or disorder on the part of the employee is generally considered sufficient to forewarn the employer,’ ” quoting 34 ALR2d 390, § 9 (emphasis added), and the majority in Brown, 478 Mich at 560, quoted this passage from Hersh.
Although the majority opinion cites Brown, 478 Mich at 555, for the proposition that “[e]ven the incident of aggression [toward an inmate] did not put defendants on reasonable notice that Johnson would sexually assault an inmate [because] violent actions do not inevitably lead to acts of criminal sexual conduct,” ante at 16, the cited portion of Brown does not actually support that conclusion. Rather, the relevant portion of Brown states that “[cComments of a sexual nature do not inexorably lead to criminal sexual conduct any more than an exasperated, angry comment inexorably results in a violent criminal assault.” Brown, 478 Mich at 555 (emphasis added). Furthermore, Brown later stated, while discussing Hersh, that “it is the employee’s known past acts that provide a basis for the employer’s knowledge of the employee’s ‘impropriety, violence, or disorder’ and that those acts potentially place an employer on notice of the employee’s violent propensities.” Id. at 561. Therefore, it appears that the majority has even further limited the scope of previous conduct by an employee that will be sufficient to put an employer on notice of the employee’s violent propensities. Disregarding the fact that a rape is an “incident of aggression,” the majority claims that Johnson’s previous “incident of aggression” toward an inmate did not make his subsequent rape of plaintiff foreseeable because the previous “incident of aggression” was not a “sexual assault.” The majority’s efforts to distinguish the differences between various violent acts leaves plaintiffs vulnerable to harm and immunizes employers from liability unless an employee commits the exact same act that he or she previously committed. In my view, the majority’s analysis is arbitrary and undercuts the clear legislative intent of the CRA.
Curiously, the majority proclaims that “[n]o meaningful distinction can be drawn between the facts in Champion and those in the present matter,” ante at 26, but later finds fault in my conclusion that a straightforward application of Champion is appropriate in this case. My conclusion is not faulty; rather, it simply reflects an adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. It is the majority that falters in its effort to satisfy the burden of explaining its imprudent decision to forgo precedent.
Indeed, the majority’s argument that the “conflicting dispositions in the courts below” support its decision to overrule Champion, ante at 33, is simply one more example of the majority’s misplaced efforts to satisfy its burden. While it is true that the trial court in this case applied Zsigo and the Court of Appeals applied Champion, a simple answer exists for this apparent conflict. Although our trial courts work diligently and, in the vast majority of instances, reach the correct result, the trial courts do, on occasion, err. Indeed, the Court of Appeals and this Court exist in large part to address this reality.
In this case, the trial court erred by applying Zsigo because Zsigo did not consider a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. Rather, as the Court of Appeals correctly determined, the proper course of conduct in this quid pro quo sexual harassment case was to apply Champion, not Zsigo. Indeed, as repeatedly noted in this dissent, the Zsigo majority recognized that Champion applies “in the context of quid pro quo sexual harassment under MCL 37.2103(i).” Zsigo, 475 Mich at 224 n 19. Therefore, the resolution of this case should be simple: Champion should apply because this is a quid pro quo sexual harassment case. It is the majority that needlessly injects “conflicting precedents and principles.” Ante at 33.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s decision to overrule Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich 702; 545 NW2d 596 (1996). I fully agree with and join parts I, II, iy and V of Justice CAVANAGH’s dissenting opinion. It is my strong belief that Champion, a unanimous decision of this Court,
The concurring justices joined the analysis in full. See Champion, 450 Mich at 714 (Boyle, J., concurring).