86 Ala. 199 | Ala. | 1888
Tbe decree, wbicb is for tbe foreclosure of a mortgage, must be reversed for failure to make tbe mortgagee, Harris, a party to the foreclosure suit, be being tbe trustee in tbe mortgage, and as such the bolder of tbe legal title. In such cases, tbe trustee, in whom tbe legal title is vested, is an indispensable party, without whose presence tbe court will not proceed to a decree; and tbe objection is available at any time, and in any form.' — Comer v. Bray, 83 Ala. 217; Prout v. Hoge, 57 Ala. 28; Lawson v. Ala. Warehouse Co., 73 Ala. 290.
We might reverse tbe decree in this case, and have nothing further to add, as tbe testimony on another trial may be different from that in tbe present record. But, to prevent a second appeal, we proceed to consider some other points raised in tbe argument.
Tbe main point of controversy in tbe case is one as to tbe relative priority of titles acquired by tbe trustee (Harris) under tbe mortgage from Bradford Hambrick, on February 7th, 1881, and that acquired by Joseph M. Hambrick, by bis deed of September 9, 1865, from Alfred Hambrick, through whom both parties claim title.
It is contended for complainant, that Harris was a bona fide purchaser of tbe legal title, for value, and without notice, and should on this ground be protected. Tbe basis of this claim is, that tbe deed of Joseph Hambrick,’ whatever interest it created in him, was not recorded at tbe time tbe mortgage to Harris was executed, and that neither be, nor tbe mortgagor, Bradford Hambrick, bad any notice or
The objection is not one of multifariousness, but of jurisdiction as to the subject-matter, and may be raised at any time, or enforced by the court sua sponte, without formal suggestion.' — Lewis v. Cocke, 23 Wall. 466; Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. (U. S.) 278.
Reversed and remanded.