{1} Plаintiff brought this tort action against Defendant for injuries Plaintiff allegedly suffered while working at Defendant’s facility. The issue in this case is whether Defendant is considered Plaintiffs special employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 52-1-1 to -70 (1929 and as amended), such that Defendant is immune from tort liability under the exclusivity provision, NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-8 (1989). We conclude as a matter of law that Defendant had the right to control the details of Plaintiffs work, thus making Defendant a special employer under the test established in Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, Inc.,
I. BACKGROUND
{2} Plaintiff, a graphic artist, was injured while working at Defendant’s facilities. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was directly emplоyed by Orion International Technologies (“Orion”). Orion was under contract to provide various professional services to Defendant, including Plaintiffs position. This ease thus involves two contracts: Plaintiffs employment contract with Orion, and Orion’s services contract with Defendant.
{3} Under the emplоyment contract, Orion pays Plaintiff an hourly wage; provides him with benefits, leave, and educational assistance; and evaluates his job performance. The services contract requires Orion, among other things, to provide certificates of workers’ compensation insurance. Orion did, in fact, pay workers’ compensation premiums for its employees, including Plaintiff. Defendant paid Orion a direct labor rate for each Orion employee who worked at Sandia, plus a
{4} The services contract limited the control that Defendant had over Orion’s employees. Defendant was not allowed to make any employment decisions, such as hiring, firing, promotion, or benefits determinations, and it was not allowed to supervise Orion’s employеes. Defendant was, however, allowed to direct Orion to remove any person from the contract. Defendant was also entitled to have a delegated representative who could assign work, monitor technical performance, and inspect and accept the work of Orion’s employees.
{5} Plaintiff was assigned to work for Defendant under the services contract as a graphic technologist. Plaintiff was injured after a direct employee of Defendant allegedly ordered Plaintiff to disassemble, move, and reassemble a large metal storagе unit. Plaintiff alleges that this order violated the supervision provisions of the services contract.
{6} Plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits for his injury through Orion’s insurer. Plaintiff now seeks to sue Defendant under a theory of negligence. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was Plaintiffs spеcial employer and that it had complied with the requirements of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Plaintiff responded that he was an independent contractor and that Defendant had not paid workers’ compensation insurance premiums as required by the Act. The district court granted summаry judgment for Defendant, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{7} ‘We review de novo the granting of summary judgment, construing reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the party that opposed the motion. Summary judgment is prope[r] when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Blea v. Fields,
III. DISCUSSION
A. PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT STATUS
{8} The exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act shields employers who comply with the Act from tort liability. Section 52-1-8. Thus, Defendant may be immune from tort liability if it has an employment relationship with Plaintiff. Plaintiff would have an employment relationship with Defendant if he was a direct employee, a statutory employee, or a special employee. In contrast, if Plaintiff was an independent contractor, he would not have an employment relationship with Defendant. Defendant was clearly not Plaintiffs direct employer. We turn next to the tests for statutory employment and special employment.
{9} Whether we apply the statutory employment or the special employment test depends on whether Defendant procured work or labor. A statutory employment relationship exists when “ ‘any employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor other than an independent contractor and the wоrk so procured to be done is a part or process in the trade or business or undertaking of such employerf.]’” Harger v. Structural Servs., Inc.,
{11} Before applying the special employment test, we must determine whаt that test should be. Defendant argues that the proper test for determining special employer status is the three-part test established in Rivera,
{12} Plaintiff urges instead that we replace all three parts of the Rivera test with the Harger test, recasting special emрloyment as a totality of circumstances test.
2
See Harger,
{13} We see no reason to depаrt from the test set out in Rivera. Although modern labor contracts may be complex, that complexity can be captured by the Rivera test’s third part. In this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the first two parts of the Rivera test were met and were not seriously contested by Plaintiff. Hаmberg,
{14} In his response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff listed a number of disputed material facts. Assuming that the facts are true for this analysis, Plaintiff has still failed to raise an issue of material fact regarding Defendant’s right to сontrol. Plaintiff alleges that Orion maintained control over his hours of work, evaluated his job performance, provided all of his employment benefits, disciplined him when required, and could terminate his employment at will. Plaintiff also alleges that he was supervised by an Orion manager, that he owed certain duties to Orion, and that Orion’s employees were sometimes physically
{15} Turning to Defendant’s right to control, Plaintiff first argues that he is a skilled specialist, and therefore he is not subject to Defendant’s control. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the right to control the details of a skilled specialist’s wоrk does not mean control over the “ ‘technical details[,]’ ” but means control over “ ‘the time and place of the services, the person for whom rendered, and the degree and amount of services.’ ” Hamberg,
{16} In trying to argue that his specialized skills show that Defendant lacked the right to control, Plaintiff instead shows that his situation falls precisely under the sсenario described in Carnes. Plaintiff alleged that he controlled “all the details of the conceptualization, design and creation of the projects he worked on[,]” while Defendant’s role “was limited to assigning projects, monitoring technical performance and inspecting and accepting [Plaintiffs] work” and that these assignments “were limited to a description of a desired end product.” These are the types of controls recognized by both Larson and Carnes as satisfying the special employment relationship.
{17} As a second argument against Defendant’s right to control, Plaintiff describes an “elaborate contract” that refers to Plaintiff as a contractor and disclaims any employment relationship. As explained by the Court of Appeals, we look to the relationship’s actual circumstances, not to how the parties define the relationship in their contracts. Hamberg,
B. COMPLIANCE WITH THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT
{18} Because Defendant is Plaintiffs special employer, Defendant is immune from tort liability if it complies with the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Rivera,
{19} Our holding is consistent with the policy behind the Workers’ Compensation Act:
[Allowing an employee who has received workers’ compensation benefits to maintain a tort action against his special employer[ ] destroys the compromise that is the foundation of the act. Such a construction would have the effect of encouraging litigation by employees that have received workers’ compensation benefits, the exact opposite of what the Legislature intended.
Sorenson,
IY. CONCLUSION
{20} Defendant and Orion shared control over the details of Plaintiffs work, thus making Defendant Plaintiffs special employer. Defendant complied with the Workers’ Compensation Act by requiring Orion to carry insuranсe and paying Orion a sufficient amount in addition to Plaintiffs hourly salary to cover overhead. Allowing Plaintiff to sue in tort under these conditions would undermine the policies of the Workers’ Compensation Act. We affirm the Court of Appeals and uphold the district court’s dismissal.
{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. We have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Agency test for distinguishing between an independent contractor and a statutory employer. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(1) (1958)). In its opinion below, the Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he test that Plaintiff urges this Court to apply ... is not the test for determining whether an employer can be considered a statutory employer, but rather is the test to be used in determining whether a contractor is an independent contractor!.]” Hamberg v. Sandia Corp.,
. Although Plaintiff slated during oral argument that he only wished to replace the third part of the Rivera test with a totality of circumstances test, in his brief in chief he argued against use of the special employment test altogether because "the Restatement [Harger 1 approach is much broader than the special employment test” and that "the special employment test is applicable, if at all, in very limited circumstances.”