Kimberly Halverson appeals the district court’s 2 оrder affirming the decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) denying her claim for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434. Halverson contends the ALJ improperly discounted medical evidence favoring her claim, erred in assessing her credibility, and improperly rejected her supplemental evidence. We affirm.
I
Kimberly Halverson was born in 1961. She has two years of education beyond high school and has worked as a receptionist, waitress, administrative clerk, and bill sorter. On June 16, 2004, Halverson filed for disability benefits, citing a disability onset date of September 25, 2003, and alleging she was disabled due to depression, anxiety, and agoraphobia. 3
Since 2001, Hаlverson has been treated by various mental healthcare professionals for psychological and emotional problems reaching back to her childhood. According to Halverson, she grew up in a chaotic home with a mother who was neglectful, abusive and violent. She was required to tend to her own basic needs from a young age and to assume the role of parent for her younger sibling. She stated they would go without food for days at a time because her mother neglected to buy food. Halverson also recounted a series of abusive incidents, including being beaten for eating toast after school, being held down by her mother and threatened with a knife held to her throat, and watching her mother hold a loaded gun to a neighbor’s head. Halverson also asserts she was sexually abused by a babysitter when she was five years old. As a result of these events, Halverson suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), generalized anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder.
From January 2002 through July 2003, Halverson received mental health counseling from Richard Joens, LISW. During this time, Joens assessed Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) 4 scores between 57 and 59. Halverson reported she visited a friend and visited a co-worker at the co-worker’s home. In May 2003, Halverson reported she “hate[d]” her job and the next month shе went shopping as a distraction from the “drudgery” of her job. In July 2003, Halverson stated she was “relieved” to be spending time away from work.
On July 12, 2003, Halverson saw her treating psychiatrist Wesley D. Richardson, D.O., and reported “some” insomnia, but a mental status examination revealed no abnormalities and her mood was “relatively good.” On September 18, 2003, she returned to Dr. Richardson, expressed *926 concern over weight gain, and stated she had joined the gym at work. Halverson stated she “always [felt] dull,” but Dr. Richardson noted she was alert and oriented with “good” grooming, normal speech, and normal thought processes. Dr. Richardson diagnosed generalized anxiety disorder with a GAF score of 60.
On October 1, 2003, Halverson reported being involved in a motor vehicle accident while on her way to a friend’s house after work. She also reported being upset since her pet bird died, and was “stressed out” about her son who was recently released from prison and had been having seizures. On examination, Halverson’s mood was “sad” but she was alert and oriented with “good” grooming, normal speech, and normal thought processes. Dr. Richardson assessed a GAF score of 52.
The next day, Halverson saw Joens and reported she was on leave from work under the Family Medical Leave Act for a month and attempting to qualify for short-term disability payments from her employer. Joens recommended she also apply for Social Security disability benefits. Halverson continued to receive mental health counseling from Joens through April 2006. During this period, Joens assessed GAF scores between 52 and 58.
On March 10, 2004, Halverson began mental health counseling with Alice Harberts, LISW. Harberts noted she “looked very nice,” was “well dressed,” and wearing make-up. Halverson saw Dr. Richardson a few times over the next several weeks, reporting varying moods and motivation levels. Dr. Richardson assessed GAF scores between 55 and 60.
On April 21, 2004, she told Harberts she had “mixed feelings” about applying for Social Security disability benefits. Halverson stated she needed the money but wanted to get better and return to work at “some point.” Harberts noted she was “well groomed” and cooperative.
On July 8, 2004, she reported planning a camping trip with a friend. Halverson also stated she had “reached out” to some of the women who lived by her. Harberts also noted improvement in Halverson’s condition. Three weeks later, Halverson reported joining the YMCA and had an appointment with a personal trainer. Harberts noted Halverson was “well” groomed and goal directed.
On September 27, 2004, she reported financial problems due to overspending. She had gained weight and had to рurchase new clothes. Halverson stated she “always” ran out of money before her next check came and had to ask for loans from a friend. Harberts suggested she find places to “cut back” her spending. In October 2004, Halverson stated she had been denied Social Security disability benefits and reported increased anxiety. She had not gone to the YMCA yet because she did not trust people and did not believe she could be safe around them.
In February 2005, Halverson stated she had recently broken her leg after falling on ice. She described her living situation with her roommate as “horrible.” Harberts noted Halverson was “well” groomed and seemed motivated to make changes once she recovered from her broken leg. Harberts opined her depression and post-traumatic stress disorder prevented her from functioning to full capability.
On July 15, 2005, Halverson stated she was going to Dallas from July 27, 2005, through August 12, 2005. One week later, she indicated she was going to Florida for “several weeks” to see her son. On August 15, 2005, Halverson reported she had just returned from visiting her son in Florida and he had experienced seizures while she was there. In September 2005, Halverson complained she was not handling her money well and had chosen to buy something to make her feel better before *927 paying her bills. She claimed she stayed in hеr room all day and watched television. Harberts noted she was “well” groomed with “good” eye contact, appropriate behavior, a “good” attention span and was “doing ok” in her interactions with others.
On October 31, 2005, Halverson reported she had been in a car accident and it would cost over $2,000 to repair the damage to her car. On February 6, 2006, Halverson stated she owed $30,000 in medical bills related to her leg fracture. She also said the long-term disability insurance from her employer was due to expire in March 2006, and she was waiting to find out whether she would be found eligible for Social Security benefits. On each of these visits, her mood was depressed and anxious but Harberts noted she was “well” groomed with “good” eye contact, her behavior was appropriate, she had a “good” attention span and was “doing ok” in her interactions with others.
On February 9, 2006, Halverson saw Michael Taylor, M.D. Dr. Taylor noted her attire and make-up “border[ed] on the outlandish,” but a mental status examination was “totally within normal limits.” Dr. Taylor indicated Halverson’s subjective complaints were “totally inconsistent” with the mental status examination, and he opined that a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder should be considered. On April 20, 2006, Halverson again saw Dr. Taylor and reported decreased concentration, immediate recall, interest level, and energy level. She also reported moderately increased anxiety. Her mental status examination was within normal limits.
On May 3, 2006, Dr. Taylor completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire indicating Halverson’s current GAF score was 40 and her highest GAF score for the past year was 40. 5 He noted she had difficulty completing daily self-care tasks, rarely left her home, and could not sleep, remember, concentrate, or get along with others. Dr. Taylor opined Halverson was seriously limited but not precluded in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out very short and simple instructions, intеract appropriately with the general public, maintain socially appropriate behavior, adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness, and travel in unfamiliar places. He concluded she was unable to meet competitive standards with respect to her ability to remember work-like procedures, maintain attention for two hour segments, maintain regular attendance, be punctual within customary tolerances, sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision, and make simple work-related decisions, among other job-related tasks she was unable to perform. Dr. Taylor further opined Halverson would be absent from work more than four days per month.
Halverson testified at the administrative hearing held on May 10, 2006, and stated she had major depressive disorder, anxiety, PTSD, and agoraphobia. She further testified she had experienced her mental impairments since childhood and had a history of childhood abuse, resulting in nightmares and flashbacks related to her abuse. Halverson stated she experienced depressive symptoms, including crying spells, a loss of interest in “life,” weight gain, “low” mood and energy level, and feelings of fear and suspicion when around other people. She also stated she experienced racing thoughts and had difficulty with concentration and memory. Halverson testified she experienced anxiety, eon *928 stantly felt tense, was “hypervigilant” and always “watchful.”
Halverson testified she stopped working in September 2003 due to her mental impairments, which resulted in absenteeism, difficulty completing a workday, difficulty getting along with co-workers, and difficulty completing tasks. She reported being terminated from her previous job because she was “overwhelmed” with the amount of work expected of her and she was unable to concentrate and follow changes in work rules. Halverson further stated she engaged in few daily activities other than watching television, listening to music, and doing “minimal” hоusecleaning. She claimed difficulty leaving her house, stayed in her bedroom 24 hours per day unless she had a medical appointment, and lacked the motivation and energy to maintain her personal hygiene.
A vocational expert also testified at the administrative hearing. The ALJ asked the vocational expert to assume a hypothetical claimant of the same age, education and work experience as Halverson who was limited to simple, routine, repetitive work involving no more than superficial interaction with the public and coworkers. The hypothetical claimant could not perform work involving a very fаst mental pace, strict deadlines, directing others, handling emergency situations, or handling complaints. Additionally, the hypothetical claimant could not be closely supervised or have frequent change of instructions. In response, the vocational expert testified the individual would be able to perform the jobs of photo copy machine operator, order caller, document preparer, and table worker.
Following the administrative hearing, the ALJ denied Halverson’s claim for benefits. The ALJ reviewed the medical evidence which both supported and detracted from her claim and concluded she was not disabled frоm performing substantial gainful employment. In particular, the ALJ discounted Dr. Taylor’s functional capacities evaluation because it conflicted with his earlier examinations and those of other mental health professionals who repeatedly reported Halverson’s mental examinations were unremarkable and her demean- or and appearance appropriate. The ALJ also discounted Dr. Taylor’s GAF score of 40 because it conflicted with the numerous GAF scores between 50-60. The ALJ noted a psychological examination by Beverly Westra, Ph.D., which indicated Halverson was markedly limited in her abilities to understand, remember, carry out instructions, maintain regular work attendance, interact with co-workers and the public, etc. Nonetheless, he discounted the report because it was largely based on a written evaluation from one of Halverson’s employers and not Westra’s personal observations. Additionally, the ALJ found some of Halverson’s testimony at the administrative hearing less than credible. For example, Halverson testified she had great difficulty maintaining concentration and focusing her thoughts. At the hearing, however, she testified for an extended period of time, was able to clearly articulate her thoughts, and testified coherently and in considerаble detail. The ALJ also found her complaints of employment related difficulties inconsistent with her ability to travel, visit friends, go shopping, attend frequent medical/mental health appointments, and care for her activities of daily living. Finally, the ALJ concluded her need for money and dislike of the “drudgery” of work suggested Halverson’s application for benefits was partially driven by a desire for secondary gain.
On review of the ALJ’s decision, the district court affirmed the denial of benefits. The district court also held that additional evidence presented to the district court, e.g., her long-term disability insurance claim file, should have been presented *929 to the ALJ and could not be considered for the first time on appeal. Alternatively, the district court concluded the additional information was essentially the same information considered by the ALJ and would not have changed his benefits decision. Halverson timely appealed the district court’s decision.
II
We review de novo a district court’s denial of social security benefits.
Travis v. Astrue, 477
F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir.2007). The court’s task is to determine whether the ALJ’s decision “complies with the relevant legal requirements and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.”
Ford v. Astrue,
Substantial evidence is merely such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Substantial evidence on the record as a whole, however, requires a more scrutinizing analysis. In the review of an administrative decision, the substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Thus, the court must also take into consideration the weight of the evidence in the record and apply a balancing test to evidence which is contradictory.
Heino v. Astrue,
In order to qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act and the accompanying regulations, an individual must be disabled.
Pate-Fires v. Astrue,
A. The ALJ’s Decision to Discount the Treating Physician’s Opinion
Halverson first argues the ALJ did not properly consider the medical evidence from hеr treating psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Taylor. “A treating physician’s opinion is given controlling weight if it ‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [a claimant’s] case record.’ ”
Tilley v. Astrue,
Dr. Taylor diagnosed Halverson with major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and PTSD. According to Dr. Taylor, Halversоn’s prognosis was poor and she was unable to perform a number of job-related tasks essential in the average workplace. Halverson contends the ALJ improperly discounted Dr. Taylor’s opinions when it determined the medical records did not generally support Dr. Taylor’s conclusions. Halverson also asserts the ALJ relied exclusively on the February 2006 office visit, during which Dr. Taylor noted Halverson’s attire and makeup bordered on outlandish, and her mental status examination was “totally inconsistent with her subjective complaints.” Halverson contends this was only the second time she had visited Dr. Taylor, and his assessment of her impairments changed significantly in subsequent visits in March and April 2006 as he came to know her better. Finally, Halverson argues it was inappropriate for the ALJ to strongly rely on Halverson’s GAF scores to discount Dr. Taylor’s opinions.
As recited above, there is considerable medical evidence demonstrating Halverson has moderate limitations resulting from her emotional and psychological problems. While Halverson’s symptoms waxed and waned between appointments, for the most part she was attentive, alert, focused, and appropriate when examined. Indeed, nearly all of her mental status examinations revealed no abnormalities or were inconsistent with her complaints.
Additionally, the ALJ properly explained his bases for discounting the two reports suggesting Halverson would be unable to maintain consistent employment. After evaluating Dr. Taylor’s opinions regarding Halverson’s abilities, the ALJ determined his opinions were not entitled to weight because they were inconsistent with and unsupported by the medical evidence of record, including Dr. Taylor’s own treatment notes.
Travis,
Contrary to the extreme limitations assessed by Dr. Taylor in his Mental Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire, multiple mental status examinations, including examinations performed by Dr. Taylor, revealed no abnormalities, and Halverson was repeatedly noted to be alert and oriented with normal speech and thought processes. See Heino, 578 F.3d 873, 880 (“An ALJ may credit other medical evaluations over that of the treating physician when such other assessments are supported by better or more thorough medical evidence.”). In Dr. Taylor’s February 2006 examination, he noted Halverson’s subjective complaints were “totally inconsistent” with her “normal” mentаl status examination. Similarly, in April 2006, Dr. Taylor determined Halverson’s mental status was within normal limits despite her reports of increased anxiety and decreased concentration, immediate recall, interest level, and energy level.
Additionally, Dr. Taylor’s functional capacities assessment indicated a GAF score of 40, but dozens of earlier examinations over a period of years indicated GAF scores between 52 and 60. While Halverson correctly states the Commissioner has declined to endorse the GAF scale for “use in the Social Security and SSI disability
*931
programs,”
see
65 Fed.Reg. 50746, 50764-65,
In
Pate-Fires,
the claimant’s total GAF score history indicated she was above 50 only four out of twenty-one times in a six-year period.
Pate-Fires,
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said there is not substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.
Travis,
B. The ALJ’s Credibility Determinations
We next address Halverson’s claim the ALJ erred in assessing her credibility. We set forth the standard courts should follow when evaluating subjective complaints in
Polaski v. Heckler,
In this case, the ALJ weighed the
Polaski
factors and concluded Halverson’s allegations were not fully credible for a number of reasons. “If an ALJ explicitly discredits the claimant’s testimony and gives good reason for doing so, we will normally defer to the ALJ’s credibility determination.”
Juszczyk,
First, the ALJ concluded Halverson’s actual activities demonstrated in the record were inconsistent with her allegations of disability. In her intake questionnaire completed as part of the disability application process, Halverson stated she was able to take care of her own personal needs and grooming, care for a pet, prepare her own meals, do laundry, change sheets, clean her house, iron clothing, vacuum, wash dishes, drive her car, run errands, go out alone, take out trash, wash her ear, go shopping, manage her finances, watch television, and read occasional self-help books. The ALJ found these statements, combined with the statements she made to mental health care providers, demonstrated her ability to engage in a normal range of daily activities inconsistent with her statement of disability. Additionally, according to the ALJ, other statements suggested alternative motives on Halverson’s part, such as her statement she viewed her job as “drudgery” and her acknowledgment that difficulties in her social relationships were part of the reason she missed work frequently.
“We have held that acts which are inconsistent with a claimant’s assertion of disability reflect negatively upon that claimant’s credibility.”
Heino,
The ALJ also considered other inconsistencies in the record as a whole which undermined Halverson’s credibility.
Van Vickle v. Astrue,
The ALJ concluded the medical records did not support Halverson’s allegations of disability. The ALJ concluded her allegations concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were inconsistent with some of the medical evidence of record. Despite hеr claimed inability to work, multiple examinations demonstrated no abnormalities, and she repeatedly appeared alert and oriented with normal speech and thought processes. She also behaved appropriately in her interactions with others. Halverson contends the ALJ failed to take into account favorable evidence regarding her credibility, such as her consistent medical treatment over four years and her consistent use of medication. While this evidence is certainly consistent with debilitating symptoms, we cannot say the ALJ’s credibility determination was unsupported in light of the objective medical evidence in the record as a whole.
Juszczyk,
Based on the ALJ’s evaluation of Halverson’s daily activities, the objective medical evidence, and other inconsistencies in the record as a whole, we will not disturb the ALJ’s decision to discredit, in part, Halverson’s subjective complaints.
C. The ALJ’s Rejection of Halverson’s Supplemental Evidence
Finally, we address Halverson’s argument the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record by obtaining medical evidence of her work-related limitations. Halverson contends the ALJ should have further develоped the record to determine the degree to which her impairments limited her ability to engage in work-related activities after the ALJ discredited Dr. Taylor’s opinion. Specifically, Halverson suggests the ALJ should have either ordered a consultative evaluation or obtained records related to her private long-term disability insurance benefits she presented at the district court.
“A disability claimant is entitled to a ‘full and fair hearing’ under the Social Security Act.”
Hepp v. Astrue,
Halverson’s suggestion regarding her private long-term disability insurance
*934
file similarly fails because, although the ALJ is required to fairly and fully develop the recоrd, “he is not obliged to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the application for benefits and not offered at the hearing as a basis for disability.”
Mouser,
We сonclude there was substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the ALJ’s denial of disability insurance benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Notes
. The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.
. Agoraphobia is a condition where the sufferer becomes anxious in unfamiliar environments where she perceives she has little control. Triggers for this anxiety may include wide open spaces, crowds, or traveling (even short distances). Agoraphobia is often, but not always, compounded by a fear of social embarrassment, as the agoraphobic fears the onset of a paniс attack and appearing distraught in public.
.The GAF is a numeric scale ranging from zero to one hundred used to rate social, occupational and psychological functioning "on a hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness." See American Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32-34 (4th ed. 2000) (DSM-IV). A GAF of 51 through 60 is characterized by moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or coworkers). Id. at 34.
. A GAF of 31 through 40 is characterized by some impairment in reality testing or communication or major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood. See DSM-IV at 34.