Vladimir Halupa (“husband”) appeals from a decree of dissolution of marriage. He challenges the trial court’s award of retroactive child support, the award of maintenance to wife, the division of marital assets, and the court’s award of attorney fees to wife. We reverse and remand the maintenance award and the award of retroactive child support, and affirm the remainder of the judgment.
Husband and Hilda Ann Halupa (“wife”) were married on November 14, 1970. One child, Helena, was born of the marriage on November 6, 1973. At the time of trial, Helena was 22 years old and attending pharmacy school.
Wife filed her Petition for Dissolution of Marriage on April 20, 1995. In her petition, wife requested that the trial court award her maintenance, attorney’s fees, child support, and distribute the marital property. Wife also filed with her petition a motion pendente lite for temporary maintenance and child support. On November 16, 1995, wife filed an amended petition requesting that the court award her retroactive child support to May 1, 1995, the date of service of her original petition.
Trial began on November 21, 1995. Wife testified that she had been married to husband for approximately 25 years. She was 52 years old at the time of trial. Husband and wife separated from each other on or about January 1, 1995. Wife stated that her marriage was irretrievably broken because her husband had extramarital affairs during the course of their marriage. She testified that husband was currently having an affair with a neighbor woman with whom he now lived. Wife further testified that husband had an alcohol problem and that he had gambling debts. According to wife, husband had borrowed against marital assets without her consent to pay his gambling debts.
Wife worked as a manager of computer operations and earned approximately $37,000 per year. She requested that the trial court award her the marital residence and the adjoining lot. Wife also requested that the trial court award her maintenance because she wanted to maintain the same lifestyle she
At the time of trial, husband was 46 years old. Husband worked for over 16 years at Anheuser Busch as a maintenance machinist. Based upon husband’s tax returns admitted into evidence, husband earned $51,786.81 for 1992, $62,379.75 for 1993, and $60,315.81 for 1994. Husband testified that he earned less than $62,000 in 1995 because he was experiencing problems with his knees. Additionally, husband receives $170 a month from the Veteran’s Administration for a military related injury.
Husband denied having any extramarital affairs. He testified that he was not having an affair with the next door neighbor, but was only renting a room from the neighbor since he had no other place to live after the separation. According to husband, he was paying the neighbor $400 a month for rent. Husband admitted that he had lost up to $25,000 gambling in the past and had recently borrowed against the company stock plan to pay some of his gambling debts.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court requested that the parties submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court also requested that each side submit a proposed decree.
The trial court entered its judgment and decree dissolving the marriage on December 15, 1995. The court awarded wife $5,321.83 in retroactive child support pursuant to Rule 88.01 and awarded wife maintenance in the amount of $750 per month retroactive to May 1, 1995. In dividing the marital property, the court awarded wife the marital home and the adjoining lot. Husband was awarded a lot located near a lake and other property. Husband was ordered to pay $3,000 of wife’s attorney’s fees.
Husband filed a motion for a new trial. On February 27, 1996, the trial court issued an amended judgment nunc pro tunc. The trial court’s amended judgment stated: 1) husband was responsible for paying the $7,000 loan secured by wife’s car to the lien-holder; 2) wife’s deferred compensation plan was awarded to her as her separate property; and, 3) a painting from husband’s deceased mother was awarded to husband as his separate property. In all other respects, the original judgment remained in effect. This appeal follows. 1
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s decree in a court-tried case must be affirmed on appeal unless there is no substantial evidence to support the decision, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.
Mehra v. Mehra,
B. RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORT
In his first point father argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding wife retroactive child support because no request was made for retroactive child support until after the child was emancipated. According to father, once the child turned 22, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to make such a retroactive award. We disagree.
Section 452.340.1 RSMo 1994
2
authorizes the trial court to award retroactive child support to the date of filing of the petition.
Price v. Price,
the child is enrolled in an institution of vocational or higher education not later than October first following graduation from a secondary school and so long as the child continues to attend such institution of vocational or higher education, the parental support obligation shall continue until the child completes his education, or until the child reaches the age of twenty-two, whichever first occurs.
§ 462.340.5, RSMo 1994.
In its decree, the trial court found the child to be emancipated, and therefore, did not award custody, visitation or current child support to wife. The court, however, found that the child was not emancipated for the period from January 1, 1996, through November 5, 1995, and that husband did not contribute to the child’s support during this period. The court awarded wife $863.00 per month in child support from May 1,1995 (the date of service upon husband) to the date of the child’s emancipation, November 6, 1995. Wife was awarded a total of $5,321.83 in retroactive child support.
Father contends that the trial court was without jurisdiction since Mother did not amend her petition requesting retroactive child support until November 16, 1995, ten days after child turned 22 years old. The retroactive award, however, was made only for the period of time that the child was not emancipated. The trial court did not award wife any child support beyond the child’s 22nd birthday. Furthermore, the trial court stated that the parties had agreed to have wife’s pendente lite motion tried by the court with the dissolution action and without any precedent being established that wife was not entitled to child support and maintenance prior to the trial date. Additionally, wife’s request for retroactive child support in her amended petition relates back to her original petition.
See Koerper & Co. v. Unitel International, Inc.,
Child was not emancipated when wife filed her petition for dissolution.
Cf. Thomas v. Thomas,
The trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction nor abuse its discretion by awarding-wife retroactive child support. Point one is denied.
In his second point, husband contends the trial court erred in awarding retroactive child support because: 1) wife presented no evidence to support her request for child support; 2) wife’s Form 14 was not submitted to the court until after trial and was not part of the evidence; and, 3) the court did not specify how it calculated the amount awarded. Since husband’s first subpoint is dispositive, we do not address his second and third subpoints.
The record on appeal does not disclose any evidence to support wife’s request for retroactive child support. Although wife testified in a general statement that she had paid the child’s expenses during the period of separation, there was no evidence adduced as to the specific expenses she incurred while providing for the child’s needs. A court may not award child support unless there is sufficient evidence adduced as to the cost of providing such needs.
Gambino v. Gambino,
Furthermore, wife’s income and expense statement was not offered nor received into evidence, and was, therefore, not properly before the trial court.
Ramsdell v. Ramsdell,
Because there is insufficient evidence to support the award of retroactive child support, we reverse and remand for reconsideration wife’s request for retroactive child support.
C. MAINTENANCE
In his third point, husband contends the trial court erred in awarding wife maintenance because she was able to meet her reasonable needs through appropriate em
The trial court is vested with considerable discretion in granting maintenance orders.
Vehlewald v. Vehlewald,
Under § 452.335.1, a spouse seeking maintenance must meet a two-part threshold test: the spouse must demonstrate that he or she 1) lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him or her, to provide for his or her reasonable needs; and 2) is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment.
Hileman v. Hileman,
Wife alleged that there was a $1,100 deficiency between her income and her expenses. At the dissolution hearing, wife requested $1,000 in maintenance. A mere request for maintenance, however, is insufficient to support a maintenance award.
Cunningham v. Cunningham,
Based on the evidence adduced at trial, wife did not prove that her earnings were insufficient to meet her reasonable needs to be entitled to maintenance. As with the retroactive child support award, the maintenance award must also be reversed and remanded for reconsideration.
D. DIVISION OF ASSETS
In his fourth point, husband contends the trial court erred in awarding wife 80% of the marital property. Husband argues that the trial court only considered his alleged marital misconduct in dividing the marital property.
Under § 452.330, the trial court is required to “divide the marital property as the court deems just after considering all the relevant factors ...” The court is not required to make an equal division, only an equitable division.
Zlatic v. Zlatic,
Sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s division of marital property in this case. Despite husband’s contention that the trial court only considered evidence of husband’s marital misconduct, the court found that husband had not only engaged in extramarital affairs, but had also dissipated marital assets to pay gambling debts, and had a greater income as well. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court failed to consider the factors set forth in § 452.330 in awarding the marital property. Based on the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion. Point four is denied.
In his fifth point, husband contends the trial court erred in determining that wife’s deferred compensation plan was her separate property because the compensation
Wife began the deferred compensation plan approximately three months before trial. Wife testified that she placed approximately $150 per month in the deferred compensation plan. The value of the deferred compensation plan at trial was approximately $450.
In its original decree and judgment, the trial court omitted the deferred compensation plan from its disposition. In its amended judgment of February 27, 1996, the trial court stated that “[wife’s] deferred compensation plan through her employment at the City of St. Louis Circuit Attorney’s Office is hereby awarded to [wife] as her separate property.”
Wife argues that husband has mischarac-terized the nature of the trial court’s amended judgment. According to wife, the trial court did not set aside or designate the deferred compensation plan as her separate property, but merely awarded the deferred compensation plan to her as part of the division of property. We agree. Although not completely clear, the trial court’s amended judgment did not designate the deferred compensation plan as non-marital or separate property. We find husband’s argument without merit.
Even if the court had erroneously classified the deferred compensation plan as separate property, not every error in classifying property is necessarily prejudicial error.
Stephens v. Stephens,
Given the relative insignificant value of the deferred compensation plan as compared to the entire marital estate, we do not see how husband was prejudiced by the trial court’s alleged mischaracterization of the deferred compensation plan as separate property. 3 Point five is denied.
E. ATTORNEY’S FEES
In his sixth and final point, husband contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to wife’s counsel because wife was awarded assets and is gainfully employed. In essence, husband contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees because wife had the ability to pay them.
Section 452.355.1 provides that the trial court may award a party his or her attorney’s fees after considering all relevant factors.
In re Marriage of Kovach,
In the instant case, there was evidence that husband earned approximately twice the income of wife. A spouse’s greater ability to pay is sufficient to support an award of attorney’s fees to the other spouse.
Meservey v. Meservey,
Husband also appears to argue that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was erroneous because unless “very unusual circumstances exist”, each party should pay their own attorney’s fees. Husband contends that “very unusual circumstances” do not exist in this case. The “very unusual circumstances” standard, however, is not applicable in domestic relations cases under § 452.355.1.
Leone v. Leone,
Evidence was presented that wife’s attorney fees were approximately $4,000. We are unable to find, based upon the record, that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding wife $3,000 in attorney fees. Point six is denied.
The portion of the judgment awarding wife $750 per month in maintenance and the award of retroactive child support is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Notes
. Wife’s motion to dismiss husband’s appeal based upon noncompliance with Rule 84.04(b) is denied.
. All citations are to the 1994 Revised Statutes of Missouri unless otherwise indicated.
. We also note that in husband’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, husband proposed that wife's deferred compensation plan be awarded to her.