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Haltom Oil Company (Formerly Haltom-Murphy, Inc.) v. Phillips Petroleum Company
304 F.2d 95
5th Cir.
1962
Check Treatment

*1 (formerly Hal OIL COMPANY HALTOM Appellant, tom-Murphy, Inc.), COMPANY,

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM Appellee.

Fifth Circuit. Kultgen Kultgen Beard, D. & B. Beard, Waco, Tex., appellant. Rehearing July Denied Muldrow, Howell, Hilton S. E. Louis Chase, Howell,

and Ñaman Smith Tex., Waco, appellee. HUTCHESON, Before BELL, Judges. Circuit Judge. BELL, B. GRIFFIN appeal is the dismissal of This complaint alleging from breach of contract ground the terms were clear sustain, unambiguous and not the contention of producer is a and manufac- petroleum appel- products turer jobber Phillips products lant was the Phillips purchased in Waco area. group storage of stations a bulk plant in Waco Arkansas Fuel Com- pany jobber after became in turn leased the stations sold the plant bulk appellant. Appellant operat- stations to both the wholesale and retail level gasoline products, making in the sale of owned, sales from stations it from others leased from and from other owned third Appellant paid Phillips $33,358.06 for being $3,358.06 in cash with the balance being represented by in the amount of which note was mortgage. year secured About a parties thereafter decided to termi- relationship nate their and entered into containing here paragraphs numbered with the first stating mutually agreements all contracts and between arising jobber out of the relation- *2 price property of of and the form chase this ship. was contract added.)” equipment. (Emphasis by writ- and letter, prepared a Phillips. by appellant to ten closings Prior to the the various under dispute to a arose as the indi contract A paragraph. Appellant of this substantive cates that each Phillips pay it contended that $30,000 was to and distinct independent in addition to the bal- aspect the of each covered some ance due the in the on note amount para relationship. We need set out $22,247.53. Phillips position took the paragraph two three verbatim that the balance due it on the note was provid and dealt with certain to be set off or credited the disposition and consid for their it and these Paragraph dis four eration therefor. contentions make issue here. option con posed over an Paragraph only portion three is the agreement. Par of the entire sideration dealing of the entire contract repur obligated Phillips to five properties transaction, Fuel sold to theretofore chase merchandise and is and within Paragraph a six concerned itself. The last or cancellation sentence required appellant to paint and contract in the is: Petrole- Phillips painting the cost reimburse Company um pro Paragraph seven certain stations. covering Haltom-Murphy, purchase Inc.’s by appellant Phil to for vided price property equipment.” this lips past due rentals. Then We must decide whether this sentence agreed pay eight appellant to relates, Phillips contends, as other prior Phillips or due on all indebtedness provisions which have three instruments in execution properties to do with the covered entire Para volved promissory mortgage note and subject graph three, the matter of this Phillips and for which total a controversy provided: $30,000 repur- as "(3) Phillips Company Petroleum price, chase or whether relates to the conveyed sold and has heretofore appellant as contends. Haltom-Murphy, Inc., a bulk sta- personal property Under the first alternative there certain purchase price of is no The total consideration $30,000 was to with which covered being part security note and various If, including consideration. Deed of that hand, ments of Trust and Mortgage. applies properties to the entire Chattel These To equipment are known and parties adopt prop- contention of makes disregard erty equipment. Phillips Petro- purchase leum to Murphy, Haltom- put Inc., or We cannot a total considera- three. aside ignore property these words and thus the contract said light subject any equipment construed in them. must be downward adjustment v. Petrolite pursuant Oil to an Pure inven- Cir., tory 158 F.2d 503. Neither can we For existence. parties agree as we would purposes, add these do make read oil use the industries code Phillips was to cash and of market value determination the note in Harrison v. properties addition. are unaccount- cancel which Fortlage, Compa- U.S. S.Ct. ed for. Ry. 616; Chicago, P. R. I. ny agrees L.Ed. Co. said note cov- Casualty Co., Cir., Maryland ering Haltom-Murphy, Inc.’s Contracts, Am.Jur., Option claim to Purchase 75 F.2d Furthermore, apply can- 14th Austin in Waco- Texas, is as the whole of the consideration cellation sentence to *3 ambiguity agreement.” is this entire Thus would be agraph create eight provides will reasonable that that to conclude op- question may debts to in all its also abe posite of the cancellation of the consideration for this entire agreement” the entire con- This would and have clause. render no relation to ambiguous price put tract whereas paragraph para- Fuel graph cancellation sentence in paragraph specific am- leaves that No. In the three biguity absence language resolving uncertainty, as well. I anything do not see how the issue can be ambiguity appearing in con- No ambiguous. appearing tract and no other error judgment is ambiguity This basic on the allocation augmented analy Affirmed. very language sis of the question— that Judge (dissenting). ** If no men majority has concluded that made, the note had been then unambiguous question be- (whereby 8No. Haltom-Mur- 1) in- cause: “A of the contract phy agreed outstanding all indebt dicates that each substantive edness) paid that it be and distinct in that each off. appellee’s interpretation Since the separate aspect covered some of the rela- of the cancellation does no more 2) tionship”, to rule that require payment than by offsetting the chase-price note should cancelled in against ap note pear it would addition specified agreement 3 No. would be surplusage. If, hand, note is on the other $52,- of” create agreement the added to “cancel” were 247.53—a press language ex- result conflict with the intending discharge construed as of the paragraph. of that note without substantial mean since this conclusion rests ing would attach. upon unsupported as- mistaken Moreover, use of the word “cancel” sumption that, because each specially lends itself to such a construc dealt with a distinct rela- law, tion. Under Texas a contract to tionship parties, between the the consid- giving be construed technical words their agreement frag- eration for the also meaning. Magnolia Warehouse distinctly mentized and paragraph. allocated each Storage Blackwell, Co. v. Davis & assumption Such an seems (1917); Tex. S.W. Frost contrary to the whole nature of the Martin, 72 (Tex.Civ.App. S.W. agreement. For, as stated in 1918). Under Article of the Texas No. Statutes, Civil “intentional cancellation a mutual termination of all contractual thereof the holder” is one of the relations between the Thus no negotiable paragraph may one be considered to instrument. The most defini completely independent stand as if the tion of “cancellation” a Texas court willing carry would be it out Hickox, is to found Hickox v. paragraphs; the absence the other (Tex.Civ.App. S.W.2d 917-918 and the consideration for 1941), where the court said: graph must be looked at in terms of fact, whole In “We have been unable to find a specifically implies satisfactory No. 4 so when definition of the term Haltom-Murphy’s states ‘cancellation,’ release used statute. might negotiable No. be offset Cancellation in- act is manifestation thereto tention with reference ambiguous I think that the contract legal aas render same inefficacious and that evidence is needed resolve the manifesting obligation. This act respectfully I therefore dis- may several take intention sent. forms; instance, the surrender obligor, the the instrument signature obli- erasure of the instrument, gor, destruction *4 marking It of same cancelled. or the that a is not supported a consideration. 475, p. Notes, C.J.S., Bills and 1036.” “can- Most states seem GRUMMITT, minors, Dennis and David abrogation

cellation” means friend, father their and next William remaining un- Grummitt, the contract Grummitt, duties J. and William J. Plaintiffs-Appeliants, Drilling v. performed, M. Co. M. F. & Co., 372, P.2d 192 Okl. & T. Oil v. Hampton Credit Commercial v. STURGEON WINTER BAY SPORTS 270, 476, and some 176 P.2d 119 Mont. BAY, CLUB OF STURGEON WISCON say gone SIN, George that “can- Resch, John so far as Purvis in dividually Sturgeon Bay Win d/b/a inconsistent with cellation” is Wisconsin, Sports Sturgeon Bay, ter Club of Ex’r., 383, 107 Va. v. Gibson’s Brown dants-Appellees. Defen clear, appear It 386. would S.E. then, that “cancellation” discharge some indicate often used to monetary than full satisfac- Seventh Circuit. here, intend- if the 1962. the note ed to for the entire consideration would then “cancellation” appropriate term to use. most appellant's interpretation of Since making agreement not avoids question surplusage but language used, accounts that, help but conclude at the reasonably least, very meaning.1 susceptible to more than ap- appellee also claims that interpretation pellant’s contract- “for to read However, cash.” “payment of language actually perfectly used is appellee’s view that consistent referred to the indebtedness “* * * clearly meaning one reasonable if after established ambiguous.” emerges interpretation Universal is not rules Daniel, Corp. reasonably susceptible 150 Tex. more Credit C.I.T. remains ambiguous, 243 S.W.2d if than one

Case Details

Case Name: Haltom Oil Company (Formerly Haltom-Murphy, Inc.) v. Phillips Petroleum Company
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Jul 23, 1962
Citation: 304 F.2d 95
Docket Number: 19357
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
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