{¶ 2} The subject matter of the underlying case pertains to the present ownership of a portion of Watt Street in the City of Youngstown, Ohio. As it was originally constructed, Watt Street ran essentially in a northerly direction from Federal Street to Wood Street. At some point in the 1990's, the southern path of the street was altered and a new curve was built so that the southern segment of the street intersected with Commerce Street, instead of Federal Street. As a result of this new configuration, a substantial portion of the old roadway for Watt Street was basically abandoned and not used for any traffic. After approximately ten years, the City of Youngstown enacted an ordinance which vacated a section of the abandoned roadway. At the present time, appellant owns a city lot which abuts the vacated section of Watt Street.
{¶ 3} As part of the underlying case, the parties were able to stipulate concerning the authenticity of certain documents which showed the development of Watt Street and the surrounding parcels of land. These documents indicate that, as of 1830, the property which would eventually constitute Watt Street belonged to the Estate of John Longridge. By 1840, a survey of the northeastern section of the land in question showed the creation of an unnamed roadway between Federal Street and Wood Street. By 1860, a new survey established that the new roadway had been officially named "Watt" Street. At that time, the street was only thirty-three feet wide.
{¶ 4} During the 1920's, the City of Youngstown began to take steps to widen Watt Street so that it could accommodate additional traffic. In furtherance of this *3 project, the City acquired a number of small tracts of land which abutted the eastern border of the original roadway. Although one of the tracts was dedicated to the City for the purpose of widening the roadway and creating a separate alleyway, the majority of the tracts were obtained through the appropriation of the land from the private owners of the abutting lots. For example, in July 1928, the City appropriated from the Realty Company and the Liebman Swaney Realty Company a parcel which was twenty-seven feet wide and approximately one hundred eighty-eight feet long. This process of acquiring new land and widening the roadway continued until the 1970's. By that point, the width of Watt Street had been increased to at least sixty feet throughout its entire path between Federal Street and Wood Street.
{¶ 5} As was noted above, the City of Youngstown stopped using a segment of Watt Street when it constructed a new southern ending for the roadway in the early 1990's. After the "old" southern ending had lain dormant for ten years, the City became involved in negotiations with Ohio One Corporation to further develop the general area adjacent to the northern segment of Watt Street. As part of its plan to bring nearly two hundred new jobs to a local hospital, Ohio One Corporation indicated its desire to build a new parking lot in the vicinity of Watt Street. Ultimately, the City agreed to sell certain property to Ohio One Corporation which included a portion of the "abandoned" segment of Watt Street.
{¶ 6} In July 2003, the Youngstown City Council passed Ordinance 03-128 for the sole purpose of vacating a segment of the "original" Watt Street under R.C.
{¶ 7} Approximately two months after the enactment of the ordinance, the City's Board of Control executed a quit claim deed under which it granted or sold certain property to Ohio One Corporation for the sum of one dollar. Included in this property was the part of the abandoned roadway which had previously been vacated. In addition to the deed, the City entered into a written agreement which gave Ohio One Corporation a license to use other municipal property. This land included a portion of the abandoned roadway which had not been vacated.
{¶ 8} At the time the quit claim deed was signed, Youngstown City Lot No. 62182 was owned by Summit Securities, Inc., an Idaho corporation. This specific lot was located at the old intersection of Watt Street and Federal Street; as a result, the western border of the lot abutted the abandoned segment of Watt Street, including a significant portion of the area of the old roadway which had been vacated. In late November 2003, almost three months following the execution of the quit claim deed, Summit Securities sold its entire interest in the lot to appellant.
{¶ 9} In June 2004, appellant initiated the underlying civil action against appellees, the City of Youngstown and Ohio One Corporation, Inc. As the basis for his sole claim for relief, appellant alleged that the purported conveyance of the vacated segment of Watt Street was legally void because the City did not have the authority to sell the land once the vacation had been completed. Specifically, appellant stated that, pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 10} After the City and Ohio One Corporation had submitted their respective answers to the complaint, the parties filed their joint stipulation concerning the trial court's review of certain documents pertaining to their dispute. In essence, the parties stipulated as to the authenticity of forty-two documents which were attached to their submissions. The documents related to such matters as the chain of title to the various lots abutting Watt Street throughout its history, the manner in which the City had obtained the underlying land for the street, and the manner in which the City had conveyed the vacated roadway to Ohio One Corporation.
{¶ 11} In light of the joint stipulation and the accompanying documents, the parties then submitted cross-motions for summary judgment. In his motion, appellant sought partial summary judgment on the limited issue of whether he was entitled to ownership of one-half of the vacated roadway under R.C.
{¶ 12} The matter was referred to a court magistrate for consideration of the motions for summary judgment. Upon reviewing the stipulated documents and the *6
arguments of the three parties, the magistrate issued a three-page decision in which he concluded that the City of Youngstown and Ohio One Corporation were entitled to prevail on the final merits of appellant's declaratory judgment claim. As the basis for the judgment, the magistrate held that R.C.
{¶ 13} Within fourteen days of the issuance of the magistrate's decision, appellant filed written objections to his determination. In addition to contesting the magistrate's holding on the "dedication" issue, appellant asserted that, regardless of the manner in which the City had acquired the land for the vacated roadway, R.C.
{¶ 14} Upon conducting an oral hearing on the matter, the trial court rendered its own judgment in which it overruled the objections and adopted the magistrate's decision. In setting forth its determination, the trial court did not provide any separate analysis of the issues raised by appellant; instead, the court merely quoted the entire discussion of the magistrate. In light of the magistrate's recommendation, the court *7 entered judgment for the City and Ohio One Corporation as to the entire complaint against them.
{¶ 15} In now appealing the foregoing judgment, appellant has raised the following as error:
{¶ 16} "[1.] The trial court erred by failing to declare the appellant to be the owner in fee title to the easterly one-half of Watt Street when the street was vacated by the City of Youngstown, Ohio.
{¶ 17} "[2.] The trial court erred by failing to preserve the rights of access belonging to the appellant to cross the vacated portion of Watt Street in order to reach his property."
{¶ 18} In his first assignment, appellant has submitted three separate arguments for our consideration. Under the first argument, appellant seeks to challenge the merits of the magistrate's analysis concerning the application of R.C.
{¶ 19} In support of this particular point, appellant references a written statement of an estate trustee which was attached to an 1860 survey of the general area in question. A review of this document, which the parties labeled Exhibit 4 of their *8 stipulation, shows that it does refer to the location of certain "dedicated" streets in the area. However, our review also indicates that, although the survey lists Watt Street as an existing roadway at that time, the written statement of the trustees does not include Watt Street as one of the "dedicated" roads in the City. To that extent, this court holds that Exhibit 4 is not legally sufficient to establish the elements of a proper dedication of land for use as a public roadway.
{¶ 20} In relation to the "dedication" point, this court would further note that appellant's present argument is different than the assertions which his counsel made to the trial court during the oral arguments on the objections to the magistrate's decision. At that time, counsel had indicated that he had been unable to locate any document from the 1800's in which the original owner of the subject land had expressly stated that he was dedicating the property to the municipality for use as a public roadway. Nevertheless, counsel still maintained that a proper dedication of the original thirty-three foot wide roadway could be inferred from the fact that the underlying land has always belonged to a private owner before Watt Street was first recognized on a survey of the area.
{¶ 21} Even though counsel's argument before the trial court was somewhat logical, it was not consistent with the limited case law concerning the elements for the dedication of land under the common law. In Becker v. Youngtown (1936),
{¶ 22} As an aside, this court would again emphasize that, regardless of the manner in which the land for the original "thirty-three foot" portion of Watt Street was obtained, the stipulated documents readily showed that the additional land used to widen the vacated segment of the roadway was acquired solely through the process of appropriation. In addition, the documents showed that appellant's lot abuts only that side of the vacated segment situated on appropriated land. Under such circumstances, we fail to see how the fact that the original thirty-three feet of the roadway's width may have been acquired through dedication would be relevant to determining whether appellant is entitled to own one-half of the vacated segment. Stated differently, if his entitlement to the land does turn upon the exact manner in which it was obtained by the City, it is simply illogical that the alleged dedication of the original thirty-three feet would apply to him when he abuts the part of Watt Street which was taken through eminent domain.
{¶ 23} Under the second aspect of his first argument, appellant alternatively asserts that the manner in which the City took possession of the subject property should not be the controlling factor in deciding if he now has an interest in one-half of the land. That is, he maintains that whenever a municipality vacates the status of any roadway as a public street, it does not retain any interest in the underlying land which it can convey *10 or sell to a private entity. According to appellant, regardless of the manner in which the land was initially acquired, the act of vacating the street's official status automatically causes the ownership of the land to go to the abutting property owners.
{¶ 24} In support of this position, appellant relies upon two legal authorities. The first is R.C.
{¶ 25} "The order of a legislative authority of a municipal corporation vacating or narrowing a street or alley which has been dedicated to public use by the proprietor thereof, shall, to the extent to which it is vacated or narrowed, operate as a revocation of the acceptance thereof by the legislative authority, but the right of way and easement therein of any lot owner shall not be impaired by such order."
{¶ 26} In interpreting R.C.
{¶ 27} The second authority cited by appellant is the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. Carpenter (1976),
{¶ 28} In upholding the trial court's decision that all of the landowners were entitled to one-half of the underlying land, theTaylor court expressly rejected the contention that the successor in title to the original dedicator of the alleyway had a superior interest in the land. Instead, the Supreme Court held that each of the abutting landowners had an identical interest in the land. As the basis for this holding, the Taylor court emphasized that this interest arose from the necessity that each abutting landowner have the ability to come and go from her respective property. At the end of its opinion, theTaylor court summarized its conclusion in the following manner:
{¶ 29} "* * * Therefore, upon vacation of an alley by a city, abutting lot owners, as to that portion of the alley abutting their properties, are vested with a fee simple interest in one-half of the width of the strip of land which formerly comprised the alley, irrespective of the fact that the original owner and dedicator of the land was not the predecessor in title to all such abutting lot owners; subject, however, to those rights which other owners may have in the alley as a necessary means of access to their properties." Id. at 142-143.
{¶ 30} Our review of the Taylor decision indicates that the fact that the underlying land had been dedicated by a private owner was not a controlling factor in the legal analysis; i.e., the Supreme Court never stated that its analysis of the parties' legal rights *12 would have been different if the subject land had been appropriated by the municipality. On the other hand, it cannot be disputed that theTaylor court never considered the issue of whether it would have reached a different conclusion if the subject land had been taken by appropriation, as compared to dedication. As to this point, we would further note that
{¶ 31} Appellees have established that each of the prior cases cited in the Taylor opinion also involved situations where the underlying land had been dedicated. Similarly, we would note that the Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to consider whether the Taylor holding is applicable when the subject land was appropriated. Hence, for the foregoing reasons, this court rejects appellant's contention that theTaylor holding dictates the outcome in the instant matter.
{¶ 32} In regard to R.C.
{¶ 33} As to the foregoing point, we would also indicate that the prior versions of R.C.
{¶ 34} As a final point, this court would emphasize that the limited application of R.C.
{¶ 35} In contrast, when real property has been acquired through the power of eminent domain, the municipality has had to pay the prior owner certain funds in order to obtain its interest. Accordingly, it has been held that when a proper use of the land existed at the time of the taking, a municipality has the latent ability to sell the property when the land can no longer serve that purpose. See State ex rel. Thomson v.Giessel (Wisc., 1953),
{¶ 36} In the instant case, our review of the parties' stipulated documents shows that, in regard to the portion of Watt Street which was vacated by the City Ordinance, there was no evidence indicating that any of the subject land had been dedicated for *14
purposes of the street. However, those documents do unequivocally show that, as to the vacated area, the City of Youngstown did obtain a fee simple interest when it appropriated the additional lands for the purpose of widening Watt Street. In light of such facts, this court holds that appellant was not entitled to one-half ownership of the vacated area abutting his property because R.C.
{¶ 37} Pursuant to the foregoing analysis, the trial court did not err in concluding that appellees, the City of Youngstown and Ohio One Corporation, were entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether appellant had any legal interest in the vacated area of Watt Street. Specifically, our review of the evidentiary materials demonstrates that: (1) there were no genuine issues of material fact remaining to be litigated in relation to that issue; (2) appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that issue; and (3) the state of the evidentiary materials were such that, even when they were construed in a manner most favorable to appellant, a reasonable person could only reach a final conclusion which is adverse to him. See Civ.R. 56(C). Therefore, the first argument under appellant's first assignment is without merit.
{¶ 38} Under the second and third arguments of his first assignment, appellant argues that, once the City of Youngstown had passed the "vacation" ordinance, it failed to follow the proper procedure for conveying municipal property. Citing R.C.
{¶ 39} A review of the trial record indicates that appellant asserted his "procedural" arguments as part of his reply to the City's and Ohio One Corporation's respective motions for summary judgment. Despite this, the court magistrate never made a ruling on these particular points as part of his written decision. Similarly, the trial court's final judgment in the case did not contain any reference to the final merits of these particular points. Moreover, the trial court did not review the merits of the City's position that it was not required to follow the statutory procedure because its own City Charter had provisions governing the sale of municipal property.
{¶ 40} In most instances, when a trial court has failed to render a decision on a pending motion or issue, this court typically presumes that the trial court implicitly made a ruling consistent with its final judgment; based upon this, the actual merits of the matter are then addressed. See Scott v. Falcon Transport Co., 7th Dist. No. 02 CA 145,
{¶ 41} Therefore, as to appellant's first argument under his first assignment, we uphold the judgment of the trial court. Nevertheless, since a remand is warranted as to his second and third arguments, we ultimately conclude that his first assignment has merit to that extent.
{¶ 42} Under his second assignment, appellant submits that the trial court erred in not rendering a determination as to whether he had a separate right to continuing access to his property across the vacated segment of Watt Street. Appellant contends that, even if he is not entitled to be declared the owner of one-half of the vacated area, Ohio law still requires that he be granted an easement so that he would have the same ability to access his land as he did prior to the act of vacation. In support of his position on this issue, appellant maintains that, even though he does have some access to his property from Federal Street, it is still incumbent that he be awarded separate access across the vacated street because certain trucks can only make deliveries to his building through the side of his property.
{¶ 43} As was noted above, appellant specifically alleged in his complaint that the City's vacation of the segment of Watt Street had restricted his ability to gain access to his lot. In its motion for summary judgment, the City of Youngstown did not address this exact issue. In its separate motion, Ohio One Corporation did refer to the "access" issue in the final two sentences of its legal analysis. In also requesting final judgment on this issue, Ohio One Corporation merely argued that appellant should not be given separate access across the vacated area because he had always used Federal Street as his sole access to his property. However, in making this basic statement, Ohio One Corporation did not provide any legal analysis to support its position. More importantly, *17 it did not refer to any evidentiary materials supporting its factual assertion.
{¶ 44} To prevail on a summary judgment motion, the moving party must be able to cite specific materials in the record which supports its factual argument. Dresher v. Burt (1996),
{¶ 45} Pursuant to the foregoing analysis, the trial court's determination on the application of R.C.
WILLIAM M. O'NEILL, J., Eleventh District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment, COLLEEN MARY OTOOLE, J., Eleventh District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment, concurs. *1