112 Ala. 185 | Ala. | 1895
This case grows out of certain litigation between John Thomas Eason, on the one side, and the firm' of Baldridge, Murray & Halsey, and two members thereof, upon the other, one branch of which was decided by this court at a former term. — Baldridge v. Eason, 99 Ala. 516. After the affirmance by this court, in that case, of the decretal order dissolving the injunction, which had issued at the suit of W. F. Baldridge and C. H. Halsey, Eason caused proceedings to be taken for the collection of his claim which were based upon the theory that the obligors upon the injunction bond and upon the supersedeas bond — given to restore the injunction pending the appeal to this court. — had become liable to him for the amount of the judgment he had recovered against the firm of Baldridge, Murray & Halsey; and'whether or not this view was correct is the main question to be determined upon this appeal, the correct solution of which will require the consideration of several subsidiary propositions.
The bill proceeds upon the idea that the injunction which issued against Eason and the sheriff of Madison 'county, upon the complaint of W. F. Baldridge and C. H. Halsey, was an injunction of a judgment, or, what is the same thing, an injunction “to stay proceedings after judgment,” within the meaning of section 3522 of the Code, and that the main defendant in that suit, upon the dissolution of the writ, was entitled to summary process for the collection of his judgment against the firm of Baldridge, Murray & Halsey out of the prin- ■ cipal and sureties upon each of said bonds — :the original injunction bond and the bond given to restore the injunction pending the appeal.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Stanley v. Bonham, 12 S. W. Rep. (Ark.) 706, makes the proposition clear in the following extract: ‘ ‘As to the assessment of damages, on dissolution of an injunction, the statute does not authorize an assessment except in cases where the proceedings have been stayed — that is when the enforcement of the judgment has been enjoined. An injunction preventing the sale of particular property does not prevent the execution of the judgment within -the meaning of the statute.”
And in Hardin v. White, (Iowa) 16 N. W. Rep. 580, it was held that where an action is brought to restrain the sale of a particular piece of property under an execution, issued on a judgment, and not to restrain the execution generally, the bond need not be double the amount of such judgment and conditioned for its payment, since the court was of opinion that the object of such action was not' to stay proceedings upon a judgment.
In Barnard v. Davis, 54 Ala. 565, where a judgment had been enjoined at the suit of a stranger, Judge Stone, referring to sections of the revised Code, corresponding with the sections of the Code of 1886 now under consideration, said that those sections were “intended and framed to meet the wants of defendants in judgments who seek to relieve themselves from the payment thereof by force of some defense of equitable cognizance.” That this is the true interpretation of the sections of the Code,
• Under our dual system, there may be a defense to a demand not available in the law court, or a defendant may, without fault or neglect on his part, be deprived of an opportunity to present a defense, available there ; thus necessitating a resort to a court of equity to secure his rights. Until impeached and avoided, a judgment is conclusive as between the parties and their privies, that the defendant owes the plaintiff the sum adjudged, and, therefore, if a defendant should desire to invoke the aid 'of a court of equity to make further controversy, upon the merits of the case and in the meantime, to withhold •payment of the judgment, it is but just that he should not be allowed to doubly vex his opponent at the same time, by continued litigation in the law court, or upon appeal therefrom, and that he should furnish security for the doing of equity — the payment of the judgment with interest, damages for delay, if it be a delay case, •and costs — if it turn out, he has wrongfully sued out the writ. So it is, and no doubt for these reasons, the legislature has declared in section 3521 that “an injunction obtained by a defendant to a judgment at law, to stay proceedings thereon, operates as a release uf errors as to such defendantand in section 3522 has provided •that the bond to be given, upon the procurement of an injunction to stay proceedings after judgment shall be “conditioned on the dissolution of such injunction to pay the amount of the judgment enjoined, with interest, and also such damages and costs as- may be decreed against such party.” The concluding clause of this section, relating to the payment of damages that may be decreed, must be interpreted in connection with section 3528, where it is enacted, that upon the dissolution
Those, against whom it is necessary to legislate to prevent resort to legal proceedings, for mere delay, are the parties who are liable for the debt, and from whom its collection would be otherwise coerced. Following• the motives which inspired these sections, it may be remarked that if an injunction of a judgment be dissolved, prompt and summary proceedings should be allowed to force collection of a claim, twice subjected to judicial investigation, without necessitating further resort to the tardier remedy of an action upon the bond ; hence it is we find in section 3529 the declaration, which accords to the bond the. force and affect of a judgment and authorizes execution thereon, “for the amount of the judgment which has been enjoined, interest and damages decreed; ’ ’ thus referring to the damages that may b.e decreed for delay, under seetion 3528 — the only instance in which authority is conferred upon the chancery court in the injunction proceeding, to award damages upon the bond, damages being usually, indeed in all other cases, recoverable only in a separate action. Under our rules of chancery practice, an injunction is often dissolved, before fina] hearing’, thus withdrawing the obstacle in the way of the collection of the judgment, whereas, after a full presentation of the case, it may appear that the injunction was properly obtained and hence should be made perpetual. Therefore, it is provided by seetion 3531 that when ‘ ‘an interlocutory decree is made, dissolving an injunction to stay proceedings on a judgment at law, the chancellor must require of the defendant a refunding bond, ***** conditioned to refund the money and interest he may collect on the judgment, if the same is on final hearing perpetually enjoined ;” and further provision is made for “a final decree. on such bond against any or all the parties
The case of Thomas v. Brashear, 4 Mon. (Ky.) 65, holds that damages by statute on the dissolution of an injunction is given only where the defendant to the judgment is complainant and obtains the injunction, not where the order is obtained on the application of others.
We have analyzed the statutes and quoted freely from decisions shedding light upon them, because, after careful examination and due consideration, we have been forced to the conclusion, that one of the rulings made by the court, in McCalley v. Wilburn, 77 Ala. 549, cannot be sustained on principle or authority. In that case, the heirs of Mrs. McCalley, under the supposition that a judgment rendered against “'William J. McCalley, administrator of Martha Ann McCalley” was a judgment against said administrator in his official capacity, filed a bill to assail the judgment and prevent a sale of the lands of the estate under the execution issued thereon. They procured an injunction restraining the plaintiffs ‘ ‘froui further prosecuting their suit, ’ ’ — thus using language broad enough to prevent any effort at enforcing the
The bond given in McCalley v. Wilburn, supra, was not the obligation the statute required and although it may have been enforceable as a common law contract— whether so or not, and if so, to what extent, we need not inquire — it ought not to have been enforced by summary process, and the supersedeas ought to have been granted. The case is in conflict with Bartlett v. Gayle, 6 Ala. 305, and Barnard v. Davis, 54 Ala. 565, and the decisions from other States, reviewed in the opinion. It is, therefore, overruled.
Neither the rule nor any statute has declared what
Let the decree of the chancellor be reversed and the cause remanded to be disposed of according to the principles of this opinion, unless amendment of the bill be made so as to show that complainant is entitled to some relief.
The defendants in the preparation of their answer have unnecessarily encumbered the record by exhibiting therewith proceedings and pleadings in other cases between the parties, . and have duplicated several documents shown by the bill. They have even caused the opinion of this court in Baldridge v. Eason, 99 Ala. 516, to be twice annexed to the answer. By this violation of the rule against prolixity, the transcript has been swollen far beyond what it ought to have been. The cost of transcribing this unnecessary and immaterial matter should be borne by the parties committing the fault. Let one-half of the ' cost of preparing the transcript be taxed against the appellants.
Reversed and remanded.