[¶ 1] Defendants/Appellants (“Lyng-stads”) appeal from a summary judgment quieting title in the Plaintiffs/Appellees (“Hallins”) to a 2/3 interest of an undivided 3/4 interest in minerals in land in Mount-rail County. We conclude the legal effect of a 1960 warranty deed’s plain language, excepting and expressly reserving “unto the Grantors” an “undivided 3/4 interest” in thе minerals, did not alter the grantors’ proportion of ownership existing before execution of the 1960 deed. We affirm.
I
[¶ 2] This appeal arises out of a quiet title action for mineral interests in Mount-rail County described as:
“Township 153 North, Range 92 West
Section 14: S1/2SW1/4
Section 23: N1/2NW1/4.”
The parties are the heirs and successors-in-interest to the grantors on the 1960 warranty dеed conveying the above property. Lyngstads are successors-in-interest to Emma and John Lyngstad, and Hallins are successors-in-interest to Walter and Esther Brandt. The district court quieted title in the Hallins to a 2/3 interest of an undivided 3/4 interest in minerals in the above land. The parties do not dispute that, before exeсution of this 1960 deed, Emma Lyngstad owned a 1/3 interest in the surface and the minerals in the property and Walter Brandt owned a 2/3 interest in the surface and the minerals in the property.
[¶ 3] The grantors on the 1960 deed are identified as: “Emma L. Lyngstad and John O. Lyngstad, wife & husband, and Walter J. Brandt & Esther C. Brandt husband & wife.” The 1960 deed also contains the following language after thе legal description of the property:
“Excepting from the premises herein conveyed and expressly reserving unto the Grantors herein an undivided 3/U interest in and to all of the Oil, gas, and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the lands herein described, together with the right of ingress and egress at аll times for the purpose of mining, drilling, exploring, operating and developing said lands for oil, gas, casinghead gas, casinghead gasoline, and other minerals, and storing, handling, transporting and marketing the same therefrom.”
(Emphasis added.) The parties agree the grantors in the 1960 deed together conveyed 100 рercent of the surface of the property and 1/4 of the minerals to the grantee, R.I. Hukkanen. The parties also agree that together they all own 3/4 of the mineral interests in the property, but they dispute the proportion of ownership in the minerals based on competing interpretations оf reservation language in the 1960 warranty deed.
[¶ 4] In November 2011, Hallins commenced this action to quiet title to the disputed mineral interests. Hallins claim that they own 2/3 of the 3/4 of the mineral interests, as successors-in-interest to Walter and Esther Brandt, and that Lyng-stads own 1/3 of the same 3/4 of the mineral interests, as successors-in-intеrest to Emma and John Lyngstad. Lyngstads, however, claim they collectively own 1/2 of the 3/4 mineral interest and Hallins collectively own the other 1/2 of the 3/4 minerals interest. Lyngstads moved for summary judgment, and Hallins filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.
[¶ 5] In posturing the case for summary judgment, the parties agreed no disputed material fаcts exist and only a legal issue remained for the district court in construing the 1960 warranty deed. It was undisputed that all the grantors in the
II
[¶ 6] Our standard for reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment is well-established:
“Summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56(c) is a procedural device for the prompt and expeditious disposition of a lawsuit without a trial ‘if either litigant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and if no dispute exists as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if resolving factual disputes will not alter the result.’ ”
Nichols v. Goughnour,
III
[¶ 7] Lyngstads argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Hallins and erred in creating an issue by relying on a lack of evidence of an agreement between the grantors. The parties do not contend the 1960 warranty deed is ambiguous, nor do they assert reformation of the deed is necessary. The parties instead argue, based on the undisputed facts, for competing legal interpretation and effect of the 1960 deed’s language excepting and reserving the mineral interest to the grantors.
[¶ 8] In
Waldock v. Amber Harvest Corp.,
“In construing a deed, the primary purpose is ‘to ascertain and effectuate the grantor’s intent, and deeds are сonstrued in the same manner as contracts.’ State Bank & Trust of Kenmare v. Brekke,1999 ND 212 , ¶ 12,602 N.W.2d 681 ; see Williams Co. v. Hamilton,427 N.W.2d 822 , 823 (N.D.1988). If a deed is unambiguous, this Court determines the parties’ intent from the instrument itself. See Brekke, at ¶ 12; Stracka v. Peterson,377 N.W.2d 580 , 582 (N.D. 1985). In other words, ‘[t]he language of the deed, if clear and explicit, governs its interpretation; the parties’ mutual intentions must be ascertained from the four corners of the deed, if possible.’ North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield,530 N.W.2d 297 , 300 (N.D.1995); see N.D.C.C. §§ 9-07-02, 9-07-03, 9-07-04, 47-09-11. Whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Brekke, at ¶ 12.”
Thus, our primary purpose in construing a deed “is to ascertain and effectuate the grantor’s intent.”
Nichols,
A
[¶ 9] Before execution of the 1960 warranty deed Emma Lyngstad owned 1/3 of the surface and minerals and Walter Brandt owned 2/3 of the surface and minerals. Although Emma and John Lyng-stad, as wife and husband, and Walter and Esther Brandt, as husband and- wife, were
[¶ 10] Based on
Malloy v. Boettcher,
[¶ 11] In
Malloy,
the sole issue was whether “in a deed of conveyance, a reservation of a life estate unto a third party, who is a stranger to the title of the property, is effective to convey thе life estate to the third party.”
[¶ 12]
Malloy
initially acknowledged this Court previously followed the common law rule “that a reservation or exception in a deed of conveyance cannot operate as a conveyance to a third party who is a stranger to the title or deed.”
Malloy,
“The common law rule that a reservation or exception cannot constitute a conveyance to a third party is based upon an extremely narrow interpretation of the terms ‘reservation’ and ‘exception.’ When a grantor attempts to reserve or except a property interest unto a third party the common law rule may operate to defeat the obvious intent of the grantor to transfer the reserved or excepted interest to the third party. It is well settled that the primary purpose in construing a deed is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the grantor. Several jurisdictions have abandoned the common law rule on the ground that it serves no useful purpose and is contrary to the rule that a deed must be construed to carry out a grantor’s intent if at all possible. Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica,7 Cal.3d 473 ,498 P.2d 987 ,102 Cal.Rptr. 739 (1972); Garza v. Grayson, 255 Or. 413 ,467 P.2d 960 (1970); Townsend v. Cable,378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964); See also, Krug v. Reissig,488 P.2d 150 (Wyo, 1971).”
Malloy,
at 9 (emphasis added). The Court in
Malloy
also found
Willard,
[¶ 13] The effect of Malloy was to retain the common law rule, as stated in Stetson, but to hold an exception or reservation may be effective to convey property to a spouse who does not have an interest in the property but joins in the deed’s execution, when that is determined to have been the grantor’s intent. Nonethelеss, here, even if we were inclined to abandon the common law rule as urged by Chief Justice Erickstad in Malloy, we decline to do so because, as will be discussed, we conclude the unambiguous language of the 1960 deed, in excepting and reserving the mineral interests, does not state a clear and obvious intent by thе grantors to convey the mineral interests equally among the grantors so as to constitute a conveyance to a third-party stranger to the title or deed. We therefore decline to extend Malloy to completely abrogate the holding in Stetson.
B
[¶ 14] Lyngstads contend that, based on the plain language of the 1960 deed, the grantors’ intent by “[excepting from thе premises” and “expressly reserving unto the Grantors” an “undivided 3/4 interest” of the mineral interests in the property was to convey equal ownership among them. Lyngstads argue that this “reservation” created a new right in the grantors which did not exist before the grant, that a property right created in favor of severаl persons is presumed to create an interest in common and that a tenancy in common is an undivided common interest in property in which each tenant in common is equally entitled to the use, benefit, and possession of the property. Hallins respond that Lyngstads’ interpretation is unreasonablе since, in “reserving” an “undivided 3/4 interest” of the mineral interests, 1/3 of the 1/4 of the minerals received by the grantee came from Emma Lyngstad, and 2/3 of the 1/4 minerals came from Walter Brandt, such that Emma Lyngstad reserved 3/4 of her 1/3 mineral interest to herself and Walter Brandt reserved 3/4 of his 2/3 mineral interest to himself.
[¶ 15] The parties’ competing interpretations of the 1960 deed highlight the difficulty in distinguishing between an “exception” and a “reservation” in a deed.
See Christman v. Emineth,
[¶ 16] Lyngstads assert that the language in the deed excepting and reserving an “undivided 3/4 interest” in the minerals indicates that the grantors intended the reserved ownership of the mineral interest to be equal. However, an “undivided interest” merely means “[а]n interest held under the same title by two or more persons, whether their rights are equal or unequal in value or quantity.” Black’s Law Dictionary 886 (9th ed.2009). Lyngstads also correctly assert that under N.D.C.C. § 47-02-08, a property interest “created in favor of several persons in their own right is an interest in common, unless acquired by them in partnership for partnership purposes, or unless declared in its creation to be a joint tenancy.” See also N.D.C.C. § 47-02-05. However, this is not determinative.
[¶ 17] “The chief attribute of a tenancy in common is unity of possession by the joint owners, with each sharing a common right to possession of the entire interest and a separate claim to a fractional share of thе property.”
Volson v. Volson,
[¶ 18] Lyngstads argue that silence in the deed reservation as to proportion of ownership reserved shows the grantors’ intent to reserve an equal proportion of ownership in all the grantors. In essence, they rely on the presumption that the reserved tenancy in common in the mineral interest would be equal to “clearly” demonstrate the grantors’ intent to convey a property interest in the reservation to spouses and a third-party stranger. We are not convinced.
[¶ 19] Based on our review of the 1960 deed to ascertain and effectuate the grantors’ intent, we conclude that the language of the deed is unambiguous. We further conclude based on the plain language, while the language excepting and reserving an “undivided 3/4 interest” in the minerals was effective in reserving the minerals to the grantors, the reservation did not operate to regrant an “equal” proportion of the mineral interests in the grantors. Rather, the reservation prevented the mineral interest from passing to thе grantee, with the grantors retaining their proportion of their interests prior to execution of the deed.
Cf. Stetson,
[¶ 20] We therefore conclude the district court did not err in granting Hallins’ summary judgment motion, and we affirm the judgment.
[¶ 21] We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments, and we conclude they are without merit or unnecessary to our decision. We affirm the judgment.