161 Iowa 185 | Iowa | 1913
Some time prior to July 1, 1908, defendant expended a considerable sum of money in remodeling a building owned by him, in the city of Davenport, and divided the first floor thereof into three rooms, the middle one of which was known as 212 West Fourth street-. Plaintiff was, at that time, engaged in the undertaking business, occupying a building on Harrison street, in said city, belonging to one Ficke. For this latter building he held a lease which expired on July 1, 1908. Some time before the expiration of this lease, defendant proposed to plaintiff that if he (plaintiff) would give up his lease on the Harrison street property and lease 212 West Fourth street, with the basement, he (defendant) would let the same to him for the term of ten years and would make such changes in the premises as would especially fit it for plaintiff’s use and would also put in the necessary furniture and fixtures and charge him for the use of the entire property the sum of $43 per month, payable in advance from the first to the tenth day of every month. Plaintiff accepted the proposition, and defendant made the proposed improvements, costing something like $1,400. Plaintiff moved into the premises on the strength of the agreement and expended something more than $700 in buying additional furniture and fixtures to better adapt it to his use. About the time
Defendant demurred to the petition because the contract was within the statute of frauds, but his demurrer was overruled, and, on issues already stated, the case was tried to the
Neither taking possession of the property under an oral lease, nor the payment of rent thereunder, will take the case from under the statute. Code, section 4626; Burden v. Sheridan, 36 Iowa, 125; Hunt v. Coe, 15 Iowa, 197; Recknagle v. Schmaltz, 72 Iowa, 63; Powell v. Crampton, 102 Iowa, 364; Burden v. Knight, 82 Iowa, 584; Thorp v. Bradley, 75 Iowa, 50. In this respect our statute differs from that of many other states. Butler v. Threlheld, 117 Iowa, 116.
The rule is thus summarized by Pomeroy, in his work on Equity Jurisprudence (sections 921, 1293, and 1294):
The statute of frauds was enacted for the purpose of preventing fraud and cannot be made an instrument of shielding, protecting, or aiding the parties who rely upon it in the perpetration of the fraud or the consummation of a fraudulent scheme. This proposition is the basis of many forms of equitable relief as in cases of verbal agreements for the sale of land, reformation, and enforcement of agreements which are imperfect through fraud or mistake.
Where any agreement is made verbally which the statute requires should be in writing or the execution of a written agreement is prevented through the fraud of one party and the other party is induced to accept and rely upon the verbal agreement as binding and valid, a court of equity will not permit a fraudulent party to set up the statute of frauds as a defense, but will enforce the contract against him although ft is merely verbal.
When equity seems to depart from and disregard the statute and especially in its enforcement of verbal contracts for the sale of lands, which have been part performed, it is only invoking the aid of the most salutary principles for the purpbse of carrying out the ultimate object of the statute, as the primary object of the statute is to prevent frauds, mis*190 takes, or perjuries, by substituting written for oral evidence in the most important class of contracts.
Courts of equity have established the principles which they apply in various circumstances that it shall not be used as an instrument for the accomplishment of fraudulent purposes. Designed to prevent fraud, it shall not be permitted to work fraud. This principle lies at the basis of the doctrine concerning part performance, but is also enforced wherever it is necessary to securé equitable results.
There is a form of contract peculiar to equity which is created by representations made by one party and acts done by the other party upon the faith of such representations. Where an absolute unconditional representation of something to be done in the future is made by one person in order to accomplish a particular purpose, and the person to whom it is made relying on it does the act by which the intended result is obtained and purpose accomplished, a contract is thereby concluded between the parties.
The general doctrine upon which the rule is based is founded upon estoppel. All the elements thereof are present here, and we think the trial court was clearly correct in overruling the demurrer and in rendering the decree as prayed.— Affirmed.