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Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.
770 A.2d 1072
Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2001
Check Treatment

*1 рremises,” of route with the other than to tion the access very was close to his of appellee place employ- observe note, however, grava- when attacked. We do that “[t]he ment proximity employee men of is not that the close [the rule] employment, to his but rather proximity place proximity employee subjected danger reason such degree beyond or to an abnormal that to which the peculiarly subjected.” Bakery, Pariser 239 Md. at general public 591, 212 A.2d 324. therefore, law, as

We hold a matter that because the “premises” “proximity” exceptions going to the and com- case, ing applicable appellee’s rule are not to the facts of this injuries employment. did not occur the course his Ac- circuit court cordingly, granting summary judg- erred appellee implicitly affirming ment in favor of Commission’s decision.

JUDGMENT REMANDED TO REVERSED. CASE CITY, THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE WITH TO ENTER SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS JUDGMENT FOR APPELLANTS. BE PAID BY APPELLEE.

COSTS TO A.2d

Melissa M. HALLIDAY STURM, COMPANY, RUGER & INC. Term, Sept.

No. 1999. Special Appeals Maryland. Court of

April 2001. *4 (C. Brown, Andrew D. Freeman Christopher Brown and brief), Baltimore, Goldstein LLP on Levy, & for appel- lants. (M. Hill, III, Venable,

Paul F. King Strain and Baetjer and Howard, LLP, Baltimore, Dorr, James P. Vogts James B. and Wildman, Harrold, Dixon, IL, brief), Allen & Chicago, on the appellees. for MURPHY, C.J.,

Argued DAVIS, before HOLLANDER, SALMON, SONNER, KENNEY, EYLER, ADKINS, KRAUSER, DEBORAH S. JJ.

DAVIS, Judge. Appellant Halliday Melissa M. an wrongful filed action for death and a survivor’s claim the Circuit Court Baltimore Sturm, City Inc., against appellee Ruger & Company, alleging liability strict for the self-inflicted shooting death of her three- son, year-old Jordan Garris.

Subsequent to the against dismissal of all claims the retailer Inc., dismiss, On handgun, Target, appellee moved to alternative, sought summary judgment. On October *5 J.) (Cannon, grant- City for Baltimore 1999, Court the Circuit fоrth the appellee, setting favor summary judgment ed grant From the in bench memorandum. ruling its a basis for timely appeal, this filed judgment, appellant summary as follows: that have been restated questions which she asked law, “risk-utility applica- test” is the Maryland I. Under claim? liability a handguns under ble appropriate, summary judgment grant II. theWas dangerous instru- misuse of the either because the factual determina- precludes any involved mentality “risk-utility test” foreseeability or because the tion of inapplicable? nature, designed very product, III. When death, appel- were the injury inflict or cause serious establish, as a matter of warnings sufficient to lee’s law, was misused? handgun that the

FACTUAL BACKGROUND Garris, father, purchased In Jordan’s March Clifton Inc., Target, from On a firearms retail store Ruger pistol P89 Severn, Maryland. The P89 shooting range and located action, fire, automatic magazine-fit, is a center double pistol handgun. loading, recoil-operated purchase months after the of the P89 June three parents’ under his

pistol, handgun Jordan discovered the from the ammunition gun, separately mattress. The stored there, unlocked, readily to be avail- magazine, kept had been Young home from intruders. Jordan protect able magazine into allegedly capable loading the ammunition similar semi-automatic handgun because he had seen As he watching loaded and fired while television. weapons accidentally discharged and played pistol, the loaded head; a fatal bullet wound he young child suffered mother days Appellant, personal died two later. Jordan’s action, estate, this brought alleging of his representative device, i.e., a child- failed to include lock, and instruc- trigger resistant because given tions to Garris were inadequate to the fatal prevent accident.

The Circuit Court for City delivered its oral Baltimore. bench, opinion from the it opined:1 which *6 THE COURT: This will be memorandum of opinion.... is,

And simple said, fact as the if [appellant] has gun put gun manufacturer onto the they’ve device known about for a years hundred or so to it make certain that a year it, three old not could have fired the child would still be here. they But did not. So question is really whether that failure to [safety incert [sic] made device] the gun defective under the products liability law.

There is much if wrong that’s the wrong. case. Much problem The is that it’s also clear the child’s father knew this was also a very dangerous product. I say my must One, reaction to the warning argument multiple. suggestion the warnings provided were more than ade- quate were not I impressive to me. think the [appellant] has pointed booklet, out that this 35 paged with [sic] children, warnings respect small, relatively are small type, and there is so much warning much; about so and, that, I say as I I’m say want also equally aware of defendant’s youth handgun safety [sic] action no- tice, which I think plaintiffs also correctly point out one titled, can why tell it is it is not directed towards [sic] year many three olds. So ways, it seems the warnings аre far from adequate. hand, On the other this ais handgun we’re about talking where there is a question of any whether warning whatsoever is necessary because guns are made to kill people. That simple. Particularly a handgun such as this was not hunting. made for It was to kill people, pure made and simple. opinion

1. While reprinted, much of the has not been we believe that the recounting extensive ruling the basis for the lower court’s is essential analysis. to our is, one, that was questions, there are two And so second, warning if a warning necessary? And any fact, warnings all of these necessary, maybe, equally are neces- in this 35 booklet paged [sic] that are are, gun about a de- talking again, Because we sary. on warning page people, to kill so signed death, says serious about ammunition example, wrong in the use of ammu- damage can result injury and warning about nition, arguably That warning. is a page on 6 about warning it around children. keeping safety an intermedial says placing the safety manual user can result between safe and fired position when position is in a or fired thinking pistol is not.

Likewise, firing, 10 about the one warning page on unloading sliding, handling, 11 about one on page about are lots and lots malfunctioning, there or a in the death of go wrong ending up could what *7 gun. this is a injury to someone because serious respect with to the way, warning it that the Look at addition, children, more than adequate. it’s danger warning and sense respect to the issue childrеn, from gun away to the keep the sense of the need again, are allegations [appellant], I made the think the 16 which allegations paragraph made relevant. gun found the year [child] that three old [the] states mattress, allegation an that it clearly his father’s under that it would not be expectation was there with the put to say old. Goes on his father year found this three magazine the gun the there and had removed had hidden I gun safety, from which containing the bullets clip some making also some indication effort clearly think is safe. inherently dangerous product make this misuse, I think are some there But on issue in this case that terms that lead me to conclude things intervening cause or whatev- superceding of the misuse or er, summary judgement I motion for think makes a in favor of [appellee] appropriate,

[sic] and that is that we’re about a talking gun. gun, And a where clearly person who it knew it purchased dangerous by was handled, it was way response and in argument test, about the risk I utility think that what the Court of (sic) Special Appeals said in Keller veruss Archie [sic] utility Industries is that the risk test is applicable and when only applied something goes wrong with a product. And I think what they’re talking about is not something going wrong in the sense clearly [appellant] right, something wrong went in the sense that a year three old was killed and that’s very wrong, but not in the sense of the gun behaving way one predict gun would behave, should gun and in the sense the operated way have, also, here, it should I think rеally even stronger that it is a misdemeanor for possess someone to gun, store or leave a loaded firearm any location where an individual knew should have known that an unsuper- vised minor child would have I access to it. say realizing that is a heavy burden for the father the child and the mother of the also child to be stuck with. IAnd say that because that makes it than the Klien different case, relied upon by [appellant], [sic] where the warning is one putting finger in the wrong place, which was not a criminal offense, nor should it have been a offense, use, criminal but simply was sense of sloppy similar the Elsworth case involving [sic] the nightgown might use, which not even be termed but sloppy which is predictable; [sic], but with respect to Klien it can be described as use. I sloppy say And I because do [appellant] right, believe the Klien does make [sic] *8 warning clear that a by itself doesn’t obviate problem. the on, If really that was what this I case turned reach would result, a different but the problem something, here is as I said, question needed; the any warning whether second, whether, was, type because of the it you need to get read the manual to all warnings, it dangerous third, because was so and so deadly; dangers. about all these father knew the child’s is clear it a has to make also, with this way dealing one And the child place in a where gun to put offense criminal to it. get would claim of inade- pursue does appeal, appellant

On regarding operаtion and instructions quate of sale. at the time the elder Garris received OF REVIEW STANDARD ruling of a trial court’s review appellate our We summarized NIBCO, 96 Bond summary judgment for on a motion (1993): 127, 134-36, 623 A.2d 731 part: in pertinent 2-501 provides Rule Maryland summary a motion for any time may file Any party ground on the of an action part on all or judgment material fact any as to genuine dispute is no there as a matter of judgment is entitled party identify ... shall "with to a motion response The law.... disputed.... that are facts the material particularity against of or in favor judgment shall enter court show that there response if motion and party moving fact and that the any as to material dispute is no genuine is entered is entitled judgment favor party whose of law. as a matter judgment Thus, grounds forth sufficient moving party

... must set is not re- Although the movant summary judgment. unless motion with an affidavit his support [or her] quired which adverse day files it “before she] he [or filed,” ..., [or she] he initial or motion party’s pleading by placing contentions his various support [or her] must admissible in evidence that would be before the court facts in the record evidence detailing the absence or otherwise ... cause of action. support Court, Supreme from the emanating Discussing trilogy we continued:

146

The Supreme have, Court and the of Appeals Court years, recent that a emphasized trial court should grant reluctant a motion for summary in an judgment See, Catrett, e.g., Celotex v. appropriate case. Corp. 317, 2548, (1986); U.S. 106 S.Ct. Anderson 91 L.Ed.2d 265 Inc., Liberty Lobby, 242, 2505, 477 U.S. 106 S.Ct. (1986);.... Surеty Seaboard Co. v. Richard L.Ed.2d 202 Kline, Inc., F. 236, 242-45, 91 Md.App. 603 A.2d 1357 we at length discussed some these teachings, emphasizing that a motion for summary judgment, although not a substi- trial, is nevertheless not disfavored. A proper tute for summary judgment motion granted is to be unless the i.e., parties truly dispute fact, a material the evidence is such that a jury fair[-]minded could return a verdict for the Id. nonmovant. reason, 603 A.2d 1357. For this although a party opposing proper summary motion for judgment need not file an affidavit unless ... “the motion supported by oath,” an affidavit or other statement under ..., opponent rely cannot on formal denials or general allegations. Instead, ... an opponent must “identify particularity the material facts that disputed.” are ... Thus, moving party “[w]hen a has set forth sufficient grounds summary judgment, the party opposing the for motion must show with precision’ ‘some there is a genuine fact,” ..., as to a dispute material place before the trial court facts that would be admissible evidence. is, ... That if summary judgment motion is on based facts not contained in the record or on papers file proceeding it “shall be supported by affidavit accompa- by any nied on papers which it is ... based.” Moreover, as Supreme Court noted articulating its Celotex now famous holding, even an when affidavit is not necessary

... a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility informing district court motion, basis and identifying those portions “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogаtories affidavits, if file, together with the and admissions demonstrate the absence which believes any,” issue material genuine fact. 2548, (emphasis U.S. at S.Ct. Corp.,

Celotex *10 added). there be no requirement “To the that satisfy fact, moving any party as to material the dispute genuine necessary the to obtain include the motion must facts as to showing dispute any and a that there is no judgment ... if a movant “bears this initial Only those facts.” the “showing” party makes this does responsibility” summary judgment the motion have the burden of opposing particularity “with the material facts are identifying Thus, judgment ... summary a motion disputed.” has opponent disputed asserts the not identified simply summary judgment usually is not sufficient. A movant facts affidavit, ..., an the movant required is not file but if (or if complaint facts in the answer disputes alleged movant plaintiff), [or movant is the must himself herself] of the record identify portions that “demonstrate Indeed, ... genuine of a issue of material fact.” absence “any movant must attach “as an exhibit” to his motion in ruling that he “wishes the court to document” consider by motion ... unless the document is reference adopted 2-303(d) by permitted by or set forth as permitted as Rule 2-432(b).” ... Rule

DISCUSSION outset, it be noted that has aban appellant At the should warnings provided appellee claim that the were any doned perti is therefore inadequate. adequacy warnings only appellant’s as a that Garris nent refutation denial subject Citing firearm.2 Restatement of misused Sears, (Third), Roebuck Liability, Torts Products Klein argument written submis- Apрellant, 2. in oral before this Court and in court, to this Court and the trial admitted that sions adequate summary judgment provided appellee were to entitle toit on that issue. Co., 477, 486, & 92 Md.App. 608 A.2d 1276 appellant initially asserts that this Court has “made clear that the risk- utility applies test to a claim that the absence of a device renders a design defective.” She alludes to a state ment in Klein that “the absence of a safety device may clearly defect, a design even that does not ‘malfunc ” tion.’ Ultimately, appellant contends that trial judge mistakenly

[t]he applied the consumer-expecta- tions test rather than the risk-utility test. While acknowl- edging plaintiffs argument that “there certainly no rea- son that it should be easier for a year three old to use a than ... bottle,” an open aspirin the court failed to weigh the risks from the absence of a child-resistant safety device against utility of not incorporating it. Instead, the court observed that “guns are to kill made people. That simple. Particularly handgun such as this that was not made for It hunting. to kill made people, pure simple.” The trial court mistakenly believed that *11 the risk-utility test did not apply because “the gun be- hav(ed) the way one would predict gun behave,” would ie. the gun passed the consumer-expectations test. Finally, appellant asseverates that “the trial court mistaken- ly relied on in Kelley Industries, dictum R.G. 304 Md. 497 A.2d 1143 that said that the risk-utility test ” does in apply ‍‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‍the absence of a ‘malfunction.’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Apрellee’s Memorandum of in Law Support of Motion to Dismiss, or, Alternative, in the Motion for Summary Judg- ment, after asserting appellee that is entitled to judgment as a facts, matter of law because the as recited in the complaint, “clearly exonerate [appellee],” sets forth two “factually relat- ed, (1) but distinct legal grounds,” to wit: “that the firearm was not in a defective condition or unreasonably dangerous as (2) a matter of law” and that pistol “the was in used a manner that contrary to clearly worded instructions and warnings accompanied when sold.” The alleged undis- puted material facts upon by relied appellee are: firearms should manual warned that 1. The instruction from away children securely and unloaded always be stored adults; only should be loaded when firearms and careless in or shoot; racks cabinets firearms should locked ready use; separate stored from ammunition should be when not sight visitors and firearms; firearms should be stored out children; gun responsibility to be certain it is the owner’s gain with firearms cannot persons children and unfamiliar firearms, ammunition, users and components; access to and the manual should the instructions read carefully using before firearm. DeCarlo, Target who

2. the On salesman sold Edward Garris, him and explained the manual pistol reviewed safety. the manual gun operate how to and unload the and load acknowledged a statement which he signed Garris how to and explained” DeCarlo “demonstrated load had and/or safety weapon, unload and function purpose mechanism(s) (them), and how to work it that Garris under- should if it until weapon stood that he treat the as were loaded loaded, made that it was not and that he personally he certain to use the a lawful manner. Garris also weapon intended Handgun Safety received a “Youth Act Notice” distributed Alcohol, Firearms, and which the Bureau Tobacco read: “Safety storing securing away firearms from children will help prevent handguns by juveniles, the unlawful possession stop and save lives.” accidents Target

3. Garris received from On a lockable box and offered a padlock provided appellee trigger he was purchase lock3 which he could as an precau- additional tion. *12 facts,

4. of Mo- undisputed material purposes for Summary Judgment, tion from the are complaint extracted that Garris stored the under his mattress and pistol stored shelf; magazine containing three-year- on a book bullets and, magazine old found the gun Jordan and the loaded disputes 3. Garris’s affidavit this assertion.

“having seen pistols semi-automatic loaded and fired televi- sion, was able put the magazine clip in the gun” gun and the discharged while Jordan “played with the gun.” was, judge

The trial instance, the first required to determine if allegations forth in set the complaint stated a cause of action in and, so, strict liability if whether appellant’s claim, facts, on the above material if undisputed, survivеs the Motion for Summary Judgment.

Appellant argued her opposition to the motion that the handgun was defective and unreasonably dangerous under “[bjecause test, the risk-utility the risk from excluding child safety features outweighs utility exclusion, of that because designs alternative safer could have adopted been economically....” that, She argued also because it was rea sonably appellee, foreseeable to “any warning gun store the locked and unloaded would not be followed a significant proportion owners,” of gun Garris’s improper storage of the gun did not constitute misuse and thus could not defeat the design defect claim.4

The opposition was accompanied by affidavits, two one which was given by Garris. The contents of Garris’s affidavit are consistent with the facts upon by relied appellee, except Appellant First, 4. legal advanced two arguments. further she asserted recovery Garris's actions could not negligence bar because "[t]he parent may a imputed (1998 to an infant....” See Md.Code Repl.Vol.), § Cts. & Jud. Proc. provision, 10-910. Under parent's this negligence preclude recovery by cannot an infant unless it is an "inde- pendent superseding injuries.” cause of the child's Caroline v. Reicher, 125, 130, (1973). 269 Md. 304 A.2d 831 inquiry The relevant reasonably is "whether what occurred anticipated was to have been as a result ... the defendant’s acts or omissions ...” Id. at Yerman, Farley 444, 450, (quoting A.2d 831 231 Md. 190 A.2d 773 (1963)). substantially We note that this is foreseeability similar tо the inquiry, Co., test used in Simpson the misuse see v. Standard Container 199, 206, 527 A.2d 1337 so constituting that actions necessarily superseding misuse are injury. cause of the Because we law, determine that Garris’s actions constituted misuse as matter of we argument. do not reach this Second, appellant argued warnings accompanying gun defective, were a contention that has appeal. been abandoned on See supra accompanying note 2 and text. *13 Target one or elsewhere ever for assertion that at On “[n]o his explain or the need one. trigger to sell me a lock offered I Indeed, trigger August first time ever saw a lock was 20, 1999,” Garris also months after Jordan’s death. three owner’s manual” he “glanced through the when stated that he any gun, reading did “not recall purchased the but arguably This statement is storage gun.” of the regarding DeCarlo’s version of events. conflict with accompanied appel- of P. Teret also Stephen affidavit professor Hopkins is a the Johns lee’s Teret opposition. Public and the director of the Hygiene of and Health School Policy large for Gun and Research. Johns Center Hopkins of recitation of statistics on the affidavit consists part, storage prac- unsafe firearm deaths and firearm unintentional compilations government from of compendium tices culled cited, the ten articles two journals. and articles medical Of affidavit also contains a by co-authored Teret. Thе were factual of unattributed assertions: number boys play gun 8. has will study A recent found that environment, including they seemingly find in a safe toy. as if it were a trigger gun, pulling century, 9. more than a manufacturers have been gun For pose to children. Be- handguns aware the risk 1880[’]s, & designed late Smith Wesson ginning not be handgun they operat- and marketed a said could ordinary age an child under the of 8. by ed discipline 11. A well-recognized accepted tenet prevention is a more method of injury effective into injuries design safety to children is preventing the users owners of the products than instruct all to behave in a safe manner at times. products opinions. He attributes Teret’s affidavit also contains several opinion “childproof an editorial that he co-authored personalized operable only which are autho- handguns, ” users, also design opines: rized are He options.... viable upon Based incidence of gun-related unintended deaths children, knowledge gun storage unsafe prevalent children, adults in homes with existence feasible design guns resistant, that could changes make more child and the of warnings relative ineffectiveness and instructions *14 compared to modifications for protection children, opinion [appellee] it is that the reliance my by owner’s materials manual and the of a provision lockable case was carrying inadequate protect to children gun from the risk of unintended death. also

There was a third exhibit attached to appellant’s opposi- tion, labeled, picture a of a “Smith & Wesson child- 1894.” proof handgun, circa

The to a opposition summary judgment motion for must be “facts supported that would be admissible Bond, 134, 731; evidence....” 96 at Md.App. 623 A.2d see Co., 22, 26, Vanhook v. Merchants Mut. 22 Ins. 321 Md.App. (1974) (“Each 540 opposing given A.2d is party ample opportu place which, to nity hand, before the court facts on the one that show he is as a [or she] entitled matter of law to the seeks, ruling hand, he or on the other that [or she] show fact, opponent’s material to the position, disputed.”)5 reviewing evidentiary 5. standard during for an made determination summary judgment a court’s consideration of a motion is unclear. Co., 194, Compare Imbraguglio v. Great Atlantic & Tea 358 Md. Pacific (2000) 747 (affording A.2d 662 the trial court no deference in holding part that an properly unsworn statement "was of the record summary judgment.”), considered on Accident & Indem. Hartford 217, 287, P’ship, Co. v. Scarlett Assocs. Ltd. Md.App. Harbor 109 674 158, 167-71, Rosenberg, Md.App. A.2d and Helinski v. (1992) (each reviewing rejection A.2d 882 a trial court's of a expert purported summary judgment witness’s affidavit on under the standard). Here, holdings regarding abuse discretion our Garris's purported photograph affidavit and the of the Smith & Wesson hand- gun would be the same under either standard. It is unclear from the opinion expert opinion. trial court’s oral whether it considered Teret’s brings [Appellant’s] Which us to the issue of misuse. reaction [is] type that it is this happen, foreseeable of accident would that оut, plaintiff’s spells response affidavit attached to kind this of out- very type going happen; come is foreseeable that this accident is to [appellee’s] response to that there is no evidence facts Vanhook, such placing of methods of offered list we court, affidavit, transcript, including by deposition before facts, stipulations, admissions of interrogatories, answers Vanhook, circumstances, 22 Md. and, pleadings. under some admissibility 26-27, to the Turning at 321 A.2d 540. App. is no we note that there first alleged appellant, the facts of the purported photograph for basis the admission (re- (2001) 5-901 See Rule handgun. & Md. Smith Wesson finding support sufficient quiring “evidence as a “condi- proponent is what its claims” question matter this did not raise admissibility.”). Appellee precedent tion however, court, we must us or trial so infirmity before as photograph authentic. treat to a motion opposition

An affidavit submitted it has making person show summary judgment “must testify facts competent to the knowledge of and is personal “An Vanhook, 321 A.2d 540. stated.” to place in the context summary judgment suffices affidavit *15 that, affiant at fact to before the court a testified if trial, admissible, the affidavit itself though even would be Imbraguglio is not admissible at trial.” Great generally Co., 207, 194, A.2d 662 & Tea 358 Md. 747 Atlantic Pacific (2000). Garris’s affidavit meets these standards. proble Teret’s is more admissibility of affidavit an that its contents

matic. The affidavit contains affirmance happens gun it with our with our we sell with a lock box and whеn really of warnings. that that is relevant in terms But I don’t think is, because, go forward foreseeability if it the case should issues then discovery and and have to out if the lock box the instruction find any nothing There is [sic] manual makes difference whatsoever. guess to assume of to indicate does. So I would have and front me prepared to do it does. And I’m not that. fact, affidavit, no reason upon what's there would be based upon I take a do is in the affidavit. If want to that based what affidavit, guess opposite guess upon the would be in the based appropriate the court to But I don’t believe it ever for direction. certainly guesses on guess appropriate not for the court make summary judgment. So I do that. motion for won't review, and are left an exercise of discretion to We therefore without we must consider the issue de novo. are personal knowledge, based on but of admissibility 2-311(c) First, some of the statements is at issue. Md. Rule (2001) requires party to “attach as an to a exhibit written response motion or any document that the party wishes the court to on consider or ruling response motion ...” Bond, 135, See at 623 A.2d 731 that a (confirming “party moving for summary judgment, a party any like filing motion, 2-311.”). other must with comply Md. Rule Although studies, the affidavit name, mentions eleven of ten them editorial, and one none of the documents were attached appellant’s opposition. This omission deprived the court the opportunity to examine details of the studies in order to assess basis for expert Teret’s opinion. a full Because citation short description were given study, each however, appellant’s comply failure technical re- quirements not would have been a proper basis for the grant judgment. Bond, summary See 96 Md.App. A.2d 731 (reversing grant of summary judgment mov- where ing party “did not identify any and attach pleading, deposition, answer, admission, interrogatory affidavit, other document” demonstrating the genuine fact); absence of a issue material Cadillac, Inc., Brown v. Suburban 256-57, 260 Md. (1971) A.2d (affirming grant summary judgment where opposing party’s affidavit contained only generalized allega- tions and repeatedly to a ‘power “refer[red] but attorney,’ such produce [did] a document or any state particular facts which support allegations would made concerning existence.”). argues

Appellee appeal the studies described Teret’s affidavit are “immaterial to the foreseeability of Gar ris’s specific misconduct specific firearm, with this with its *16 features warnings, by [appellee].” and The Court of Appeals Locke, Sonnenleiter, stated in 443, Inc. v. 447-48, 118 208 Md. (1955): A.2d 509

The rule followed by majority the of cases the is that if the accidents, to past evidence as tendencies or defects is suffi- ciently relevant and illuminating similarity because there is time, circumstance, of place it will be admissible —not as

155 of a to show the existence of but negligence direct evidence or place, of method in the character or defect danger danger the or knowledge or notice and to show appliance unless, discretion, in its defendant, on the the part of defect surprise unfair or it will cause an court the trial believes issues. by raising collateral confusion Stores, Inc., 22 omitted), Lucky (Citations Cutlip cited (1974). 696, 673, 325 432 A.2d 581, Inc., A.2d Lingerie, Sherne Md. Ellsworth v. admissibility of Appeals Court of discussed “deaths, injuries economic on government reports certain fabrics, burning products, from resulting accidental losses ” 348. Id. at n. 495 A.2d materials.... or related Ellsworth, nightgown when her injured who was plaintiff against the fire, liability a strict action caught brought on Although nightgown the fabric of clothing manufacturer. standards, alleged that plaintiff flammability met federal unreasonably ignite rendered propensity fabric’s question was focused “the dangerous. The evidence burns, by ignition clothing severity incidence and caused subject that was Federal standard----” Id. excluding

A.2d 348. held that the trial court erred this We to the issues and reports evidence because are material “[t]he as nightgown tend to establish the that the sold proposition ” unreasonably was users.... Id. at dangerous prospective 602, 495 348. A.2d judice, government

In the statistics cited case sub judgment. summary no to the issues on Teret have relevance as the number of children listing He describes documents “unintentional, gun- and under ten who suffered under five must, as from Judging, solely related we Teret’s deaths.” on how contain no information these description, the statistics ‍‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‍involved, occurred, guns were types deaths such as what found, guns were equipped were whether the guns where the devices, guns were in the even whether shootings occurred. Unlike possession of children when Ellsworth, flammability of a fabric the evidence in where the as meeting government the same standard those studied *17 issue, directly government at these are of statistics little probative study” finding value. The unnamed “recent “boys gun will in play they seemingly find a safe environment” likewise in patently lacking probative value. The published by vary studies cited Teret in their focus. by One article co-authored Teret studied 88 gun- unintended California, shot deaths of children in finding that substantial number were handguns self-inflicted and involved that were stored and unlocked. loaded Teret’s other article studied deaths, such finding majority handguns involved that, of handguns, those nine were by manufactured appellee. us, These are slightly studies more similar the case before sufficiently but are still not probative be admissible. See Locke, 447-48, at (discussing Md. A.2d 509 the danger to past may by “evidence as accidents” cause “confusion issues.”). raising Appellee collateral has not denied the fore- seeability young injured children playing being with and handguns, handguns or even of being stored. Its improperly focuses, rather, argument misuse on the gave, and foreseeability of a improperly storing owner one of its them. handguns despite The four studies cited that give solely statistics on improper suffer storage from the same infirmity.

Two of studies go bеyond cited Teret the recitation of statistics on in gun storage unsafe houses with children. “[sjafety One states that ... provided by instruction even if class, military a formal associated with safe procedures as gun-handling they guns relate to keeping load- study ed.” The other found that who received “[individuals training firearm significantly were more likely keep gun unlocked,” in the home both loaded and concluded that “complete reliance on the training strategy may be mis- unclear, however, placed.” It is safety procedures what were taught classes, in these or indeed whether the “firearm train- ing” in the second study included instruction all. Moreover, appellee’s theory misuse in this case relies on the manual, warnings and instructions contained not in a class. Appellant failed to establish sufficiently the relevance opposition in her studies submission any of these not prop- they therefore were summary judgment; motion for the court. erly before was correct stage, court summary judgment

At the that, more “[f]or Teret’s statement the truth of assuming *18 of aware the manufacturers have been century, gun than a true of his The same is handguns to children.” pose risk that features is design product safety that to statement children than preventing injuries more of effective method safety instructions. in were dissimi- Teret’s affidavit opinions

The two contained first, of summary as a of contents an expressed lar. the The co-authored, handguns is that “the of design Teret editorial children,” the of and that to increase can modified design ... viable “childproof personalized handguns are Appeals As the of handgun for manufacturers.” Court options Products, Inc., 330 Md. Beatty in v. Trailmaster stated opinion “an derives its expert A.2d facts on which it is and predicated, force from the probative of opinion to sustain the the legally these must be sufficient omitted.) (Citation Teret’s quotation internal expert.” and supported, is design options the of safer opinion viability the factual assertion about Smith & tenuously, albeit absence of the he cited handgun. In the studies Wesson established, affidavit, not relevance was Teret’s whose other, as opinion may be restated follows: comprehensive more changes of design feasible upon

Based existence resistant, the relative guns could make more child and compared to of and instructions ineffectiveness children, it my for the of protection modifications by [appellee] that the on materials opinion reliance of a provision carrying manual lockable owner’s the risk of inadequate protect case children from was gun unintended death. true, remaining assertions to be

If we Teret’s factual assume too, factual by a sufficient basis. opinion, supported this summary, there were main two issues before the trial (1) as it summary court considered the judgment: motion whether the sold to Garris was a defective condi- (2) and unreasonably dangerous tion whether Gаrris’s improper storage constituted an unforeseeable misuse handgun. only facts in dispute were whether Garris was purchased offered a lock trigger when he the handgun and thoroughly how Garris and the On Target salesman reviewed instruction day manual on purchase. These dispute areas of judg- were sufficient to defeat summary ment; however, neither dispositive of the two issues outlined above. facts,

The undisputed including the warnings contained manual, delivery the instruction Garris a lockbox and accident, padlock, and the circumstances constituted upon core material facts which the lower court could properly to judgment determine entitlement as a matter For law. her part, undisputed appellant’s were submissions *19 gun that the manufacturers been dangers have aware of the of to for handguns century, children over a that childproof and personalized handguns are viable design options, design that improvements are more effective than in safety instructions children, preventing injuries to and that “the of reliance [appellee] on materials owner’s manual and the provision of a lockable case carrying inadequate protect was to children from the risk of gun unintended death.” court, therefore,

The had which facts were material to the resolution of the controversy before it and which upon it could properly party decide which a judgment entitled to as law, of matter the notwithstanding disputed claim of appellee trigger it made a lock available to Garris and that warnings DeCarlo did not review the and instructions with words, him. other accepting as true the facts that DeCarlo trigger had not lock offered and that he had not discussed warnings Garris, the and with instructions these assumed facts, in conjunction undisputed the facts of support appellant’s opposition to summary the motion for judgment discussed, supra, represented putative the evidence in the Thus, from the appellant. undisputed most favorable light by appellant, true upon and facts assumed relied facts motion, undisputed as facts as well purposes of trial court had before it upon by appellee, the relied summary judgment. facts on the motion for material to rule whether, make a determination as it could Specifically, handgun sold controlling legal authority, of contemplation defective, dangerous unreasonably was in a condition to Garris handgun storage of the Garris improper and whether the gun. an misuse constituted unforeseeable Morever, dispute to create a factual appellant’s attempt her position is undermined trigger lock DeCarlo offered trigger external urging that the argument, us oral before available not constitute the the salesman said he made did lock alleged safety that would have corrected the device type maintained, argument at oral before Appellant also defeсt. us, graphic of how or the written irrespective prominent been, they sale had would warnings issued at the time of in the to render Garris’s violation of State law operated have storing his storing handgun, negligence manner lack of of a three- supervision under the mattress and his gun Thus, appellant’s attempt generate year old unforeseeable. dispute regarding a factual whether DeCarlo reviewed stated warnings position and is adverse to her instructions of conduct should have been foreseeable that Garris’s course any warnings may given. which have been despite posits “unjustifiably that our dissenting opinion decision (1) the incorporation from the trier fact” whether removes design is a workable under the risk- option of a device test; (2) utility storing whether the under reasonably not a misuse mattress foreseeable therefore (3) product; whether instructions *20 sufficiently against warned the reason- provided appellee foreseeable, of prod- or incorrect use the ably yet unintended noted, no warnings As we appellant uct. have insists sufficient, the of thereby removing adequacy have would been jury. as a factual issue for the warnings those submission foreseeability of of storage the reasonable Regarding whether 160 handgun matter,

the under mattress was a factual we conclude, infra, storage that such handgun the under the judice, sub circumstances, i.e., of an unsuper- within reach law, three-year vised old in violation State constitutеs as a misuse matter law. Even were to determine we improper storage reasonably whether handgun matter, foreseeable is a factual appellee would nonetheless be summary hand, entitled to judgment given the case at Maryland risk-utility law is that inapplicable test is handguns which do not malfunction. No factual is issue it generated because is as to immaterial whether the incorpo- ration of a device is a option workable design under risk-utility standard-the test-that does not For apply. forth, infra, reasons we undisputed set facts which are handgun material establish that did not malfunction and was, therefore, appellant’s not defective improper storage and failure to heed constituted an unforeseeable handgun. misuse

KELLEY v. THE R.G. INDUSTRIES: HOLDING OR OBI TER DICTUM as dictum

Appellant characterizes Court’s state Kelley ment risk-utility inapplicable test to a unless malfunctions. See Kelley, 304 Md. term dictum is an abbreviated form of 497 A.2d 1143. dictum, obiter as “a which translated remark the way.” (6th ed.1990). Dictionary Black’s Law It 454 refers to a by a “incidentally statement made court collaterally, or directly it, not upon question point before upon ” necessarily involved the determination of the cause.... Id. at 1072. Obiter dictum adjudication. authority lacks Stover, v. Stover 470, 476, see Md.App. (1984); 483 783 A.2d Comm’n, v. Bryan State Roads 712-13, 115 Md.App. (1997). It is A.2d not entitled to the precedential weight holding afforded the because it does not “the receive deliber judgment” ate and in phrasing considered used the holding. Wilson, 24, 36, Stаte (1995). A.2d 1

161 on certification Appeals came the Court of Kelley before rephrased The Court District Court. from the United States as and dealt questions6 three new questions four certified 131, 497 A.2d 1143. Kelley, 304 Md. at them seriatum. handgun question of whether a first Court addressed The strict be held liable under or marketer could manufacturer Kelley’s. It found injuries for such as liability theories (Second) Torts could on Restatement liability not be based (1965) or abnormally dangerous governing and 520 §§ 519 apply because this doctrine “does activity ultrahazardous 133, handguns.” Id. at marketing manufacture or to the A.2d 1143. 497 to the applicability Court next looked Restatement

(Second) 402A, of a § which holds liable the seller Torts unreasonably dangerous.” “in a condition defective 134, “consumer-expecta- Applying 1143. Id. at A.2d test, handgun normally operating found that a tion” Court 136, 497 1143. It not in a defective condition. Id. at A.2d test, “risk-utility” finding then turned the alternative wrong prod- with a only something goes can used “when 138, 1143. handgun Id. at A.2d Because “a which uct.” fired ... worked person in whose direction it was injured intended,” as test was risk-utility “inapplicable precisely Id. then considered present situation.” The Court the common law to make the manufacturers whether extend but handguns gunshot injuries, marketers of liable for contrary Maryland public that this “would be determined rephrased questions as 6. The were follows: 1) handgun, general, of a liable Is manufacturer marketer theory injured any liability person a result of under strict to a as product? the criminal use of its small, 2) particular category of Is the manufacturer or marketer of a cheap “Saturday Night Spe- handguns, referred to as sometimes cials,” activity, strictly to a regularly used in criminal liable injured by during the of a crime? person such course RG38S, 3) Handgun Does the Model serial number Rohm Revolver 0152662, category question within the referred to in 2? fall Kelley, Md. at 497 A.2d 1143. Id.

policy Legislature.” as set forth A.2d 1143.

Turning to rephrased question, its second the Court found “Saturday the class of known handguns Night as Spe- cials” was intended and suited to uses that were inconsis- *22 Id. at 147-53, Maryland public policy. tent with 497 A.2d It also of 1143. took notice “the ever growing number of to injuries deaths and such in handguns being due used 157, 1143, id. at activity,” criminal 497 A.2d and determined that “the or Saturday manufacturer marketer of a Night or Special ought knows know that chief the use of the 156, id. at is for activity,” criminal 497 A.2d 1143. recognized separate, The Court thus “a limited area of strict manufacturers, for liability the as in well as all the marketing chain, 157, Id. at Specials.” of Saturday Night 497 A.2d 1143. Finally, the Court the rephrased answered third question, the handgun Kelley’s injuries whether that caused was a Id. at Saturday Night Special, 159-61, in the affirmative.7 A.2d 1143.

The Court’s risk-utility statement the test was to “a which inapplicable handgun has not malfunctioned” was not obiter dictum. and history Based structure decision, pellucidly, finding the Court made not this “inciden tally collaterally,” response but Kelley’s contention § that R.G. Industries liable under 402A. As the Court Education, State Board of stated in Appeals 633, 346 Md. 641, (1997), 697 A.2d 1334 appellate rejection “[a]n court’s of a reаson given litigant sought the relief in the case is ” Moreover, procedural ‘dicta.’ posture the case necessitated answering questions each certified Court, making U.S. District applicability consideration of the (Second) § Restatement Torts 402A absolutely neces Thus, holding Kelley sary. risk-utility test inapplicable handguns is neither nor “incidental” “eollater- 7. The Court also discussed effective date of the "modification of 161-62, Maryland principles” common law tort it had Id. at fashioned. 497 A.2d 1143. indeed, and, set forth an exten- the Court al” to the decision holding. support of explication sive Kelley has over- which have construed None of the cases holding ultimate that “the Kelley rejected or have turned liability on the impose be extended to utility test cannot risk[-] not malfunc- which has maker or marketer of Although the Kelley, 497 A.2d 1143. tioned.” 304 Md. times, none of its Kelley several Appeals Court of has cited of the decision.8 specific aspect has this opinions addressed and, opinions issue in two This has dealt with the Court Kelley, from we have nei- distinguished both cases while we Lord, K Inc. v. In C & rejected it. questioned ther nor Carter, applied 536 A.2d 699 we in which the conveyer that a belt risk-utility finding test that, stated injured arm was was defective. We plaintiffs Kelley language clearly malfunction] “although [on handguns, inappli- such as it is applicable to instrumentalities here, is the failure to include design cable where as defect *23 ability or majority discussed the Court’s 8. The of these cases have State, willingness modify 337 Md. the common law. Seе Parker v. 270, 271, 7, (1995); Hawkins, Md. n. State v. 326 283 653 A.2d 436 292-94, (1992); Owens-Illinois, Zenobia, 325 Md. 604 A.2d 489 Inc. v. 420, 469-70, 342, (1992); Murphy Edmonds, Md. 601 A.2d 633 325 v. 362, 79, 91, (1992); Md. 585 601 A.2d 102 322 Chops, Erie Ins. Co. v. 17, 28, (1991); Harrant, Md. 557 A.2d 210 A.2d 232 316 Gaver v. 724, (1989); 704, Labs., Doe, 315 Md. 556 Inc. v. Miles Cutter Labs. Div. (1989); A.2d 1107 County Anne Arundel v. Fraternal Order Anne 98, 106-07, 543 A.2d Personnel, 313 Md. Arundel Detention & Officers 328, 331, (1987); (1988); State, Md. 529 A.2d 365 841 310 Ireland v. 344, 357, (1986). State, Md. 509 A.2d 120 Others have 306 Harris v. modifications, prospective the nature of such discussed see Julian v. 1, 10-11, (1990); Trucking Christopher, 320 Md. 575 A.2d 735 American 583, 7, (1988), or Ass’ns, Goldstein, 312 Md. 592 n. 541 A.2d 955 Inc. v. legislative policy, v. the interaction of these modifications see State 585, 606-07, (1998); 350 Md. 714 A.2d 841 Wiegmann, v. Telnikoff 561, 580, (1997); Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 347 Md. Medical Waste 623, 596, Coalition, Inc., Assocs., Md. 612 ‍‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‍Inc. v. 327 Maryland Waste J., 35-36, (Adkins, (1992); Gaver, 557 A.2d 210 A.2d 241 316 Md. at 331-32, Ireland, Two have dissenting); Md. at 529 A.2d 365. cases 310 subject abnormally dangerous Kelley’s holding discussed on 58, 71-74, U.S.A., 335 Md. 642 activities. See Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co. (1994); Washington 180 Sanitary v. CAE-Link A.2d Suburban Comm’n 115, 14, (1993). 745 330 Md. 141 n. 622 A.2d Corp., 164 device____” Id. at 86, safety 536 A.2d 699. followed the We

Kelley malfunction end, however, requirement finding conveyer had malfunctioned before risk- applying the Id. We also utility test. applied risk-utility test find Industries, Ziegler Heavy v. Kawasaki defective 74 613, (1988), 539 701 Kelley Md.App. limiting A.2d malfunc- tion requirement to “the narrow context of handguns” possibly of other ... products whose “normal function [is] Id. at 622-23, bring injury.” about serious 539 A.2d 701. We stated, however, absence of a that “the safety may device defect, clearly design be a in a product even which does not ” Id. 623, ‘malfunction.’ 539 A.2d 701. in Ziegler gave rise to a line of cases, This statement each applying risk-utility test to a product which had allegedly malfunctioned but which had the design defect of Klein, device. See failing safety include 92 Md.App. at Co., 486, Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor (1992); 608 A.2d 1276 80 (1989). 695, 717-19, case, Md.App. A.2d 135 In one we extended this doctrine applying risk-utility test to a product whose design flaw was not the absence of a safety feature but nоnetheless had “an indirect ... influence safety ... [by] mak[ing] likely it less feature Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, Valk [would] utilized.” 304, 317, grounds rev’d on other A.2d Co., sub Montgomery County nom. Mfg. Valk 317 Md. (1989). Nevertheless, 562 A.2d 1246 neither this Court nor Appeals the Court of has applied risk-utility test to a handgun, nor has either questioned holding Court Kelley the risk-utility inapplicable test to a handgun Kelley, malfunctioned. See that has not 304 Md. at A.2d 1143.

MALFUNCTION *24 handgun

A that has performed expected as cannot be said to have “malfunctioned” within the ambit of Restatement (Second) 402A, by Kelley. § of Torts as A construed handgun is a in unique product that “its normal function is to propel Kelley, 136, bullets with deadly force.” 304 Md. at 497 A.2d

165 can be by handgun accident caused a every Not fatal 1143. malfunction, then, a handgun “danger- because considered a 136, 497 Id. at 1143. As the very nature.” A.2d ous[ ] stated, which a Kelley Court injured “In the case of a fired, was worked in whose direction it person 138, Id. at 1143. as intended.” 497 A.2d precisely Lord, K C & concept of malfunction We discussed injured employee rendering plant an a chicken was when conveyer. cleaning convey- a The stick with which he was in a his arm drawn into the caught pinch point up er was we looked to Duke v. & For guidance, belt’s roller. Gulf Mfg., Western (Mo.App.1983), 660 S.W.2d 404 case cited Duke, Kelley “In example malfunctioning product. as an of a was when struck plaintiff operating die-press ‘something knew, him in thing the head and the next he his hands were ” Lord, K 85, C & at 536 699 press.’ A.2d Duke, 407). at The on (quoting press S.W.2d descended hands, injuries. plaintiffs causing serious We concluded that Duke “extremely analogous” to the case before us and reasoned that subject conveyer’s transport “normal function” is to conveyer “precisely

feathers cookers. The did not work it caught as intended” when Carter’s hand. 86, 536

Id. conveyer A.2d 699. We held that had malfunctioned and that the trial court “did not err in instruct- test.” Id. ing jury risk[-]utility Kelley Engineering, Court also cited Barker v. Lull

The Inc., 413, 225, 143 Cal.Rptr. 20 Cal.3d 573 P.2d 443 Back v. Corporation, Wickes 375 Mass. 378 N.E.2d (1978), as examples Kelley, See malfunctioning products. Barker, Md. at A.2d 1143. a motor home was in a highway involved accident and ran off the road. When fence, flames, struck a killing the vehicle roadside it burst into Back all four of its passengers. plaintiffs injuries oc curred when the construction loader he was became operating unbalanced and over. As the tipped plaintiff away scurried loader, from the he was by piece falling struck lumber and *25 cases, In

seriously injured. injuries both were caused something product other than the normal function of the convey normal function of a motor is to involved. The home in along roadways. The normal function of the lift passengers stationary lifting Back was to remain while a load. sure, question partially

To be one of definition. inquiry largely The outcome of the malfunction determined narrowly broadly how or the normal function is defined. example, For had we defined the normal function of the in K as in conveyer broadly “carrying objects C & Lord more in which belt is moving,” the direction we would have found no malfunction. But when the in is а question handgun, we are not left to our own devices. The of Court Appeals already has defined the normal function of a hand gun deadly bullets with force.” propel Kelley, Md. —“to In judice, 497 A.2d 1143. the case sub the fact that the in gunshot tragic young boy resulted death of a does not transform the into a propulsion bullet malfunction. us Appellant gun would have define the normal functions of a enforcement, sport, as “law and home and business protec tion,” citing exceptions to the crime of wearing, carrying, Md.Ann.Code, a firearm art. transporting contained 36B(c) (1957, § Repl.Vol., Each of Cum.Supp.). functions, however, suggested these relies on the more basic handgun function that renders a useful—the of a propulsion great bullet with force. Kelley reliance Court’s definition, we conclude that the in this case did malfunction. (Second) liability concepts

The strict of Restatement § apply Torts 402A were never intended to to instrumentali- ties, handguns, such as whose normal functions are to cause inflict injury. death or serious Section 402A was rooted concept holding engaged ancient common law “those business of food intended for human ... selling consumption to a high degree responsibility products.” their Re- § 402A cmt. statement b. The drafters the Restatement more cases that special followed modern “extended this rule liability beyond consump- strict the seller of food for human which, ... if it any product tion to cover the sale should defective, harm may expected physical to be to cause prove consumer or his Id. property.” [or her] foods, liability concept began products Because § of the illustrations used the comment to 402A refer many for human These illustra- products consumption. intended *26 i example, tions are instructive nonetheless. For comment must provision product focuses on the that the be “unreason- to user or consumer.” The comment ably dangerous explains dangerous article sold must be to an “[t]he beyond contemplated by that which be extent would it,” purchases offering following consumer who ordinary illustrations: whiskey unreasonably dangerous merely

Good is not be- drunk, especially it will make some and is people cause alcoholics; but a dangerous whiskey, containing to bad oil, dangerous unreasonably dangerous. amount of fusel merely is not unreasonably dangerous Good tobacco because harmful; of but smoking may the effects be tobacco contain- ing something marijuana may unreasonably danger- like be ous. propensity whiskey

Id. at cmt. i. The to make one drunk and of tobacco to harm one’s are well known lungs expected; dangers go “beyond such do not that which would contemplated by ordinary consumer who it.” purchases Id. of a handgun, expect the case consumer would “[a] [it] nature, dangerous, by very to be to have the capacity 136, to a bullet with force.” Md. at deadly Kelley, fire danger handgun might injure A.2d 1143. The that a someone then, its normal through operation, type is not the hazard § general- intended to be covered Restatement 402A. See ly Liability Injuries Note: Manufacturers’ Strict From a (1983) Handgun, Mary Well Made Wm. & L.Rev. 467 (noting agreement among “most authorities ... that the defi- nitions ‘unreasonably dangerous’ ‘defective condition’ and [of §in liability outline a device known as the consumer 402A] test,” expectation discussing legal theory but the “novel v. Lull risk-utility balancing” Engineer advanced Barker Co., 413, 143 (1978)), 573 P.2d 443 ing Cal.Rptr. 20 Cal.3d 304 Md. at 497 A.2d 1143. Kelley, cited supported by partial types This conclusion is list § to to which Restatement 402A was intended products apply. sale of

The- rule stated this limited [s]ection ... consumption, although obviously food for human it will any It include them. extends sold the condi- ... in which it is the ultimate user or expected tion reach automobile, Thus a applies consumer. the rule stated an tire, wheel, heater, a airplane, grinding gas an a a water stove, tool, machine, chair, riveting and an power insecticide. (Second) § reporter

Restatement of Torts 402A cmt. d. The “products liability also lists in his notes the to which has been food, automobiles, tires, by case law: animal steer- extended” instruments, wheels, ing gear, airplanes, airplane grinding blocks, cable, building cinder electric insecticide herbi- sprays, cide, tools, carts, power power combination children’s golf *27 chairs, machines, riveting water heat- playground equipment, ers, A gas reporter’s handgun and stoves. Id. at note 3. is inherently products different from each of these that it is ” 304 “dangerous[ by very Kelley, nature.... Md. ] A is handgun designed purpose 497 A.2d 1143. for the sole of force,” id., “propel[ling] deadly purpose bullets with that has necessary endangering result of human life. This attrib- by only products, ute is shared few manufactured none of of products which is included the list to which Restatement § 402A was intended to apply. Appeals unequivocal Kelley

The Court of when it said, believe, however, risk-utility inappli- “We that the test is present only applied cable to the situation. This standard is something goes wrong when with the As we have product.” noted, from none of the decisions which have emanated construing rejected has overturned or Appeals Kelley Court its ultimate that “the test cannot be ex- holding risk-utility

169 impose liabñity to on the maker or marketer of a tended think it Although which has not malfunctioned.” we mention, almost too elemental to when there has been a clear pronouncement by Ap- issued the Court of unambiguous and peals, by we are bound to abide that decision.9 We do not spoken the Court of have Appeals any believe that could clarity Kelley. than it did in its decision in Until greater issue, Appeals unless the Court of revisits the are bound we by stare decisis.

MISUSE has

Appellant risk-utility applies asserted “the test to a safety design claim that the absence device renders a assertion, Notwithstanding defective.” the firearm in question, more was not with an precisely, equipped “external” devicе, safety design prevent but did have a it from The fatal discharging. prevented by event could have been inability young disengage victim to the manual lockbox, safety, storage use of the proper weapon pursuant to the or provided, proper supervision young child. Counsel for acknowledged: Garris recognized previous 9. We have in several decisions that adherence to Appeals mandatory: Corning the decisions of the Court of Owens Bauman, 454, 496, (1999) Md.App. (holding 726 745 A.2d "[ajlternatively, judicial public policy matters of in the arena are [ujntil relegated Maryland’s highest Appeals court-the Court of ... appellant unless either avenue of pursued, redress available to ... purview is not within our ... to overrule a decision of the Court of 329, 335, Appeals.”); Square Hospital, Md.App. Hans v. Franklin (1975) "[wjhatever (holding A.2d application merits case, ipsa loquitur beyond of res authority to the facts in this it is our contrary clearly decide established law set forth the Court of Appeals. decisis.”); We Loyola are bound stare Fed. Sav. & Inc., 646, 659, Trenchcraft, Loan Ass’n v. 303 A.2d 432 (1973) remains, however, (holding appears "The fact that such standard State, to be the law of this as enunciated in the decisions of the Court of *28 Appeals previously. discussed Unless those decisions are either ex itself, plained away Appeals or overruled the Court of this Court majority precept must follow what a of its members discern to be the ‍‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‍i.e., them, action, proof be drawn from of fraud in a civil either in lаw equity, convincing.’ Only or in Appeals must be 'clear and the Court of notion.”) could disabuse of that are way trying

I’m in no to excuse Mr. Garris’s actions. We way in the he stored this negligent not. Mr. Garris was negli- suffer the of that gun. consequence Mr. Garris will responsible for the rest of his life. He knows he was gence for of his son. the death may imputed not be

Although negligence parent child, question it is relevant on the of whether the elder undeniably dangerous what is a instrumentali- Garris misused ty-

Thus, appellee’s even were we to conclude that device on the was a failure to include a child defect, summary design appellee would still be entitled h of judgment gun. because of his misuse Comment (Second) § of Torts 402A provides: Restatement A it product is not a defective condition when is safe for If handling consumption. injury normal results as where a is handling, beverage from abnormal bottled from against cap, knocked a radiator to remove the use, abnormal as where too much salt preparation food, or from abnormal as where a consumption, added ill, too much is not candy child eats and made the seller hable. if principle,

The misuse doctrine is based on the same because product unreasonably dangerous “is not when used for foreseeable, reasonably in a manner that is it purpose and defective, simply is not and the seller will not be liable.” Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 495 A.2d 348. Misuse therefore claim negates design defect occurs when the reasonably is used a mаnner not foreseeable to question 595-96, 348; Simpson, the seller. Id. at 495 A.2d see test, “foreseeability” 527 A.2d 1337. The however, must be with caution applied

because, hindsight, any with the benefit of accident could care, of strict imposition products foreseeable. Without in a an insur- liability becoming could result manufacturer’s from every injury may product. er for result *29 Simpson, (citing Phipps at 527 A.2d 1337 Motors 337, 351-52, Corp., General Md. A.2d 955 (1976)). Simpson, gasoline

In we examined whether a was container in purchasers misused. The of the container stored it home, they four-year-old basement of their where allowed two play unsupervised. children to The children removed the cap from the container spilled poured gasoline onto the basement floor. resulting gasoline vapors ignited, When the one of the children died and the other was severely burned. The gasoline container had written on two of its four sides reading “Keep Out of Reach of “Do Children” and Not in Space.” Id. Living Store Vehicle or at 527 A.2d 1337. misuse, With said in Simpson, id. respect the issue of we 205-06, 527 A.2d 1337: Ellsworth, the plaintiff severely burned when the

flannelette nightgown she was wearing ignited after she came in proximity close to a front burner on the electric stove her plaintiff kitchen. The sued the seller and manufacturer of nightgown grounds: three strict liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranty of fitness. The verdicts were for the plaintiff defense and the appealed, claiming the trial court gave erroneous in- jury structions on of a product misuse as a defense to the strict liability claim. The Court of Appeals eventually reversed court, the trial stating that there was insufficient evidence of misuse to generate an issue for jury to consider but not before thoroughly discussing misuse and other defenses strict liability.

The Court pointed out that problems arise understanding the issue of misuse because of agreement absence as to meaning of the word.

Misuse has been reasonably defined as: a use not foresee- ... able a use of the product a manner which defen- dant not reasonably could ... foresee a use of a product where it is in way handled which the manufacturer could not have reasonably foreseen or expected normal and intended product plaintiff use and the use of the unintended as the result injury

could foresee an con- average so unusual handling ... a use or to be product reasonably expect could not sumer which to withstand it-a use manufactured designed and therefore, seller, anticipate provide need or reckless which constitutes wilful ... use of the omitted.) (Citations injury. invitation of or an misconduct *30 Ellsworth, 594-595, 348. The Court 495 A.2d 303 Md. at foreseeability” appropri- was the “reasonable concluded that required provide product a seller ate test. “[T]hus for a purpose when used unreasonably dangerous that is not reasonably foreseeable----[I]f that is in a manner and for a when used unreasonably dangerous is not product foreseeable, reasonably in a manner and purpose defective, not be liable.” the seller will not and simply is Ellsworth, 596, 348. at 495 A.2d 303 Md. ultimately

We held: case, can gasoline stored the [purchasers] In this home, on the ignoring the admonitions of their basement areas. The living not to store it of the can sides allowed two can an area which stored the [purchasers] gasoline to the can. The four-year-olds access unsupervised in manner and being purpose used for the can was not reasonably foreseeable. that was 206, storage We held the Id. at 527 A.2d 1337. law, misuse as a matter of to be the basement container Id.10 defeating thus the element defect. § com- alternatively on Restatement 402A based our decision

10. We that, given, adequate warning is no j, provides when an which ment for use in if the was safe products liability action will lie 206-07, Although A.2d 1337. warning. Id. at 527 with the accordance extensively, address it we do not parties briefed this issue have summary judgment was not based grant of trial court’s because the 512, 518, German, Md.App. A.2d 239 642 100 See Warner v. thereon. Sears, Co., (1994). Roebuck & do discuss Klein v. We also squarely on that which was based Md.App. 608 A.2d 1276 1276. legal principle. at 608 A.2d Id. same for the Fourth Appeals The United States Court of Circuit in Hood v. recently applied Maryland’s Ryobi misuse doctrine Cir.1999). (4th There, Corporation, America 181 F.3d plaintiff using guards miter saw that the had two blade shielding Despite the saw blade. Id. at 609. clear itself, both in the owner’s manual plaintiff the saw guards removed the blade continued to use the saw. later, twenty About minutes “the spinning saw blade flew off saw” and seriously injured plaintiff. Id. at 610. The trial granted summary court as to his judgment defective claim design and the Fourth Circuit that judgment. affirmed “Maryland The Hood court stated that imposes duty law no clear, predict that a easily consumer will violate under- standable warnings____” distinguished Id. at 612. It warnings, between such as in Simpson, guard those misuse,” against “affirmative consumer and those that are carelessness,” at simply avoiding “aimed consumer noting in Maryland latter should not be-and not been- have sufficient to defeat a claim. design (citing defective Id. at 612 Klein, 1276). 490-91, A.2d The court found *31 plaintiffs that the product affirmative misuse of the “in viola- clear, unmistakable, tion of easy-to-follow warnings” and injuries, caused his any and that this misuse “defeats claim that the saw is in design.” defective Id. at 613. case,

In present the provided by the instruction manual stated, in appellee relevant part, always “Firearms should unloaded, securely stored and from away children and careless adults” and “Firearms securely should be locked in racks or warnings cabinets when not use.”11 These gener- were not alized, “clear, unmistakable, but were easy-to-follow.”12 and 11. There handgun was also an instruction on the itself to read the using general warnings throughout manual before it and manual handgun safely thoroughly. use the and to read the manual argues Appellant warnings 12. that they were defective because "do specific danger not inform a consumer of the at issue here —the fact them, young guns children are attracted can fire even аt however, very young ages.” warning, only An effective need warn the followed, Moreover, they tragic been 612. had Id. at not have occurred. See Mazda in this case would accident America, 331 n. Rogowski, Md.App. Inc. v. Motor (1995) to consumers are (“Warnings given 659 A.2d 391 way in which the consumer is informed of effective when the risk.”). mitigates that nullifies or can be used however, under his mat- Instead, handgun stored the Garris can be no tress, reach of his son. There evidently within on part an affirmative action Garris’s debate that this was in the instruction warnings contained clearly contravened mis- handgun of the improper storage manual. Garris’s use, design defective claim. defeating appellant’s thus under storing

Appellant contends fore reasonably misuse because it was mattress was not seeable, study after has demonstrated “study out that pointing up not lock gun owners do significant proportion that a ..., household.” As when children are guns their even above, however, properly were not before these studies noted Moreover, as the Fourth summary judgment. the court Hood, duty predict no “Maryland imposes Circuit stated clear, easily understandable that a consumer will violate ” warnings presence Id. at 611. The warnings.... is, foreseeability proper question inquiry; transforms the reasonably that Garris would appellee have foreseen could commit acts provided lockbox or that he would use the instructions ignore law or clear violation id. this he the firearm? See provided purchased when case, that this behavior was not conclude as a matter law we reasonably foreseeable. BALTI- THE COURT FOR OF CIRCUIT

JUDGMENT CITY AFFIRMED. MORE BY APPELLANT. BE PAID

COSTS TO *32 behavior; dangerous not inform the engage in the it need user not to Hood, may consequences that result from that behavior. See user of the warning removing (finding specific the blade that a 181 F.3d at 611 unnecessary). was guards would lead to blade detachment

175 SONNER, in which Dissenting opinion by Judge, HOLLANDER, J., joins. opinion

Because I understand the to create a majority’s law, strict I “gun exception” Maryland products liability respectfully majority’s opinion dissent. The affirms the circuit test, to apply expectation court’s decision the consumer test, reject risk-utility as the standard to determine pistol defectively designed whether the P89 because of its I application failure to include a device. believe the fails to expectation the consumer test is flawed because it 1985, recognize the evolution of the law from when the Court Industries, Inc., Appeals Kelley decided v. R.G. 304 Md. 124, (1985), present. 497 A.2d 1143 to the application current strict law reveals that the Maryland products liability circuit court incorrect applied the standard determine de- product design. fective

Maryland applied expectation courts have the consumer test claims, products liability design all strict defect unless the alleged design either malfunctions defect is a a safety very failure include device. Under those two circumstances, particular plaintiff applica- entitled risk-utility genesis tion оf the test. The of this rule can 337, traced to Phipps Corp., General Motors 278 Md. 363 (1976), § 955 adopted A.2d when the Court of 402A of Appeals (Second) of Torts Restatement consumer Court, however, expectation test standard. The Phipps stated “in some question circumstances the of whether a particu- lar design is defective may depend upon balancing of the utility design and other factors against magnitude 348, the risk.” Phipps, Although Md. 363 A.2d 955. the Phipps gave examples Court no of the “some circum- stances” when risk-utility applicable, test is Court Appeals Kelley Kelley did. The announced Court risk utility test

is inapplicable present to the situation. This standard only applied something goes wrong when with the product. Co., Inc., Eng. Barker Lull [v. Cal.3d (1978) ], Cal.Rptr. P.2d an unbalanced machine *33 176 633, 378 Mass. Corp. [375 In Back v. Wickes over.

tipped (Mass.1978) ], home exploded, a motor 964 N.E.2d (Mo.App. 404 Mfg. Co. S.W.2d [660 Duke v. & Western Gulf 1983) These hands. ], caught plaintiffs power press malfunctioned. products 138, Thus, Kelley, the 497 A.2d 1143. after 304 Md. at

Kelley, whether a was defec- determining product for Maryland test test, unless the expectation consumer was the tively designed in the instant majority opinion The product malfunctioned. this claim at analysis appellant’s begins case and ends the last entirely overlooks majority’s opinion The point. liability law. products of strict years sixteen announced Kelley decided Appeals the Court of Since test, three expectation the consumer exception first to product our defective noteworthy question trends continue First, criti legal of the continued because design standard. test, twenty-four at least expectation cism of the consumer test for risk-utility form of the adopted have some states John liability design defects. See determining products strict Law The American The New Clothes: Vargo, Emperor’s F. lp02A Products a “New Cloth” Section Institute Adams for the States Reveals Survey Liability Design Defects —A (1996). Second, Weave, 493 26 U. Mem.L.Rev. Different (Third) rejects expectation of Torts the consumer Restatement judging defectiveness independent as an standard test (Third) of Torts: Products Restatement designs. (1998). Third, this 2, important, § and most Liability, g cmt. 1985, “some circum Court, began expand beginning include, malfunction, addition Phipps stances” of device, same claim made very absence of Co., Md.App. 62 Mfg. v. Black Decker Troja See & appellant. denied, 471, 516, 494 A.2d 939 101, 107, cert. 303 Md. 488 A.2d Carter, 68, 86, ‍‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‍Lord, 536 (1985); Md.App. K Inc. v. 74 C & (1988); v. 74 Mfg. Rangaswamy, 699 Co. A.2d Valk Mont 304, 313, grounds, rev’d an other 537 A.2d Co., 185, 317 Md. 562 A.2d Mfg. gomery County Valk Indus., Ltd., Md.App. (1989); Heavy Kawasaki Ziegler v. denied, 32, 542 A.2d 858 613, 623, cert. 313 Md. 539 A.2d Sears, Co., 477, 486, (1988); 92 Md.App. Klein v. Roebuck and (1992). 447, 614 608 A.2d cert. denied 328 Md. A.2d because, distinguishable Kelley claim is from Appellant’s similar, are the claim is different. The although products “gun exception” creates a to the line of majority’s opinion cases, that created the second Kelley, exception decided after majority consumer expectation to the test. apparently *34 of justifies “gun exception” overtly dangerous this because of I propensities handgun. cannot subscribe to a strict liability liability formula that the least to the products assigns dangerous products. majori- manufacturers of the most The ty’s opinion technological freezes the advancements of hand- at 1985 gun safety Handgun devices levels. users and their not of of deprived children should be the same standards quality every product, and afforded to users of other of this to hold liable appellee because Court’s reluctance pistol placed for the P89 within the stream of commerce. Furthermore, majority’s opinion unjustifiably removes (1) whether, from question the trier fact under the test, risk-utility of a incorporation safety device into the (2) pistol P89 is a workable design option, storing whether the pistol of the P89 reasonably under mattress is foreseeable (3) product, therefore a misuse of the and whether the provided by or instructions the appellees sufficiently foreseeable, against warned reasonably yet unintended or product. incorrect use of the As the Court of Appeals stated Co., Fenwick, 134, 138, in Fenwick Motor Inc. v. 258 Md. underlying A.2d 256 where the facts are “[e]ven undis- puted, if those facts susceptible permissi- are to more than one inference, ble the choice between those inferences should not law, as a made matter of but should be submitted to the trier of fact.” balancing risk-utility test and the question an intervening superseding misuse as cause should be determined the trier of fact. I believe the proper disposition instant case should have been to judgment vacate the court the circuit and remand the case proceedings. further

Case Details

Case Name: Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.
Court Name: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
Date Published: Apr 25, 2001
Citation: 770 A.2d 1072
Docket Number: 2095, Sept. Term, 1999
Court Abbreviation: Md. Ct. Spec. App.
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