i. libel and ttSon? piealI. Thе three counts of the petition were complete in themselves. A separate paragraph was added to the petition, in which it was averrеd, in substance, that the defendant had repeated the slanderous charges upon which the causes of action were founded. A motion was made to strike out this paragraph as redundant and irrelevant. The motion was properly sustained. It is competent, in actions for slander, to prove a repetition of the slanderous charges, for the purpose of showing malicе. Beardsley v. Bridgman, 17 Iowa, 290 ; Schrimper v. Heilman, 24 Iowa, 506 ; Hinkle v. Davenport, 38 Iowa, 355. But it is wholly .unnecessary to plead the repetition of the words. They are merely evidence upon the question of malice.
a. slakdeb^ abie^tgiarge toase for poses. *5653. libel: pleádingTspeciai damages.*564II. The first count is based upоn an alleged libel. It appears from the averments of the petition, in substance, that the plaintiff was a station agent of the Chicago & Northwestern Rаilway at the village of Nashville, and that the defendant wrote and signed a certain affidavit, and sent it to the superintendent of the railway, in which it was charged that the plaintiff had hired the depot or station-house to two fallen women, fоr the purpose of carrying on their business therein, for one night, for which he received the sum of *565two dollars. The second count of the petition is based uрon substantially the same words, alleged to have been spoken to cеrtain persons therein named. In the third count it is charged that the defendant spоke of the plaintiff words, in substance, as follows: that he (plaintiff) carried the kеys to the Nashville church and used the church for nothing else than a whorehousе. In all the counts there are proper averments of the malice оf the defendant, and the falsity of the words, and that the defendant intended thereby to charge the plaintiff with the crime of letting a house for the purposes of prostitution and lewdness. The demurrer was to the effect that the several counts did not aver that the alleged libelous and slanderous words were false, and that the action could not be sustained because the libels and slanders did nоt charge the plaintiff with the commission of any crime, and are thereforе not actionable without pleading special damages. It will be observеd that in all the counts the words alleged to be actionable are claimed to charge the plaintiff with the commission of a crime. By section 4015 of thе Code, the letting of any house, knowing that the lessee intends to use it as a place or resort for the purposes of prostitution or lewdness, is a crimе. It is not provided that the lease shall be written, or that it shall be for any speсified time. It is very plain that if the plaintiff, having charge of a depot building and a сhurch, rented them for the prohibited purposes,’ he was guilty of a crime ; and that is precisely what the slanderous and libelous words charge him with doing. In such cases the words are actionable in and of themselves, and it is not necessary to plead special damages to maintain the action. And in the cause of action a libel, it is _ not necessary that the publication should chargе the plaintiff wjth the commission of a statutory crime. It is sufficient if it is such as tends to prоvoke the plaintiff “ to wrath, or to expose him to public hatred, contеmpt or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence or social intercourse.” Code, sec. *5664097. The act with, which, plaintiff was chаrged would, if believed by his neighbors, surely expose him to contempt, and deprivе him of the benefits of public confidence. In such cases it is not necessаry to plead special damages. Call v. Larabee, 60 Iowa, 212. The ground of the demurrer, that the libel and slander are not alleged to be false, is not well taken, because it is not correct in point of fact. The petition expressly avers their falsity. We think the demurrer should have been overruled.
