74 P. 1052 | Ariz. | 1904
The amended complaint in this action contains in substance the. following allegations: That the plaintiffs are stockholders in the Cobre Grande Copper Company, an Arizona corporation, one of the defendants herein, and that the plaintiff Ha'llenborg is a creditor of said company. That since January 1, 1900, the said Cobre Grande Copper Company has been engaged in a series of litigation with the defendants William C. Greene, George Mitchell, and their associates, confederates, and agents; that said litigation, among other things, involved the title and right of possession to certain mining property situate in the state of Sonora, republic of Mexico. That the Cobre Grande Copper Company claims to be the rightful owner and entitled to the possession of said property, and that the defendant Greene wrongfully and fraudulently had dispossessed said company, and is now in the wrongful and fraudulent control of the same. That suits are pending in the courts of Mexico, brought by the Cobre Grande Copper Company, to recover possession of said property. That actions in replevin, instituted by the company, are pending in New York and in Texas. That there was pending, at the time of the commencement of this suit, an action in the district court of the third judicial district of the territory of Arizona, in and for the county of Maricopa, against the defendant Greene, the defendant Mitchell, and the defendant Phoenix National Bank to prevent the delivery by said bank to said Greene of certain deeds to said mining
On these facts as alleged the plaintiffs prayed for the following relief, to wit: For an injunction restraining the defendants from discontinuing or causing to be discontinued or dismissed each and all of said pending suits; that a mandatory injunction issue directing said defendants to faithfully
On the trial of the cause the following uncontroverted facts were established, to wit: That the action brought by the Cobre Grande Copper Company in the state of Texas had been dismissed prior to the issue of the temporary injunction. That the action which was pending in the state of New York is still pending and undetermined, and that the defendants have been enjoined by an order of one of the courts of that state from dismissing said action, or causing it to be dismissed. That the action pending in the district court of Maricopa County was decided and had gone to judgment, and that as a part of said judgment the Phoenix National Bank was commanded to and had delivered up the papers and documents to Greene, and that the directors whose removal was desired had resigned, and had ceased to be officers or directors of the company. The trial court rightly held that, in view of these facts, an injunction could afford the plaintiffs no relief, and, as the case stood, the only question left was whether a receiver should be appointed.
The question presented on this appeal for our determination is whether, in view of the pleadings and the admitted situation of the parties at the time of the trial of the action, the district court was within a proper exercise of its discretion in refusing to appoint a receiver. If so, judgment was properly entered for the defendants. The grounds on which the receivership is asked are, substantially: That the suit in the district court of Maricopa County was brought in good faith by the Cobre Grande Copper Company to recover from Greene the possession of the Mexican property; that the agreement of December 12, 1900, whereby that suit and the various other suits were to be dismissed was and is fraudulent, because it
In the view we take, it is not incumbent on us nor proper for us to determine in the case before us whether the judgment in the action in the district court of Maricopa County was a proper and valid judgment, or whether the agreement of December 12th was illegal and without consideration, nor is relief in this respect prayed for in the complaint. The question for us to determine is whether the district court, in refusing to appoint a receiver in this action, exercised a sound judicial discretion, based upon a due consideration of the facts
It is urged that a receiver, being in possession of the books and records of the company, would be in a better position
Upon a full review of the pleadings and the admitted facts in this case, we are of the opinion that the district court was well within the exercise of sound discretion in refusing to appoint a receiver herein, and that there was not any other relief which the court could properly grant the plaintiffs in this action. The judgment will therefore be affirmed.
Doan, J., and Davis, J., concur.