A jury convicted appellant of distribution of heroin and possession with the intent to distribute heroin (“PWID”), both in violation of D.C.Code § 33-541(a)(l) (1988 Repl.). On direct appeal, appellant asserts as grounds for reversal that her trial counsel’s legal representation fell below the required standard thereby violating appellant’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree and affirm appellant’s convictions.
Specifically, appellant contends that her representation at trial was deficient in four respects: (1) counsel failed to introduce evidence to rebut the government’s contention that the $255.00 police found on her were the proceeds of illegal drug distribution activities; (2) counsel refused to call appellant, who wished to testify, as a witness; (3) counsel failed to call another witness appellant had identified as able to give exculpatory testimony; and (4) counsel failed to exploit the misidentification of appellant by a police officer at trial.
A hearing was held on appellant’s motion to set aside her convictions under D.C.Code § 23-110 (1981) at which appellant’s trial counsel testified and explained his actions. It is the record from this hearing that forms the principal basis for appellant’s appeal to this court. Appellant, however, has not filed a notice of appeal from the denial of her § 23-110 motion. We emphasize that unless a party appeals from the denial of such a motion, the only issues properly before this court are those the party raises on the basis of the record of trial.
See In re E.G.C.,
Affirmed.
Notes
. Even if we were to reach appellant’s other contentions, our review of the record of the § 23-110 proceeding, which was made part of the record on appeal, convinces us that we would find them meritless. In order for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to warrant reversal, there must be a showing that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
Strickland, supra.
Moreover, judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance.
Id.
at 689,
