ROBIN HALL, еt al., Plaintiffs, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 20-cv-03454-HSG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
June 17,
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR., United States District Judge
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; Re: Dkt. No. 5
Pending before the Court is the motion for preliminary injunction filed by Plaintiffs Robin Hall and Steven Summers. See Dkt. No. 5. The Court heard argument on June 10, 2020. As detailed below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their heavy burden of establishing that an injunction is warranted at this stage in the litigation and DENIES the motion.
We are currently in the midst of a once-in-a-generation global pandemic resulting from the spread of a disease called COVID-19, which is caused by a novel coronavirus. As of the date of this order, more than 2.1 million people in the United States have tested positive for COVID-19, and more than 116,000 Americans have died.1 In response to this crisis, Congress passed the
The Court understands the breadth and severity of the challenges that COVID-19 has presented—and continuеs to present—to individuals and governments across the country. Still, the scope of this particular case, and the instant motion, is narrow. The Court is tasked with determining whether the USDA‘s interpretation of the FFCRA as it relates to SNAP is inconsistent with the statute, and if so, what relief Plaintiffs may be entitled to as a result. This case does not call on the Court to decide what would be the fairest or most effective way to assist SNAP recipients in this era of COVID-19, because that judgment is committed to the political branches. Instead, the only issue for this Court is determining what Congress actually did in passing thе FFCRA—not whether its actions were the best possible policy response to current conditions, a matter on which the Court cannot and does not offer any opinion.
To guide its analysis and for context, the Court provides a brief overview of SNAP and the FFCRA.
A. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
Congress enacted SNAP “to promote the general welfare, [and] to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation‘s population by raising the levels of nutrition among low-income households.” See
SNAP is a state-administered Federal program. See
Under the program, SNAP provides monthly “allotments” for eligible low-income households to use tо purchase food at authorized retailers. See
The total SNAP allotments issued in each fiscal year are limited “to an amount not in excess of the appropriation for such fiscal year.”
B. Families First Coronavirus Response Act and the CARES Act
Congress enacted the FFCRA on March 18, 2020. See 134 Stat. 178. The FFCRA is divided into several divisions, including, as relevant here, “Division B—Nutrition Waivers.” Id. § 2101, at 184. Within Division B, Title III relates to “SNAP Waivers.” Id. §§ 2301–2302, at 187.
In the event of a public health emergency declaration by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act based on an outbreak of coronavirus disеase 2019 (COVID-19) and the issuance of an emergency or disaster declaration by a State based on an outbreak of COVID-19, the Secretary of Agriculture—shall provide, at the request of a State agency . . . that provides sufficient data (as determined by the Secretary through guidance) supporting such request, for emergency allotments to households participating in the supplemental nutrition assistance program under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 to address temporary food needs not greater than the applicable maximum monthly allotment for the household size . . . .
Two days after the FFCRA was signed into law, the USDA issued guidance to state agencies regarding these “emergency allotments.” See Dkt. No. 5-9, Ex. 2 (“March 20 Guidance“). This guidance comprised a sample “Request to Provide Emergency Allotments (Supplements) to SNAP Households.” Id. The sample request indicated that states could ask “to provide an emergency allotment to address temporary food needs to households to bring all households up to the maximum benefit due to pandemic related economic conditions for up to 2 months.” Id. The sаmple also advised that “[c]ontingent upon the availability of funding and ongoing need, USDA may approve additional
Congress subsequently enacted the
On April 21, 2020, the USDA issued updated guidance to state agencies regarding the “emergency allotments” under the FFCRA. See Dkt. No. 5-9, Ex. 7 (“April 21 Guidance“). The USDA‘s April 21 Guidance clarified that “[a] household‘s [emergency allotment] cannot increase the current monthly household SNAP benefit allotment beyond the applicable maximum monthly allotment for the househоld size.” Id. Thus, the USDA concluded that “SNAP households that already receive the maximum monthly allotment for their household size are not eligible for [emergency allotments].” Id.
C. California’s Request for SNAP Emergency Allotments under the FFCRA
The Secretary of Health and Human Services declared a nationwide public health emergency based on the outbreak of COVID-19 on January 31, 2020, satisfying the first condition required by the FFCRA.3 And Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency in California based on COVID-19 on March 4, 2020.4 As part of this state of emergency, the Governor issued a “shelter-in-place” executive order on March 19, 2020, which directed residents to “stay home” except for essential activities and to “at all times practice social distancing.”5
Accordingly, California‘s Department of Social Services submitted an initial request for emergency allotments under the FFCRA on March 25, 2020. See Dkt. No. 5-9, Ex. 3. In the cover letter submitted along with its request, CDSS highlighted its disagreement with the USDA‘s interpretation of
On March 26, 2020, the USDA responded to CDSS by email, informing CDSS that the proposal was “not aligned with the Emergency Allotment guidance.” See Dkt. No. 5-9, Ex. 4. The USDA directed CDSS to “revise the plan in accordance with the template,” as set forth in the USDA‘s March 20 Guidance. Id. The next day, CDSS submitted a “revised emergency allotment request.” See Dkt. No. 5-9, Ex. 5. In its cover letter, CDSS stated that its “revised request” was made as a result of the USDA‘s denial of its prior request. Id. But CDSS reiterated its belief that the FFCRA “authorizes paymеnts more broadly than as interpreted by [the USDA]” and CDSS “reserve[d] the right to challenge [the USDA‘s] implementation of the [FFCRA].” Id. In conformity with the USDA‘s guidance, however, CDSS‘s revised request sought emergency allotments to “raise each household‘s regular monthly SNAP allotment to the maximum allowable allotment based on household size.” Id.
The USDA approved CDSS‘s revised request on March 30, 2020, providing emergency allotments that would increase SNAP households’ current monthly allotments for March and April up to the maximum monthly allotment for a household of that size. See Dkt. No. 5-9, Ex. 6. And on April 29, 2020, CDSS submitted its request to extend the emergency allotments for the month of May 2020. See Dkt. No. 5-9, Ex. 8.
D. Procedural History
Despite California‘s indication to the USDA that it “reserve[d] the right to challenge [the USDA‘s] implementation of the [FFCRA],” see Dkt. No. 5-9, Ex. 5, as of the date of this order, California has not pursued litigation against the USDA. Rather, Plaintiffs filed this action on May 21, 2020, challenging the USDA‘s interpretation and implementation of the FFCRA as inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiffs assert two causes of action under the
In conjunction with their complaint, Plaintiffs also filed a motion for class certification, Dkt. No. 6, and a motion for preliminary injunction, Dkt. No. 5. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class defined as:
SNAP recipients in California who have been deemed eligible to receive, are receiving, or will receive the regular maximum monthly SNAP allotment for their household size from March 2020 until the Secretary for Health and Human Services rescinds the COVID-19 public
health emergency declaration or the State-issued emergency or disaster declaration expires.
See id. at ¶ 57; see also Dkt. No. 6. And in the instant motion, they seek a preliminary injunction enjoining the USDA and the United States Secretary of Agriculture “from denying any otherwise appropriate request from California under section 2302(a)(1) of the [FFCRA] because it provides emergency [SNAP] allotments to households receiving the maximum monthly benefit amount.” See Dkt. No. 5-10.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A preliminary injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits, that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. Alternatively, an injunction may issue where “the likelihood of success is such that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [the plaintiff‘s] favor,” provided that the plaintiff can also demonstrate the other twо Winter factors. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under either standard, Plaintiffs bear the burden of making a clear showing that they are entitled to this extraordinary remedy. Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010). The most important Winter factor is likelihood of success on the merits. See Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017).
A preliminary injunction “can take two forms,” either a “prohibitory injunction” or a “mandatory injunction.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2009). “Prohibitory injunction[s]” simply “preserve the status quo pending a determination of the action on the merits,” while “mandatory injunction[s]” “order[] a responsible party to take action.” Id. (quotation omitted). Mandatory injunctions are “particularly disfavored” and are only permissible if “extreme or very serious damage will result.” Id. at 879 (emphasis added). Courts do not issue mandatory injunctions “in doubtful cases.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
As a threshold matter, the Court finds that Plaintiffs seek a mandatory rather than prohibitory injunction. Plaintiffs nominally frame their requested injunctive relief in the negative, seeking to enjoin the USDA and the Secretary of Agriculture “from denying any otherwise appropriate request from California” under the FFCRA. But in substance, they are asking the Court to order the USDA to take action: approving “any otherwise appropriate request from California,” regardless of whether that request includes emergency allotments for households that already receive the statutory maximum. See Dkt. No. 5-10. As such, Plaintiffs are asking the Court to change the status quo, not preserve it. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A] mandatory injunction goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo pendente lite . . . .“) (quotations omitted). Plaintiffs thus bear a heavy burden of establishing that such an injunction is warranted, since mandatory injunctions are “particularly disfavored.” Id. (quotations omitted). Applying this stringent standard, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Where, as here, Plaintiffs seek a mаndatory injunction, they must show a “clear likelihood of success on the merits.” See Stanley v. University of Southern California, 13 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 1994). The crux of Plaintiffs’ case is that Defendant‘s interpretation of
As noted above, Defendant contends that
The Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs’ facial reading of
Here,
California noted exactly these types of employment difficulties as justification for its emergency allotment requests:
Many non-essential businesses have temporarily closed or reduced staffing, resulting in significant and immediate job loss across the statе. The economic impacts of COVID-19 have hit hourly workers and the self-employed especially hard, as working from home is not an option for many. Many workers will not continue to get paid as demand slows, businesses close, shifts are canceled, and workers are laid off. For instance, employees who are paid hourly, who make up over half of all wage and salary workers, constitute more than two-thirds of the retail trade and leisure and hospitality workforce nationwide, which are among the hardest hit industries in the current economic crisis. Many SNAP recipients have lost essential earned income and many Californians, who were not previously SNAP-eligible, are now turning to SNAP for critical food assistance.
See Dkt. No. 5-9, Ex. 3. Clearly, loss of income is not the only challenge facing SNAP households during the pandemic: as Plaintiffs note, “COVID-19 has greatly increased food insecurity in California” by increasing food prices and food unavailability. See Dkt. No. 15 at 5–8. However, unexpected job loss is a challenge Congress reasonably could have chosen to focus on in the FFCRA. And Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their interpretation, which would substantially raise the maximum monthly allotment cap, is clearly what Congress intended.
During oral argument, the parties acknowledged that there is no legislative history that elucidates Congress’ intention in enacting
First, Congress did not appropriate funds for any SNAP emergency allotments in the FFCRA. But the total SNAP allotments provided in each fiscal year are limited “to an amount not in excess of the appropriation for such fiscal year.”
A few weeks after passing thе FFCRA, Congress then appropriated approximately $15.8 billion for SNAP as part of the CARES Act “to prevent, prepare for, and respond to coronavirus, domestically or internationally.” See
Plaintiffs point out that their interpretation does not require all SNAP households to receive 200% of the maximum monthly allotments in emergency allotments, but that this instead is just a cap on such allotments. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 27 at 10–12. The Court understands that the parties do not know precisely how much the hypothetical emergency allotments under Plaintiffs’ interpretation would cost and that, as such, the parties do not know precisely how far SNAP‘s appropriations would stretch. Nevertheless, the Court thinks it important to сonsider the practical import of the parties’ two interpretations, even in rough estimates.
Second, Congress has not suggested that the USDA‘s guidance or its implementation of the FFCRA is inconsistent with its intention in passing the FFCRA. To the contrary, some members of Congress have publicly lamented that the FFCRA did not go far enough in assisting SNAP participants,6 and advocated for increasing the maximum monthly allotment in light of COVID-19.7 And on May 15, 2020, the House passed the HEROES Act, which, among other things, seeks to increase “the value of [SNAP] benefits” to “115 percent of the June 2019 value of the thrifty food plan” and to appropriate an additional $10 billion for SNAP. See Heroes Act, H.R. 6800, 116th Congr. div. F, tit. W, § 60606; id. at div. A, tit. I. Increasing the maximum monthly allotment by 15% in light of COVID-19 would seem unnecessary if the FFCRA already increased this maximum by 100% in the form of emergency allotments. The Court finds that these facts cast further doubt on Plaintiffs’ interpretation of
The Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs’ argument that all SNAP households need support in the midst of the pandemic is compelling as an equitable matter. However, Congress, not the Court, is charged with determining how best to weigh and triage the needs of all Americans during this time of crisis, taking intо account the budgetary costs and benefits of various policy choices. The Court does not minimize the challenges facing SNAP households, and fully understands that participation in SNAP is already “limited to those households whose incomes and other financial resources . . . are determined to be a substantial limiting factor in permitting them to obtain a more nutritious diet.” See
B. Likelihood of Irreparable Injury, Balance of Equities, and Public Interest
Plaintiffs’ inability to establish a clear likelihood of success on the merits is dispositive for purposes of this motion for preliminary injunction. The Court also notes that it has considerаble reservations about the nature of Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief and Plaintiffs’ ability to establish redressability. To establish redressability, Plaintiffs must allege clear and specific facts showing that it is likely that the relief sought will remedy their injury. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). But as Plaintiffs acknowledge, even if the USDA were to adopt their interpretation of the FFCRA, Plaintiffs do not have the ability to request emergency allotments under SNAP from the USDA directly. See Dkt. No. 5 at 21–22. Rather, California, an independent sovereign, must renew its request for emergency allotments and decide to provide such allotments to Plаintiffs. Id.
Plaintiffs contend that “California‘s words and actions make clear that the state will very likely request emergency allotments for Plaintiffs and the proposed class if the Court rules in their favor,” Dkt. No. 27 at 2, and that “[t]he state is obviously committed to this position,” see id. at 3. However, California is conspicuously absent from this case, for whatever reason. Despite reserving the right to pursue action against the USDA for denying its initial request for emergency allotments, California has not filed its own action, or joined in this one. The Court simply has no basis to say what California would dо if the Court entered Plaintiffs’ requested preliminary injunction. Under these circumstances, redressability appears speculative. Cf. Glanton ex rel. ALCOA Prescription Drug Plan v. AdvancePCS Inc., 465 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) (“There is no redressability . . . where (as is the case here) any prospective benefits depend on an independent actor who retains ‘broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict.‘“). Ultimately, however, the Court need not conclusively decide this issue at this stage.
* * *
Plaintiffs have not established a clear likelihood of success on the merits, and thus have not met their high burden of showing that an injunction is appropriate under the circumstances.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court further ADVANCES the case management conference to June 30, 2020, at 2:00 p.m. All counsel shall use the following dial-in information to access the call:
Dial-In: 888-808-6929
Passcode: 6064255
At the case management conference, the parties should be prepared to discuss a plan for expeditiously resolving this matter on the merits, including, as necessary, the pending motion for class certification. The parties must submit a joint case management statement by June 23, 2020.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 6/17/2020
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge