141 Ga. 7 | Ga. | 1913
The defendant, I. B. Hall, was convicted of murder, without recommendation. He made a motion for new trial, which was overruled, and he excepted.
It is well settled in this State that the trial judge is the trior as to the competency and disqualification of the jurors under the evidence, and that his discretion in refusing a new trial because of the alleged disqualification of a juror on account of bias and prejudice will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly abused. We. have examined the evidence upon the question, and it does not appear that there was any abuse of discretion on the part of the triál judge in refusing to grant a new trial on this ground. Ray v. State, 15 Ga. 223; Costly v. State, 19 Ga. 614 (2); Buchanan v. State, 24 Ga. 286 (2); Brinkley v. State, 58 Ga. 296 (3); Durham v. State, 70 Ga. 265 (12); Vann v. State, 83 Ga. 46 (15), 58 (9 S. E. 945); Hill v. State, 91 Ga. 154 (16 S. E. 976); Allen v. State, 102 Ga. 619 (29 S. E. 470); Huff v. State, 104 Ga. 521 (7), 524 (30 S. E. 808); Carter v. State, 106 Ga. 372 (32 S. E. 345, 71 Am. St. R. 262); Hackett v. State, 108 Ga. 40 (33 S. E. 842); Roberts v. State, 110 Ga. 253 (34 S. E. 203); Bowdoin v. State, 113 Ga. 1150 (39 S. E. 478); Jones v. State, 117 Ga. 710 (44 S. E. 877); King v. State, 119 Ga. 427 (46 S. E. 633); Cox v. State, 124 Ga. 95 (52 S. E. 150); McCrimmon v. State, 126 Ga. 560 (55 S. E. 481); McLeod v. State, 128 Ga. 18 (57 S. E. 83); Crawford v. State, 128 Ga. 30 (57 S. E. 94); McNaughton v. State, 136 Ga. 600 (71 S. E. 1038); Jefferson v. State, 137 Ga. 382 (73 S. E. 499); Embry v. State, 138 Ga. 464 (75 S. E. 604).
There is nothing in the motion, or otherwise, showing affirmatively that there was any communication between the jury or any member of it and those on the outside of the jury-room during the consideration of the case; and in view of the certificate of the presiding judge, and the affidavits of the attending bailiffs, we think the court did not err in refusing a new trial on this ground of the motion. It nowhere appears that the defendant was hurt in any way by reason of the jury deliberating in the places they did. See Brown v. City of Atlanta, 66 Ga. 76.
We think the' testimony objected to was properly admitted by the court. It tended to explain why the deceased was in the house; that he was there by consent and procurement of the wife of the defendant, as a tenant, and that he was not á trespasser. The jury could have found from the statement of the accused that he recognized the tenancy of the decedent under the agreement of rental made by the wife of the accused. The evidence objected to tended to show the character of the occupancy by the deceased, and was admissible for that purpose.
The affidavits submitted by the State in connection with the heaiing of the motion for a new trial are properly before this court for consideration. Judgment affirmed.