Hall v. State
422 S.E.2d 533
Ga.
1992
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HALL v. THE STATE

S92A0548

Supreme Court of Georgia

October 29, 1992

Reconsideration Denied December 3, 1992

262 Ga. 596 (422 SE2d 533)

CLARKE, Chief Justice.

tion of amounts paid to the Pouloses by defendant Brewer, which amounts apparently remain held in escrow with the Pouloses’ attorney.

Because the suit by the Pouloses against Brewer is still pending, the trial court correctly denied the Pouloses’ motion insofar as it sought to require immediate payment to the Pouloses of all amounts paid by Brewer and held in escrow. However, the case is remanded to the trial court to set the action by the Pouloses against Brewer for trial pursuant to the Court of Appeals opinion.

. The trial court is further directed to order disbursement of the funds held in escrow in accordance with the judgment, or other resolution of the action by the Pouloses against Brewer, once a judgment is obtained, or the action is otherwise resolved.

Judgment affirmed in part, and remanded. Clarke, C. J., Bell, P. J., Benham, Fletcher, Sears-Collins, JJ., and Judge Eugene H. Gadsden concur; Hunstein, J., not participating.

DECIDED DECEMBER 2, 1992.

Francies A. Poulos, pro se.

Hugh M. Worsham, Jr., for appellees.

CLARKE, Chief Justice.

Hall was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 2.2 grams of cocaine and sentenced to life imprisonment under the mandatory sentencing provision of OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), as this was a second conviction.1 On appeal, Hall challenges the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) and (d).

1. Hall challenges the constitutionality of provisions (b) and (d) of OCGA § 16-13-30, on their face, and as applied.

(a) We have upheld the constitutionality of the statute against various challenges. See, e.g.,

(OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) concerning marijuana - not vague and uncertain and violative of due process);
(OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) not violative of equal protection and due process guarantees of United States and Georgia constitutions);
(OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Georgia Constitution);
(OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) is not irrational because sentence for second offense of possession of cocaine is greater than that for trafficking in cocaine, OCGA § 16-13-31 (a) (f));
(OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the United States Constitution).

(b) The evidence of selective enforcement against young and impoverished blacks fails to meet the standard of intentional discrimination announced in

;
; and
. In
we said “proof of selective prosecution ... requires evidence that his prosecution represents an ‘intentional or purposeful discrimination which is deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard ... or arbitrary classification.’ ”

2. The trial court‘s determination that Hall did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel was not error under the standard of

.

3. We have reviewed Hall‘s remaining claims of error. We hold that the evidence is sufficient under

; and there was no error in the trial of the case that warrants a new trial, or other substantial relief.

Judgment affirmed. Bell, P. J., Hunt, Benham, Fletcher and Sears-Collins, JJ., concur.

BENHAM, Justice, concurring.

I concur separately to point out that while there is some evidence to support appellant‘s allegation of selective prosecution, that evidence is insufficient under both the intentional discrimination standard adopted by this court in

, and the disparate treatment standard utilized in
. Accordingly, I join the majority in affirming the trial court‘s judgment.

DECIDED OCTOBER 29, 1992 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED DECEMBER 3, 1992.

Zion, Tarleton & Siskin, Jonathan J. Wade, for appellant.

Notes

1
The crime was committed on November 20, 1990, and Hall was indicted on December 28, 1990. He was convicted and sentenced on May 10, 1991. His motion for new trial was filed on June 6, 1991, amended on October 23, 1991, and denied on December 2, 1991. The notice of appeal was filed on January 2, 1992, and docketed in this court on February 6, 1992. The appeal was argued on April 13, 1992.