*1 op State 1975] STATE OF HALL v SECRETARY Opinion the Court Proceedings. Right to Counsel —Civil 1. Constitutional Law — afforded to a defendant in to is not counsel A constitutional granted governmentally privilege proceeding to revoke a civil right to drive an automobile. such as the Suspension Li- of Drivers’ 2. Automobiles —Drivers’ Licenses — Law —Due Process. censes —Constitutional Suspension involves state action that licenses of issued drivers’ adjudicates important and the licenses of the licensees interests process procedural away due without that not to be taken are required by to the Constitution Amendment the Fourteenth XIV). (US Const, Am Power —Entitlements 3. Law —Restraints—State Constitutional Rights—Privileges. —Terminating Entitlements — power terminate an enti- limit state to restraints Constitutional "right” denominated a or the entitlement is tlement whether "privilege”. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6, [8-14] Admissibility Requiring Qualification Admissibility 7 Am Jur 16 Am Jur 16 Am Jur intoxication 332-334. test to determine alcoholic constitutional submit to scientific 87 ALR2d 370. Am 29 Am Am Jur 7 Am Jur Jur Jur submission 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, as References in criminal case of evidence that accused Automobiles and 2d, Automobiles and Constitutional Law 334. Constitutional Constitutional expert 2d, ALR2d 1407. rights. 25 presence Evidence weight Automobiles and test to physical testify for Points of alcohol in of evidence §§ determine content of blood. 77 ALR2d Law Law 549. Highway Traffic Highway as examination or test as violation § § §§ findings 542, Highway (and amount of alcohol system. based on scientific test Headnotes Traffic §§ 543. supp.). or results of scientific 159 ALR Traffic §§ §§ 168, 109-124. 312. 971. 209. refused to 259, 260, system. for 60 op 4. Constitutional Law —Due Process —Nature Due Process. process conception Due is not with a technical fixed content circumstances; time, place very unrelated its nature *2 negates procedures any concept universally appli- of inflexible compounded every imaginable situation; cable to it is of his- tory, reason, past and the course decisions. 5. Constitutional Law —Due Process —Procedures—Governmen- tal Function. procedures process may require
Consideration of due what under any given begin set of circumstances must with a determina- precise governmental tion of the nature of the function in- private by volved as well as the interest that has been affected governmental action. Driving 6. Criminal Law —Constitutional Law —Drunk —Mi- Warnings Right Right Telephone randa to — Counsel — to Call. driving suspect warnings If a drunk were Miranda at the single phone time of his arrest but not allowed a call to his attorney, placed contradictory he would be situation of being then, right told of a to consult and counsel if he seeks to right, being previously given exercise that told that the advice inoperative. was Suspects—Custody—Right Telephone 7. Criminal Law — to Call. policy prohibits suspect making Stationhouse from telephone cooperates police call until he with the is not com- police practice. mendable Driving Implied 8. Automobiles —Drunk — Consent —Breatha- lyzer Test —Refusal to Take Test —Reasonable Refusal— Coercion. plaintiff’s Breathalyzer A to refusal take a test reasonable telephone where he is refused the amake first call and cooperating that refusal is in order to coerce him into with the police. D. E. Appeal 9. and Error —Standard for Review —Automobiles— Driving Breathalyzer — Drunk Test Test —Refusal Take —Reasonableness. Appeals The task Court of on review of court a circuit plaintiff that a decision automobile driver’s to submit to simply to determine Breathalyzer unreasonable test was clearly erroneous. decision whether the circuit court’s Breathalyzer Implied Test —Consti- Law — Statutes — Consent 10. Right to Counsel. Law — tutional individual and not his Legislature that the has determined take a Breatha- attorney whether the decision shall make statutory provision specific for consul- lyzer no and there is test (MCLA attorney the individual tation between 257.625d). Breathalyzer Statutes—Implied Law — Consent 11. Automobiles — Right Test. Test — to Refuse statute; compelled in the absence of could be A statutory therefore, test is not refuse the 257.625d). (MCLA constitutional Driving Implied— Consent 12. Automobiles —Statutes—Drunk Warnings. Law —Miranda Law —Criminal warnings driving give to a drunk There is no need to to a Breatha- suspect to submit whether wishes whois asked implied suspect’s rights under the consent lyzer test if the *3 (MCLA 257.625c, explained properly him to statute are 257.625d). Against Right Right Self- Law — to Counsel — 13. Constitutional Driving Implied— Law —Drunk Incrimination —Criminal -Right Breathalyzer to Refuse Test. Test — Consent Law — by police driving suspect to to a officers submit A drunk asked present attorney Breathalyzer no to have an test has being suspect prior was not to the test where the to submission possible questioned criminal act at commission of a about and was informed of his to take the test the time he was asked statute, argu- implied rights made no consent and under the to take the to his to refuse ment that he was confused as counsel, test, right against and to his self- to as as 257.625Í). (MCLA 257.625d, 257.625e, 257.625c, incrimination Privilege Terminating 14. Law —Due Process — Constitutional Hearing Breathalyzer Notice—Opportunity for — Drive — Take Test. Test —Refusal process requires a state seeks to terminate Due that when privilege it must to drive an automobile interest such as the hearing appropriate opportunity to the notice and for afford effective, termination becomes nature of the case before driving suspect to submit to a drunk who refused hearing appeal and a de and was notice and license Opinion the Court suspended novo before his license was circuit court process. was accorded due Appeal Mikesell, Eaton, L. from Willard J. Sub- January Lansing. mitted at Division 14, 1975, (Docket April No. Decided 18386.) 23, 1975. by Wayne Hall, Petition in E. Sr., circuit court plaintiff, suspension of to review the his driver’s State, license defendant. Sus- pension ap- of driver’s license affirmed. Plaintiff peals by granted. leave Reversed. plaintiff. Koestner, P.
Jack for Kelley, Attorney Frank General, J. Robert A. Derengoski, George General, Solicitor M. El- Attorney worth, General, Assistant for defendant. J., Before: T. M. E. P. and D. Holbrook Burns, and M. J. JJ. Kelly, Wayne
M. J. Hall, Plaintiff E. Sr. was Kelly, July arrested 1973 scene a minor property damage Township, accident Delta Ea- County. p.m. ton The accident occurred at about 6 placed scene, He handcuffed at under police arrest and taken in the car the Eaton County charged Jail at Charlotte. Plaintiff was driving with while under the influence of intoxi- cating liquor, MCLA MSA 9.2325. Accord- 257.625; ing lyzer testimony, plaintiff to his refused a Breatha- following
test under the circumstances: *4 deputy] "He asked if I me would take a Breatha- [the test, lyzer attorney’s opinion and I told him I my would but I would like did, I before and I to would also like * * * phone make a to call him .” 'no,’ "He said that I didn’t I attorney, need no Secretary of State Hall v op Opinion the Court my because she call wife I could says: him—I If asked 'no, not even notified, says, you’re be should calling her.’ day this? was time of "Question: what Now quarter probably oh around Approximately "Answer: seven.” to August on Board held Appeal
The License take the Breatha- refusal to plaintiffs of the of the section in violation test was lyzer dealing implied with Code Michigan Motor Vehicle of State sus- Secretary An order consent. was affirmed days for 90 license pending plaintiffs Circuit Court. County Eaton to the appeal on to this Court appeal to was Application for leave granted. Appeal License Board hearing
At the before for refusing his reason gave officer as police telephone call to make plaintiff opportunity "booking card”. This was sign refusal novo court the de hearing circuit verified at prosecutor: plaintiff questioned by when booking "Question: sign card and You refused * * * valuables, you? receipt your for didn’t sign my for valuables "Answer: I did not refuse "Question: you sign anything? Did Nope.” "Answer: Appeal at the License Board
Plaintiff contended and at the de novo hearing in circuit court that under the circumstances his refusal to submit Breathalyzer to the test was reasonable. Defendant urges to take any upon a claimed be based represented counsel or to consult with even counsel se unreasonable because per "[t]here *5 60 op Opinion the Court provision Implied
no Michigan Consent in the Law prohibiting either for [sic] calling involvement of an in the administration of attorney the [B]reathalyzer test”. impression
The issue first raised is one of in this In implied state. landmark Michigan’s consent State, case, Secretary Collins v of 656, 384 Mich 668; 187 NW2d the Court noted the facts under the accused driver refused said, to take a test. The Court then now "[w]e consider whether this refusal was reasonable”. The ultimate determination of that case was based upon its and facts circumstances its but we find it significant that when Collins offered a breath pursuant test granted to the statute he was also permission to call his attorney.
In the case at the bar refusal of the arresting permit plaintiff officer to to make phone a call appears to arbitrary. be Plaintiff testified that the gave officer no The reason. officer asserted at the Appeal License Board it was the policy the department prisoners to refuse telephone call signed unless and until they booking Although card. appellant never sign did booking requirement card apparently was de- "inoperative” clared after 7 hours and he was allowed to call wife. We think it is reasonable if appellant signed infer had booking card he would permitted have been to make his call. telephone procedure appears The to be coer- cive rather than attempt expedite test. conceptual problem
The permeating the issue from arises the fact that defendant was arrested offense, for a criminal driving under influence intoxicating liquor, 257.625(a); MCLA MSA 9.2325(1). That arrest set in motion the chain events which leads to the instant civil appeal. op Opinion Court apparent test has itself serious consequences criminally. civilly both
If arrestee to take the and the decides blood at least results show that his contains 0.10% alcohol, presumed he is to have been under *6 intoxicating influence of liquor. MCLA 9.2325(l)(l)(c). 257.625a(l)(c); conviction, A MSA by may statutory presumption, aided result for first jail a in a fine of and a offender sentence $100 90 days. of conviction within 10 years third felony a conviction.
If the arrestee refuses to take the test and request thereafter fails to a within 14 days prevail fails to hearing, lose may up license for to two MCLA years. 257.625f(l); 9.2325(6X1), MSA 257.625f(3); MCLA MSA 9.2325(6)(3). For many of occupations, possession a valid driver’s or may chauffeur’s license be indis- pensable. In our society the of driving mobile loss privileges may and, cases, impair some effec- tively preclude pursuing a man from his liveli- hood. agree
We
with defendant
since this is a
civil
proceeding
revoking
governmentally
granted
drive,
privilege,
a constitu
tional
to counsel
is not afforded as in the
Illinois,
landmark criminal cases of Escobedo
378
v
478, 486;
1758,
US
84
1762;
977,
S Ct
12 L Ed 2d
(1964)
983
Arizona,
and Miranda
436;
v
384 US
86
(1966).
S
1062;
Ct
Therefore, we must examine the proceedings if see they meet the due process requirement fairness, fundamental especially where in the early stages of this controversy trappings were akin proceedings. to criminal guided We are language of Cafeteria Workers v McElroy, 367 US 886, 895; 1743, S Ct 6 L Ed 2d (1961): *7 very
"The process negates nature of due any concept procedures of inflexible universally applicable every to ' * * * imaginable situation. process,” unlike "[D]ue legal rules, some conception is not a technical with a time, fixed content place unrelated to and circum- stances.’ It 'compounded reason, is history, of past the * * * course of decisions .’ procedures of what process due may "Consideration require given under any set of circumstances must begin with a precise determination of the nature of the government function private involved as well as of the interest that governmental has been affected action.” (Citations omitted.)
Regarding governmental interest, it that may be prudent police practice in arresting a drunk driv- ing suspect give is to the warnings to avoid the risk that inculpatory statements will later be declared inadmissible in driving the drunk 439 of State Hall v Opinion the Court of include advice as warnings would prosecution. Adopting posi- defendant’s right the of counsel. to entitled is not to a tion, person the arrested that result attorney, would to his single phone call would be told The arrestee situation. contradictory counsel, then, to consult has a that he right, would be sought to exercise when he inopera- given advice previously told that the accomplished be with would Presumably tive. this of the distinction be- explanation pedagogical proceedings, either of and criminal tween civil loss of driver’s license. result in the may the have confronted jurisdictions Courts other told, pursuant an situation where arrestee Miranda, then counsel and refuses of his an to call opportunity test until take the Vehicles, Department Motor 267 counsel. Rust v (1968), Wiseman 545; Rptr 366 Cal 2d Cal Sullivan, 724; 211 v NW2d Neb Beckey, Department Highways State (1971). have Minn All held NW2d of the inherent confusion because the the suspect, refusal to take is reasonable improper. and license revocation is 9.2325(6)(2)(c) 257.625f(2)(c); MSA pro- MCLA person vides for a to decide "[w]hether upon refused to the test reasonably to submit Thus, request urges plaintiff, officer”. the implicit mandate that one’s license statutory not be revoked where to submit question reasonable raises of whether plaintiff be should allowed advice of counsel make informed decision. impaled on the
Plaintiff was horns of civil/ criminal dilemma. He could in the participate find that his Breathalyzer possibly later ill-advised. participation Alternatively, 60 Opinion of the Court could refuse to take the test and face the loss of his license. Legislature properly fit, The so, saw
provide agonizing choice for one accused of the driving. legislation serious does crime drunk But the permit reasonably An choice. arrestee can legislative refuse to take the test. That deliberate significance alternative takes on when one consid- Legislature ers that the could have constitution- ally requirement set forth the unconditional that person the arrested take the test. weighing against In the individual interest the governmental suggested interest, it is that to avoid problems governmental above, mentioned by allowing suspect interest phone is best served attorney. call to his A caveat: We are not suggesting a constitutional to counsel—we suggesting process approach are a reasonable due to a certain set of circumstances. We are not probative unaware test fact that the value of the delay taking Here, decreases with the it. approximately however, already one hour had elapsed, telephone and a five minute conversation delay. with counsel not would constitute It undue noteworthy judge misperceived is importance that the trial facing plaintiff.
of the decision inquired: court particular "What is there about these you events that
felt shall we life necessary than, it was your to call attorney more say, any other place your event takes day by day?” argues strongly Plaintiff that fundamental fair- statutory language require ness and the knowingly tactical choice allowed be made. Partic- ularly impact so when one considers the by hypothesis, person choice and the fact that *9 Hall v Holbrook, by Dissent D. E. J. probably arrested is intoxicated not at his A in best. similar fact situation set the context of a criminal proceeding led Court Escobedo v Illinois, 1758, 478, 486; 378 US 84 S Ct 12 L 977, 2dEd note: "The 'guiding hand of counsel’ was essential to advise petitioner of his in this delicate situation.”
However, it necessary ground we do not find our decision on appellant’s "right to counsel”. We do not say he has such unqualified or absolute in these proceedings. say We do a stationhouse policy prohibits suspect from making a telephone call does not constitute com- police practice. mendable Was appellant’s refusal unreasonable? It does not seem to person us unreasonable for a to refuse to succumb to the of police wishes officer employ- ing an arbitrary "persuade” device to him to coop- It erate. is indefensible to hold a man entirely then, incommunicado for 7 only hours and at 2 a.m., permit him to call his wife. We won’t speculate on her concern —he was arrested about supper hour. The state is hardly position to complain plaintiffs negative re- sponse to the officer’s draconian tactics. We are persuaded that the great weight of the evidence shows plaintiffs to take test was reasonable under these cir- cumstances.
We reverse the decision of the trial court and reverse the order suspending plaintiffs license. No costs, a public question being involved. Burns, J.,
T. M. concurred. Holbrook, D. E. J. (dissenting). Plaintiff, Wayne 60 Mich D. E. July Hall, Sr., 1973, E. was arrested sometime p.m., property before at the scene a minor damage Township, accident in Delta Eaton County. charged deputy driving A him with while liquor, intoxicating contrary under the influence of to MCLA 257.625; 9.2325. MSA He was advised of consent to refuse to take a Breatha- *10 lyzer suspension possibility of test and of of his driver’s license should refuse. apparently sign booking
Hall refused to card upon jail. his arrival at the He refused to submit claiming telephone test, to the that he wanted attorney present attorney his his have before submitting showing to the is no test. There that 1 rights. deputy Hall was the Miranda request refused this for consultation with the at torney given. August 29, and no test On Appeal plaintiffs the License Board held that refusal to take the test was in viola implied Secretary tion of the consent law. The plaintiff’s suspended State ordered license for 90 days. hearing A de court, novo was had in circuit pursuant 257.625f(3); 9.2325(6X3). to MCLA MSA The circuit court after its de novo found unreasonably the driver had refused take appealed the test. Plaintiff asserts, has here and essence, that the disallowance consultation with attorney process constituted a denial of due agree. law. With this assertion this writer cannot This Court does not conduct another de novo hearing but determines on review whether clearly circuit court’s decision was erroneous. The plain simple: task herein is to determine clearly whether the trial court was erroneous determining plaintiffs refusal was unreasona- Arizona, 436; 1602; 694; v 384 US 86 S Ct 16 L 2dEd (1966). ALR3d 974 v by D. E. The Legislature ble. has determined the propriety of who shall make the decision to take the test or not, viz., individual, attorney not his and with- specific out a provision for consultation between the two.
In
statute,
the absence of
a Breathalyzer
test
Keen,
People
could be compelled.
See
56 Mich
84;
App
(1974),
This writer
fails to see that Rust v Department
Vehicles,
of Motor
267
App
Cal
545;
2d
73 Cal
Rptr
(1968),
366
Sullivan,
Wiseman v
724;
Neb
NW2d 906
or State Department
of
Highways v Beckey, Minn
"The of person whether a arrested refused by D. E. to take questions grounds the test or had reasonable to do so are here, Where, of fact. as the evidence and the conflict, inferences holding to be drawn therefrom the court hearing the the Upon appeal, must find facts. question the presented findings is whether such are supported by the evidence.
[*] [*] [*] interrogating "Where the repeat officer undertakes to warnings given arresting officer at the time the arrest as well person as inform the rights obligations arrested of his under the implied- consent statute making without at the same time clear that his constitutional to counsel and to remain do silent apply implied-consent statute, not to the it is occur, not unlikely that confusion resulting will in the person’s being arrested believing misled into that he may remain being silent and that he is offered the option postpone his decision and the chemical test until he attorney. can consult an responses Where the person being upon requested arrested to submit to a chemical asserting right test indicate that he is which he just assert, has been told he is free to it is upon incumbent the officer to make clear that he has no constitutional attorney consult an before deciding whether he will submit to a test merely but that, at made, request time the has a permitting choose refusing between the test at the risk of revocation of his driver’s license.” an in-depth. For discussion of the foundations Beckey Agnew Hjelle, case, see 216 NW2d (ND 1974), 296-297 disclosing that in no small part the decision may upon have been based Min- 169.123(6) inter nesota 12A MSA provides, alia, for to "be recorded and proceed as in a criminal matter”. Agnew goes case on to discuss so-called supra. Rust,
"confusion test” under The Court *12 thereafter, 297-298, at 216 NW2d quotes from Department Vehicles, Cahall v of Motor Cal 16 445 v by D. E. 186 491, 497; Rptr 94 Cal 3d App Rust, thusly: explaining
" he was so con- 'Finally, appellant maintains taking a chemical test that his concerning fused authority there is While refusal should be vitiated. a test because he was to take where driver refuses warnings as to his constitu- confused test for a under and the demand tional (see Department of Rust v Motor Implied Consent Law 545, 547; Rptr Vehicles, 73 Cal 366 App 267 2d Cal arresting apply when the [1968]), this rule does not the arrestee that the Miranda explicitly informs officer rights taking chemical to the of a apply do not (Reirdon Law. v Direc- Implied Consent pursuant Vehicles, App 266 Department of Motor Cal 2d tor of 808, 811; Rptr [1968].) 72 Cal 614 " question a driver "refused” a test 'The whether question of fact. meaning of the statute is within (Walker Vehicles, App Department of Motor 274 Cal v 793, 799; Rptr [1969].) 79 Cal 433 When there is no 2d confusion, apparent confusion is and where evidence apparent arresting is not to the not demonstrated and officer, part of the arrest- no further clarification on the (See Orr, ing required. App 271 Cal officer is Wethern v 813, 815; Rptr [1969].) 2d 76 Cal " inapplicable doctrine” is be 'The Rust "confusion appellant not that he suffered cause the any does maintain as a result of the constitutional bewilderment admonition. determining In whether an arrestee’s re confusion, the crucial factor is not fusal is result mind; meaning it is the the state of the arrestee’s to fair response to the demand that he submit be (Maxsted Department to the chemical test. of Motor Vehicles, 982, 986; App Rptr 3d Cal Cal Vehicles, [1971]), Department Cahall v of Motor Cal ” (1971).’ 182, 186 Rptr 3d Cal "prudent police practice arresting
While the Miranda warn- drunk-driving suspect give is to it is desired ings”, question suspect where *13 60 Mich Holbrook, by E. J. Dissent D. offense, concerning there is no showing the that Miranda Moreover, the rights were here. so do is to the error type of exactly invite that Minnesota to. There is no Court referred need to give if warnings under Here, explained statute properly. plaintiff are has made no argument that was confused. The following occurred:
"The Court: particular What is there about these you necessary events that attorney felt was your it to call than, say, we any more shall other event that place by day? takes life your day figure "Mr. Hall: I my that that was to have an attorney present. I my knew at the time of tickets and I also I knew had three or four beers the officer at sarcastic, time the ney was a little and I my wanted attor- present (Emphasis supplied.) at the time.” There is no to have an attorney present this case showing as there is no plaintiff that was being questioned. plaintiff And has made argu- no ment he was hopelessly confused as to his rights or of rights. lack
This writer fails to understand how the implied- (1) consent law2 can be of any value if the means (2) of invited error are or allowed a drunk driver be may escape allowed the entire process with no sacrifice or involved. penalty This is exactly could, would, what if not happen in these cases just when individual is coherent enough delay realize that is advisable and if the lawyer can’t unavailable come immediately there will time for the be effects of the alcohol to dissipate; also, delays part on the of lawyers could serve the i.e., purpose. statute, same intent protect from those society who are drunk and 9.2325(3). 257.625c; MSA
2MCLA v D. E. may who do so driving highways3 on our defeated. effectively then again, Sullivan, supra, Neb In Wiseman 908, the said: Court 211 NW2d supports evidence is whether question "The here refusal, and if there conclusion there was, or unreasonableness the reasonableness 39-727.17, R.S.Supp., 1972.” refusal. § *14 the added but without is question, This the same Mi- given not was herein plaintiff fact that is There this faced. randa Court rights, with which three test, to the made had consented Wiseman (two attempts to secure calls unsuccessful phone bond), arrange and attempt one to counsel and which stated: a "Miranda warning” given type " or an right the to consult with obtain 'You have during the you attorney present have him with my investigation. you Do any of questioning part or right willingly your you that? Do waive understand attorney pres- your right to have an remain silent and attorney the to consult with you, ent with 727; 211 (Emphasis supplied.)” 190 Neb this time?’ NW2d 909. test.
Thereafter, to take the subject refused Later, that police Wiseman informed the same to take the test but was refused wished Court elapsed. much time had because too said, 728; 211 910: at 190 Neb NW2d best, commingling Miranda very "At in a warnings implied consent resulted statute high degree ambiguity.” of 3 State, 656; 423 See Collins v 384 Mich 187 NW2d (1971). 60 D. E. The Court held:
"If a warning type in connection with concerning implied information the arresting consent stat ute, it is upon incumbent explic officer to itly inform person the arrested the constitutional against to counsel and self-incrimination which may previously explained have been applicable are not to the decision the driver must make concerning the giving samples, that he has no to consult with attorney an right against making decision, before and that the the permit self-incrimination does not driver to request refuse to make an answer to the for such samples.” (Emphasis supplied.)4 729; 190 Neb NW2d 910. light
Additional upon thrown the issue in the Burson, Bell case of 535; 402 US 1586; S Ct L Ed 2d suspension involved motor vehicle registration and driver’s license for failure post security damages to cover claimed by aggrieved parties procedural accidents. The process due there involved was ability to adju- dicate liability through litigation. held, The Court 540; at 402 US 91 S Ct L29 Ed 2d 95: *15 procedural process due will be "[T]hat satisfied inquiry limited to the determination whether there is a possibility reasonable judgments in the amounts being against claimed rendered the licensee.” case, The majority, in this are attempting to ex- pand parameters of procedural due process in civil through matters judicial definition and exten- sion of "fundamental fairness”. except fundamental that emergency
"[I]t situa- — Wiseman, Department Safety Nystrom, As to see of Public v —; (1974). Minn 217 NW2d by D. E. one) requires (and process that due this is not tions an interest such as to terminate a State seeks when that opportu- and involved, 'notice afford here it must of the case’ to the nature hearing appropriate nity for (Emphasis in effective.” becomes termination before 1591; Ct 29 L Burson, 91 S 402 US original.) Bell v (1971). 2dEd procedural Thus, there it is obvious that hearing. present In issue was notice appeal hearing case, a license there has been There can be no in circuit court. de novo a question is a valuable driver’s license that a
but privilege, important one with but and an asset including goes responsibility certainly impaired responsibility or intox- drive while to not penalty if must be meted and that a icated the case. uphold the circuit court
This would writer finding unrea- to take the test was upon properly the evidence sonable and based it. before