Hall v. . R. R.Hall v. . R. R.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Clark
While there was no tariff rate, shown in the bill of lading, from Jones’ Landing to Plymouth, by the tariff rates which the defendants contend were in effect the rate on a bale of cotton from Jones’ Landing to Edenton, which is 25 miles beyond Plymouth, was 50 cents per bale. When the witness learned that the cotton had been carried by Plymouth to Edenton, he went to the latter town and, finding the cotton in the hands of the Norfolk Southern Railroad Company, presented his bill of lading and demanded that it be turned over to him there. This was refused, and subsequently the cotton was shipped back over the Norfolk Southern, and at that point he paid the agent as above 50 cents per bale from Jones Landing to Edenton and another 50 cents from Edenton back to Plymouth, and $4 extra charges, making $76.
According to the law of this State, the Daniels Roanoke River Line could not have charged more from Jones Landing to Plymouth than to Edenton, and there was nothing in the bill of lading which authorized the cotton to be shipped via Edenton. It was the duty of the Daniels Roanoke River Line to have delivered this cotton to the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, at Plymouth, which is a well known shipping point and where the record states that the Atlantic Coast Line, in whose care this cotton was shipped, had a wharf. It was an entirely officious act to carry the cotton on to Edenton, and for this no charge could have been made; and, having done so, it was the duty of said company to have brought the cotton back to Plymouth at its own expense.
This cotton was shipped “order, notify” — that is, the shipper retained the control over it; and, as was held in Myers v. Railroad, 171 N.C. 193, quoting 2 Hutchison Carriers, sec. 660, “So long as the goods remain the property of the bailor he may countermand any directions he may have given as to their consignment, and may at any time during the transit require of the carrier their redelivery to himself.” This
On the facts in evidence the judge was in error in directing a nonsuit against the plaintiff, who seeks to recover the overcharge against him. The plaintiff also joins a charge for the penalty in exacting the overcharge. This penalty is prescribed by statute to prevent imposition on shippers and consignees who have to pay the charges of carriers before they can get their goods, as the plaintiff had to do on this occasion. Tilley v. R. R., 172 N.C. 363. We do not, however, pass upon the right of the plaintiff to recover the penalty, but leave that matter open until the facts are developed at the trial on the merits.
The judgment of nonsuit is
Reversed.