15 F. 57 | W.D. Tenn. | 1882
It was much argued at the trial and on this motion for a new trial whether, under this declaration, there could be any recovery ex contractu at all, and whether the action did not sound so entirely in damages that the plaintiff could not recover for any mere breach of the contract, irrespective of the question whether the plaintiff had been rightfully or wrongfully ejected from the train. The court was of opinion then, and now is, that this was an -immaterial question, since, under our Code, abolishing all forms of action, a plaintiff may recover by a simple statement- of the facts, be they what they may, if these facts entitle him to recover in any form. Tenn. Code, §§ 2746-2748, 2896, 2975; Jerman v. Stewart, 12 Fed. Rep. 266, 267; Angus v. Dickinson, Meigs, 459; 5 Am. Law Rev. 205, 225. The court, therefore, put the defendant under a stipulation to submit to a verdict for the price of the tickets, not because the ejection of the plaintiff was adjudged wrongful, but because the facts showed that the defendant had refused to carry out its contract, and
It is now argued that, this being so, the plaintiff was wrongfully ejected, and the case should have gone to the jury under proper instructions as to the measure of damages. If the defendant company were complaining and demanding a new trial, I should not refuse it; for, clearly, the fact whether it made any contract other than that expressed on the limited tickets was much disputed, and the jury might have found the verdict either way, and the action of the court was wrongful as to the defendant company in depriving it of a jury trial on that question. But the stipulation was put upon the defendant to compel it to submit to a verdict on that question against itself, and disembarrass the case of all other considerations, except the one whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover for putting him off the train anything more than the price of the tickets. The proper direction would have been to find for the plaintiff the amount 'paid for the new tickets and interest, or not, in the discretion of the jury, instead of a direction to find for the defendant company. But I had not then fully made up my mind that the plaintiff was entitled to recover anything ex contractu, and sought to reserve that question by the stipulation. The real question in the case is one of the proper measure of damages. When the court directed a verdict for the defendant corporation, with the stipulation above mentioned, it determined that, the price of the extra tickets was the proper measure of damages, and, taking the subsequent action of the court under the stipulation into view, the case stands in the attitude of a direction by the court, on all the facts, assuming conclusively in favor of the plaintiff that he had a contract entitling him to carriage, that the
It is proper to remark that the court laid out of the case all questions of unnecessary force, for, on the plaintiff’s own proof, and paying no attention to the conflict as to what was actually done, as appears by defendant’s proof, he resisted the conductor, and not only provoked, but invited, force to eject him; no doubt under the mistaken view of the law, as he himself expressed it, that “he had a right to vindicate his constitutional and legal rights as a free American citizen;” that it was his duty to do so; and further, that resistance was necessary to secure his right of action against the company. He admits that much, and I do not doubt he felt that he was building up a more substantial claim for large damages by resistance. It is a common mistake, but whore the conductor is acting lawfully, and doing what he has a right to do, the passenger must submit to his authority, and resistance is wholly unlawful. The courts will not, where a passenger is in the wrong, tolerate any nice discriminations about the force necessary to secure submission to the conductor’s lawful authority and overcome the resistance, unless it may be where the conductor departs from the exercise of lawful force, and beats, wounds, or maltreats the resisting passenger in the ill-temper of belligerency, and thereby becomes an aggressor on his own personal account. Even here it would be remembered that the conductor is likewise human; while he should do his duty without xmnecessary violence, and in the best of temper, a resisting passenger cannot expect the courts to erect delicate scales on which to wreigli with exact nicety the force used to overcome his resistance. The conductor is somewhat like the master of a ship. He has police powers and disciplinary control over the train, and the quiet and comfort of the passengers and their safety are under his protection. He should be obeyed by the passengers, and the common notion that force must be invited to secure legal demands against his unlawful exactions is, in my judgment, erroneous and vicious. All the passenger need do is to express his dissent to the demand made upon him, and he need not require force to be exerted to secure his rights, certainly not to increase his damages. I have held in another case that even whore the passenger is right and the conductor wrong, it is contributory negligence to resist him by engaging in an unnecessary trial of strength with superior force. Absolute submission may not be a duty where the conduct of the conductor is wrongful, and resistance does not pre
I fully recognize the feeling of “a free American citizen” in the face of threatened wrong or insult, but the safety of the ship forbids that he should fight with the master, and imperil the ship and the lives and property she carries. Better that he should suffer the wrong than to endanger or discomfort his fellow-passengers. The conductor of a railroad train is not altogether ass supreme, perhaps, as the master of a ship; but on analogous principles, that seem to me obvious, it is, I think, the duty of a passenger to avoid resistance beyond mere dissent, and submit to his authority without more than mere protest, unless resistance is necessary to defend himself against impending personal injury. In this case, therefore, it not appearing that the conductor was guilty of any attempted violence in overcoming the resistance of the plaintiff, and that he was as considerate of his age and obstinacy as possible, taking all the plaintiff said to be true, I do not feel authorized on the proof to submit to the jury whether or not the plaintiff’s resistance might not have been overcome with something less of force- than the conductor used. The plaintiff said he did the best he could to retain his seat in the train by holding on and refusing to leave it.
The same considerations, growing out of the mistaken notion of the plaintiff that he was only vindicating his rights, that to do this he must invite force, and his obstinacy in refusing to pay the additional fare demanded while he had abundance of money with him to do s,o, convinced me that he was intent on making a case against this railroad company by compelling the conductor to eject him or recognize his tickets, and induced me to withdraw all the circumstances connected with his ejection from the consideration of the jury in aggravation of damages. In my judgment passengers cannot be allowed to build up cases for damages. Admit that the company should have carried this plaintiff notwithstanding the expiration of the limited ticket, and notwithstanding the regulations forbidding the conductor to recognize a ticket after it had expired, and it does not follow that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for the injuries, real or imaginary, to his person or his feelings for his ejection from the train. He may be entitled to the damages for a breach of the contract, which he has, by the judgment, received; and if, by the delay or refusal to carry him, he had suffered in his
The plaintiff’s claim rested upon complicated transactions, understandings, inferences, and a contract, if you please, resting in parol, with two or more station agents, more than 100 miles away. How could the conductor act on such a contract? How could he take these expired tickets, and obey the rules of his company prescribed for his guidance ? But here was the plaintiff insisting unreasonably that he should. Their negotiations came to the point that by paying less than five dollars the party would be carried to Colliersville, where they had friends and were willing to stop until the trouble could be arranged; and yet this obdurate passenger refused to pay it, with ample funds in hand, and insisted on a forcible ejection of himself and the aged wife, their daughter and her child. If wrongly demanded it could have been recovered back, with costs, and all damages satisfied. Why should he not have taken that course ? It is not the case of a man with a clear right and a clean ticket entitled to ride on that trip and train wrongfully ejected, but of one with a disputed right, a ticket void on its face, and which required further attention from the passenger to make it available, as he was informed
Here we are met with an argument that this was all for the jury and not the court. I think not. The court determines the measure of damages as a question of law, by fixing the principle by which the jury' measures the quantity. Outside of that it is for the court to adjudicate on the facts as. found by the jury, and in reaching my conclusions .1 assume all the plaintiff’s case to be just as he himself makes it, and base my judgment solely on his proof. Numerous cases can be cited in opposition to these views, but none of them are from the supreme court, and I prefer to follow those that may be cited to support this judgment. The fact is that this class of cases is not satisfactory as furnishing precedents for any judgment. The facts are so differential, the oscillation and vacillation so great, that any hope of reconciling the conflict is visionary. The most that can be done is to trace out some principle of judgment that meets the general approval. That which I seek to follow 'here is. this: While the law holds carriers to a rigid responsibility to the public, and will enforce it by awarding damages, sometimes more than have been actually sustained, it does not require of them unreasonable acquiescence in every demand made by a customer to waive their ordinary business rules of conduct in favor of his convenience or even in favor of his contract. I tried to illustrate this at the trial by putting the case of a passenger being furnished through accident or mistake with a ticket to another place than that to which he wished to go. He has paid his money and there is a valid contract to carry him to his destination, but it can hardly be that he can require the conductor to stop the train till he can rectify the mistake, or take the ticket on his assurance of the real contract, or to abandon the ticket system and disregard the regulations made for the general public and the carrier’s mutual convenience.. What is to be done ? Clearly, it seéms to me, the passenger should pay his fare—if able—and settle the difference with the company by returning the ticket and adjusting the .balance. Men do' this in ordinary business intercourse in other branches of trade or commerce, and there is no reason why they should not in this.
It is in my judgment the duty of a passenger to see to it, before he takes a train, that his ticket will carry him on that train, and whore it is on its face expired he should have it renewed or otherwise made good at the proper placo, and by inquiry before taking the train be sure that it is a proper thing for him to take that train. The business could not be done with tickets on any other principle. Admit all that may be demanded by a theory that it is the duty of tho carrier to inform its agents of anomalous contracts and the result is the same. They do this by giving the passenger evidences of his contract, called tickets, or sometimes special passes, and it is likewise the duty of the passenger to see that he has these necessary tokens of his right to travel on a train. If there be mutual mistake*
Some argument has been made that the conductor demanded more fare than under the regulations he should have done. I think the regulations, as explained by the several conductors’ books put in proof, and the explanations of the dates when they were in force, and the explanations as to the meaning of the terms “straight fare,” “train rates,” “conductors’ rates,” etc., as given by the witnesses, will show that this is -not the fact. But I do not go into that, because the principle of this judgment is the same, whether the conductor demanded too much or not. A moving train is no place to wrangle with the conductor about rates. His demand for fare should be complied with, or the passenger peaceably and quietly leave the train
A very vigorous protest is made by the argument against the doctrine of contributory negligence, as applicable to a ease like this, but it is only at last a controversy about terms. Perhaps it is more technically correct to say that the conduct of tho conductor of the train being unobjectionable, the injury complained of was not the direct result of any fault of his or the defendant corporation which ho represented, and it is not, therefore, liable to the plaintiff, but it could have been prevented if the plaintiff had chosen to pay the fare demanded, and in that sense it was the result of his own negligence, rather than anything the conductor did.
On the whole case, it seems to me now, as at the trial, that the plaintiff’s suit must be treated as if he had quietly left the train and sped for a breach of his alleged parol contract to be carried at the reduced rate of limited tickets after the limitation had expired, and that inasmuch as he shows no special damage to his business or otherwise, resulting from the delay, his recovery must be limited to the extra fare paid, the other injuries complained of being the cause of his mistaken notions about his right to be carried on the expired tickets, and his resistance to the proper demand of the conductor that he should, in the absence of any evidence of his contract, pay train fare.
As before remarked, there are eases which do not, in the text of the opinions and perhaps as adjudications, justify this judgment, but if finds support in others which seem to me more sound. Bemarking that the case of Louisville R. Co. v. Garrett, 8 Lea, 438, does not, in my judgment, in the least contravene the views here expressed, and that the case of Walker v. Langford, 1 Sneed, 514, fully sustains them, although that was a contract of a wholly different nature, when it rules that a plaintiff cannot -increase his damages for a breach of contract by neglecting, or refusing at his own expense, to do that which would lessen them, I close this opinion with a citation of the principal and most pertinent eases cited on either side, without attempting to review or reconcile them. Frederick v. Marquette R. Co. 37 Mich. 342; Chicago R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 Ill. 499; Pullman Car Co. v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125; Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Johnson, 67 Ill. 312; Cincinnati R. Co. v. Cole, 29 Ohio St. 126; Townsend v.
Motion overruled.
See S. C. 9 Fed. Rep. 585; Gray v. Cincinnati South. R. Co. 11 Fed. Rep. 683; Maskos v. Amer. Steamship Co. 11 Fed. Rep. 698; Brown v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. 7 Fed. Rep. 51; S. C. 5 Fed. Rep. 489.
Recent Decisions on the Rights of Passengers.
§ 1. Peeliaiinaey. The principal case was reported in 9 Fed. Rep. 585, where the learned judge, in charging the jury, ruled substantially the same question which is again ruled as above, that, although a passenger may have a right to bo carried under a special contract, if he be not provided with a ticket which the conductor can recognize, he must pay the fare demanded by the conductor, under a reasonable regulation requiring him to demand fare of persons without tickets, and cannot insist on being expelled by force, as a foundation for a suit for damages for wrongful expulsion. By this conduct ho contributes to his injuries, which are the direct result of his own conduct,, and not the breach of any special contract he may have for his carriage.
A case involving the same facts as the above case was tried in December in the circuit court of Shelby county, Tennessee, before the Hon. James O. Pinito ra, who is well known to the profession as a judge of exceptional culture and ability. Mrs. Glendonin was traveling with Mr. and Mrs. Ilall, her parents, on the same kind of a ticket, bought at the same timo and under the same circumstances, and expiring at the same time. They went to Texas, and, on their return, reached Memphis on the very day their tickets were to expire. The time when they expired was midnight. They got on board a train which left Memphis at 11:59 p. m. The conductor refused to recognize their tickets, claiming that they had expired, and demanded what is known as “conductor’s fare” from Memphis to Town Creek. They declined to give this, and offered to pay agent’s fare,” which is somewhat less; whereupon the conductor put them off at White’s station, which is 10 miles out, whore they remained all night, without any place to sleep, and exposed to the weather. Mr. and Mrs. Hall brought the above suit for damages in tho United States circuit court claiming $20,000, and recovered the amount of the extra fare which Mr. Hall was obliged to pay in order to reach home. Clendenin and
“Gentlemen of the Jwry:
“ Two principal questions are presented m this cáse for your determination.
“First. Did the plaintiff, at the time she was ejected from the defendant’s train, have a valid contract, then in force, for carriage from Memphis to Town Creek.
“Second. If she did not have such a contract, and refused to pay the regular fare therefor, at the defendant’s established rates, when demanded by the conductor, in which case she had no right to remain on the train, then did the conductor put her off at any place other than a regular station, or did he in ejecting her use any more force or violence than was necessary?
“ It is admitted that when plaintiff’s agent, Hall, purchased the ticket in question, nothing was said by him concerning the 30-days’ limitation upon the ticket. You are instructed that if this were all, the plaintiff could not claim the right to use the ticket after the 30 days expired; and if she endeavored thereafter to ride on defendant’s train upon that ticket alone, and refused to pay the regular fare established by the company’s regulations, she was wrong in so doing, and the defendant had the right to eject her from the train.
“ The rule on this point would be the same if plaintiff’s agent, Hall, purchased the ticket by mistake, and afterwards asked the ticket agent to take it back and give him his money or another ticket, or to exchange tickets, and the ticket agent refused.
“Whatever claim or demand, if any, the plaintiff may have had upon the defendant by reason of such refusal, she had, under the circumstances stated, no right to ride upon defendant’s train in defiance of its regulations, and without paying the fare as provided by those regulations.
“ The rule would be the same if you find that defendant’s ticket agent might have exchanged the ticket in case he desired to, but refused to do so, no matter from what motive.
“Again, if you find that, after so purchasing the ticket, plaintiff's agent, Hall, in endeavoring to get an exchange of tickets, asked the ticket agent who sold him the ticket whether plaintiff could not ride on the ticket after the 30 days had expired, and that the said ticket agent told Hall she could not do so, or that he did not know, or that he did not assure him she could do so, the rule would be the same as above stated, and plaintiff would have no right to carriage upon that ticket after the 30 days expired.
“ If, without the right to do so, she endeavored to ride upon the expired ticket, and the conductor refused to permit her to do so, and demanded her fare, it was her duty either to pay the fare or leave the train. Her fare would be the regular rate, according to the defendant’s established regulations; and an offer to pay the difference between such fare and the sum that had been paid, either in whole or in part, for the expired ticket, would not be an offer to pay fare.
“ If, however, you find that Hall, the plaintiff’s agent, on the same day applied to the ticket agent for an exchange of tickets, and stated that the tick*71 ets ho had purchased were not what he wanted, and had been purchased by mistake, and the ticket agent told him that the 30-days’ limitation would not he enforced by the defendant, but that (he ticket in question would serve plaintiff’s purpose for longer than 30 days, and assured him that she could use tlie ticket for carriage after the 30 days expired, and that Hall relied on those representations, and for this reason did not purchase other tickets, and that plaintiff was relying thereon when endeavoring to ride from Memphis to Town Creek at the time she was ejected, then you will inquire and determine from the evidence whether sncli assurances by the ticket agent were within the actual or apparent scope of Ids authority.
“In considering these questions you will observe that Hazlewood was the regular ticket agent of tlie defendant at Town Creek, and you are instructed that Hazlewood’s private clerk, Houston, became ticket agent only as he exercised Hazlewood’s power in selling tickets, and for such act only, and for tlie time only when engaged in selling a ticket or tickets, and was not such ticket agent when not so engaged, and his authority in regard to selling any particular ticket or tickets terminated when that ticket or those tickets had been sold and delivered. Haniel’s power or agency to sell tickets for Hazlewood was limited in like manner.
“If you ibid that Houston alone was engaged in selling the tickets in ques tion, and Daniel took no part therein, then Houston, and not Daniel, was tlie ticket agent in this transaction; and if you find this to be so, then any remark, statement, or assura ice made at tlie time by Daniel as to a waiver by the defendant of tlie 30-days’ limitation would not bo the act of the ticket agent, and would not bind the defendant.
“ But if you find that, in connection with tlie sale of the tickets in question, Houston made any statement or assurance concerning the 30-days’ limitation, you will then inquire and determine from the evidence whether it was within either the actual or the apparent scope of the ticket agent’s authority to give such statement or assurance.
“In considering what was the actual scope of the ticket agent’s authority, you will look to all tlie evidence in the case, including tlie instruction to agents given by tlie defendant, tlie practice as to printing, preparing, and issuing tickets, tlie form of tlie tickets and the limitations or stipulations oil their face, and tlie manner in which they were sold by ticket agents.
“If you find that it was not within tlie actual authority of the agent to waive the limitation to 30 days, expressed on tlie face of the ticket, then you will determine whether it was within the apparent scope of liis authority.
“ If you find that it was part of the business of the agent at Town Creek to attend to all tlie business of the defendant at that place in the way of selling tickets, then you will determine, from the evidence, whether the defendant authorized or allowed such agent to transact the business in such a way as to make it appear that he liad authority to waive the limitation to 30 days on the face of these tickets, or whether the defendant held him out to the public as having sncli authority, or knowingly allowed him to exercise or acquiesced in his exercise of sueli authority; and, further, whether Hall, tlie plaintiff’s agent, was ignorant of tlie actual scope of tho ticket agent’s authority, and relied on tlie appearances so indicated. In determining tiiis question you will*72 consider the manner in which the tickets are usually prepared and issued, and put in the hands of agents for sale, so far as appears from the face of the tickets; the manner in which they are sold, and anything else that is known about the matter by the traveling public generally.
“ If it was not within the actual scope of the ticket agent’s authority to waive the 30-days’ limitation, and Hall knew it was not, then he had no right to rely on the ticket agent’s waiver of the limitation, and the plaintiff cannot base her contract on it, and cannot claim to ride upon the ticket in question. Or, if you find under the instruction above given that it was not within either the actual or apparent scope of the ticket agent’s authority to waive that limitation, then Hall had no right to rely on such a waiver, even if you find that the ticket agent waived, or attempted to waive, that limitation, and that Hall relied on it; for if the act of the ticket agent in making such waiver was not within either the actual or the apparent scope of his authority, it did not bind the defendant, and the contract remained as it appeared to be on the face of the ticket; and if you so find, your verdict on this point will be in favor of the defendant.
“But if the act of the ticket agent in waving the 30-days’ limitation was within the scope of his authority, as it appeared to be from the usual and customary way in which he transacted the defendant’s business, with the knowledge and approval or acquiescence of the defendant, and if you find that he did waive that limitation, and that Hall relied on such waiver, and the plaintiff undertook to use her ticket accordingly, this was a contract between the parties, and your verdict will be for the plaintiff; and, in considering whether Hall relied on such waiver, you may consider any assurances in regard to the same subject which were previously given by Hazlewood, and which were in like manner within the apparent scope of the ticket agent’s authority, if you find from the evidence that any such assurances were given by him.
‘ If the plaintiff was on the train upon a ticket unlimited in time either by the express terms of said ticket, or by a valid verbal contract or understanding with the station agent at Town Creek, who sold the ticket, then the railroad is liable for damages, if the conductor ejected her from the train, notwithstanding the faet that a strict construction of the rules laid down by the company for the guidance of the conductor made it his duty towards the company to expel her.
“If you find from the proof and from the charges given that the plaintiff was rightfully on the cars, and that she should not have been put off, then the touching of plaintiff, however gently, in the effort to put her off by the conductor, was an assault upon her, for which the defendants are liable.
“ If you should be of opinion that the violence, if you find any, used by the conductor in expelling plaintiff was not greater than he was compelled to use, and for which the company would not be liable if the expulsion had been .lawful, yet if you find that the expulsion was unlawful, then any violence or laying-on of hands upon the plaintiff by the conductor was excessive and unwarranted, and constituted an assault upon the plaintiff, for which the defendants are liable.
“ If, however, you find under the foregoing instructions that the plaintiff had no valid contract with the defendant for carriage after the 30 days ex*73 pired, then the plaintiff liad no right to riele on the train without paying tlio fare required hy the regulations, and if she refused to do so the defendant’s agents had a right to eject her from the train.
“ But this must be done at a regular station, and with the use of no more force or violence than is necessary for the purpose.
‘•A regular station is one at which the passenger trains on the road, or the majority of them, regularly and customarily stop to put off and take on passengers.
“If you find that defendant’s agents put the plaintiff off at such a station, using no more force or violence than was necessary, then your verdict on tliis point will he for the defendant. If you find that they put her off at some place not a regular station, or if you find that they used more force or violence than was necessary, then, in either case, this was a wrong on the part of defendant, and your verdict on this point will be for the plaintiff.
“ But if the plaintiff had no right to ride on the train without paying fare, and refused to pay fare, it was her duty to leave the train when so required by the conductor; and if no more force or violence was used than was made necessary by her own resistance to the demand of the conductor that she leave the train, this was not a wrong on the part of the defendant, and your verdict in this respect will be for the defendant.
“If you find against the plaintiff on all the points stated in the foregoing instructions, then your verdict will he for the defendant.
“Butif you find in favor of the plaintiff on any oneof those points, then you will proceed to estimate her damages under the following instructions, and you will return the same in your verdict.
“ If, under the instructions given, you should find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the court instructs you that, in estimating damages to be awarded the plaintiff, you will allow the losses and expenses actually incurred hy her, and include compensation for physical suffering and inconvenience, if any, and for mental suffering and any sense of mortification, humiliation, and degradation suffered by the plaintiff by roas on of such expulsion in the presence of her family and in the presence of other passengers, and including compensation for pain and inconvenience and expenses experienced while waiting at the place where she was put off, until she could obtain another train; and for any injury to her health by reason of exposure to the weather, under the circumstances, if you find that she was so exposed.
“ But if you find from the evidence that plaintiff and her mother and father were evicted at the same time and place from defendant’s train because their tickets were all alike upon their face,—expired limited tickets,—and all throe refused to pay the fare demanded by the conductor, and you should find for the plaintiff, you can allow no damages in this ease because of the eviction of the father and mother of plaintiff, nor because of any hurts or injuries or discomforts sustained hy them, nor because of any suffering or misery or mental anxiety of plaintiff at witnessing their expulsion or hurts, injuries or discomforts.”
It will he seen, hy comparing the foregoing eases, that both of these able judges agree upon the question that the ticket agent of a railway company may
The proof before Judge Pierce presented a question not presented in the other case. At the station where the travelers were ejected there were no lights, no station agent, no one to sell tickets, and they tried in vain to procure tickets, so as to proceed on the same train. The conductor who had refused “ ticket fare” when tendered, and demanded “ conductors’ fare,” knew when he put them out that there was no agent there to sell tickets. AVliat was, then, his duty towards them, and were they entitled to ride on “ ticket fare,” as bona fide passengers who were not permitted to purchase tickets?
It is not proposed in this note to revie?v, much less to criticise, the decision of the learned judge in the principal case, nor the charge of Judge Pierce above set out. It is thought that the needs of the readers of the Federal Reporter will be better subserved by reviewing all the decisions of the English and American courts relating to the rights of passengers and carriers of passengers under the various contracts of carriage, which have been rendered during the last two years, or since the publication of any edition of any general work on the subject; referring to prior decisions only so far as necessary to a discussion of the recent cases examined. Such being the purpose of this note, the reader will not expect a connected discussion of any one topic. On the contrary, a great many topics will be touched upon which have not been suggested by anything decided in the principal case. One feature of the principal case has, however, been examined, in the light of some recent decisions, in section 7, infra.
I. As to Certain Regulations of Carriers.
§ 2. Reasonableness of Carrier’s Regulation—AFiietiier a Question of Law or Fact. It has been held by one court that the reasonableness of a regulation of a carrier of passengers is a question of fact for the jury.
§ 3. Excluding Pjsesons of Evil Repute. In a recent decision of the learned and accomplished judge who wrote the opinion in the principal ease, this question is considered with reference to the right of a carrier to exclude from his vehicles unchaste women. The learned judge charged the jury that, in determining whether the expulsion was lawful or not, the same principles were to he applied to women as to men; that the social penalties of excluding unchaste women from hotels, theaters, and other public places could not be imported into the law of common carriers; that the carrier is bound to carry the good, the bad, and the indifferent, and lias nothing to do with the morals of his passengers, if their behavior be proper while traveling. Neither can he use the character for chastity of his female passengers as a basis for classification, so as to put all chaste women, or women who have the reputation of being chaste, into one car, and all unchaste women, or women who have the reputation of being unchaste, into another ear. Such a regulation would be contrary to public policy, and unreasonable. It would put every woman purchasing a railroad ticket on trial before the conductor as her judge, and, in case of mistake, it would lead to breaches of the peace. It would practically exclude all sensible and sensitive women from traveling at all, no matter how virtuous, for fear they might be put into, or occasionally occupy, the wrong oar. The police power of the carrier, continued the learned judge, is a sufficient protection to the other passengers, and he can remove all persons, men or women, whose conduct at the time is annoying, or whose reputation for misbehavior and indecent demeanor in public is so notoriously bad that it furnishes a reasonable ground to believe that the person will he offensive or annoying1 to others traveling in the same car; and this is as far as a carrier has any right to go. He can no more classify women according to their reputation for chastity, or want of it, than he can so grade men. He accordingly charged the jury, in substance, that a female passenger traveling alone is entitled to ride in the ladies’ car, notwithstanding an alleged want of chastity, if her behavior is ladylike and proper; and she cannot be compelled to accept a seat in another car offensive to her because of smoking and bad ventilation,
§ 4. Regulation that Passengers on Treigiit Trains must Procure Tickets. • A regulation allowing persons to ride upon freight trains, provided they will procure tickets before entering the cars, is a reasonable regulation ;
§ 5. Penalty for Riding without Paying Pare. The English railway clauses consolidation act imposes a penalty upon any person who shall travel in any carriage of a railway company without having previously paid the fare, and with intent to avoid the payment thereof ;
§ 6. Statutory Regulations without Extraterritorial Porce. A statute of a state which attempts to proscribe a regulation for a railway company extending into another state, is inoperative beyond'-the limits of the state whose legislature lias passed the act. The obvious reason is that the police regulations of the states have no extraterritorial force. But there is a further reason. Congress alone has power to regulate commerce between the states and with foreign countries; and such an act would, therefore, in so far as it operates beyond the limits of the particular state, he in contravention of the federal constitution.
II. As to the Contract of Carriage.
§ 7. Effect'OF Declarations of the Company’s Agent to Passenger. There are cases where the declarations of the station agent of the company, or of its train conductor, are held admissible, although contrary to the rules of the company, or to what appears upon the face of the ticket which the passenger has purchased. Indeed, the contrary rule has so little practical sense to support it, and proceeds in such obvious disregard of the rights of the traveling public, that it is a wonder how any court ever came to accede to it. The ticket agent of a railway company is appointed to give information to the traveling public about the rates and conditions of travel. To say that the traveling public are to be bound, in all cases, by what appears on the face of a ticket which is purchased, is unreasonable. The mass of the traveling public are ignorant persons. Many of them are women, and even children, without discretion enough to judge in such matters. Many of them cannot read the language. Most of them would confide in a statement deliberately made by a station agent as to what the train conductors of the company would do in case a particular ticket were purchased and presented to them. How, suppose such a person presents himself at a railway ticket office and asks for a ticket to a distant place, and tells the agent that he wishes to stop over at an intermediate place, and the agent sells him a ticket on which is the recital, “ Good for this day only.” The passenger, acting on the promise of the agent, stops off, and, when he undertakes to resume his journey, is informed that he must pay the additional fare or leave the train. Will any fair-minded person say that a fraud has not been perpetrated upon him ? Ordinary persons are bound by the acts of their agents in waiving the written conditions in contracts. Why is it that a railroad company should receive special favors at the hands of the law in this particular? Why should a doubtful point of law be so construed as to work a forfeiture of the rights of the traveler, and to permit the carrier to retain his money without giving him an equivalent therefor ?
On this subject the supreme judicial court of Maine has made the following judicious observations: “Upon the plaintiff’s ticket we find the indorsement ‘ good for this day only.’ The fact that he accepted and produced it as proof of his right to a passage would certainly be prima facie evidence of his right to a passage on the day of its date alone, and possibly he would not be permitted to deny that he was bound by that indorsement, unless he could show that his assent had been withheld with the knowledge and consent of the company. This he attempts to do by showing just what contract was made with the ticket agent at South Paris. But it is said that this agent had no authority to change any of the rules cf the company, and therefore his acts
So, a steam-ship company forwarded passengers from Hamburg to America, partly by connecting lines. -Its passenger agent at Hamburg, who was also agent for other lines of steamers, made verbal representations to the plaintiff that the company would be responsible for his baggage in the hands of connecting lines, as well as in its own hands. The plaintiff purchased a passage ticket on the faith of these representations. His trunk was lost by one of the connecting lines. It was held that the company selling the ticket was liable for the loss, and that it was no defense to show that the agent, in making such representations, exceeded his instructions.
But it has been held, in accordance with the view of the learned judge in the principal case, that while the company may be liable for a breach of the contract embodied in the agent’s representations, on the faith of which the passenger has paid his money, yet this will not justify the 2)assenger, on learning that the agent exceeded his instructions, in insisting upon being expelled from the train, in order to make his expulsion a ground for recovering enhanced damages. Thus, in the view of the supreme court of Michigan, passengers may rightfully rely upon 'information given by station agents of the company as to the particular trains on which they will be allowed to travel on a coupon ticket; but if the information thus given is erroneous, so that the passenger finds himself on a train which does not stop at the desired point, he must, upon being advised of that fact by the conductor, get oif at the preceding station; he cannot remain upon the train if it lias gone beyond the point where he desired to get off, and to which his ticket entitled him to ride, provided he had got upon the train which, according to its schedule, stopped at that point, and refuse to pay fare, and compel the conductor, acting under the rules of the company, to.put him off, and then seek redress in damages. The safety of the public requires that railway trains should be run according to fixed regulations and schedules, and when the passenger discovers that the agent at the station has given him erroneous information, he must act reasonably; he cannot compel the conductor to depart from the schedule upon which he is required to run his train, merely by informing him that the station agent has said that the train would stop at a particular place; but he must' either get off before the train reaches the station in question, or go on to a succeeding station, paying the additional fare, and then seek his redress in damages for the failure of the company to transport him according to the representations of its agent. He cannot recover for the additional damages which
A case in Yew York proceeds on substantially the same grounds. A passenger having purchased a ticket for L., told the ticket agent what train he wished to take, and was directed to take a particular train. He followed this direction; but the train which he took, after running 150 miles, deflected to a branch road, which did not pass through, but was followed an hour later by a train which did pass through, that place. It was held that if, on the arrival of the train at the point of deflection, notice was given that the passengers for L. must change cars, in such a way that passengers of ordinary intelligence and understanding, making proper use of their faculties, could hear it and understand it, the plaintiff was wrongfully on the cars after they left that point; and if he was carried past the point of divergence without fault on his part, but was apprised of his error, and requested to take a return train, upon which he would have been carried back free in season to have reached the train which would have carried him to L. without delay, his refusal to do so, and his persisting in remaining on the wrong train, rendered him liable to expulsion as a trespasser,
On the contrary, it has been held in Yew Jersey that a passenger cannot rightfully rely upon the assurance given him by a train conductor, contrary to the purport of Ms ticket, that it will entitle him to stop over and resume his journey, although the conductor, in earnest of what he says, puts his initials upon the ticket; and where, in such a case, it appeared that only train agents had the power to modify the statements made on the tickets themselves, it was held that the passenger who had received and acted upon such information, and had subsequently been put oil the train by a subsequent conductor, had no cause of action against the company.
§ 8. Carrier, now fab Bototo by Statements of Ticket. On the other hand, the carrier is bound to make good what the ticket imports on its face, and the passenger is not bound by any rule or usage of the company not go expressed, limiting the ticket, unless he has notice of the same. Thus, in a recent case, it appeared that the plaintiff, having paid for his passage over the defendant’s route of street railway, was given, at an intermediate point therein, in return for an additional sum paid by him, a ticket on which were these words: “ Third-avenue Kailroad Company. Good only from Sixty-fifth street up to Yorkville and Harlem for a continuous ride. By order of the President.” The ticket was indorsed, “ Ticket check, July 6th, 1878.” The plaintiff did not then use the ticket, but afterwards, on the same day, he entered one of the defendant’s cars below and paid fare to such intermediate point, and, at a place above said point, tendered the conductor the ticket, which
Of course, this applies only in cases where the statements of the ticket are explicit. A railway ticket is ordinarily a mere token, of the fact that the holder or some other person has paid to the company issuing it the sum of money which entitles the holder to ride from a point named to a point named within the dates named.
§ 9. Assignability of Railroad Tickets. As stated above, a railroad ticket is not ordinarily a complete contract to carry; it is looked upon either as a receipt for passage money, or as a token which, when presented by the buyer to the proper agent of the company over whose road it is issued, indicates to the latter that the person presenting it is entitled to be carried from and to the places named therein.
§ 10. Commutation Tickets Issued to Particular Persons. Railroad companies frequently issue tickets at reduced rates to persons living on the line of their roads, in the vicinity of cities, in which such persons transact their business, good for a prescribed period of time. These tickets are issued to the particular person, and embody the terms of a special contract with him, to the effect that the ticket shall be forfeited if found in the hands of any other person. Where such a ticket contained the stipulation, “ If found in the hands of any one hut the party in whose name it is issued, this ticket will he forfeited and taken up,” it was held that it might be taken up by the conductor of the company issuing it, even when tendered by the party to whom it had been issued, if, in fact, it had been used by some other person,
In England, railroad companies sometimes exact a deposit from persons purchasing such tickets, to he forfeited on certain conditions. The courts of that country seem disposed to construe the contract embraced in such ticket strictly, and not to relieve against the forfeiture; for they regard a strict compliance with the conditions as being of very great importance to tiie railway companies in the transaction of their business, and of little importance to each particular passenger,—the deposit being generally small, say 10 shillings. Hence, where one of the conditions of such a ticket was that it should he delivered up to the company “ on the day after expiry,” the court refused to extend this language so as to make it mean that the ticket should he delivered up within a reasonable time after expiry,
§ 11. Special Ticket Obtained through Eraud oe Passenger. The rule that a person who has been induced through fraud to enter into a contract cannot rescind the contract and at the same time keep the consideration,
§ 12. Tickets Issued by Agents of Other Companies. There seems to be a custom among connecting railroad companies in the United States to issue what are termed “ coupon tickets” over each other’s roads. Such a custom has been proved in cases which have come under the writer’s cognizance, one of which is a recent case in Texas.
§ 13. “Hot Good if Detached. Coupon tickets, issued for a continuous passage over connecting lines, generally, if not universally, contain upon each coupon the legend, “ Hot good if detached.” Ho action lies against a railroad company for refusing to honor a coupon ticket which contains this recital, and which, when presented to the conductor, is detached from its stub; and this is so, although the coupon may have been sold to the holder, thus detached, by the agent of a connecting company,
§ 14. Bights of Passenger on Train which does not Stop at the Station Galled for by His Ticket. In the absence of a statutory provis
III. As to the Expulsion and Detention of Passengers.
§ 15. Under, wiiat Circumstances the Carrier will be Liable for the Act of ms Servant in Wrongfully Expelling Passenger. In one of the most recent contributions to the law on this subject, the following propositions are said to have been finally and firmly established: (1) That whether a wrongful act done by a servant of a railway company, not entirely inconsistent with the nature of his employment, was done by him in pursuance of his employment, and to serve the interest of his employer, or wickedly and maliciously, out of his own personal spite, is always a question for the jury. (2) That where the jury find such an act to have been done in pursu
Accordingly, where a hoy sued for injuries alleged to have been received by being thrown from a street railway car by the conductor, the following charge was held proper: If the conductor “ acted neither maliciously nor with a view to effect some purpose of his own, but within the general scope of his employment, while engaged in defendant’s business, and” with a view to the furtherance of that business and the defendant’s interest, believing from the appearances before him, and upon which he had to exercise his judgment, that liis duty to the defendant required him to act, then the defendant is responsible for the manner in which he acted, and the consequences of his act, though he may have acted in excess of his real authority.”
In a late case in the appellate court of Illinois it is laid down that, while it is a general rule that where an employe goes outside the line of his employment, and, for purposes of his own, inflicts an injury upon the person of one who has no claim upon the employer, arising from any special relation existing between them, the employer is not liable; yet, when applied to the treatment by a common carrier of its passengers, tho rule does not apply. Tho reason of this is said to be that a common carrier owes a duty to passengers that they shall be protected from all danger, so far as the efforts of the carrier and its servants can he made available. The grounds on which the court proceed are thus well expressed by Fjllsbtííiy, J.: “ It is impossible for a railroad company, as such, to perform the contract upon its part, as it can act only through its agents and servants. The performance of its contract is intrusted to agents and servants selected by its authority, for their known or presumed fitness to perform the duties assigned to them. The passenger has no voice in tho selection oí tho employes charged with the fulfilling of the company’s contract with him; but, relying upon the reasonable presumption that the company has selected competent, faithful, and humane servants, ho confidently submits himself to their control and direction until the completion of the contract. The employes of the company have exclusive control of the train. In its operation and management, and in the performance of the company’s contract with the passenger, they are the representatives of the company, and as to
The supreme court of Pennsylvania appears still to adhere to the old idea that if the act of the servant of a railway company in expelling a passenger was “malicious,” the company will not be liable. Thus, it is said by that court in a late case: “If the conductor was at the time acting in the line of his duty and within the scope of his employment in putting Toomey off, under the existing circumstances, the company is liable for the act of the conductor, although he may have done it in a careless, negligent, or reckless manner; but for his unauthorized, willful, and wanton or malicious trespass, the company is not liable.”
§ 16. Distinction as to tiie Kind or Grade of Servant who did tiie Act. Within the moaning of the above rule, there seems to be no just distinction with reference to the grade or office of the servant who did the act. It will be for the jury to say, in each case, whether the servant who did the act was, in a general sense, acting within the scope of his employment, and in furtherance of his master’s business. Thus, in order that a person, may recover damages from a railway company for being improperly expelled from its train, or for being expelled therefrom at an improper place, or in an improper maimer, it is not necessary that the expulsion should have been done by the oonduotor of the train; he will be entitled to recover if it was done by some other servant of the company acting in the manner above stated.
§ 17. Right of Passenger to Resist Unlawful Expulsion. It seems that passengers have a right to resist unlawful expulsion, hut that they have no right to carry resistance to an extreme point. On the one hand, they have no right to resist for the mere purpose of bringing upon themselves violence, in order to make such violence ground of recovering enhanced damages.
In one ease, however, the right of the passenger is more strongly put; “When a conductor is in the wrong, the passenger has a right to protect himself against any attempt to remove him, and resistance can lawfully be made to such an extent as may be essential to maintain such a right. Cases occur where circumstances mayTmperatively require that the passenger should remain on the train on account of others who may he there in his charge, or where it is indispensable that he should hasten on his journey without delay; and if, by reason of the mistaken judgment or willfulness of the conductor, he should be expelled when lawfully there, serious injury might follow. The law does not, under such circumstances, place the passenger within the power of the conductor; and, when lawfully in the cars, he is authorized to vindicate such right to the full extent which might be required for his protection.”
§ 18. Expelling Passenger at Place Other than Regular Stopping-Place. A statute of Texas provides that “if any passenger shall refuse to pay his fare or toll, it shall be lawful for the conductor of the train, and the servants of the corporation, to put him out of the cars, at any usual stopping-place which the conductor may select.”
A similar statute exists in Illinois. The term “ usual stopping-place,” employed therein, means a regular station, at which passengers get on and off
§ 19. Whether Conductor Bound to Receive Rare Tendered after tte has Commenced to But Bassenger Oejt. Where a person is upon a train under circumstances which entitle the conductor to demand payment of fare of him, and he fractiously refuses to pay fare,.and the conductor thereupon, as he may rightfully do, signals the train to stop and commences to- put him off, if the passenger then changes his mind and offers to pay fare, or if some one offers to pay it for him, the conductor is nevertheless not bound to desist from putting him off.
The reason of the rule was quite forcibly expressed by Denio, J.: “ Railroad trains are now run according to a scheme in which the time required in passing from one point to another and the time required for the necessary stoppages is accurately calculated. Any disarrangement or departure from the time fixed is exceedingly hazardous to the safety of the company’s property and the persons employed in running the train. The most horrible calamities have often been the result of such disarrangements. And if one passenger can by his unjustifiable humor cause the cars to stop, another may do the same thing, and the utmost irregularity may be brought about. The rule, therefore, was, in my judgment, plainly reasonable, which imposed a forfeiture of his right to proceed further on the ears upon a person who should refuse to show his. ticket to the conductor when requested. If he forfeited his right by his improper conduct, it was for the company or its agents to say whether he should he retained after having occasioned the inconvenience of the stoppage by his pertinaeity.”
So, where a passenger had exhibited a spent ticket, and insisted on his right to ride upon it, until the conductor stopped the train to put him off, it was held that he could not, on producing a regular ticket, claim the right to be allowed to remain on the train. “In my opinion,” said Beasley, O. J., “ such a doctrine is not consistent with either law or good sense. Its establishment would practically annul the power of a railroad company to require passengers to show their tickets; for it is obvious that, if the only penalty on a refractory passenger is a momentary expulsion, he will be enabled, at a small sacrifice, by repeated refusals, to compel an abandonment of the demand upon him. A passenger takes his ticket subject to the reasonable regulations of the company; it is an implied condition in his contract that he will submit to such regulations; and if he willfully refuses to be bound by them,
In like manner tho supreme court of Iowa hold that if a passenger refuses to pay his fare when demanded, the conductor may rightfully put him off, although he offers to pay it before he is actually expelled. “ The rule,” says Adams, J, “that a passenger may contest the regulations of the company and the firmness of the conductor by refusing to pay full fare, and still save himself from expulsion by tendering full fare after expulsion has commenced, is not only uncalled for for the just protection of the recusant passenger, but would tend to encourage a practice, which, if indulged in, would interfere with the convenience of the company, and the dispatch and quiet to which other passengers are entitled.”
§ 20. Wii ether the Company, before Expelling the Passenger, must Keeund the Unearned Passage Money. Where a traveler, on the faith of representations made to him by the company’s agent, stops over on Ms ticket and attempts to resume his journey on the same ticket after it has, by its terms, expired, the conductor cannot lawfully expel him from the train without first restoring to him that portion of the passage money which is represented by that part of the transit called for by the ticket which lias not yet been made, or deducting it from the fare claimed for the rest of the journey. The ticket is evidence that the faro has been paid for the entire transit, and there is no rule, founded in sense or justice, which will allow tho company to keep the passenger’s money, where he lias acted in good faith, without'transporting Mm over the route for which lie lias paid.
In a late case the plaintiff entered the defendant’s ears without procuring a ticket, and handed to the- conductor the ticket fare. The conductor after-wards demanded of the plaintiff the additional amount required by the rules of the company to be paid by persons who had not purchased tickets before entering tlio train. This the plaintiff refused to pay. The conductor thereupon, without first offering to return the amount which the plaintiff had paid
■ §21. Detaining Passengers for Non-Payment of Pare. Where a railroad company had a regulation that passengers on leaving its trains must exhibit their tickets to the gateman at the company’s station, and a passenger tried to pass out without exhibiting his ticket, alleging that he had lost it', and the gateman thereupon detained him, and caused him to he arrested and confined in the-police station over night, on the charge of disorderly conduct, and he was discharged by the police justice the next morning, it was held that he could maintain an action against the company for false imprisonment. The power which the company sought to exercise was not like the power to expel a passenger from its cars for non-payment of fare, but it was the power to imprison for debt,
IV. As to Damages.
§ 22. Measure of Damages for Expulsion of Passenger. In an action for damages for refusing to carry the plaintiff in defendant’s ears, the following facts appeared. The plaintiff, a colored woman, the wife of u colored preacher, having purchased a first-class ticket, applied for admission into a first-class ear and was refused, and directed to go into the smoking car, where there were none hut men, and some of them smoking. This she refused to do, and left the cars. She was lady-like in appearance, and at the time carried a sick child in her arms. The court instructed the jury that she was entitled to such damages as would make her whole; and that, in estimating such damages, the jury should consider the loss of time, the inconvenience she had been put to, and the probable amount of expenses incurred in the vindication of her rights. The jury returned a verdict for $1,000.
The rule thus laid down that the jury, in estimating the plaintiff’s damages, may take into consideration the expenses incurred by him in the litigation, has been held allowable in courts of law, where the case is a proper one for exemplary damages,
§ 28. Exemplary Damages in Such Cases. It has been well said that “ there is no class of cases where the doctrine of exemplary damages can be more beneficially applied than in the case of railroad corporations in their capacity of common carriers of passengers
“ The only way carriers of passengers can ho held to reasonable regulations, is by allowing juries to inflict punitive damages for a violation of the rights of the public; and the establishment of unreasonable regulations is the gravamen of the offense, that being a disregard of the rights of the public for which the carrier is punished. • The mere price of a ticket or refunding of the money will not answer the purpose in all cases; that would be simply to permit the carrier to enforce the unreasonable regulation, because he would never claim to keep the money while refusing to render the service. He would take no money, or refund all received, and go on with his business in his own way, and the plaintiff or the public would be no better off. This rule of damages
§ 24. Instances of the Amount of Damages. A boy eight years old jumped upon a street-railway ear, having money in his pocket to pay his fare. After the car had proceeded about a block, the conductor came from inside the car, when another boy, who had got upon the car, put his hand to his nose and jumped off. Thereupon the conductor, without asking the former boy for his fare, or giving him an opportunity to pay it, and without stopping the car, threw him off from it. He fell on the defendant’s other track, about four feet distant, and another of the defendant’s cars, which had this moment come up the track, ran over him. His collar-bone was broken, so that it protruded from the skim His second and third ribs were also broken. His right arm was broken near the shoulder in four or five pieces. The small bone of his left arm was broken near the wrist, and so was his thigh joint between the middle and upper third. There were great contusions and abrasions, and.the boy was permanently injured and deformed. The court could not say that $15,000 were an excessive award of damages for such injuries.
Where a person purchased a collector’s certificate of the payment of a certain sum as railroad taxes, which was more than the amount of fare, according to the company’s regular schedule of fare, for the distance which he desired to travel, and got upon the train in good faith, supposing that this would pay his fare, there being no agent at the station where he got upon the train to inform him of his error, and presented such certificate to the conductor when his fare was demanded, who refused to receive it, and demanded the payment of the fare in money, which the plaintiff was unable to pay, and thereupon the conductor took hold of him to put him off the train, when a fellow-passenger, out of motives of humanity, offered to pay the fare demanded, which the conductor refused, but put the plaintiff off the train, it was held that the company was liable, that it was a ease for exemplary damages, and that $2,000 damages were not exeessive.
A well-dressed colored woman was put out of the lady’s car because of her color, and also because of a claim, on the part of the conductor, that she was known to him to be a woman of lewd character. She resisted, and a good deal of force had to be used in expelling her. Her testimony showed that her thumb was dislocated, and that she was severely choked, while other testimony tended to show that no unnecessary violence was used. It was held that an award of $3,000 was not so gross as to authorize the court to set aside the verdict, though the learned judge would have been better satisfied if it had been smaller.
The wife of an employe of a railroad company got upon the train without a pass, having been told that she would be allowed to ride free without a pass being required of her. The conductor ordered her to leave the train, not at a station, but at a water-tank where the train had stopped. Her petition al
Where a passenger, after having been carried but a few miles, was put off from a railway train, was detained but a few hours, and suffered no special damage from inconvenience and loss of time, a verdict for $750 was held excessive.
St. Louis, Missouri„
Hall v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. 9 Fed. Rep. 585.
State v. Overton, 24 N. J. L. 435, 441; Morris R. Co. v. Ayres, 29 N. J. L. 393.
Bass v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 36 Wis. 450; S. C. Thomp. Car. Pass. 311; Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520; Brown v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. 4 Fed. Rep.
Brown v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. supra.
In Iowa this regulation is allowed by statute. Hoffbauer v. Railroad Co. 52 Iowa, 342.
Lane v. Railroad Co. 69 Tenn. (5 Lea,) 124; infra, i 4.
Brown v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 499, 500.
Vinton v. Middlesex R. Co. 11 Allen, 304; S. C. Thomp. Car. Pass. 6; Murphy v. Union R. Co. 118 Mass. 228; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Vandyne, 57 Ind. 576. See, also, State v. Ross, 26 N. J. L. 224.
Thurston v. Union Pacific R. Co. 4 Dill. 321. Compare Coppin v. Braithwaite, 8 Jur. 875.
Smith v. Wilson, 31 How. Pr. 272.
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. St. 512; S. C. Thomp. Car. Pass. 295.
Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 Ill. 499.
Lane v. Railroad Co. 69 Tenn. (5 Lea,) 124. A regulation refusing to carry passengers on. freight trains altogether, is also reasonable. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 67 Ill. 312, 314; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Randolph, 53 Ill. 510; Railway Co. v. Moore, 49 Tex. 31; Hazard v. Chicago, etc., R Co. 1 Biss. 503; Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. McArthur, 43 Miss. 180. A regulation is also reasonable which provides that only those passengers shall he carried on freight trains who are provided with tickets of a particular description; as, for instance, a round-trip ticket, a thousand-mile ticket, or a pass. Faulkner v. Ohio, etc., R. Co. 55 Ind. 369.
Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Kennedy, 3 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 467, (Sup. Ct. Ind.)
Lane v. Railroad Co. 69 Tenn. (5 Lea,) 124 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Greenwood, 79 Pa. St. 373.
Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Greenwood, supra.
Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Kessler, 18 Kan. 523.
Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Flagg, 43 Ill. 364; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Johnson, 67 Ill. 312; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Myrtle, 51 Ind. 566.
Act 8 Viet. c. 20, § 103. See Reg. v. Pigot, 8 Q. B. Div. 151.
Id. § 145.
Id. § 146.
Id. §§ 108, 109. See Dyson v. London, etc., R. Co. 7 Q. B. Div. 32; Saunders v. Southeastern R. Co. 5 Q. B. Div. 456; Watson v. London, etc., R. Co. 4 C. P. Div. 118.
Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S, 485:
Me. St. 1871, e. 223.,
Carpenter v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 72 Me. 388.
Burnham v. G. T. Ry. Co. 63 Me. 298, 302.
Gregory v. Railroad Co. 10 Neb. 250.
Maskos v. American Steamship Co. 11 Fed-Rep. 698.
Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Pierce, 47 Mich. 277; S. C. 3 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 340.
Barker v. New York Central R. Co. 24 N. Y. 509.
Petrie v. Pa. R. Co. 42 N. J. L, 449; S. C. 1 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 258.
McMahon v. Third Ave. R. Co. 47 N. Y. Sup. (Jones & S.) 282.
Maroney v. Old Colony, etc., R. Co. 106 Mass. 153.
See next section.
Crosby v. Maine Central R. Co. 69 Me. 418.
Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306; Henderson v. Stevenson, L. R. 2 Scotch App. 470, per Ld. Hatherley; Rawson v. Pa. R. Co. 48 N. Y. 212; Elmore v. Sands, 55 N. Y. 512, 515; Johnson v. Concord R. Co. 46 N. Y. 213; Gordon v. Manchester, etc., R. Co. 52 N. H. 596; State v. Overton, 21 N. J. L. 435, 438; Barker v. Coffin, 31 Barb, 550.
Hudson v. Kansas Pacific R. Co. 9 Fed. Rep. 879. The assignability of the ticket turned on the provisions of a statute relating to the ass'gnmeut of dioses in action, which, it is presumed has a counterpart in most of the states.
Freidenrich v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. 53 Md. 201.
Id.
Cooper v. London, etc., R. Co. 4 Exch. Div. 88.
Gregory v. Railroad Co. 10 Neb. 250.
Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Ford, 63 Tex. 364.
Id.
Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Ford, 53 Tex. 364.
Pa. R. Co. v. Wentz, 37 Ohio St. 333, 337; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Nuzum, 50 Ind. 141; Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Applewhite, 52 Ind. 540; Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Swarthout, 67 Ind. 567.
Pa. R. Co. v. Wentz, 37 Ohio St. 333, 337.
Id.; citing Com. v. Eastern R. Co 103 Mass. 254; Shields v. State, 26 Ohio St. 86; S C. 95 U. S. 319; State v. New Haven, etc. R. Co. 43 Conn. 351; New Haven, etc., R. Co. v. State, 44 Conn. 376; Pierce, Railr. (Ed. 1881,) 460; Const. Ohio, art. 13, §2.
Railroad Co. v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 617.
Pa. R. Co. v. Wentz, 37 Ohio St. 333, 338. See Leake, Cont. 723; Spurgeon v. McElwain, 6 Ohio, 442; State v. Findley. 10 Ohio, 51; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 287; Huber v. German Con. 16 Ohio St. 371; Delaware Co. v. Andrews, 18 Ohio St. 49; Hooker v. De Palos, 28 Ohio St. 251.
Railroad Co. v. Wentz, 37 Ohio St. 333, 339; citing Pigot’s Case, 11 Coke, 27b; Pollock, Cont. (Wald’s Ed.) c. 6.
Hoffman v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. 46 N. Y. Sup. (J. & S.) 526, 528; S. C. 44 N. Y. Sup. (J. & S.) 1. See Rounds v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. 64 N. Y. 129. Isaacs v. Third Ave., etc,, R. Co. 47 N. Y. 122; Cohen v. Dry Dock, etc., R. Co. 40 N. Y. Sup. (8 J. & S.) 368; S. C. affirmed, 69 N. Y. 170; Jackson v. Second Ave. R. Co. 47 N. Y. 274; Mott v. Consumers’ Ice Co. 73 N. Y. 543; Feck v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. 70 N. Y. 587; Garretzen v. Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104; Bayley v. M., etc., R. Co. L. R. 8 C. P. 148; S. C. in court below, L. R. 7 C. P. 415; Poulton v. London, etc., R. Co. L. R. 2 Q. B. 534; Oliver v. Northern Transp. Co. 3 Or. 84; Garrett v Louisville, etc., R. Co. 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 416, (Sup. Ct. Tenn. 1831.)
Citing Higgins v. Watervliet Turnpike Co. 46 N. Y. 23; Rounds v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. 64 N. Y. 129.
Hoffman v. N. Y., etc., R. Co. 87 N. Y. 25, 30.
Schultz v. Third Ave. R. Co. 46 N. Y. Sup (14 J. & S.) 211.
Railroad Co. v. Flexman, 9 Bradwell, 250, 254.
Pa. R. Co. v. Toomey, 91 Pa. St. 256, 259; citing Phila., etc., R. Co. v. Wilt, 4 Whart. 143; Passenger R. Co. v. Donahue, 70 Pa. St. 119.
Allegheny Valley R. Co. v. McLain, 91 Pa. St. 412; citing Phila., etc., R. Co v. Wilt, 4 Whart. 142; Yerger v. Warren, 7 Casey, 319.
Hoffman v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. 46 N. Y. Sup. (14 J. & S.) 526.
Bayley v. Manchester, etc., R. Co. L. R. 8 C. P. 148; S. C. in court below, L. R. 7 C. P. 115.
Northwestern, etc., R. Co. v. Hack, 66 Ill. 238.
Lovett v. Salem R. Co. 9 Allen, 557; Cohen v. Dry Dock, etc., R. Co. 40 N. Y. Sup. (8 J. & S.) 368.
Ante, § 7.
Brown v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. 7 Fed. Rep. 51, 65.
English v. Delaware, etc., Canal Co. 66 N. Y. 454.
Hutch. Car. § 593.
Pasch. Dip:. Tex. St. art. 4892.
Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Casey, 52 Tex. 112, 122.
Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Flagg, 43 Ill. 364; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Parks, 18 Ill. 465; Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Vanatta, 21 Ill. 188.
Terre Haute, etc . R. Co v. Vanatta. 21 Ill. 188; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Peacock, 48 Ill. 253.
Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Roberts, 40 Ill. 503.
Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Cunningham, 67 Ill. 316.
Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Flagg, 13 Ill. 364.
Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 67 Ill. 312.
Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Patterson, 63 Ill. 301.
Illinois Cent R. Co. v. Nelson. 50 Ill. 110.
O’Brien v. N. Y., etc., R. Co. 80 N. Y. 236; S. C. 1 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 259; Hoffbauer v. Railroad Co. 52 Iowa, 342; Stone v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 47 Iowa, 82; O’Brien v. Boston, etc., R. Co. 15 Gray, 20; Hibbard v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. 15 N. Y. 455; People v. Jillson, 3 Park. Cr. R. 234, 239; Stone v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 47 Iowa, 89; State v. Campbell, 32 N. J. L. 309.
Garrett v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. 3 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 416, (Sup. Ct. Tenn. 1881;) S. C. 72 Tenn. (8 Lea,) 438.
O’Brien v. N.Y., etc., R. Co. 80 N. Y. 236; S. C. 1 Amer. & Eng. R. Gas. 259.
Stone v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 47 Iowa, 82; S. C. 10 Chi. Leg News, 78; 6 Reporter, 489.
Hibbard v. N. Y., etc., R. Co. 15 N. Y. 455.
Nelson v. Long Island R. Co. 7 Hun, 140, 145, per Brady, J.
State v. Campbell, 32 N. J. L. 309, 312.
Hoffbauer v. Railroad Co. 52 Iowa, 313.
Burnham V. Grand Trunk R. Co. 63 Me. 298, 303.
Bland v. Southern Pac. R. Co. 55 Cal. 570; S. C. 3 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 285.
Lynch v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. 24 Hun, 506. See Chilton v. London, etc., R. Co. 16 Mees. & W. 212.
Gray v. Cincinnati Southern R. Co. 11 Fed. Rep. 683, before Swing, J.
Beecher v. Derby Bridge Co. 24 Conn. 496; Lindsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 235; Welch v. Durand, 36 Conn. 182; Dalton v. Beers, 38 Conn. 429; New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Allbritton. 38 Miss. 242; Landa v. Obert, 45 Tex. 539; Finney v. Smith, 31 Ohio St. 529.
Code Ga. (Ed. of 1873) § 2942. Seo Savannah v. Waldner, 49 Ga. 316; Gurnsey V. Shellman, 59 Ga. 797.
The Oriilamme, 3 Sawy. 397, 404.
Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363; Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211; Fairbanks v. Witter, 18 Wis, 287; Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275; Hoadlev v Watson, Id. 289; Kelly v. Rogers, 21 Minn. 143; Howell v. Scoggins, 48 Cal. 355; Falk v. Waterman, 49 Cal. 224. And see Lincoln v. Schenectady, etc., R. Co. 23 Wend. 425. The costs of prior litigation are recoverable as damages outhe principle of compensation, where they have flowed as the necessary or proximate result of the wrong done the plaintiff,—as in actions for malicious prosecution or false imprisonment. Pritchet v. Doevey, 1 Cro. & M. 775; Bonesteel v. Bonesteel, 30 Wis. 511; Blythe v. Thompkins, 2 Abb. Pr. 468; Foxall v. Barnett, 22 Eng. Law & Eq. 179; Parsons v. Harper, 16 Grat. 64, But see Strang v. Whitehead, 12 Wend. 64; Bradlaugh v Edwards, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 377.
Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 57 Me. 202; S. C. 2 Amer. Rep. 39; Haley v. Mobile, etc., R. Co. 7 Baxt. 243; Garrett v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. 3 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 416, (Sup. Ct. Tenn. 181.)
Brown v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. 7 Fed. Rep. 51; Evans v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. 11 Mo. App.
See the discussion of this question in Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Armstrong, 91 U. S. 489; also Ackerson v. Erie R. Co. 32 N. J. L. 254, 200.
Railroad v. Brown, 17 Wall. 446; Brown v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. 7 Fed. Rep. 51, 63.
Brown v. Memphis, etc., R. Co supra.
Id., per Hammond, J.
Schultz v. Third Ave. R. Co. 46 N. Y. Sup. (14 J. & S.) 211.
Garrett v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. 3 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 416, (Sup. Ct. Tenn. 1881.)
Brown v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. 7 Fed. Rep. 51, 62.
Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Casey, 52 Tex. 112.
Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Ford, 53 Tex. 364.