171 Ind. 9 | Ind. | 1908
This proceeding was commenced by appellees before the Board of Commissioners of the County of Porter for the improvement of certain highways in' Pine township in said county by taxation, under §7712 Burns 1908, Acts 1907, p. 137, and Acts 1905, pp. 521, 551-561, §§64-83, §§6790-6800, 6802-6804, 6806-6811 Burns 1905.
Appellants, remonstrators, appealed from the judgment of the board of commissioners in favor of appellees to the court below, where the cause was tried upon the issues made before the board, and the court rendered judgment-thereon
Appellees move to dismiss the appeal because: “ (1) Said judgment of the court below is not final, but interlocutory, from which no appeal lies; (2) the assignment of errors' does not contain the full names of all the appellees.”
2. No motion -was made to modify or change said judgment or order of the court in any way. Said judgment made a final disposition of all. the questions involved in the appeal, and put an end to the proceedings in the court below. Sharp v. Malia, supra; Sunier v. Miller, supra; Bonfoy v. Goar, supra. Said judgment was therefore a final one, from which an appeal may be taken to this court. §§671, 1392 Burns 1908, §632 R. S. 1881, Acts 1907, p. 237, §1; Elliott, App. Proc., §§80-82, 84, 85. Thomas v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (1894), 139 Ind. 462, 463, and cases cited.
There is nothing in §7712, supra, or in the act of 1905, supra, which requires that any such allegations be contained in the petition. The only provision in regard to what shall be stated in the petition is contained in §7713 Burns 1908, Acts 1905, pp. 521, 551', §64, and that has reference alone to a description of -the highways to be improved.
In proceedings to establish or vacate highways in this State, the statutes have uniformly required that the petition should be signed by “twelve freeholders of the county, six of whom shall reside in the immediate neighborhood of
In Brown v. McCord, supra, a proceeding for the location of a public highway, objection was made in the circuit court to the petition, because it did not allege that the petitioners, or at least twelve of them, were freeholders of the county, and that six of such freeholders resided in the immediate neighborhood of the highway proposed to be loT eated. The circuit court overruled said objection, and on appeal this court said: “The statute says: ‘Whenever twelve freeholders of the county (six of whom shall reside in the immediate neighborhood of the highway proposed to be located) * * * shall petition the board of commission-erg [•* * *] for the location * * * of any highway, such board, if they are [it shall be] satisfied that [due] notice of such application has been given, [* * *] shall appoint viewers [three persons] to. view such highway.’ 1 R. S. 1852, pp. [307,] 310, §15 [as amended by] Acts 1859, p. 113, §1 [§5015 E. S. 1881]. The statute, as we have seen, does not definitely point out what the petition must contain. It should, however, be subscribed to by at least twelve persons, should describe the proposed highway, and should name the owners, etc., of the lands through which it may pass. 1 R. S. 1852, p. 307, §1. But an allegation that the petitioners were freeholders, or that six of them resided in the immediate neighborhood of the contemplated highway, is not, in our opinion, essential to the validity of the petition ; these facts may be proved on the hearing of the petition, though they are not alleged in the pleading.”
In Washington Ice Co. v. Lay, supra, this court said at
Section nine of the Nicholson law provided that it should be unlawful for the board of commissioners to grant license to sell intoxicating liquors when a remonstrance in writing, signed by a majority of the legal voters of the township or city ward, was filed three days before any regular session of the board. Acts 1895, p. 251, §7283i Burns 1901. It was claimed in Head v. Doehleman (1897), 148 Ind. 145, that such remonstrance, to be sufficient, must allege that the persons who signed the same were legal voters of the township or city ward, and that they constituted a majority of the legal voters thereof. This court, at page 147, said of §7283i, supra: “This section does not prescribe what the form or. language of the remonstrance shall be, nor what its allegations shall be. It does require that the remonstrance shall be against the granting of the license, and that it shall be signed by a majority of the legal voters of the township or ward. But it does not require the body of the remonstrance to state that fact, or that they are legal voters of the township or ward. A petition for the establishment of a highway must, in order to confer jurisdiction' on the hoard of commissioners under the statute, be signed by at least twelve freeholders of the county. But that fact
Section two of the drainage law of 1881 (§5656 Burns 1901, §4286 R. S. 1881) for the construction of drains by boards of commissioners, provides: “Before the board of county commissioners shall establish any ditch, drain or watercourse, there shall be filed with the auditor of such county a petition, signed by one or more of the landowners whose lands will be liable to be affected by or assessed for the expenses of the construction of the same, setting forth the necessity thereof, with a general description of the proposed starting point, route and terminus.” It has been held by this court that it is not necessary to the sufficiency of the petition under said act to allege therein that the person or persons who signed or filed the same own lands liable to be affected or assessed for the expense of the construction thereof; that the only requirement essential to the sufficiency thereof is “a statement of the facts showing the necessity for the ditch, and a general description of the beginning, rorite and terminus,” for the reason that “this is all the statute requires the petition to contain.” Shoemaker v. Williamson (1901), 156 Ind. 384, 386; Wright v. Wilson (1884), 95 Ind. 408; Metty v. Marsh (1890), 124 Ind. 18, 21; Watkins v. Pickering (1884), 92 Ind. 332, 334.
It is evident from the cases cited that it was not essential to the sufficiency of the petition that it allege any of the facts set out above, as claimed by appellants, for the reason that the statute under which this proceeding was brought does not require it.
Appellants in their brief do not set out any. application of said petitioners to the board of commissioners withdrawing or asking to withdraw their names from said petition as to themselves, or any order of said board thereon, or the substance thereof. For aught that appears from appellants’ brief, if they filed such an application the board did not act thereon or overrule the same. Under such circumstances, said three petitioners were parties to the petition on appeal to the court below the same as they were before the board, and the rulings complained of, if made, did not harm appellants.
Moreover, appellants have not, as required by rule twenty-two of this court, set out in their brief said petition, or their objections thereto, or the motion to strike from the files said petition to reinstate, or any order of the court allowing said petitioners to be reinstated as original petitioners, nor have they set out the substance of any such papers, pleadings, motions or order of the court. The failure to comply with said rule is a waiver of the right of appellants to call in question any of said rulings, even if made. Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Marschke (1906), 166 Ind. 490, 497; Springer v. Bricker (1905), 165 Ind. 532, 535, and cases cited; American Food Co. v. Halstead (1905), 165 Ind. 633, and eases cited; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Walton (1905), 165 Ind. 253, and cases cited-.
What we have said disposes of all the'errors assigned and not waived. Judgment affirmed.