ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND
On June 23, 2015, Todd Hall and Dan Rivera (collectively “plaintiffs”) filed this action individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals in Los Angeles Superior Court against Live Nation Worldwide, Inc (“Live Nation”).
On July 31, 2015 Live Nation filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ first and third causes of action.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On October 24, 2013, the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees — ■ Local 33 (“IATSE”) allegedly entered into a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with Live Nation Hollywood (the “2013 CBA”).
Plaintiffs allege that they were hired by Live Nation on January 11, 2015 to work as stagehands on a television production of the “20th Annual Critics’ Choice Movie Awards,” which was broadcast live from the Hollywood Palladium on January 15, 2015 (the “Production”).
Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that IATSE and Live Nation did not enter into a new contract governing live events that covered the Production between September 20, 2014 and January 15, 2015.
Plaintiffs’ first and third claims for relief, which seek penalty wages, unpaid minimum wages, and overtime compensation under California Labor Code §§ 203, 510, and 1194 respectively, are asserted on behalf of a class of all individuals who were employed by Live Nation in connection with the Critics’ Choice awards show on January 15, 2015 (the “Critics’ Choice Class”).
In its notice of removal, Live Nation alleges that although the prior collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) expired on September 30, 2014, Live Nation and IATSE entered into a new CBA on June 22, 2015, which explicitly covers work performed between October 1, 2014 to September 30, 2016.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Requests for Judicial Notice
Live Nation asks the court to take judicial notice of two documents related to its motion:
In deciding a- Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court generally looks only to the face of the complaint and documents, attached thereto. Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc.,
Under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts frequently take judicial notice of public filings. See Velazquez v. CM AG Mortg. Corp.,
Further, because the. motions , to dismiss and remand raise the issue of complete preemption, and “[b]eeause complete preemption often applies to complaints drawn to evade federal jurisdiction, [the] court may look beyond the face of the complaint to determine whether the claims alleged as state law causes of action in fact are necessarily federal claims.” Panino v. FFIP, Inc.,
The court therefore grants Live Nation’s request for judicial notice.
B. Whether Plaintiffs’ First and Third Causes of Action Must Be Dismissed
1. Legal Standards Governing Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. A. Buie 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory,” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept.,
The court need not, however, accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
2. Legal Standard Governing § 301 Preemption
Live Nation contends that plaintiffs’ first and third causes of actions must be dismissed because they are preempted by section 301(a) of the LMRA. Section 301(a) of the LMRA gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear “[sjuits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). See Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for So. Cal.,
To further the goal of uniform interpretation of labor contracts, the preemptive effect of § 301 has been extended beyond suits that allege the violation of a collective bargaining agreement. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
Despite the broad preemptive effect of § 301, a claim that seeks to vindicate “nonnegotiable state-law rights ... independent of any right established by contract” is not within its scope. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
Nor can a defendant invoke preemption merely by alleging a “hypothetical connection between the claim and the terms of the CBA,” or a “creative linkage” between the subject matter of the suit and the wording of the CBA. Id. at 691-92. To prevail, “the proffered interpretation argument must reach a reasonable level of credibility.” Id. at 692. A preemption argument is not credible “simply because the court may have to consult the CBA to evaluate [a plaintiffs claim]; [similarly,] ‘look[ing] to’ the CBA merely to discern that none of its terms is reasonably in dispute does not require preemption.” Id. (quoting Livadas,
In Cramer, the Ninth Circuit clarified the scope of the LMRA’s preemptive effect: “To the extent our prior cases held or implied that preemption was proper because of the mere possibility that the subject matter of the claim was a proper subject of the collective bargaining process, whether or not specifically discussed in the CBA, we today hold such statements to be an incorrect articulation of § 301 preemption principles. A state law claim is not preempted under § 301 unless it necessarily requires the court to interpret an existing provision of a CBA that can reasonablybe- said to be relevant to the resolution -of the dispute.” Id. at 693.
See also Humble v. Boeing Co.,
The Ninth Circuit has articulated a two-part test to determine whether a cause of action is preempted by the LMRA. Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp.,
3. Whether Plaintiffs’ Employment Was Governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement
Plaintiffs assert that their state claims are not preempted by the LMRA because there was no CBA in effect while they were employed. Live Nation notes the existence of two CBAs: the 2013 and 2015 agreements.
(a) Whether Plaintiffs’ Employment Was Governed by the 2013 CBA
The 2013 CBA was in effect from October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2014.
CBAs are interpreted according to ordinary contract principles. M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, — U.S. -,
“The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1636. Such intent is to be inferred, if possible, solely from the “written provisions of the contract.” AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court,
Courts have, in some cases, held that a CBA can be enforced beyond its expiration date where- the parties have, through their actions, expressed an intent so to be bound. See, e.g., O’Connor Co. v. Carpenters Local Union No. 1408 of United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., AFL-CIO,
In this case, however, the parties’ intent is clear from the face of the 2013 CBA. The contract not only sets forth an expiration date, but includes a clause explicitly stating that the agreement does not set precedent, for or govern the rights or obligations of the parties beyond its expiration date. It is thus clear the parties intended that the 2013 CBA not apply beyond its expiration date of September 20, 2014. See Office and Professional Employees Insurance Trust Fund v. Laborers Funds Administrative Office, Inc.,
Contrary to the plain language of the contract, Live Nation argues that the 2013 CBA governed the terms' of plaintiffs’ employment because it had a duty to continue the- status quo under § 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) and (d), until the parties bargained to impasse or reached a new agreement. Live Nation argues that this is sufficient to imply a contract .extending the terms of the 2013 CBA and to preempt plaintiffs’ state law claims. This misapprehends the applicable law. An employer’s .duty to maintain the status quo under § 8(a)(5) does not create a cause of action under section 301. that preempts state law claims. Derrico v. Sheehan Emergency Hosp.,
In sum, the 2013 CBA did not govern the terms of plaintiffs’ employment in January 2015 and cannot form the basis for an argument that plaintiffs’- state law claims are preempted.
(b) Whether Plaintiffs’ Employment Was Governed by the 2015 CBA
Live Nation next argues that the 2015 CBA applies retroactively to cover plaintiffs’ employment in January 2015.
Plaintiffs contend the 2015 CBA agreement does not apply because it had not been negotiated at the time they worked for Live Nation. Employers and unions, however, can enter into a valid CBA that retroactively covers the bargaining period. See University of Hawaii Professional Assembly v. Cayetano,
4. Whether § 301 Preempts Plaintiffs’ First and Third Causes of Action
Having concluded that the 2015 CBA governed plaintiffs’ employment in January 2015’, the court next examines whether plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by § 301 oftheLMRA.
(a) Whether Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action is Preempted
Plaintiffs’ first cause of action seeks continuing wage penalties under Labor Code § 203; based on Live Nation’s alleged failure to pay final wages in a timely fashion
Plaintiffs counter that the claim is not preempted because it is based on nonnegotiable state-law rights. California Labor Code § 201 states: “If an employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately.” Labor Code §§ 201.5 and 201.9 set forth exceptions to this general rule that apply to employees in the entertainment industry. See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201.5, 201.9. See also id., § 203(a). Plaintiffs argue that § 201.5 applies,
Section 201.5 applies to employees involved in the production of motion pictures, including “the development, creation, presentation, or broadcasting of theatrical or televised motion pictures, television programs, commercial advertisements, music videos, or any other moving images, including, but not limited to, productions made for entertainment, commercial, religious, or educational purposes, whether these productions are presented by means of film, tape, live broadcast, cable, satellite transmission, Web cast, or any other technology that is now in use or may be adopted in the future.” Id., § 201.5. Section 201.9 applies to individuals who- are “employed at a venue that hosts live theatrical’ or concert events and are enrolled in and routinely dispatched to employment through a hiring hall or other system of regular short-term -employment.” Id., § 201.9.
The plain text of the statutes indicates that they are not mutually exclusive. Both statutes would appear to apply where, as here, an employee works on presentation of a live broadcast at a venue that hosts live theatrical or concert events. The complaint alleges that plaintiffs were involved in “the television production of the ‘20th Annual Critics’ Choice Movie Awards,’ broadcast ] live from the Hollywood Palladium.”
Neither § 201.5 nor § 201.9 provides nonnegotiable state-law rights, however, as both expressly authorize employers and employees to set alternate rules for the final payment of wages in a collective bargaining agreement. Cal. Lab. Code § 201.5(e) (“Nothing in this section prohibits the parties to a valid collective bargaining agreement from establishing alternative provisions for final payment of wages to employees covered by this section if those provisions do not exceed the time limitation established in Section 204”);
Stated differently, under both §§ 201.5(e) and 201.9, §' 201 does not apply
Section VII.B of the 2015 CBA states: “Pursuant to the authority granted in California Labor Code Section 201.9 and 204(c), this Agreement waives the requirements for the timing of wages specified in [the] California Labor Code, including but not limited to, Section 201 (pertaining to wages due at termination of employment) and Labor Code Section 204 (requiring semi-monthly payments within specified dates for work performed within specified dates). In lieu of the requirements provided in those provisions, wages for work performed on the Event shall be mailed to the Employee not later than seven (7) days after the end of the regular pay period for the Employer corresponding to the dates work was performed for the Event and in the event of an involuntary termination (as defined in section A above) or a resignation, unpaid wages for work performed prior to the issuance of written notice of termination or resignation shall be mailed to the Employee not later than seven (7) days after the end of the regular pay period during which the Employee was involuntarily terminated or resigned.”
As can be seen, the provision explicitly waives the protections of Labor Code §§ 201 and 204 and establishes alternate terms for final wage payments. Based on plaintiffs’ allegations and §§ 201.5(e) and 201.9, therefore, section VII.B applies, and the first cause of action is preempted by § 301.
Plaintiffs’ third cause of action alleges failure to pay minimum and overtime wages in violation of Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194. Plaintiffs assert they “worked many hours without timely compensation for all the work they performed, as required by law,” and that Live Nation “failed to timely pay plaintiff(s) and other members of the class their minimum and overtime wages as required by Sections 204, 510, and 1194 of the California Labor Code.”
Labor Code § 204 provides in part that “when employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provides different pay arrangements, those arrangements shall apply to the covered employees.” The rights set forth in § 204 are therefore waivable. As noted, Section VII.B of the 2015 CBA explicitly waives rights under § 204 and sets forth alternate provisions.
Live Nation contends that although plaintiffs assert the third cause of action under §§ 204, 510, and 1194, the crux of plaintiffs’ allegations is not that overtime was not paid or was paid in an improper amount, but rather that payment was not timely. As a result, it contends that the claim is preempted because the 2015 CBA supersedes the timeliness provisions of § 204 under § 204(c). Even were this not the case, §§ 510 and 1194 require enforcement of a CBA, rather than Labor Code provisions, where such an agreement exists. Section 510 “do[es] not apply to the payment of overtime compensation to an employee working pursuant to any of the following: ... [A]n alternative workweek schedule adopted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to Section 514.” Cal. Lab. Code § 510. Section 514, in turn, states: “Sections 510 and 511 do not apply to an employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement if the agreement expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the employees, and if the agreement provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay for those employees of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage.” Cal. Lab. Code § 514. The 2015 CBA establishes an alternate workweek in Article X, and provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of employees in Article VIII. The same articles provide for overtime pay at well over 1,3 times the state minimum wage. Thus, the 2015 CBA meets the requirements of § 514, and applies in lieu of § 510.
Because under Labor Code §§ 204, 510, and 1194, a compliant CBA applies rather than the Labor Code, the 2015 CBA governs plaintiffs’ third cause of action. The claim is therefore preempted.
5. Whether Plaintiffs’ Second, Fourth,' and Fifth Causes of Action are Preempted
The notice of removal and Live Nation’s opposition to plaintiffs’ motion to remand assert that the second, fourth, and fifth causes of action are also preempted by the LMRA and provide a further basis for federal question jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs’ second cause of action , alleges failure to provide accurate wage statements in violation of Labor Code § 226, and failure to maintain accurate records in violation of Labor Code § 1174. The allegations supporting the cause of action are conclusory recitations ' of the substance of those statutory provisions. The claim does, however, incorporate , the factual allegations of the first cause of action. As a result, the court construes the claim as based on the fact that payments (and accompanying pay stubs)1 were purportedly not provided in a timely fashion, and that the wage information not timely recorded. Because the only facts incorporated in the claim concern the timeliness of payment, the court agrees that, as presently pled, the second cause of action is derivative of the first, requires interpretation of’ the CBA, and is preempted.
The fourth cause of action, which alleges violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200, is based on the allegedly unfair and unlawful business practices pled in the first, second, and third causes of action. Because determining whether defendant acted unfairly or unlawfully as alleged in these claim requires interpretation of the CBA, the fourth cause of action is preempted.
Finally, the fifth cause of action, which seeks civil penalties under Labor Code § 2699.3(a), pleads that plaintiffs are entitled to recover civil penalties due to the statutory violations alleged in the first three causes of action. Consequently, this claim is derivative of those claims, and is preempted for the same reasons they are preempted.
6. Whether Plaintiffs’ First and Third Causes of Action Must Be Dismissed
The fact that plaintiffs’ first and third causes of action are preempted by § 301 is alone a sufficient basis for dismissal. See Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
Even were the court to treat the causes of action as federal' claims seeking to enforce the terms of the 2015 CBA, however, as presently alleged, they would fail because plaintiffs are subject to ¡the CBA’s- grievance and arbitration provisions.. Prior to filing suit, an employee seeking to vindicate personal rights under a collective bargaining agreement must first attempt to exhaust any mandatory or exclusive grievance procedures set forth in the agreement. See United Paperworkers Int’l. Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc.,
The 2015 CBA states that “[i]n the event of a grievance arising out of the terms and conditions of this [CBA], the parties agree that every effort shall be made to settle such grievance as harmoniously as possible through the following [three-step] procedure.”
Plaintiffs have not alleged that they exhausted the grievance procedure prescribed by the 2015 CBA. Consequently, their first and third causes of action must be dismissed.
C. Plaintiffs’ Request for Attorneys’ Fees
In the event the. court remands the case, plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), ‘[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.’” Leon v. Gordon Trucking, Inc., No. CV 14-6574 MMM (MRWx),
“Removal is not objectively unreasonable solely because the removing party’s arguments lack merit and the removal is ultimately unsuccessful.” Id. (citing Fussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.,
The court has concluded that plaintiffs’ first through fifth causes of action are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA; defendant thus properly removed on the basis that the court had federal question jurisdiction to hear the action. Consequently, there..is no basis for awarding fees to plaintiffs.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the court dismisses plaintiffs’ first and third causes of action with leave- to amend. Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this order if they are able to remedy the deficiencies the court has noted. The amended complaint should plead federal causes of action in lieu of state law claims, consistent with the court’s findings herein regarding § 301 preemption. Plaintiffs may not plead additional claims or add allegations that are not intended to cure the specific defects the court has noted. Should any amended complaint exceed' the scope of leave to amend granted by this order, the court will strike the offending portions under Rule 12(f). See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(f) (“The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act: (1) on its own; or (2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading,”); see also Barker v. Avila, No. 2:09-cv-00001-GEB-JFM,
Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is denied. Their request for attorneys’ fees is also denied.
Notes
. Complaint, Docket No. 1-2 (July 24, 2015).
. Notice of Removal, Docket No. 1 (July 24, 2015),
. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First and Third Causes of Action ("MTD”), Docket No. 11 (July 31, 2015). See also Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First and Third Causes of Action ("MTD Reply”), Docket No. 27 (Oct. 7, 2015).
. Opposition re: Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First and Third Causes of Cation ("MTD Opposition”), Docket No, 22 (July 22, 2015).
. Motion to Remand Case to Los Angeles Superior Court ("Remand Motion”), Docket No. 16 (Aug, 24, 2015). See also Reply in Support of Motion to Remand Case to Los Angeles Superior Court ("Remand Reply”), Docket No. 28 (Oct. 7, 2015).
. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Remand Case to Los Angeles Superior Court ("Remand Opposition”), Docket No. 21 (Sept. 30, 2015).
. Complaint, ¶ 14.
. Id., ¶ 15; Complaint, Exh. 2 (2013 Collective Bargaining Agreement ("2013 CBA”).)
. id., ¶ 16.
. Id., ¶¶ 7, 9-10.
. Id., ¶ 7.
. Id., ¶¶ 9-10.
. Id., ¶ 9.
. Id., ¶ 10.
. Id., ¶ 11.
. Id., ¶ 18.
. Id.
. Id., ¶ 32.
. Id.
. Removal, Docket No. 1 (July 24, 2015), § 10(c); Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Docket No. 12-1 (July 31, 2015), Exh. 1 (Live , Nation & IATSE Local 33 Legit Agreement Hollywood Palladium ("2015 CBA”).)
. Notice of Removal.
. Request for Judicial Notice re Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First and Third Causes of Action ("RJN”), Docket No. 12 (July 31, 2015). ' '
. RJN, Exh. 2 (Certificate of Merger),
. Certificate of Merger.
. To support a finding of complete preemption, the preemptive force of the federal statute at issue must be “extraordinary.” See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
. Plaintiffs object to' consideration of the Declaration of Joseph Kaplon in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and the Declaration of Stacey Levine in Support of Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand. (Objection to Evidence Filed re ... Motion to Dismiss, Docket No. 23 (Sept. 30, 2015); Objection to Evidence in Support of ... Motion to Remand, Docket No. 30 (Oct. 7, 2015).) Because the court does not rely on this evidence, it need not rule on plaintiffs’ objections.
. The Livadas Court held that the state law claim asserted in that case required only that the court “look to” the CBA to determine the applicable rate of pay. The fact that there was “no indication ... there was a ‘dispute’” regarding the rate of pay, it held, "foreclose[] even a colorable argument” of preemption.” Livadas,
. Complaint, ¶ 15; 2013 CBA at 17.
. Complaint, ¶ 16; 2013 CBA, § XXI.
. "Although the court is not bound by unpublished, decisions of intermediate state courts, unpublished opinions that are supported by reasoned analysis may be treated as persuasive authority.” Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. OU Interests, Inc., No. C 05-313 VRW,
. At the hearing, plaintiffs argued that the court could not consider the 2015 CBA as a basis for federal jurisdiction because the agreement had not been attached to the notice of removal. While it is true that the 2015 ■ CBA was not itself attached to the notice of removal, the allegations in the notice specifically referenced the 2015 agreement, and the fact that it covered work from October 1, 2015 to September 30, 2016. (See Notice of Removal, ¶ 10(c).) The notice also referenced the Declaration of Tracy Wagner, simultaneously filed in support thereof, (see id., ¶ 10(b)), and noted that the 2015 CBA was attached as Exhibit A to her declaration. Consequently, the notice of removal and related documents adequately identified the 2015 CBA as a basis upon which defendant claimed federal question jurisdiction. Even were this not the case, in determining whether removal jurisdiction exists, the court is not limited to documents attached to the notice of removal. Rather, a court can consider supplemental evidence later proffered by the removing defendant. Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc.,
. 2015 CBA at 17.
. Plaintiffs argue that the2015CBA is invalid because the parties to that contract are IATSE "Local 33” and “LN Hollywood, Inc.” as opposed to Live Nation. They contend LN Hollywood, Inc. was not licensed to do business at the time the contract was signed. The circumstances surrounding execution of the 2015 CBA indicate that the parties mistakenly used LN Hollywood, Inc., and Live Nation interchangeably and intended that the contract be between Live Nation and IATSE. The contract, for example, incorporates a "side letter,” signed the same day as the 2015 CBA, which states that "[t]his letter shall serve as formal documentation to the agreement made between Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., (hereinafter ‘Live Nation’) and IATSE Local 33 (hereinafter ‘Local 33’) during the course of the negotiations for the 2014-2016 collective bargaining agreement between the parties.” The letter, which is signed by a representative of Live Nation and IATSE’s business representative, is evidence that both parties intended that the 2015 CBA be between Live Nation and IATSE; thus, the reference to LN Hollywood, Inc. appears to have been a clerical error. (2015 CBA at 22.) The fact that Live Nation Worldwide is the successor of Live Nation Hollywood, Inc., (Certificate of Merger), further suggests that the inclusion of LN Hollywood instead of Live Nation was a clerical oversight due, e.g., to a failure to update the CBA’s language after the merger.
As noted, the goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. Cal, Civ. Code § 1636. The court therefore will not disregard the 2015 CBA, as it appears that the parties intended that Live Nation be a party to that contract.
. Complaint, ¶¶ 41-45.
. Although plaintiffs allege in their complaint and argue in their opposition that Labor Code § 20L5, rather than Labor Code § 201,9 applies, they also plead that § 201.9 applies. {Id.., ¶ 33.)
. Id., ¶ 7'.
. 2015 CBA, § V.A.
. Valerie Reitman, Palladium Operator Plans Major Renovation, Los Angeles Times, Apr. 12, 2007, available at http://articles.latimes.com/ 2007/apr/12/local/me-palladiuml2 ("The theater opened Sept. 23, 1940, with performances by the Tommy Dorsey Orchestra and Frank Sinatra. Over the years, it has-played host to the Emmy Awards, the Grammy Awards, the Rolling Stones, James Brown, Led -Zeppelin, Madonna, Barbra Streisand and hundreds of others”); August Brown, The Hollywood Palladium is for Sale, Los Angeles Times, June 5, 201-2, available at http:// latimesblogs.latimes.com/music_blog/2012/06/ the-hollywood-palladium-is-for-sale.html (“The historic, Live Nation-leased concert venue was built by L.A. Times publisher Norman Chandler in 1940, and reopened in 2008 after an extensive 2007 remodel. It has hosted concerts from legendary acts including Frank Sinatra,. U2, Tommy Dorsey and Jay-Z and remains, a fixture of the L.A, live music scene”). .... ,
- Courts Can -take judicial notice- of - newspaper articles when the facts recited in. the arti-
. The 2015 CBA complies with the time limitations established by § 204. Cal. Lab. Code § 204(a) ("Labor performed between the 1st and 15th days, inclusive, of any calendar month shall be paid for between the 16th and the 26th day of the month during which the labor was performed-, and labor performed between the 16th and the last day, inclusive, of any calendar month, .shall be paid for between the 1st and 10th day of the following month”); id., § 204(d) ("The requirements of this section shall be deemed satisfied by the payment of wages for weekly, biweekly, or semimonthly payroll if the wages are paid not more than seven calendar days following the close of the payroll period”). The 2015 CBA states that "wages for work performed on the Event shall be mailed to the Employee not later than seven (7) days after the end of the regular pay period for the Employer corresponding to the dates work was performed for the Event and in the event of an involuntary termination (as defined in section A above), or a resignation, unpaid -wages for work performed prior to the issuance of written notice of termination or resignation shall be mailed to the Employee not later than seven (7) days after the end of the regular pay period during which the Employee was involuntarily terminated or resigned.” (2015 CBA, § VILB). This provision comports with the time limitations on the payment of regular wages set forth in § 204.
. Plaintiffs cite Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,
. At the hearing, plaintiffs argued this case was similar to Gregory,
. Id., ¶52.
. Labor Code § 1194 does not create substantive rights, but a private right to enforce the provisions of §§ 510 and 204.
. Plaintiffs argue that Labor Code § 219(a) applies to all of their statutory causes of action. That provision states: “[N]o provision of this article can in any way be contravened or set aside by a private agreement, whether written, oral, or implied." The general language of § 219(a) is modified by the more specific provisions of §§ 201.9, 201.5, and 204, however. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3534 ("Particular expressions qualify those which are general”); Santa Clarita Org. for Planning & the Env't (SCOPE) v. Abercrombie,
. Remand Opposition at 2; Removal, § 15.a.
. See also Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,
. 2015 CBA § XVII.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. At the hearing, plaintiffs argued that they could not have complied with the grievance and arbitration provision of the 2015 CBA because the CBA was not signed until more than 14 days after they should have been paid. As a result, they asserted, the exhaustion requirement should be waived or deemed satisfied. As neither party briefed the law applicable to this issue, the court declines to decide it at this stage of the proceedings.
. Live Nation did not rhove to dismiss the second, fourth, -and fifth causes of action. Consequently, the court does not address them. It notes, however, that the claims are deficient for the same reason that the first and third causes of action are.