Hall v. HallHall v. Hall
The parties were married in 1975 and separated in 1999. Their two children are emancipated. Defendant’s divorce action on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment was dismissed in 2002 following a trial. Plaintiff subsequently petitioned Family Court for spousal maintenance. At the time the Hearing Of
The action for a judgment of separation culminated in a trial on the issues of maintenance and equitable distribution of the parties’ property. Supreme Court, among other things, denied plaintiff maintenance finding that “plaintiff failed to present any proof to contradict the holding” of the court which vacated the original maintenance award of $300 per month. Supreme Court also fashioned a distribution of the marital property, including an order that the marital home (where plaintiff was then residing) be “sold to the first bonafide offer of $95,000 or more” and the net proceeds be divided equally. Plaintiff’s parents submitted an offer of $95,000 and, the next day, defendant received an offer of $120,000 from a prospective purchaser. The parties returned to court disputing to whom the property should be sold. Supreme Court found that plaintiffs parents were not bona fide purchasers within the context of its order because of their apparent knowledge of the minimum acceptable purchase price. The court thus directed that the home be sold to the person who made the higher offer. Plaintiff received a stay of that order pending appeal (see
Plaintiff initially argues that Supreme Court erred in vacating the spousal maintenance award. A court may modify a maintenance award upon a showing of a “substantial change in circumstances” (
Here, defendant stated that she began the teaching job at BOCES in 1994 and, in order to maintain her pay scale, she was required to complete 60 credits of courses within a fixed number of years. She took courses starting in 1994 and had earned 12 credits by 1996. However, she testified that, after the 1996 classes (and long before the parties separated), she did not take any more courses because she suffered from physical and mental health problems. While she kept a job at BOCES, her salary was reduced in 2003 because she had not completed the mandated credits. In light of the considerable course work that defendant had remaining to maintain her pay scale, her reported health problems and, significantly, the fact that she had stopped taking courses years before the parties separated, we are unpersuaded that Supreme Court abused its discretion in vacating the maintenance award to plaintiff.
The remaining issues asserted by plaintiff do not merit extended discussion. Supreme Court’s distribution of the marital property fell within the discretion it is afforded in crafting an equitable division of such property (see Nichols v Nichols, 19 AD3d 775, 777 [2005]; Lincourt v Lincourt, 4 AD3d 666, 666--667 [2004]). Nor are we persuaded that the court erred in finding, under the particular circumstances, that the $25,000 higher offer (made one day after the offer by plaintiffs parents) should be accepted as regards the marital residence. Finally, the undertaking set by Supreme Court pending this appeal did not impermissibly stray beyond its broad discretion in making such a determination (see Clover St. Assoc. v Nilsson, 244 AD2d 312, 313 [1997]; cf. Lelekakis v Kamamis, 303 AD2d 380, 380 [2003]). The remaining arguments have been considered and found meritless.
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Carpinello and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment and orders are affirmed, without costs.