In this action brought pursuant to the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (hcra), MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq., plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s' *50 grant of summary disposition for defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact), and defendant cross appeals as of right from the trial court’s refusal to grant summary disposition for defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) (claim barred by statute of limitations). We affirm.
From 1983 to 1991, plaintiff, who was diagnosed with asthma when she was four years old, worked for defendant hospital in various capacities. In early 1991, plaintiff began working as a mental health worker in defendant’s Northwood Center, an approximately forty-eight-bed psychiatric unit located in a separate building adjacent to the hospital. Plaintiff’s duties at thе center included interacting with, checking on, and helping patients throughout the day.
Defendant’s smoking policy states that "[s]moking is prohibited in all areas of the hospital with the exception of one designated area for patients in Northwood Center.” At one time patients were apparently permitted to smoke throughout the center. However, in response to a grievance filed by the center’s mental health workers regarding the dangers of secondhand smoke, defendant designated two ventilated smoking rooms at the center and required patients to smoke only in those rooms. (Contrary to defendant’s stated smoking policy, there are aсtually two, not one, designated smoking areas.) One of the smoking rooms is for the general patient population and visitors and one is for psychiatric intensive care patients. The smoking room designated for the general patient population and visitors has a cigarette lighter on thé wall, but for safety reasons the smoking room designated for intensive care patients does not have such a lighter. Intensive care patients are required to have their cigarettes lighted by a *51 nurse or mental health worker at an office located about twenty feet from the smoking room and walk to the smoking room to smoke the cigarette.
Defendant’s rationale for permitting patients to smoke at the center is explained in the affidavit of the center’s medical director, Augustus F. Kinzel, M.D. The center’s patients typically have acute psychotic illnesses and are locked inside the center during their stay. They generally remain at the center for about nine days. Many of the patients are addicted to tobacco. They often have a very intense craving to smoke, and denying them cigarettes can lead to increased assaultive behavior, acute withdrawal, or profound depression resulting in further mental and physical deterioration. The decision to permit the patients to smoke refleсts the center’s desire to first control the patient’s psychotic episode before addressing the patient’s tobacco addiction.
Plaintiff was required to go into most of the rooms at the center, including both smoking rooms, as part of her duties. Although the air in the smoking rooms was recycled, cigarette smoke continued to permeate the center. Because of sinus and asthma problems, plaintiff left work on February 20, 1992, and sought medical treatment. Plaintiff’s doctor determined that she was the type of asthmatic who was sensitive to airborne irritants, such as tobacco smoke. Her doctor permitted her to return to work on February 29, 1992, but instructed her not to expose herself to tobacco smoke and not to work in a smoke-filled environment.
On February 27, 1992, plaintiff went to defendant’s nursing office and informed defendant that she could not work in a smoke-filled environment. Defendant approved a medical leave of absence for plaintiff effective February 28, 1992. On March 18, Thomas Flaсk, defendant’s associate relations *52 manager, met with plaintiffs supervisor, Mary Ehresman, and human resources employee Melanie Towne to determine if there was any way that plaintiff could continue to work at the center. They determined that, because plaintiff could not be exposed to smoke and the centеr permitted smoking, she could not continue to work at the center. Flack and Towne met with plaintiff on March 30, 1992, to discuss plaintiffs leave status and to determine whether she was permanently or temporarily banned from exposure to smoke. In June 1992, defendant offered plaintiff alternative employment as an environmental services aide, or janitor. However, plaintiff did not accept the position because she feared that airborne irritants associated with the work, such as dust and cleaning solvents, would aggravate her asthma and because the job was inappropriate for her skill level. On September 22, 1992, plaintiff wrote a letter to defendant asking defendant to attempt to reasonably accommodate her handicap. Flack met with plaintiff in October 1992 to discuss plaintiff’s request, but the substance or result of this discussion is not apparent from the record.
On January 5, 1993, plaintiff filed suit pursuant to the hcra, MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq., alleging that defendant failed to accommodate her asthma as required by MCL 37.1102(2); MSA 3.550(102)(2). Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(0(10). The trial court granted defendant’s motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10), but denied defendant’s motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). Because we find that the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10), we need not *53 address defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly denied its motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).
On appeal, our review of a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10) is de novo.
Adkins v Thomas Solvent Co,
To recover under the hcra, a plaintiff must allege and prove that (1) the plaintiff is "handicapped” as defined by the hcra,*
1
(2) the handicap is unrelated to the plaintiffs ability to perform the
*54
duties of a particular job,
2
and (3) the plaintiff has been discriminated against in one of the ways set forth in the statute.
Merillat v Michigan State Univ,
Plaintiff argues that defendant failed to satisfy its duty to accommodate as set forth in MCL 37.1102(2); MSA 3.550(102X2). MCL 37.1102(2); MSA 3.550(102)(2) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in article 2, a person shall accommodate a handicapper for purposes of employment, public accommodation, public service, education, or housing unless the person demonstrates that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.
The hcra places the burden of proof on the handicapper to show that the defendant failed to accommodate the handicap. MCL 37.1210(1); MSA 3.550(210)(1). If the handicapper proves a prima *55 facie case, the defendant bears the burden of producing evidence that an accommodatiоn would impose an undue hardship. Id. If the defendant produces evidence that an accommodation would impose an undue hardship, the handicapper bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an accommodation would not impose an undue hardship. Id.
Plaintiff argues that defеndant reasonably could have done two things to accommodate her asthma. First, plaintiff argues that defendant could have banned smoking in the center. Second, plaintiff argues that defendant could have offered her another position in the hospital that did not involve exposure to cigarette smoke or other airborne irritants. We find that plaintiff did not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant reasonably satisfied its duty to accommodate plaintiff. Therefore, we conclude that summary disposition as a matter of law was appropriate.
Defendant’s duty to accommodate plaintiff did not require defendant to ban smoking at the center. As the party opposing the motion for summary disposition, it was plaintiff’s burden to show that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether defendant was required to ban smoking at the center to satisfy its duty to accommodate plaintiff.
Patterson v Kleiman,
Furthermore, even if plaintiff had established a prima facie case that defendant failed to satisfy its duty to accommodate plaintiff by not banning smoking at the center, defendant met its burden of producing evidence that completely banning its patients from smoking at the center would impose an undue hardship, and plaintiif failed to prove by a preponderance оf the evidence that banning smoking at the center would not impose an undue hardship. MCL 37.1210(1); MSA 3.550(210X1). The affidavit of Augustus F. Kinzel, M.D., constituted evidence that there was a sound medical reason for the center’s decision to permit patients to smoke cigarettes and that to require a complete ban on cigarette smoking at the centеr would impose an undue hardship on defendant because such a ban would threaten the mental and physical health of its patients. We do not believe that the scope of defendant’s duty to accommodate plaintiffs asthma requires defendant to ban smoking at the center when there is a sound medical basis for permitting thе patients to smoke, the center has attempted to limit human exposure to secondhand smoke by confining smoking to two ventilated rooms in the facility, and plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that banning smoking would not impose an undue hardship on defendant.
We caution thаt our decision that defendant is not required to ban smoking at the center to satisfy its duty to accommodate plaintiffs asthma should not be read as a general rule that an employer never has a duty to ban or restrict smoking to accommodate an established handicap. Our holding is narrow and turns on the specific facts of this case. The instant case is unique be *57 cause of the special needs of the psychiatric patients at the center. Because of the patients’ acute psychotic illnesses, there are sound medical reasons for permitting the patients to smoke in designated areas. Balancing plaintiffs interest in imposing a complete ban on smoking against the patients’ interest in permitting smoking in limited areas, we conclude that the interests of the patients, on balance, must prevail. Although we can think of few, if any, other cases where such strong factors favor allowing patients to smoke, in this case, the patients’ medical needs are parаmount. Therefore, we conclude that on the facts of this case, defendant was not required to ban smoking at the center to accommodate plaintiffs asthma.
We also hold that defendant’s duty to accommodate plaintiff did not require defendant to place plaintiff in another job in the hospital because "[t]he duty to accommodate imposed under the handicappers’ act does not extend to new job placement.”
Rancour v Detroit Edison Co,
Plaintiff contends that
Rancour
is inapplicable to the instant case because it was decided before the 1990 amendments of the hcra,
Furthermore, the Legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of appellate court statutory interpretations.
Gordon. Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc,
In sum, we conclude that the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10). Plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding her claim that defendant failed to accommodate her handicap because defendant was under no duty to provide the type of accommodation sought by plaintiff. Thus, the trial court properly granted summary disposition as a matter of law.
Affirmed.
Notes
A "handicapper” is "an individual who hаs a handicap.” MCL 37.1103(g); MSA 3.550(103)(g). "Handicap” is defined in relevant part in MCL 37.1103(e); MSA 3.550(103)(e) as:
(i) A determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder, if the characteristic:
(A) For purposes of article 2, substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position or substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual’s qualifications for employment or promotion.
" 'Unrelated to the individual’s ability’ means, with or without accommodation, an individual’s handicap does not prevent the individual from . . . performing the duties of a particular job or position.” MCL 37.1103(l)(i); MSA 3.550(103)®®.
In
Sherman v Optical Imaging Systems, Inc,