11 La. 1 | La. | 1837
delivered the opinion of the court.
The question we are called upon to solve in this case, was presented to the court below on a case stated. The parties
It appears by the preamble of the act, and other evidence before us, that B. Chew, E. Lorraine, and W. Emerson, at their joint trouble and expense, had seized and prosecuted the Josefa Segunda, for an infraction of the laws of the Union, for the suppression of the slave trade; that she was condemned by the District Court of the Louisiana District, and a portion of the proceeds was decreed to them as captors. On an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, that judgment was reversed, so far as related to the claim of those persons, the court being of opinion, that in consequence of an omission in the acts of Congress, they were not entitled to any part of the prize. While things were in this situation, Emerson died, and a memorial was presented to congress by Chew and Lorraine, and the children of Emerson, and the act in question was passed, by which the District Court was « authorized, and directed to order the proceeds of said seizure, now deposited, &c., to be paid over to said B. Chew, and the legal representatives of W. Emerson and E. Lorraine, respectively.”
It is contended by the counsel for the appellant, that Emerson, in his life time, was not entitled to this fund, and consequently, that it cannot belong to his succession; that it was granted to his children as a pure gratuity, a donation,
It is true, that without the interposition of Cohgress, Emerson was without remedy, inasmuch as the sovereign cannot be sued ; but it is equally true, that the seizure and condemnation of the slave ship, in accordance with the policy of government, at the expense and by the personal exertions of Emerson and his associates, benefited the treasury of the Union; that the government, if it had retained .the proceeds of the ship, would have profited by the labor and expenditure of money on the part of those citizens. The want of remedy is not always a safe test of right. It appears to us there was an equitable right, and that the subsequent act of congress is evidence of the liberal justice of the government, rather than a pure donation or gratuity. The expense and labor employed in that prosecution diminished pro tanto the means of Emerson to provide for his debts, and formed the foundation for a just claim for indemnity. If-similar services had been rendered to an individual even without his express request, the person rendering them, as negociorum gestor would be entitled to an action to recover' back his expenses thus beneficially incurred.
Let us suppose that Emerson had afterwards become insolvent, and had executed an assignment of all his property, rights and actions; would this right or claim have passed to his syndics 1 Numerous cases to which we have been referred tend to establish the affirmative of this proposition. The ease of Comegys et al vs. Vasse, 1 Peters, 193, relied on by the counsel for the appellant, is strongly analogous. Vasse had been an underwriter, and had paid various losses occasioned by unjust seizures and condemnations by Spain. The assured had abandoned to him. He retained nothing
Here the almost hopeless chance of indemnity for losses, sustained by the injustice of a foreign government, was treated as a right, which passed by tacit subrogation to the underwriters, by whom the losses had been paid, and a fund provided by the extraordinary measure of reprisals, was considered not as a bounty to the sufferers, but substantially as an indemnity to the underwriters.
The case of Evans et al vs. Charles et al., Anstruther’s Reports, 128, has been relied on in this case. The question was, to which of four setts of claimants a certain fund belonged, which had been given by will to such of- the creditors of the husband of the testatrix, as had compounded with him in his life time for ten shillings in the pound, of a certain debt, or to their personal representatives. The reasoning of the chief baron has not much connexion with his conclusion, according to his own candid and singular confession; that the Court of Exchequer had found itself much puzzled to form any determination, “ and we now decide it,” says he, “rather because it is necessary to award the property to some one, than that we see clearly a superior right in any.”
The only question is stated to have been, who are entitled to take, under the description of the personal representatives of the creditor; and it was decided, that the administratrix of the deceased creditors was entitled beneficially to the bequest, and not the next of kin, nor the residuary legatee of the creditor. The difficulty appears to’ have been in raising
Emerson was therefore, in our opinion, seized in his life time of an equitable right to be remunerated for services rendered and money expended; a right susceptible of being assigned and transferred, as much as the claims of our citizens against foreign governments for.unjust condemnations and seizures ;■ a hope, a reasonable expectation coupled with a- pecuniary interest. If such a right could be assigned, it was certainly transmissible at his death to his succession, to those who are appointed by law to inherit his property, coupled with the obligation of paying his debts. If he had bequeathed this claim or right by will, we cannot doubt the legacy would have been- valid. Having died intestate, we must consider it as having descended, and forms a part of his succession. According to the code, succession not only includes the rights and obligations of the deceased, at the time of his death, but all that has accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. Article 869. No right, whether legal'or equitable, perfect or imperfect, is lost or annihilated, they all descend according to the legal order of succession.
When Congress authorized this fund to be paid over to the legal representatives of Wm. Emerson, we are not warranted in supposing that they intended to give it a different destination from what the law would have given it. The legal representative of the deceased person, we understand to be one standing in the rights of the deceased by authority of law. The defendant having received the money in that capacity,-it is in our opinion, liable in his hand? for the debts of the deceased.
It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the judgment of the Court of Probate's be affirmed, with costs.