*1 122 de- the defendant agreement (1877). Generally, guaranty 424 the common-
L.Ed. obligation with guaranty otherwise, sires to setoff provides that mutual debts law plaintiff. allegedly made payments by operation of automatically not setoff are counterclaim Thus, that Howard’s hold we Jones, 497, 274 265 v. S.C. law. Gilliland the action defense permissible raises a Farmer, (1980); 4 264 S.E.2d Green guaranty. on the 651; 1 Wm Bl. 98 E.R. 154 Burr. appropriate
(1768). (Lord
Summary judgment
is
latter case
Mansfield
no
there is
sub
says
only
it is clear that
equity
did observe that
when
“[n]atural
controversy
material fact.
compensate
stantial
should
each oth-
cross-demands
Ward,
529
er, by deducting
Montgomery
the less sum from the Northrip v.
(Okl.1974);
Pryor
489
Weaver v.
only
greater and
the difference is the
Jefferso
(Okl.1977). The trial
nian,
P.2d 967
due”.)
justly
which
sum
can be
summary judgment against Howard
court’s
however,
Insolvency,
may allow
guaranty was
due on the
fixing the amount
Insolvency
for different result.
of one of
defenses
proper
with Howard’s
parties
may
equity,
create an
unresolved.
counterclaims
it,
strengthen
least
sufficient to allow a
Appeals
The
Court
is
obligations.
setoff
mutual
3 J. Sto
summary judgment
vacated and the
ry,
Equity Jurispru
Commentaries on
against
The cause
Howard
reversed.
dence,
eq
This
§
remanded to the District Court’ of Tulsa
principle
applied
uitable
has been
for the
County
proceedings
further
consistent
benefit of
in cases involving
borrowers
in
as the
herewith
such time
automatic
solvent national banks. Scott v. Arm
stay
proceedings
Bank-
U.S.
strong,
13 S.Ct.
U.S.
36 L.Ed.
litigation
ruptcy Court shall
bar
(1892);
Hibernia National Bank v.
counterclaims.
Deposit
Corp.,
Federal
Ins.
F.2d
HARGRAVE, C.J., HODGES,
(10th Cir.1984);
1407-1408
Seattle-First
LAVENDER, SIMMS, DOOLIN, ALMA
F.D.I.C.,
Bank v.
Nat.
619 F.Supp.
KAUGER, JJ.,
WILSON and
(W.D.Okl.1985).
ap
It has also been
LUMPKIN,
GARY L.
(Appointed
S.J.
plied
Republic
in a recent bankruptcy
place OPALA,
V.C.J.,
who
proceeding,
Republic
In re
Financial Cor
disqualified), concur.
(Bankr.N.D.Okl.
poration,
equities of a Thrift setoff of a Certificate
against Note, a Promissory and stated: stay granted Court orders
“[TJhis
Corporation
Re
Republic Finance
Hall,
and Suzanne
HALL
Jeff
Savings Corporation be
public Trust and
Appellants,
modified so as to allow Movants to setoff
against
claim
RFC with their obli
pursuant to 11
gation owed to RT & SC
EDGE,*
Edge Energies,
Herman
d/b/a
47 B.R.
U.S.C. 553.” Id.
Jackson,
and Ronald W.
Ronald
d/b/a
grave injustice and cause
“It would be a
Company, Appellees.
W. Jackson &
hardship
monetary
loss
substantial
No. 65592.
deny
mutual
to Movants to
setoff
obligations
claims and
virtue
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
corpora-
acts and activities of the debtor
Oct.
Id.
* Edge Energies part Herman has taken in these proceedings d/b/a appeal. *2 (1) appeal hold as follows:
now Hall is dismissal of Suzanne the order of (2) The order us. properly before re- must be summary judgment granting *3 awarding (3) must the order So versed. opinion of the Court attorney The fees. fur- for and we remand Appeals-is vacated by the trial court. proceedings ther of this discuss the merits Before we ad matters must be procedural case two “Motion to Hall has filed a dressed. Tulsa, Hall, Ap pro requesting se. that the Court of Jeff Strike” deem the peals opinion be stricken. We Hall, Tulsa, pro se. Suzanne moot because we have Motion to Strike Hickman, Hickman, Hickman & Frank R. and herein va previously granted certiorari Tulsa, appellee Jackson. Appeals opinion. cate Court SUMMERS, Justice. procedural is wheth The next issue appellate review his preserved er Hall Hall sued small Jeff and Suzanne judgment. objections claims court to recover funds invested pronounced on summary judgment was gas drilling ventures. unsuccessful oil and 12, Monday, Sep September 1985 and on they to the district court After removal 1985, 23, filed a motion to tember Defen- petition allege their amended seeking it. A motion vacation of a vacate Jackson, Public Ac- dant as a “Certified days judgment is filed within 10 which for these countant who was the accountant may regarded as the func the decision professional Drilling Ventures and who had equivalent of a motion for new trial. tional knowledge of the financial and confidential Horizons, Co., Leasing Inc. v. KEO 681 each,” fraud had committed situation (Okl.1984). P.2d 759 Hall’s motion to against by verbally misrepresenting them the time within which vacate thus extended good when ventures as investments appeal preserved ap issues for our of the falsi- he knew or should have known pellate review. statements, the Halls ty of the and that upon these had relied to their detriment had also misrepresentations. Plaintiffs HALL I. DISMISSAL OF SUZANNE fraud, of securi- filed an action for violation The trial court dismissed Suzanne against Herman ties laws and conversion appear. petition Hall’s for her failure to Edge Energies, Edge, d/b/a Appeals affirmed the trial The Court partnerships. That partner of the limited prior set aside its dismis court’s refusal to part stayed the action was find, plaintiff. sal of Suzanne as a We Energies bankruptcy. After con- declared however, appellate jurisdiction that no ex litigation, action paper siderable Suzanne’s her dismissal. This court has ists to review appear, dismissed for her failure to was duty inquire jurisdiction. its into Mat summary judg- granted was and Jackson Petition, ter Initiative ment. (Okl. Suzanne was dismissed as vacate Jeff Hall then filed a motion to July party on 1985. On June summary judgment. That motion the dismis she filed a motion to set aside granted overruled and the Court sal, August which motion was denied judgment attorney fees in an additional summary judg 1985. Jackson’s motion for $3,000.00. the sum of granted September ment was 23, 1985, the Halls filed a appealed. Ap- September On
Plaintiffs The Court Summary Judgment “Motion to Vacate the peals affirmed the trial court’s orders The “dismissal” granted and Set Aside Dismissal”. have earlier certiorari. We we argument Mays producing concerned the A. I knew the were not of that motion well, still, very due “dismissal” of Jackson as at that time no sustaining operator the order the motion for summa determination had ry judgment. appeal dry-hole did not Suzanne been made to them. (30)
August
ruling
thirty
within
Q.
change
they
But that didn’t
the fact
days.
appellate jurisdiction
Thus our
has
wells.
bad
not been invoked to review her dismissal
agree.
IA. would
Bad as far as who-
O.S.1981,
trial court.
990. We
I
say
ever invested
them. would
must leave intact the trial court’s dismissal
potential
getting
that their
of ever
party.
of Suzanne Hall as a
money
very
back was
slim.”
*4
(O.R.
at
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR
“Q.
you
When did
first become dissat-
THE DEFENDANT
your
isfied with
investment in these
complaint against
Jeff Hall’s
Jackson
partnerships?
limited
...
may be summarized as follows: 1. Jackson
Q.
you’re
I
telling
you
take it
me that
Edge Energies’
was the accountant
lim-
identify any particular
cannot
time
In
partnerships;
February
ited
2.
of 1983
you
became dissatisfied with
general partners
when Hall told one of the
your investment.
partnerships
of the limited
that he did not
IA.
think the
my
dissatisfaction of
in-
want to
in
invest
the ventures the
time,
vestment came gradually over
Jackson,
partner
him
invited
tó call Ron
probably starting
spring
with the
Accountant,
Certified Public
“who
Í982, learning things like the tanks
Drilling
accountant for these
Ventures and
being gauged
tempera-
weren’t
professional
who had
and confidential
coming
ture when the trucks were
knowledge of the financial situation of each
up, that
the tanks weren’t locked.
and who could vouch for their worth as an
May
The indecision of the
well of
(Amended Petition,);
investment”
3. Jack-
dry-hole
whether to
it or shut
it
Edge Energies’
son said to Hall that
limit-
down, yet they
charging
continued
deal”,
partnerships
“good
were a
operating expenses and continued
they
“good moneymakers”,
“they
were
operating.
expecting something
two-year
were
like a
Q.
happened
spring
And that
or
(Tr.
37);
payoff”
4.
Jackson was dissat-
summer of 1982.
Edge Energies
isfied
drilling
with some
(O.R.
spring
right_”
45-46).
ventures in the
of 1982 due to mis-
A. That’s
management by
operators;
5. Jackson
support
of his motion for
Edge
in
knew 1982 that some of the
Ener-
judgment
deposi-
Jackson relied on Hall’s
gies’
investments;
partnerships were bad
tion. Hall had testified that the conversa-
drilling
in
Jackson was an investor
ven-
“short”,
they
tion with Jackson was
1982-VI;
ture
did not limit
Jackson
“generalities”,
in
talked
that Jackson stat-
Edge Energies’ part-
recommendation of
drilling
Edge Energies
ed that
ventures
nerships
specific partnerships;
8. Hall
deal”,
“good
“good moneymakers”,
were a
relied on the recommendation of Jackson
they
expecting
year
and that
a “two
Edge Energies’ drilling
and invested in
ven-
argued
payback”. Jackson
that he made
1982-VIII;
tures 1982-VI and
and 9. Hall
drilling
“a statement
to all
ventures of
lost his investment.
Edge Energies”
spe-
but that he made no
petition
Hall attached to his amended
representations concerning drilling
cific
pages
deposition
in
of Jackson
a differ-
ventures 1982-VI
1982-VIII. Jackson
pertaining
ent case
to investments
contended that the statements were true
Energies’ partnerships.
testimony
This
drilling
when made because
ventures of
part:
states in
Edge Energies
profitable
were often
result-
argued
“Q.
Mays
ing in returns to investors. He also
you
And
knew the
were bad
relationship
special
that no
existed with
wells.
drilling
good deals or
require
ventures were not
Hall
dis-
which would
Jackson
two-year pay-
makers
good money
close
to Hall. Jackson ar-
with
information
back,
specific representa-
representations
or
made the
gued that because
had
ground
believing
tion occured as to ventures 1982-VI and without a reasonable
1982-VIII,
misrepresenta-
phone
no material false
them to
true at
time
tion of
was made. Jackson concluded
fact
conversation.1
that Hall
failed to
all of the
had
show
Tindell,
tation Where expression opinion may carry the an making person representation occu- the assertion, implied only with an that it fiduciary position pies a or other of trust speaker the which knows facts would remarks, recipient for the of his for in- preclude opinion, such an but stance, recipient may justified in be justify does know facts which it. There only assuming the correctness not of fac- general agreement quite as- such opin- tual but also implied sertion is to be where the defen- ions_ partners partner- Since as to holds dant himself out or is understood se, ship matters are fiduciaries inter it is having special knowledge of the mat- partners often found were entitled ter plaintiff, which is not available to the rely opinions opinion of their col- so that his becomes effect an leagues. summarizing knowledge. assertion Thus, ordinary man is free to deal
Another
to the
re
upon
opinion
reliance
expert
an
misrepresentation
quirement that the
diamond,
jeweler as to the value of a
existing
appears
one of
fact
in the situa
attorney upon
point
law,
of a
speaker may
reasonably
tion where
physician upon
health,
a matter of
having
opin
be understood as
based
upon
validity
banker
a signature,
prediction
ion
on facts that are un
or the owner of land at a
distance as
available
the listener either
because he
worth,
though
its
even
is that
does not have access
them or because
*6
antagonist
of
in bargaining
his
a
transac-
obviously incapable
interpreting
he is
of
Keeton,
Prosser,
Pros-
tion.” W.
and W.
them.
a
Still
third
based
Torts,
ser
and Keeton
the Law
upon
assumption
the logical
that one who
of
at
109
760-761
ed.
§
asserts that a future event
come
will
to
pass impliedly warrants that he knows of
opponent’s
on an
knowledgable
Reliance
prevent
no fact that will
its occurrence.”
opinion as an element of fraud has been
Day Avery,
63,
v.
U.S.App.D.C.
179
548 recognized in
St.
&
Louis
jurisdiction.
this
1018,
(D.C.Cir.1976),
cert.
F.2d
1026-1027
Reed,
v.
350,
S.F.R. Co.
37
Okl.
by
Id.
in effect an assertion
“become
be found to
signed a release.
In
liance thereon she
knowledge”. Prosser
summarizing his
allegations
commenting
Plaintiffs
on the
Torts, supra.
Law
Keeton on the
allega-
examination
we stated: “[a]n
reply shows a sufficient
plaintiff’s
tions of
used the term
Jackson’s
The
charge
Id.
reasonable
of fair
exercise
plaintiff,
time,
oppor-
at the same
had the
impartial judgment, might reach different
tunity
strength
to test the
and weakness
conclusions, summary judgment must be
short, plaintiff
of his case.
used the
required
prove
denied. Hall
courtroom as a rehearsal hall
ex-
challenged
case
Jackson’s motion
pense of
people.
his adversaries and the
summary judgment.
satisfactorily
Owens, supra, at 7.
alleged fraud and showed factual issues in
Owens,
In contrast
Thus,
Hall’s case was
response to Jackson’s motion.
we
judgment.
decided
Jackson
grant
must reverse the trial court’s order
put
expense
has not been
of a trial
ing summary judgment to
va
judgment resolving
this time the
Appeals opinion
cate the Court
affirming
case
his favor must be set aside. There
that order.5
no finding
that Hall has
acted
such
*8
III. AWARD OP
bring
ATTORNEY’S FEES
faith
bad
as to
this ease within the
general
limited
to the
rule enun-
Attorney
ordinarily
fees are not
re
Owens,
in
supra.
ciated
The trial court’s
party against
coverable
one
another in
awarding attorney
order
fees to Jackson is
the absence
statute
or an enforceable
thus reversed.
contract. City National
Bank
Trust
(Okl.1977);
Owens,
v.Co.
tact. case proceedings.
court further
HARGRAVE, C.J., OPALA, V.C.J., LAVENDER, DOOLIN, HODGES, KAUGER, JJ.,
ALMA WILSON
concur.
SIMMS, J., part, dissents concurs
in part.
SIMMS, Justice, concurring part,
dissenting part: granted in this
I would have certiorari only purpose the limited ex-
matter
amining attorney’s fee to defen- award
dant Jackson. majority’s reversal of
I concur with attorney’s fee award the reason a defendant who transfers statute court, out as Jackson case of small claims case,
did in the instant is unable to recover O.S.1981,
attorney’s fees. Under subject pay- such a defendant is plaintiff’s attorney’s plain- if fees
ment recipro- prevails,
tiff but is afforded a right prevail. Thayer
cal should Co., Okl.,
Phillips Petroleum (1980), that statu- this Court reviewed
tory differentiation of treatment and held repugnancy results. constitutional here.
That statute controls TURLEY, Appellant,
Windle
FLAG-REDFERN OIL
COMPANY, Appellee.
No. 72408.
Supreme Oklahoma. Court of
Oct.
