80 Va. 555 | Va. | 1885
delivered the opinion of the court.
The statute relating to the summoning and selecting of juroi’s in cases of felony, as it stood in the Code -of 1860, chapter 208, has been amended, and the law, as it now is, provides as follows: “3. The writ of venire facias, in a case of felony, other than where the punishment may be death, shall command the officer to whom it is directed to summon sixteen persons of his county or corporation to be taken from a list to be furnished him by the judge of his county or corporation, residing remote from the place where the offence is charged to have been committed, and qualified in other respects to serve as jurors, to attend the court wherein the accused is to be tried, on the first day of the next term thereof, or at such other time as the court or judge may direct. * * * 4. In a case where the punishment may be death, the writ of venire facias shall require the officer to summon twenty-four persons, in the manner provided in section three of this chapter; and in any case of felony, where a sufficient number of jurors for the trial of the case can
These provisions of the statute, in respect to empaneling juries, are not directory merely, but imperative. They are rules which are made essential in proceedings involving life or liberty, and it is the right of the accused to demand that they be strictly complied with. To disregard them is to deprive the accused of that “ due process of law ” which is provided by the legislature, and which is required by the fundamental law of the land.
In the present case the record shows they have not been complied with, and the judgment of the circuit court is therefore erroneous. Of the twenty-four persons originally summoned, sixteen having been found free from exception, the jury for the trial of the accused ought to have been selected from the panel of sixteen who were thus found to be qualified. And the selection should have been made by the accused striking four from the panel, leaving the remaining twelve to constitute the jury; or, if the accused chose not to do so, then twelve of the sixteen should have been chosen by lot. This the statute requires, and if one of the formalities which it prescribes may be disregarded, all may be set at naught. Moreover, it was error to cause bystanders to be summoned without directing another
JUDGMENT REVERSED.