Hall v. Com.Hall v. Com.
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Koontz, Baker, Coleman
KOONTZ, Chief Judge.
Tacitus Anstatius Hall was convicted by jury of possession of burglar‘s tools in violation of
At approximately 11:09 p.m. on December 13, 1987, Officer Dennis Baines of the Williamsburg Police Department responded to a silent burglar alarm at the Williamsburg Drug Company, bordering the campus of the College of William and Mary. Because there were no backup units available within the department, the dispatcher radioed for assistance from the William and Mary Police Department. Officer Greg Perry of the William and Mary Police Department responded to the call, and he and Officer Baines searched the exterior premises of the drugstore. Finding no sign of forced entry, Officer Perry left the drugstore but continued to monitor the Williamsburg Police radio frequency. Officer Baines remained at the drug store and waited for the manager to arrive, and together they examined the interior of the building. In the basement they discovered an open office door, which normally was kept closed and locked. They also observed “pry marks” on the door. They described the condition of the office as a “mess.” Suspecting that an intruder was in the building, Officer Baines and the store manager went back upstairs, and Baines radioed for assistance. While waiting for assistance to arrive, Officer Baines heard a commotion and a “banging noise” in the basement. When the backup unit arrived, the officers went downstairs,
In his first issue on appeal, Hall argues that his arrest was unlawful, and, therefore, the evidence seized as a result of the illegal arrest should have been inadmissible at trial. Specifically, Hall argues that the campus police officers lacked authority to arrest him since the arrest occurred off the campus grounds.
The Commonwealth argues that Hall‘s arrest was unlawful under the provisions of
[a] campus police officer ... may exercise the powers and duties conferred by law upon police officers of cities, towns, or counties ... (i) upon any property owned or controlled by the institution for which he was appointed and upon the streets, sidewalks, and highways, immediately adjacent thereto ... and (iii) in close pursuit of a person as provided in
§ 19.2-77 .
The Commonwealth argues that Hall‘s arrest was lawful under both subsections (i) and (iii) of
Further, the arrest was not made in close pursuit, pursuant to
The Commonwealth argues that even if the officers exceeded their statutory authority, the arrest was, nevertheless, lawful because the officers retained the power as private citizens to place Hall under arrest. Because there is no statute governing an arrest by a private citizen, we must look to the common law. “It is well recognized at common law that a private person may arrest without a warrant in a felony case if the felony has actually been committed and he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested was the one who committed it.” Moore v. Oliver, 347 F.Supp. 1313, 1316 (W.D.Va. 1972). See also Tharp v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 487, 490, 270 S.E.2d 752, 754 (1980). All of the William and Mary officers involved in Hall‘s arrest testified that they had been monitoring the Williamsburg Police radio frequency and were aware that a breaking and entering had occurred at the Williamsburg drugstore. Further, the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that Hall was the one who had committed the felonious act. Shortly after Officer Baines radioed that someone had broken out of the basement, Officer Thompson saw a man, later identified as Hall, running across campus jumping fences and carrying a bag which “jingled” and “clanked“. Hall refused to comply with the repeated demands of Officers Perry and Graham to stop. After the officers apprehended Hall, he continued to struggle and reach for his gym bag containing the loaded handgun. In light of these circumstances, the officers had reason to believe Hall was involved in the breaking and entering of the drugstore and, as private citizens, place him under arrest.
Further, the items seized were properly admitted into evidence. During the struggle between the officers and Hall, Hall repeatedly attempted to reach for his open gym bag. It was reasonable under those circumstances for the officers to believe that the gym bag contained a weapon or some instrument which Hall sought to obtain to assault the officers or to effect an escape. Under these circumstances, the officers had the right to search the gym bag incident to their lawful arrest of Hall. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). The evidence obtained by that search was properly admitted.
Hall next argues that carrying a handgun in a gym bag does not violate
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
Affirmed.
UPON A PETITION FOR REHEARING Before KOONTZ, C.J., BAKER and COLEMAN, JJ.
On March 27, 1990 came the appellant, by court-appointed counsel, and filed a petition
On consideration whereof, the petition for rehearing is granted, the mandate entered herein on March 20, 1990 is stayed pending the decision of the panel on rehearing, and the appeal is reinstated on the docket of this Court.
UPON A REHEARING
Before KOONTZ, C.J., BAKER and COLEMAN, JJ.
On April 11, 1990, the Court granted a rehearing of the judgment rendered in this case on March 20, 1990.
Upon consideration of oral argument by counsel for appellant and the Commonwealth and for the reasons stated in the original panel decision, the judgment is affirmed and the stay of this Court‘s March 20, 1990 mandate is lifted.
The trial court shall allow court-appointed counsel for the appellant an additional fee of $200 for services rendered the appellant on the rehearing portion of this appeal, in addition to counsel‘s costs and necessary direct out-of-pocket expenses. This amount shall be added to the costs due the Commonwealth in the March 20, 1990 mandate.
This order shall be certified to the trial c