52 Ga. App. 150 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1935
Although the plaintiff here sought to recover in one count on the theory that he was both an implied invitee and
While the authorities are not uniform, their overwhelming weight is to the effect that an express invitation, like one implied, does not give to the recipient the legal status of an invitee, unless his visit is in some way connected with the business in which the occupant is engaged. The basis of the rule appears to be that an occupant of real estate ordinarily has the right and privilege of using it as he sees fit, without responsibility or liability, except from hidden pitfalls, to a visitor entering thereon merely for his own interest, curiosity, or pleasure, but the visitor must take the premises subject to any ordinary accompanying risks, the same as the occupant himself. Greenfield v. Miller, 173 Wis. 184 (180 N. W. 184, 12 A. L. R. 982, 984, 988); Knight v. Farmers Gin Co., 159 Ark. 423, 429 (252 S. W. 30); Fleischman Malting Co. v. Mrkacek (7th C. C. A.), 14 Fed. (2d Ser.) 602; Kinsman v. Barton & Co., 141 Wash. 311 (251 Pac. 563, 564); Southcote v. Stanley, 1 Hurlst. & N. 247 (156 Eng. Reprint, 1195); 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. 60; 38 Eng. L. & Eq. Rep. 195; 45 C. J. 824; 20 R. C. L. p. 59, § 60. As to cases which seem contra, see Pope v. Willow Garages Inc., 274 Mass. 440 (174 N. E. 727); Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn. 394 (155 Atl. 502, 503).
It is true that section 105-401 of the Code of 1933, contains the broad language that, “’where the owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries occasioned by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.” But the words “for any lawful purpose” and other language of our statute, “by express or implied invitation,” have been used in cases, such as Bennett v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 102 U. S. 577 (26 L. ed. 225, 236, 238), which, while dealing only with implied invitations, state the rule that an “ invitation is inferred where there is a common interest or mutual advantage, while a license is inferred where the object is the mere pleasure or benefit of the person using it.” Although our Supreme Court, in holding in Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Hunter, and King v. Central Ry. Co., supra (128 Ga. 604; 107 Ga. 760), that “the visitor must come for a purpose connected with
Judgment affirmed.