11 F. Cas. 211 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York | 1869
The specification of the plaintiff’s patent says: “This invention relates to a new and useful device for stretching chains, those which are designed for working over pulleys, whereby the links are all brought to an uniform length, so that they will all engage with the teeth on the pulleys, or fit propei-ly or snugly
This suit was commenced on the 24th of December, 1SGG. The notice of special matter of defence sets forth, that, at the time of the commencement of the suit, and for four years prior thereto, the defendant was using, for the purpose of stretching chains for pulley blocks, the same machine which the plaintiff claims to be an infringement on his patent, and that, for a period of eighteen years prior to August, 1862, the same machine, or one of the like kind that the defendant is using, was used for the purpose of stretching chains for pulley blocks by the deceased father of the defendant.
It is apparent, from the specification, that the plaintiff’s machine is designed to stretch the links of a chain, so as to make all the links of the chain of a uniform length, that they may fit snugly in the recesses in pulleys. It is not designed to stretch the entire chain indiscriminately, or any given portion of it, without reference to the length of any particular link before or after such stretching, but it is designed to stretch each particular link which is, before such stretching, shorter than a prescribed length, while it is so arranged that no link shall be stretched which is not shorter than such prescribed length. This necessity requires, (1st,) that the two points where the chain is to be grasped for stretching it, shall not be always at a fixed distance apart, but shall be capable of being varied in their distance apart, so as, if required, to stretch a single short link that may be found interposed between two links of the proper length; (2d,) that the jaws of the tongs shall be so constructed, by being grooved or otherwise, as to grasp firmly any particular link, without injuring it or any other link. The great utility of the invention is beyond question. The evidence shows, that it is impossible practically to make, by hand, the links of a uniform length, and that, if made thus uniform by hand, they will stretch in use, and stretch unequally, so as to produce difficulty in using the chain on a pulley with uniform recesses, and that the only feasible method of making a chain for use on such a pulley is to make the links shorter than the required length, and then take out the stretch of the metal by stretching each separate link to the proper gauged measure, by a machine like the plaintiff’s.
It is in evidence that the defendant’s father, in 1852, procured to be constructed in New York, a machine for stretching chains,, which had two pairs of tongs that grasped the chain, so that, by applying power, by means of a crank at one end, the chain was stretched. This machine he placed in a cellar, where he used it, keeping it concealed, however, from persons in general. The door of the cellar was kept locked, and, so far as appears, the existence of the machine was known only to the machinist who put it up, to the defendant’s father, to the defendant’s-brother, and to the defendant himself. The defendant states, in his testimony, that the machine was locked up to keep people from seeing it; that his father always locked the
On the foregoing facts, I think that this case fairly falls within the case of Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. [51 U. S.] 477, even assuming that the old machine, in the condition in which it was while in the cellar, was substantially identical in construction with the machine as used by the defendant after July. 1865, and with the plaintiff’s machine. In the case of Gay-ler v. Wilder [supra], one Conner had constructed, for his own private use, a safe substantially like the one patented to Fitzgerald, some time before Fitzgerald invented his safe, and had used it as a safe, for more than six years, in the counting-room of a type foundry. Its existence and use were, known to the persons who worked in the foundry, although its particular internal construction, which was the point of the invention, does not appear to have been known to them. It then passed into other hands, but what became of it did not appear. Conner made but one such safe, and, after that one passed out of his hands, he used other safes, of a different construction. At the trial, before Mr. Justice Nelson, the court charged the jury, that if Conner had not made his discovery public, but had used the safe simply' for his own private purpose, and it had been finally forgotten or abandoned, such a discovery and use was not an obstacle to the taking out of a patent subsequently, by another person, for a safe of like construction, if he was an original, though not the first, inventor of such a safe. The jury having found in favor of the patent, the case was carried to the supreme court, by' writ of error, and that court held, Chief Justice Taney delivering its opinion, that the prior knowledge and use spoken of in the 6th section of the patent act of July 4, 1S36 (5 Stat. 119), as necessary to invalidate a patent, must be a “knowledge and use existing in a manner accessible to the public.” The chief justice says: “If .the Conner safe had passed away from the memory of Conner himself, and of those who had seen it, and the safe itself had disappeared, the knowledge of the. improvement was as completely lost as if it had never been discovered. The public could derive no benefit from it, until it was discovered by another inventor. And if Fitzgerald made his discovery by his own efforts, without any knowledge of Conner’s, he invented an improvement which was then new, and. at that time, unknown; and it was not the less new and unknown because Conner’s safe was recalled to his memory by the success of Fitzgerald’s.” The court affirmed the correctness of the instruction to the jury above mentioned. Now, although the old machine, in the present case, was constructed in 1852, and had been kept in the cellar of the defendant’s father, under the circumstances stated, and had been occasionally used there, and although it had not bodily disappeared from view, yet its existence and use were not made public, the knowledge and use of it did not exist in a manner accessible to the public, it had been substantially abandoned, and it had substantially passed away from the memory' of those who used it, as .is shown by the fact that, when they were called on to stretch the links of chains to a uniform length — a purpose to which it is not shown that the defendant’s father ever applied the machine — it did not occur to them to use the machine for the purpose, until after they had learned of the existence and use of the plaintiff's machine. The knowledge of the machine was, therefore, as effectually lost as if it had never been constructed, and the public could derive no benefit from the invention embodied in it, until such invention should be discovered by' another inventor. As it clearly appears that the plaintiff made his invention by his own efforts, without any knowledge of the machine in the cellar of the defendant’s father, he invented an improvement which was then new, and was at the time unknown; and it was not the less new and unknown because the old machine was recalled to the memory of the defendant and of his brother, and of the machinist who put it up, by the success of the plaintiff’s machine.
But, independently of this view, the defendant has failed to establish satisfactorily the identity of the old machine with the machine as used by him after its removal from the cellar, in an important particular. The specification of the plaintiff’s patent states that the jaws of his tongs have grooves made in their ends to receive the horizontal links
■ On the evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. The machine used by the defendant infringes the first claim of the plaintiffs patent. But, as the plaintiff has failed to prove any specific amount of damages, the finding will be for only six cents damages.