Hall v. BarnesHall v. Barnes
This appeal is from a special hearing and determination on a petition challenging the validity of a garageman’s lien sought to be enforced by respondent pursuant to Lien Law § 201-a. Supreme Court found that respondent proved entitlement to a lien in the amount of $2,060 for painting and restoring petitioner’s car and permitted the retention of petitioner’s vehicle pending payment of that amount with storage fees to ac
The issues before us are twofold: whether a garageman’s lien was established and, in the alternative, whether respondent is entitled to an award on the basis of quantum meruit for work done on petitioner’s car and, if so, in what amount. The matter stems from petitioner agreeing to have his 1971 Chevrolet Impala painted by respondent. The terms of the agreement are mired in controversy.
Petitioner contends that respondent failed to provide evidence that he is a registered repair shop and thus not entitled to a lien pursuant to Lien Law § 184 (4). Lien Law § 184 (4) specifically limits the benefits of the application of the garage-man’s lien to a motor vehicle repair shop registered in compliance with Vehicle and Traffic Law article 12-A (see, Mem of State Dept of Motor Vehicles, 1985 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 2976). There is no proof in the record that respondent is a registered motor vehicle shop. Supreme Court’s reliance on the presentation by respondent, in an ex parte appearance before the court, of respondent’s business card reflecting a registration number as proof of registration is totally inadequate to sustain respondent’s burden of proof of registration.
Further, respondent failed to otherwise comply with Lien Law § 184 (1), which mandates that it establish that the car owner gave consent or authority to proceed with the repair at an agreed price. Respondent does not deny that the written "estimate” given to petitioner and signed by petitioner failed to contain an agreement as to the cost of the job. The only entry on the "estimate” presented to petitioner was a notation that the labor charge would be $38 per hour. Despite the fact that respondent thoroughly inspected the car, and by his own admission noted that rusting around the fenders and other body work was required to prepare the car for painting, he failed to give an estimate of work hours involved. Thus, there was no agreement as to the cost of repairs, a condition precedent to a binding contract (see, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v Chase Collision,
The final point to be addressed is whether respondent proved a cause of action based on quantum meruit. Supreme Court noted that there was a sharp dispute as to the value of the work done. Petitioner contended that it was to be in the $1,700 range, representing a bartered agreement to offset the cost of painting the car by the debt respondent owed the plumbing business run by plaintiff’s family. Respondent denied any such
Supreme Court aptly noted that the terms of the agreement are hazy, but concluded that petitioner ordered the car painted, that respondent did the job and that petitioner owes him for 120 hours of work at $38 per hour, totaling, $4,560, minus $2,500 paid on account with $2,060 still owing.
When, as here, a nonjury proceeding is held, our review is not limited to determining whether the verdict is against the weight of the credible evidence, but can extend to a review of the record as a whole and this Court may grant the judgment warranted by the record (see, Osland v Supnick,
Crew III, White, Casey and Peters, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law and the facts, with costs to plaintiff, by reversing so much thereof as granted respondent a garageman’s lien on the vehicle in question; judgment awarded to respondent in the amount of $996; and, as so modified, affirmed.