Hall v. Barist Elevator Co.Hall v. Barist Elevator Co.
Ordered that the appeals by the defendants City of Long Beach and City Council of the City of Long Beach are dismissed, as those defendants are not aggrieved by the portion of the order appealed from (see
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from by the Architectural Review Board of the City of Long Beach; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondent.
That branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the second amended complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Architectural Review Board of the City of Long Beach was based on the same grounds for dismissal as those previously urged and rejected (see Haberman v City of Long Beach, 25 AD3d 583 [2006] [decided herewith]; see also Haberman v City of Long Beach, 298 AD2d 497 [2002]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court‘s denial of that branch of the defendants’ motion was proper. Schmidt, J.P., Mastro, Spolzino and Covello, JJ., concur.
25 A.D.3d 584
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied, and the complaint is reinstated.
The plaintiff allegedly was injured at her workplace when she became trapped in an elevator that accelerated upward, hit something, and fell to a level above the third floor. The plaintiff commenced this action against Barist Elevator Company (hereinafter Barist), which had been retained by her employer to service and maintain the elevator, claiming that the elevator malfunctioned due to Barist‘s negligent failure to maintain it in a safe condition.
“An elevator company which agrees to maintain an elevator in safe operating condition may be liable to a passenger for failure to correct conditions of which it has knowledge or failure to use reasonable care to discover and correct a condition which it ought to have found” (Rogers v Dorchester Assoc., 32 NY2d 553, 559 [1973]). Here, even though Barist established, prima facie, that it had no actual or constructive notice of a defective condition on the subject elevator that would cause it to accelerate and hit something, or stop above the third floor and rumble or vibrate prior to this incident (see Gurevich v Queens Park Realty Corp., 12 AD3d 566 [2004]; Carrasco v Millar El. Indus., 305 AD2d 353 [2003]; Bigio v Otis El. Co., 175 AD2d 823 [1991]; Smith v Jay Apts., 33 AD2d 624 [1969]), the plaintiff, in opposition, raised a triable issue of fact regarding notice of such a defective condition (see Gurevich v Queens Park Realty Corp., supra at 566). Further, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (see Gurevich v Queens Park Realty Corp., supra; Carrasco v Millar El. Indus., supra at 354; see also Bigio v Otis El. Co., supra at 824; Weeden v Armor El. Co., 97 AD2d 197, 205-207 [1983]). Thus, that branch of Barist‘s cross motion which was for sum-
25 A.D.3d 586
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant‘s motion is denied, and the order dated August 27, 2004, is reinstated.
To vacate his default in appearing or answering the complaint, the defendant was required to present a reasonable excuse and a meritorious defense (see
25 A.D.3d 586