74 Wis. 118 | Wis. | 1889
This is an action of ejectment, and the foundations of the plaintiff’s title are tax deeds issued to
In order to fully understand the objections to the tax deeds, it is necessary to premise that by ch. 114, Laws of 1879, the legislature created and organized the county of Marinette out of territory theretofore embraced in the county of Oconto. By the eighth section of the act it was provided that the counties of Oconto and Marinette should each be the exclusive owner of all the real property situated, respectively, within the boundaries of each county. It was further provided that the treasurer of the county of Oconto “ shall, upon demand by the treasurer of the county of Marinette, assign to the county of Marinette all tax certificates in his office upon lands situated in the county of Marinette. The county of Marinette shall be liable to the county of Oconto for its just share of the liabilities and indebtedness now existing against said county of Oconto, when discharged by said county of Oconto; ” such share to be ascertained upon the basis specified in the law. A part of the property owned at the time by Oconto county was a large number of tax certificates on lands in Marinette county, and the plaintiff d.erives title through tax deeds issued upon some of these tax certificates. In view of the other facts in the case, the inquiry becomes material whether the provision above referred to vested in' Marinette county a perfect legal title to these tax certificates, or whether only an equitable title, which became a perfect legal title upon their being assigned to Marinette county as provided in the law. We are very clear in the opinion that the legal title did not pass to Marinette county by virtue of the act itself, but that an assignment of the tax certificates was contemplated and was essential to pass such title. This
Now, while these tax certificates were still held by Oconto county, the board of supervisors of that county at a legal meeting in September, 1879, adopted a resolution reciting, in substance, that matters of difference had arisen between that county and the county of Marinette concerning the transfer of such tax certificates to the latter county, and Oconto county proposed, as a basis for a full and final settlement with Marinette county, and offered to release that county from all indebtedness to it, upon Marinette county agreeing to surrender all right and title to the tax
It is further insisted that the two boards could not make
The position of defendant’s counsel that it does not appear that the proposed settlement was ever consummated
We now pass to the next step in the proceedings which affects the title of the plaintiff. In December, 1881, the St. Paul Eastern Grand Trunk Eailway Company, a Wisconsin corporation, delivered to the county clerk of Oconto county a proposition in writing, signed by its president and secretary, by which it proposed to build and operate a railroad in Oconto county, providing that county would aid in its construction by a subscription to the stock of the company. The subscription to the stock was to be paid for by conveying to the company all the lands owned by the county at the date of the acceptance of the proposition, except what was actually and visibly occupied for public purposes; also by a transfer of all the tax certificates owned by the county subject to a deed but not actually deeded to the county when the proposition should be accepted by a vote of the people; and also convey all lands which might come into the possession of the county by reason of the nonpayment
First, it is insisted that the county could not pay its subscription in tax certificates. But the statute authorized the county to pay its subscription “in money, lands, or other 'property, instead of by the issue of bonds.” Sec. 949, E. S. An effort was made to show that tax certificates could not be included in the words “ other property,” but to our minds the argument on this point was not satisfactory or convincing. 'We deem the position entirely unsound, having no doubt that the county might pay its subscription to the stock in whole or in part in tax certificates which it owned. This special provision on this subject controls the general statute, which requires that such certificates should be sold for cash, as was decided in Smith v. Barron Co. 44 Wis. 686. It is suggested that great confusion and inconvenience would result in allowing the county to thus dispose of tax certificates. But the legislature has clearly authorized such a disposition of them, for it says that the county may pay its subscription in lands or other property, and we are utterly unable to adopt the view that tax certificates are not included in the words “ other property,” within the meaning of the statute. The question seems too plain to admit of argument.
Again, it is said the proposition of the company was not
But it is further objected that the road was not completed within the time fixed in the original proposition which was voted upon, nor within the additional period given by the county board. The road was divided into three sections, and it is admitted that the first section was completed within the time named. But the second section should have been completed January 1, 1883, but was not. The county board, however, extended the time for completing it one year, as it was authorized to do under sec. 955, R. S. But, as the road was not completed within the extended
In March and April, 1882, the county clerk of Oconto county, for and on behalf of that county and the state, issued to the county the four tax deeds embracing the lands claimed by the plaintiff. These tax deeds appear to bé in due form. True, it is objected that they do not state or show that Oconto county was the assignee of the certificates. But, as we have seen, Oconto county never in fact parted with them. They were not delivered to the treasurer of Marinette county, and therefore were not re-assigned by that officer when the compromise was entered into. The tax certificates had remained in the possession of Oconto county all the time unassigned and undelivered. Under these circumstances it would have been contrary to the fact to state that Oconto county was the assignee of the tax certificates. The tax deeds properly refer to the county as the original holder of them, as it was in fact.
But it is further objected that these tax deeds were never properly recorded. The alleged defect in the record is that the register did not enter, in the general index kept by him, the state of Wisconsin as one of the grantors. It is said that this was essential, and was required by sec. 159, R. S. We are inclined to hold that if the name of the county which gives the deed is entered in the index, this is
This case was tried by the court without a jury. The findings of the court contain all the evidence given on the trial. The court held that Oconto county had no title to and was not the owner of any of the tax certificates at the time the tax deeds thereon were issued. This is contrary to the views which we have expressed. The court did not consider or pass upon the question whether the railroad company would have acquired title from the county had there been title in the county to transfer; but the court in its thirty-fourth finding states that it was admitted at the trial by the defendant, and is here found as a fact, that, in case the plaintiff’s title is sustained, the defendant has no valid title to the lands referred to, as all of the tax deeds on which his title is based were invalid for irregularities still open to inquiry in the tax proceedings in the train of which the tax deeds were issued. As all the facts of the case are before us we must reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and remand the case with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff.
By the Court.— It is so ordered.