Hale v. Oklahoma
488 U.S. 878
SCOTUS
1988
Check Treatment

HALE v. OKLAHOMA

No. 87-7116

Ct. Crim. App. Okla.

482 U.S. 496

any weight whatsoever to “the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments.”

. As to the specific claim, moreover, the petitioner argues convincingly that the photographic evidence created an impermissible risk that his death sentence was based on considerations that are “totally irrelevant to the sentencing process,”
, because it focused the jury‘s attention on the postmortem decomposition of the victim‘s body rather than on “the character of the [defendant] and the circumstances of the crime.”
. Indeed, photographic evidence of this sort seems no less inflammatory or prejudicial than the victim impact statements deemed inadmissible in
.

The introduction in capital trials of ghastly photographs of the victim presents substantial and recurring issues of constitutional dimension, see, e. g.,

(BRENNAN, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), that warrant plenary review by the Court. I dissent.

Certiorari denied.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,

, I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,

(MARSHALL, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for writ of certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case. But even if I believed that the death penalty could be constitutionally imposed under certain circumstances, I would grant the petition and vacate petitioner‘s death sentence for the same reasons that I expressed in
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

Petitioner was convicted for the murder-kidnaping of the son of a prominent local banking family. Pretrial publicity was exten-sive. All members of the jury had read or heard of the murder-kidnaping. Some jurors knew petitioner‘s family and some were acquainted with the victim‘s family. Six members admitted that they had formed opinions concerning the case. I do not doubt that their representations that they could set aside their opinions and listen to the evidence were sincere. But under the totality of the circumstances, I can only conclude that petitioner Hale, like the petitioner in Brecheen, was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial and to impartial sentencing because of Oklahoma‘s strong presumption against venue changes.

LEE v. GEORGIA

No. 87-7199

Sup. Ct. Ga.

Certiorari denied.

JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,

(MARSHALL, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for writ of certiorari.

Even if I did not hold this view, I would grant the petition to establish clearly the minimal due process requirements for state change of venue standards. As I recently argued in

(MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), and
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), a defendant‘s interest in a fundamentally fair trial outweighs the State‘s interest in holding that trial in a particular district. It is time that this Court consider the constitutional limits on change of venue standards and assist state efforts to ensure jury impartiality. I would grant certiorari.