15 Conn. 539 | Conn. | 1843
The suit was brought for two carriages, shipped on board the Lexington, against the defendants, as common carriers, to be transported in said boat, for hire, from New-York to Boston or Providence. The boat and goods were destroyed by fire, in the Sound; and a verdict being given for the plaintiff, the defendants excepted to the charge, and claimed,
1. That they were not common carriers, or subject to the rules that govern common carriers. It was long since settled, that any man, undertaking for hire to carry the goods of all persons indifferently, from place to place, is a common carrier. Gisbourn v. Hurst, 1 Salk. 249. Common carriers, says judge Kent, consist of two distinct classes of men, viz. inland carriers by land or water, and carriers by sea; and in the aggregate body are included the owners of stage coaches, who carry goods, as well as passengers, for hire — wagoners,
But it is said, the rule established is a harsh one, and ought not to be extended. Chancellor Kent takes a very different view of it. He speaks of it as a great principle of public policy, which has proved to be of eminent value to the morals and commerce of the nation ; (2nd vol. 602.) and with similar views, this court has said, we are not dissatisfied with the reasons which originated the responsibility of common carriers, and believe they apply, with peculiar force, at this day, and in this country, as it respects carriers by water, more especially upon which element a spirit of dangerous adventure has grown up, which disregards the safety, not of property merely, but of human life. Crosby v. Fitch, 12 Conn. R. 419. And while we are not called upon to extend the principle, we cannot yield to the argument that common carriers are not to be responsible, when the loss arises from the producing agent of the propelling power.
If the defendants are common carriers, the question must be merely what are the liabilities of common carriers? The answer is, for all losses, even inevitable accidents, except they arise from the act of God, or the public enemy. 2 Term Rep. 34. 2 Ld. Raym. 918. And by the act oí God is meant, something super-human, or something in opposition to the act of man. Forward v. Pittard, 1 Term Rep. 33. In all cases except of that description, the carriers warrant the safe delivery of the goods ; (per Kent, Ch. J. Elliot v. Bissell, 10 Johns. R. 7.) and masters and owners of vessels are liable as common carriers, as well at sea as in port. And the Ch. J. says, that the argument is not well supported, that this doctrine of the liability of carriers, is, by the common law7 of England, to be confined to transportations by water, without the jurisdiction of the realm. All the books and all the cases, winch touch the subject, lay down the rule generally, and apply it, as well to shipments to and from foreign ports, as to internal commerce. It is true, that in Aymar v. Astor,
But it is said, there is no case where the liability is extended to fire on the high seas. If the principle covers such cases, then it is to be supposed the reason such cases are not to be found, is, that they have not occurred, or were not contested. If the carrier is subjected for the loss of goods burnt on land, where he was in no fault, we see no reason for exempting the carrier at sea, under similar circumstances. We apprehend a rule of policy, Lord Mansfield says, in the case alluded to, to prevent litigation, collusion and the necessity of going into circumstances impossible to be unravelled, the law presumes against the carriers. He is in the nature of an insurer. Every reason here given applies as well to the owners of a steam-boat, as to the wagoner, whose carriage was burnt without his fault, in the bam where he placed it — the same danger of collusion, of litigation, and the same difficulty in unravelling circumstances. If the policy of the law requires that the one shall be as an insurer, we think the same policy requires that the other should also be so treated. And if it be true, that trade will regulate itself, when the rule is understood, compensation will be made, not only in proportion to the labour, but to the risk. And in a recent case in New-York, steam-boat owners are treated as other common carriers. Powell & al. v. Myers, 26 Wend. 591.
It is stated, that by the laws of Louisiana, a different rale
2. The defendants claim, in the next place, that they are not liable, because of the public notice which they gave, that they would not be responsible for losses other than what arose from the fault or negligence of their officers or servants ; and they claim, that by the common law, a common carrier may limit his responsibility, by express contract, or by public notice given of such intended limitation ; in support of which they cite many cases from the English books, where that doctrine, after some diversity of opinion, has been recognized and settled. On the part of the plaintiff, it is claimed, that these decisions are modern — all since we were separated from that country — after a diversity of opinion in the English courts, and now regretted by eminent judges, and not in accordance with the principles of the common law; and that they have been rejected in New-York, as not sound law ; and that, as this contract was made in New-York, its construction must be regulated by that law. It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine by what law this construction of the contract is to be governed.
It appears that this boat was in the business of transportation from New-York to Providence ; that the plaintiff owned carriages, which he wanted to have transported to Boston ; that the defendants received them in New-York, to convey them to Boston or Providence; and that they were lost in the Sound, off Long Island, near Huntington; and the question is, by what law is this contract to be governed. The rule upon that subject is well settled, and has been often recognized by this court, that contracts are to be construed according to the laws of the state where made, unless it is presumed from their tenor, that they were entered into with a view to the laws of some other state. Bartsch v. Atwater, 1 Conn. R. 409. 416. Smith v. Mead, 3 Conn. R. 255. Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. R. 520. There is nothing in this case, either from the location of the parties, or the nature of the contract, which shows, that they could have had any other law in view than that of the place where it was made. Indeed, as the goods were shipped to be transported to Boston or Providence, there would be the most entire uncertainty
3. On the trial below, the defendants also claimed, that a bill of lading was given restricting their liability, and by accepting this, the plaintiffs were precluded from any claim. On this point the judge charged the jury, that by the laws of New-York, neither the notice, nor the bill of lading, would change the liability of the defendants. To the last part of the charge, as well as the first, the defendants object. But as the jury have found there was no bill of lading, in this case, we do not see any necessity for discussing that question ; but will barely advert to the eases in the stale of. New-York, which show the ground upon which that opinion was based.
In Cole y. Goodwin, notice was given, that all baggage was at the risk of the owners ; of which notice, it was proved, the plaintiff' had knowledge. The plaintiff got out of the stage,
4. The defendants, however, claim, that the court below, aside from any question arising on the bill of lading, gave an opinion to the jury, that notwithstanding any stipulations of the parties restricting the liability of the carriers, they would be liable in this case. The judge who tried the cause below, had no idea of any question of that kind. No claim was made but what arose from the notice or the bill of lading. And we think, there is nothing upon this motion, which can be fairly referred to any thing else. What are the facts and claims stated in the motion? The defendants claimed, they had given public notice that they would not be liable for losses, except what arose from want of care or negligence on the part of their servants ; and that their agents were not authorized to receive goods on board, without delivering a bill of lading,containing such restrictions. They further claimed, that the plaintiff knew of the ilotice given as above, and that they dealt with him upon that understanding. They then com
5. But it is claimed, that though such be the law of New-York, as it was not, submitted to the jury to determine, the court erred. It would be going very far to send a cause back for trial, when we saw, that upon the facts shown, it appeared that it was correctly decided ; and if, upon the same facts, a jury should decide otherwise, we must grant a new trial. Perhaps, however, this might be necessary, to prevent the judge from usurping the province of the jury; and it has been decided by this court, that foreign laws, in which, for this purpose, are included the laws of our sister states, cannot be judicially noticed, but must be proved as other facts. Dyer v. Smith, 12 Conn. R. 384. Brockett v. Norton, 4 Conn. R. 521. And the existence of the law being a question of fact, it would certainly seem as if it was the duty of the jury to settle it; and the court must assist the jury, says Judge Hos-mer, in ascertaining what the law is ; but if he went further, and definitively settled the question, it was erroneous. 4 Conn. R. 520. In Kilgore v. Bulkley, 14 Conn. R. 386. there were conflicting decisions in the state of New-York ; and the judge left it to the jury to say which was law, with his opinion upon it; and the court held, that he was correct. Such were the decisions in this state; but our legislature, not willing to treat our sister states as foreign states, have enacted, that the public statutes of the several states in the United, States, prin
We think, therefore, that the instructions given to the jury, under the circumstances of this case, were correct; and that there ought not to be a new trial.
New trial not to be granted.