642 F.3d 492 | 5th Cir. | 2011
No member of the panel nor judge in regular active service of the court having requested that the court be polled on Rehearing En Banc (Fed. R. App. P. and 5th Cir. R. 35), the Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED. We GRANT the petition for panel rehearing filed by intervenor the United States and, without hearing oral argument, withdraw our prior opinion, Hale v. King, 624 F.3d 178 (5th Cir.2010) (per curiam), and substitute the following.
This case presents the question of whether certain Mississippi prison officials are entitled to sovereign immunity from claims that they violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The district court dismissed the Title II claims against the officials after determining that Title II does not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for Title II claims that challenge conduct that does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. We VACATE and REMAND.
I
John Hale, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a lawsuit against the State of Mississippi and a number of individuals who worked at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution (SMCI) or for the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Hale’s complaint appeared to assert claims for monetary and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based in part on Hale’s allegations that he suffered from chronic Hepatitis C, chronic back problems, and psychiatric conditions during his incarceration and that the defendants provided him with inadequate medical care.
Hale subsequently amended his complaint to include claims under Title II of the ADA against certain individual defendants: Ronald King (Superintendent of
The district court, proceeding sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), dismissed Hale’s § 1983 and Title II claims after the court determined that Hale’s allegations failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. With respect to Hale’s Title II claims against the Appellees, the district court concluded that Hale could not recover from the Appellees in their individual capacities under the ADA, that Hale’s request for injunctive relief was moot because Hale was no longer incarcerated, and that the Eleventh Amendment barred Hale’s Title II claims for damages against the Appellees in their official capacities. The district court made its Eleventh Amendment determination after concluding that Title II of the ADA did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity for Hale’s claims because “Title II is not a ‘congruent and proportional’ response [to constitutional violations] in the context of state prisons.” In reaching this decision, the district court “assum[ed] arguendo that [Hale] would be able to establish a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA.”
Hale appealed the district court’s holding with respect to the Appellees’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. After Hale filed his pro se brief on appeal, we appointed counsel to file a supplemental brief to address the question “whether Title II of the ADA validly abrogates Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for claims that violate Title II but are not actual violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.” The United States intervened and submitted a brief supporting Hale’s position.
II
The district court dismissed Hale’s Title II claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which allows it to dismiss an informa pauperis complaint if the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”
In United States v. Georgia,
A
It is unclear whether, under Georgia, a court is required to determine if allegations state a claim for relief under Title II before proceeding to consider any other issue in the three-part analysis. We note that at least two other circuit courts have concluded that determining whether there has been a violation of Title II is a necessary first step.
Although we do now proceed to consider whether Hale stated a claim for relief under Title II, we do not decide today whether Georgia prohibits a court from addressing the validity of Title II’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity without first deciding that a claimant’s allegations actually state a claim for relief under Title II. Determining whether Hale has stated a claim for relief under Title II requires only that we apply the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to Hale’s allegations. We are well-suited to perform this task ourselves.
“Under the 12(b)(6) standard, all well-pleaded facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but plaintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to make out a valid claim.”
A plaintiff states a claim for relief under Title II if he alleges: (1) that he has a qualifying disability; (2) that he is being denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such discrimination is by reason of his disability.
The more difficult question is whether Hale was suffering from a “qualifying disability” under Title II of the ADA when he was excluded from these programs.
1
We begin with subsection A. To establish a claim under subsection A of the definition of disability, a plaintiff must allege that he (1) has a mental or physical impairment that (2) substantially limits (3) a major life activity.
“Major life activities” are “those activities that are of central importance to daily life.”
Hale’s initial complaint identified his ailments as “chronic back pain, chronic Hepatitis-C and psychiatric condition.” The complaint did little to expound on the impact of these conditions on Hale’s health. Although the complaint at one point alleged that Hale “lost (36) thirty-six pounds since coming to SMCI, and the plaintiff was sentenced to do time not to have his liver deliberately destroyed,” the primary allegations of the complaint consisted of Hale’s recounting of his interactions with and requests for prescriptions from various prison doctors. Basically, the complaint argued that Hale’s conditions require that he receive certain prescriptions and treatments that the various defendants named in the complaint were not providing. Hale did attach to this complaint medical records stating that Hale was suffering from various ailments, but those records did not contain facts regarding the impact of Hale’s ailments on his ability to perform major life activities.
Next, we consider the allegations in Hale’s motion to amend his complaint to include the Title II ADA claim. Those allegations claimed that Hale was “denied access to sat[e]llites of MDOC and even work in the prison kitchen because the plaintiff [was] classified as medical class III, and [was] denied as per MDOC policies.” Hale also claimed that he “was sent back from the MDOC Restitution Center in Hinds County due to his medical and psychiatric conditions and MDOC failure to accom[m]odate the disabilities of the plaintiff.” Again, however, the allegations failed to detail the impact of Hale’s conditions on his ability to perform major life activities.
Finally, we consider Hale’s explication of his claims during the Spears
Well, my liver enzymes, they’ve gone up and down. But you can’t really tell by the blood tests. Actually to know the liver damage, you would have to have a biopsy, which they haven’t done either. That information is all in there. The blood tests are an okay indicator as far as that goes, but it’s not accurate as far as what the liver looks like or how it is, what kind of condition it’s in.
Hale also described his PTSD: “I have panic attacks. I have my heart beat real fast. It’s a very physical feeling. It’s bad.” Again, these alleged facts show, at most, that Hale suffered from an impairment at the time of the alleged ADA violations.
We conclude that Hale’s allegations only establish that he suffered from PTSD, Hepatitis C, and other ailments during the time of his incarceration. It is well established that “[m]erely having an impairment ... does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA.”
Hale similarly has not sufficiently alleged that he was disabled under subsection B of the ADA’s definition of disability. A plaintiff proceeding under subsection B must allege that he “has a record of an injury or impairment” and that the “impairment limited a major life activity.”
3
Finally, we consider subsection C, which “permits suits ‘by plaintiffs who, though not actually disabled per § 12102(2)(A), are nonetheless regarded as having such an impairment.’ ”
During his Spears hearing, Hale provided the following explanation of his Title II claim:
What it is is when they make you a medical class three or if you’re a psychiatric C, they have a custom or practice — I don’t know if it’s a written policy or just a custom or practice' — but they will not let you go to the satellite. They will not let you go to the regional facilities or private facility or anything like that. They just warehouse you right there in that one spot. You can’t — no chance for advancement. They denied me going to school. I tried to get a job in the central kitchen. They said, “Naw, you can’t get it because you’re a psychiatric C, medical class three.”
We cannot reasonably infer from these facts that the Appellees regarded Hale as disabled. Hale’s allegations only establish that the Appellees denied him access to prison programs and facilities because of his impairments. They do not establish that the Appellees actually perceived Hale as having more of an impairment than he actually had or regarded him as being substantially limited in any major life activity.
Ill
We now consider whether we should remand this ease to the district court in order to allow Hale an opportunity to amend his complaint to state a valid Title II claim. Specifically, we note that Hale was acting pro se during the district court proceedings. We have held that district courts should not dismiss pro se complaints pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) without first providing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, unless it is obvious from the record that the plaintiff has pled his best case.
Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court in order for the district court to allow Hale to amend his Title II allegations. Exercising judicial restraint, we do not proceed to the other two prongs of the Georgia inquiry at this time because such an inquiry, which would include resolution of constitutional issues, is unnecessary unless and until Hale has stated a violation of Title II.
For the aforementioned reasons, we VACATE and REMAND for proceedings consistent with our opinion.
. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
. Praylor v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir.2005) ("A dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is reviewed under the same de novo standard of review applicable to dismissals made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”).
. Siler-Khodr v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. San Antonio, 261 F.3d 542, 550 (5th Cir. 2001).
. 546 U.S. 151, 126 S.Ct. 877, 163 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006).
. Id. at 159, 126 S.Ct. 877.
. Id.
. Id.
. See Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524, 553 (3d Cir.2007) ("[W]e are required to determine in the first instance if any aspect of the University’s alleged conduct forms the basis for a Title II claim.”); Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 172-73 (1st Cir.2006) ("Under Georgia, the court must determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim basis, which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II. If the State’s conduct does not violate Title II, the court does not proceed to the next step in the analysis.” (internal footnote and citation omitted)).
. See Bowers, 475 F.3d at 553 n. 31 (noting that the court of appeals is "well situated” to determine whether any aspect of the defendant’s conduct forms the basis for a Title II claim); Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 31 n. 2 (1st Cir.2006) (noting that the first step in the Georgia analysis "simply requires a legal determination under the standard set out in Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)” and proceeding to address that issue in the first instance).
. City of Clinton v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152-53 (5th Cir.2010).
. See Fin. Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir.2006).
. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
. Id.
. Id. at 1950.
. Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir.2002) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
. Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671-72 (5th Cir.2004).
. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (holding that a prison is a public entity under Title II and noting that "[m]odern prisons provide inmates with many recreational 'activities,' medical 'services,' and educational and vocational 'programs,' all of which at least theoretically 'benefit' the prisoners (and any of which disabled prisoners could be 'excluded from participation in')”).
. See Blanks v. Sw. Bell Communs., Inc., 310 F.3d 398, 400 (5th Cir.2002) ("To establish a prima facie case for discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must be a qualified individual with a disability.”); Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 884 (6th Cir.1996) (noting that an ADA plaintiff must establish "that she was a 'qualified individual with a disability' at the time of the discriminatory act" (emphasis in original)).
. Pub.L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
. See EEOC v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 n. 8 (5th Cir.2009).
. Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys. of Lafayette, Inc., 242 F.3d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting former 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)).
. Id.
. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002).
. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2010).
. EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 614 (5th Cir.2009) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)).
. Id. at 614-15 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0).
. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that a district court was "required to look beyond the inmates’ formal complaint and to consider as amendments to the complaint those materials subsequently filed [with the inmates’ motion for a preliminary injunction]”).
. See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181— 82 (5th Cir.1985).
. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d at 614.
. See Furnish v. SVI Sys., Inc., 270 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir.2001) ("[U]nder the ADA, even a serious illness such as Hepatitis B does not equate with a disability. Only when the impact of the illness substantially limits a major life activity — such as working — is an individual considered disabled within the meaning of the ADA.”); Hamilton v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir.1998) (noting that
. Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys. of Lafayette, Inc., 242 F.3d 610, 615 (5th Cir. 2001).
. Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 237 (5th Cir.2010) (quoting Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 508 (5th Cir.2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
. Id. (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999)).
. Cf. Dupre, 242 F.3d at 616.
. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ("The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
. See Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). See also Peña v. United States, 157 F.3d 984, 987 n. 3 (5th Cir.1998) ("Because [Rule 12(b)(6)] dismissals [of pro se complaints] are disfavored, a court should grant a pro se party every reasonable opportunity to amend.”).
. Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994).
. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Assn, 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988) ("A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”).
. See Brockman v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 397 Fed.Appx. 18, 24 (5th Cir.2010) (unpublished) ("Previously, when lower