8 Conn. 39 | Conn. | 1830
Lead Opinion
The only controversy, in this case, regard ed the defendant’s title, claimed by him under a deed said to be executed by Israel Hills, deceased. It was insisted, by the plaintiffs, that this deed was never delivered; and if it was, that at its delivery, the grantor was of unsound mind.
1. The sole object of evidence is to ascertain the truth of the disputed facts or points in issue; and none ought to be admitted to any other point. 1 Phill. Evid. 126. Here, the question in issue was, whether there had been a delivery of the deed. Now, the evidence offered by the plaintiffs had no bearing on this point. It neither conduced to prove, that the deed, at a subsequent time, was not delivered, nor to disprove the facts advanced, by the defendant, to evince its delivery. The sole possible effect of such evidence was to withdraw the attention of the jury from the only relevant enquiry, and to diminish the proper force of the defendant’s evidence, by infusing into their minds a prejudice against him. It follows, very clearly, that the evidence ought not to have been received.
2. The evidence offered by the defendant, to prove declarations by Israel Hills, of his intention to deliver the deed, prior to the delivery claimed, and to prove the subsequent possession of the land, by the defendant, with the assent of Israel Hills, was properly excluded, by the court. No case has been cited to prove the admissibility of such evidence; nor am I aware, that any exists.
An intention to do an act affords no proof that the intended act was done; and the possession of the land, with the assent of another, at most, is presumptive evidence of an existing intention to make and deliver a deed at a subsequent time. The only mode in which an intention to deliver a deed has been admitted in evidence, is, when it accompanies the actual delivery, and thus becomes part of the res gesta. Com. Dig. tit Evidence. A. Co. Litt. 36. a. n. 223. Perk. 143, 4. Bushel v. Pasmore, 6 Mod. 217. Wheelwright & al. v. Wheelwright, 2 Mass. Rep. 452. 13 Vin. Abr. 23 K. pl. 12. a. Taw v.
3. It was claimed by the plaintiffs, that if the deed was ever delivered, the grantor was, at its delivery, of unsound mind. On this point much evidence was exhibited at the trial. The charge of the judge embraced this principle, that the act and deed of one, who has a sufficiency of intellect to know what he is doing, whether he is the subject of debility of mind or of insanity, is valid.
Had the controversy regarded the weak state of the grantor’s mind, without a pretence of his being otherwise unsound, I should consider the charge as exceptionable. I admit it to be established, both at law and in chancery, that if a man be legally compos mentis, be he wise or unwise, he is the disposer of his property, and his will stands as a reason for his actions. 1 Pow. on Contr. 30. Osmond v. Fitzroy & al. 3 P. Wms. 129. But it would demand great consideration before it should be affirmed, that the mere knowledge of the act a person is doing, which, for aught I can discern, may be asserted of an idiot, would constitute him compos mentis. I think he must know something of the nature and consequence of the act.
Be this, however, as it may, it appears from the motion and the charge of the judge, that not long before the delivery of the deed was claimed, Israel Hills was of sound mind; and whether he was compos mentis, or incompetent by reason of delirium, was the real question between the parties. To this state of the controversy the charge of the judge was not adapted.
It is a fact universally known, that a person may be non compos mentis, and yet possess great vigour of intellect, unusual power of reasoning, peculiar subtility and shrewdness, and a strong recollection of all the relations he stands in to others, as well as of all the acts and circumstances of his life. His mind, however, is unsound, by reason of the delusive sources oi thought; all his deductions within the scope of his malady being founded on the assumption of matters as realities without
Israel Hills might know, that he was delivering a deed, and yet the right use of his reason be so impaired as to leave him no rational understanding concerning the nature of the transaction. It is justly said, by the late Ch. J. Swift: “It must ap, pear, that the person had not understanding sufficient to comprehend the nature, extent and consequence of the contract he was making, in order to render it void.” 1 Swift’s Dig. 173. And, on the other hand, although he knows the act he is doing, if this is the extreme limit of his understanding, he is non compos mentis. The charge to the jury, in my opinion, was incorrect.
I would advise a new trial.
Dissenting Opinion
I feel constrained to dissent from the opinion of the Court expressed on one point in this case.
Did I view the case in the light in which it is viewed by my brethren, my opinion would accord with theirs. They deem the testimony offered by the plaintiffs of the manner in which the defendant procured the deed of the 27th of June, 1826, as wholly irrelevant, because they suppose that there was no pretence of a delivery of the deed until months afterwards; and therefore, that the testimony tending to show, that the defendant obtained the deed tortiously, by breaking open the trunk of the grantor, could have no other effect than to prejudice the minds of the jury; and that this effect would be improper. Doubtless, had those facts so appeared, the result would have been correct; but, in my judgment, a different case is presented by the motion.
It does not appear, that when the plaintiffs offered the proof of the tortious taking of the deed, by the defendant, and of the grantor’s declaration to him, “to put the deed back again, and not to meddle with it,” that it was admitted by the parties, that the deed was not delivered until several weeks afterwards. The state of things then presented, was a deed of the land in question in the hands of the defendant, which would defeat the title of the plaintiffs. There was no question, it seems, respecting the authentication of the instrument; but the only point here was as to its delivery. The testimony of the manner in which the deed was obtained, was not only proper, but, if believed, was conclusive, to prove, that nothing could be claimed by the defendant under such a possession of the deed. It proved, that it had not been previously delivered; for it was taken from the trunk of the grantor tortiously. It proved also, that it was not then delivered; for the grantor told the grantee “to return it, and not to meddle with it any more.” If the fact, afterwards, in the course of the trial, appeared, which seems now the basis of the opinion of the Court, viz. that it was agreed by the parties, that the deed was not delivered until weeks had elapsed, it might, very properly, have been the subject of the animadversion of the judge on the testimony; but I cannot perceive how it could shew it inadmissible in a previous stage of the trial. I would, therefore, disallow the motion.
New trial to be granted.