62 W. Va. 609 | W. Va. | 1907
The circuit court of Lewis county having set aside at the instance of P. M. Hale, as fraudulent, a certain deed, executed by Eliza Hale and said P. M. Hale, her husband, conveying all the real estate of the former to Thomas W. Hale, and thereby relinquishing the contingent life estate by the curtesy of the latter therein, said Thomas W. Hale has appealed from the decree.
The deed in question was executed on the 4th day of August, 1902, and the bill to set it aside was filed at rules
Our conclusion, based upon the principles and facts stated in the bill, is, that the demurrer was properly overruled; and. it will further appear from the facts, developed by the answer and evidence on the final hearing, that they do not, bring the case within the principles governing laches, wherefore the decree cannot be reversed on that ground, either for defect in the bill or on the merits, and further discussion of this x^hase of the case will be unnecessary.
The inquiry as to whether the deed was fraudulently procured involves the consideration of many facts and circumstances, not seriously controverted, and the evidence relating to manj7 others as to which there is controversy; and the case involves practically the history of the plaintiff and his family. Prior to 1858, he was a widower having certain children. In the year 1858, he married Eliza Butcher, a daughter of Jacob Butcher, and by her there was born to him one child, a son, the defendant, Thomas W. Hale, about, the year 1859. In July, 1876, Jacob Butcher died, leaving as his heirs Eliza Hale, wife of the plaintiff, and two grand sons, E. M. Vandervort and J. S. Vandervort, children of his daughter Nancy, who had married James G. Vander-vo'rt and died prior to the date of the death of her father. Jacob Butcher owned a considerable estate and died intestate. Just how much personal estate he left in the form of money, notes and bonds is not very clearly shown, nor does it appear how much other personal property he had; but he seems to have had between two and three thousand dollars in money and securities. On his decease, the wife of the plaintiff, Eliza Piale, was appointed administratrix, and the estate was not settled up for a period of about five years. On the settlement, it seems that Mrs. Hale was indebted to. the Vandervort grand, children in a small sum which she paid out of money derived from the sale of some of her-land. As to this personal estate, there is great controversy and conflict between the plaintiff and defendant. The former denied that he had ever received or used any money from
The plaintiff had been an active business man all his life. For some years prior to the war, he had been engaged in the manufacture of hats, boots and shoes and clothing, and in the manufacture of brick and the construction of buildings. During the war he was engaged, among other things, in the mercantile business, and claims that, at that time, he had accumulated about $28,000.00, of practically all of which he was deprived by the raids of three successive armies into the
Considerable argument against the decree is predicated upon the view that a grantor who has signed the deed, without having read it, is guilty of negligence so gross as to estop him from setting up his ignorance of its contents in avoidance thereof. Ferrell v. Ferrell, 53 W. Va. 515; Fulton v. Messenger, 61 W. Va. 477, (56 S. E. 830). Mere ignorance of the contents of an instrument, without more, would not suffice to open the doors of a court of equity, or sustain or defeat an action at law. It would amount merely to a complaint against one’s self. It imputes no misconduct or wrong
But to say a man can never avoid his deed, merely because he signed and delivered it, without having read it, would be greatly variant from the law. Kerr on Fraud & Mistake, 388, 389; Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210; Holbrook v. Burt, 22 Pick. 346; Curlett v. Newman, 30 W. Va. 182. Circumstances often justify such action, even when there is no fiduciary relationship between the parties and they stand on an equal footing. There may be no such relation and yet confidence reposed on the one side and abused on the other, as in the case of a verbal agreement, which one party relies upon the other to reduce to writing. If the latter takes upon himself that duty and, in the pretended performance thereof, writes an entirely different agreement and obtains the other’s signature thereto, representing that it is the verbal agreement reduced to writing, either by expressly saying it is, or by representing it as such, the failure to read it constitutes no estoppel. Medley v. Ins. Co., 55 W. Va. 342, (syl. 3); Shepherd v. Henderson, 3 Grat. 367; Pulaski Iron Co. v. Palmer, 89 Va. 384. Though this illustration does not, in its circumstances, correspond with the case in hand,- it declares the principle upon which the bill is founded. It says that, in previously signing deeds, upon the mere representation as to wdiat was thereby conveyed, as a matter of convenience, in effecting the sale of numerous lots, deeds for which had been prepared by the defendant,- a relationship and condition or method of transacting business had been established which justified the plaintiff in assuming that the defendant was presenting to him for signature a deed conveying only a lot or small por
. That the defendant here did not sustain a trust relation to the plaintiff, such as prevented his taking from the latter a binding and indefeasible conveyance, is asserted by Curlett v. Newman, 30 W. Va. 182. If he had, the deed would be voidable at the option of the grantor. Lane v. Black, 21 W. Va. 617. Though he "was not an agent having power and authority to convey the land, he was entrusted with the preparation of deeds, for both the plaintiff and his wife, and the case would not fall within the rule declared hy Lane v. Black, Jfie assumed a duty, responsibility and relationship, which not only justified, but necessitated reliance to a very considerable extent upon his honesty, fairness and good faith toward the plaintiff. It is, at least, a circumstance sufficient to repel the charge of negligence, if it appear that the deed in question was not contemplated or intended, for it afforded an opportunity to obtain such a deed by abuse of the confidence reposed.
But if it be conceded that there was no agency, in any sense, and admitted on the other hand that the facts are as they appear from the plaintiff’s bill and evidence, they put the defendant in a position which made it his duty, in
In view of the great conflict in the evidence, and our inability to see that the finding of the court below is contrary to the weight and preponderance thereof, it must be allowed to stand. It may well be regarded as proven that the plaintiff took very little interest in, and manifested very little concern about, the conveyances of the numerous small lots in which he joined prior to the execution of the deed in question, wherefore it is quite probable that he was not in the habit of reading the deeds and did, as he states, execute them wherever he happened to be found, without reading them and on the representation of the defendant as to their contents. He appears to have been a very active and industrious man, and to have devoted almost every hour of every day to his business, just such a man as would likely not have given himself much concern about a matter in which he had no interest, or his interest in which he had determined to release. His wife had a considerable estate, from the management and control of which she had excluded him,
No time need be consumed in the settlement of this question, for the argument assumes the truth of the defendant’s
The direct, positive testimony of the defendant and his wife to the alleged deliberate and specific agreement, in pursuance of which they say the deed was made and executed, is not unusual in cases of this. kind. In most cases in which deeds have been assailed on the ground of fraud in the procurement thereof, similar testimony is found, and the courts are under the painful duty of allowing the facts and circumstances with which it conflicts, to overcome it and brand it as false. Usually such evidence bears on its face indications of fabrication. It often attempts to prove too. much, and it was the opinion of the court below- that this is true of the evidence now under consideration. The defendant admits that he took the precaution to fix a date for the all important conference between himself and his father at which his wife should be present as a secret witness. Though it is said she did not eavesdrop, or secretly overhear what is said to have passed between the parties, it does appear that she did not sit down in the room with her husband and father-in-law as is usually the case in a friendly family conference. On the contrary, she came into the hall behind the father-in-law and stood at or near the door opening into the room, where she could hear and not be seen, if she chose to do so. Suddenly and without previous notice, a proposition, monstrously disproportionate and unequal in respect to reciprocal advantages, is sprung upon Hale, and he, without a moment’s hesitation, eagerly and joyfully accepts. He does not even ask for a modification.
In reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful of the rule requiring clear and satisfactory proof to overthrow a deed. The flat contradiction of the direct and positive oral evidence, pro and con, brings into play the circumstances and necessarily gives them unusual prominence and force. To them the court must appeal for the truth, it having been effectually obscured by the testimony of the parties, and the duty of the court cannot be evaded or excused by the difficulty or painfulness of the task. Nor is its investigation or power to act limited by the mere number of the circumstances to be considered. Their intrinsic character and power to carry mental conviction as to the truth is always allowed to prevail. Circumstances, to which we have adverted, and the force of which is not impaired or resisted by any thing but the contradicted parol testimony, weakened, as it is, by the improbability of the story it tells, say the plaintiff know nothing of the contents of this deed for a long
For the reasons stated, the decree will be affirmed.
Affirmed.