In this wrongful death action, plaintiffs appeal as of right from a grant of summary disposition to defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). Plaintiffs argue that there were factual issues to be resolved by the jury. We affirm.
i
On March 21, 1990, plaintiff Patricia Lodеr was driving her automobile. Along with her as passengers were her two children, Stephanie and Stephen. While heading eastbound on Sleeth Road in Commerce Township, Loder stopped in preparation to turn left оnto Half Penny Court. A motorcycle traveling westbound on Sleeth passed her at a high rate of speed. Loder then began to turn left. As she did, her automobile was struck in the right hand side by another westbound motorcycle driven by James Bondie. Upon impact, Stephen, Stephanie and Bondie were killed. Loder sustained serious injuries.
Patricia Loder and Wayne Loder, as personal representative of his two children, and Karen Halbrook, as personal representative of Bondie’s estate, sued each other for negligence. Thereafter, the Loders sued defendants, claiming negligence in the design, manufacture, marketing and distribution of Bondie’s motоrcycle. The Loders claimed that defendants created *440 and sold a vehicle that could travel and accelerate too fast. Neither the inexperienced rider nor other drivers on the road could appreciate its capabilities. Therefore, they claimed, the motorcycle was dangerous and unsuitable for public highways. The Loders also asserted that defendants deliberately marketed the motоrcycle to young male riders with special emphasis on speed.
Halbrook filed a similar complaint. The cases were consolidated by the lower court which granted summary disposition for defendants. It found that defendants were not responsible for Bondie’s reckless acts.
n
A
We review a grant of summary disposition de novo.
Plieth v St Raymond Church,
It appears that the trial court’s grant of defendants’ motion for summary disposition was made after a finding that defendants did not owe a duty to plаintiffs. Duty is a legally recognized obligation to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward
*441
another.
Ross v Glaser,
In general, our courts recognize that a manufacturer has a duty to bystanders adversely affected by its products.
Moning v Alfono,
Duty is actually a “ ‘question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff’ and concerns ‘the problem of the relation between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other.’ ” “ ‘Duty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.” [Citations omitted.]
The following policy considerations are often relevant: (1) the foreseeability of the harm, (2) the degree of certainty of injury, (3) the closeness of connection between the conduct and injury, (4) the moral blame attached to the conduct, (5) the public policy of рreventing future harm, and (6) the burdens and con
*442
sequences of imposing a duty and the resulting liability for breach.
Colangelo v Tau Kappa Epsilon Fraternity,
B
We find that it is foreseeable to manufacturers of motor vehicles that motorists speed and that excessive speed may cause accidents. This is especially true, as in this case, where it is alleged that defendants advertised the speed and acceleration capabilities of their motorcycle. However, the determination of whether a duty exists does not turn solely on foreseeability.
The second factor, degree of certainty of injury, weighs against the Loders. It is not certain that a motorcycle designed to travel in еxcess of the speed limit and accelerate quickly will cause injury to others. The risk of harm is dependent, in part, on the way the driver handles the vehicle. Even if vehicles were designed to travel no faster than the mаximum highway speed limit, there is no certainty that injuries to others could be averted. For instance, in this case, we will assume that Bondie’s motorcycle was traveling approximately 80 miles per hour in a 45 mile per hour zone. If it had been capable of traveling no faster than 70 miles per hour, there is no certainty that the injuries would have been avoided. Moreover an automobile traveling at 70 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone could be just as deadly.
*443 The third factor, closeness of connection between the conduct and the injury to the Loder plaintiffs, weighs in favor of defendants. The deaths were not closely connected to the fаct that the vehicle could be driven in excess of the speed limit and could accelerate quickly. Rather, the accident was more closely connected to the failure of Patricia Loder to yiеld the right of way and Bondie’s reckless driving.
The fourth factor, moral blame attached to the conduct, requires this Court to look at the participants to the tragedy and determine which were the most blameworthy.
Colangelo, supra
at 134. We find that defendants are the least blameworthy. They did not cause Bondie to disobey the law nor did they cause Patricia Loder to ignore the oncoming motorcycle. To shift the moral blame to the motor vehicle mаnufacturer merely because the accident involved automotive speed is a step we are not willing to take. See
Haupt v Kerr Mfg Co,
The policy of preventing future harm might be advanced by imposing a legal duty on motor vеhicle manufacturers to design and market vehicles with limited speed and acceleration capabilities. However, the danger of a moving vehicle is heavily dependent on its driver. Moreover, in the highly regulatеd area of motor vehicles, it is preferable that the Legislature, not the courts, determine if speed limitations should be set for motor vehicles. See
King v R G Industries, Inc,
Finally, considering the burdens and consequences of imposing а duty and the resulting liability for breach, we find that automobile manufacturers should not be potentially liable to innocent persons in *444 this type of case. If we impose a burden on motor vehicle manufacturers to prоtect persons who could be injured by the misuse of their products, the result would be a great increase in litigation. In some instances a product manufacturer is in a better position to assume the costs of litigation and redistribute them to the general public. However, in this case, we find it to be too great a burden. Automobile manufacturers are not insurers. We find they are not bound to guard against the careless misuse of their products by negligent drivers, as in the case before us.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendants with respect to the Loders’ claims.
c
We turn now to James Bondie. Our courts have generally held that motor vehicle designers, manufacturers and distributors owe a duty to users or occupants to eliminate any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury.
Haberkorn v Chrysler Corp,
*445 We find as a matter of public policy that an automоbile manufacturer’s duty of reasonable care does not extend to reducing the speed and acceleration capabilities of its vehicles, as plaintiffs ask in this case. While automobile manufacturеrs can limit defects in their products, as a matter of public policy, we are not willing to hold them liable for the consumers’ misuse of their products. We limit our decision to the specific claims brought before us in this casе.
D
Plaintiffs also argue that defendants’ advertising campaigns were responsible for the accident. They argue that Bondie was an impressionable young man who was concerned with his image. He was enticed into breаking the law by defendants’ advertisement which encouraged him to speed.
Plaintiffs rely on Moning, supra, to support their argument. There, the Supreme Court stated:
“One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely bеcause of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.” [Moning, supra at 425, quoting 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 390.]
However, the Moning Court was concerned with whether marketing slingshots directly to children created an unreasonable risk of harm. The Supreme Court later noted that Moning does not support a duty to third parties with regard to marketing, except where children are concerned, as children are an his *446 torically protected class. Buczkowski, supra at 103, n 8.
Here, there is no question that Bondie was not a child. He was twenty-six years old and licensed to drive a motorcycle. Plaintiffs’ attempts to liken Bondie to the children at issue in
Moning
is unpersuasive. There is no duty for an advertiser to change its advertising pitch on the basis that the target adult audience may be swayed by the advertisement. The claims of sрeed and fast acceleration in the advertisements were mostly puffing.
Overton v Anheuser-Busch Co,
Moreover, after reviewing the record, we find that plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence that the advertisements were the proximаte cause of the accident. Normally, the issue of causation is for the jury. However, if there is no issue of material fact, the trial court may decide the issue itself.
Babula v Robertson,
Affirmed.