Sеction 4003-20, General Code (Section 3349.22, Revised Code), provides:
“Citizens of such municipalities [in which municipal universities are located] shall not be charged for instruction in the academic department, except in professiоnal courses therein. Such board of directors may charge fees for any purpose to students in other departments and to students in professional courses in the academic department, and may charge fees for рurposes other than instruction to students in the academic department. From time to time they may make such university, college or institution free in any or all of its departments to citizens of the county in which it is located.
‘ ‘ The board of dirеctors may receive other students on such terms as to tuition or otherwise as they see fit.”
The plaintiff contends that the phrase, “citizens of such municipalities,” as used in the statute, is intended to mean and apply to bona fide residents legally domiciled in the city wherein the university is located, and that such residents so domiciled are entitled to free tuition in the academic departments of any university of such city on the same basis as other persons so domiciled, regardless of United States citizenship. However, the defendant contends that United States citizenship is a prerequisite to municipal citizenship
The sole question for determination by this court is the meaning of the phrase, “citizens of sucn municipalities,” as used in Section 4003-20, General Code.
Both parties, as well as the Common Pleas Court and the Court of Appeals, recognized that the term, “citizen,” as applied to municipalities, townships, and counties, is technically a misnomer. Citizenship applies ordinarily to one’s relationship to a national government and a state of domicile within such government.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States defines citizenship as follows:
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United Stаtes and of the state wherein they reside.”
It is apparent, however, from a study of legislation and court decisions, that, except where a citizen of the United States is referred to, a variety of meanings is loosely given to the term, “citizen,” and that such use creates legal ambiguity. It is to be observed that the term, “citizen,” is often used in legislation where “domicile” is meant and where United States citizenship has no reasonable relationship to the subject matter аnd purpose of the legislation in question.
For instance, the court in the case of Smith v. Birmingham Waterworks Co.,
In the case of Vachikinas v. Vachikinas,
In the case of McKenzie v. Murphy, 24 Ark., 155, the court held that an alien domiciled in that state and being a householder or head of the family is entitled to the exemption of his homestead from sale on execution, a privilege granted by statute to citizens of the state; that, unless the terms of the statute are entirely free from ambiguity, regard must be had to its known objeсt, to the mischief intended to be provided against and to its general spirit and intent; and that the word, citizen, is often used as meaning only an inhabitant or a resident of a town, state or county, without any implication of political or civil privileges.
In the case of Field v. Adreon,
This court in the early days of its existence had occasion to consider a similar question then before it. In the cаse of State, ex rel. Owens, v. Trustees of Section 29, 11 Ohio, 24, the court was called upon to construe Section 13 of the Act of the General Assembly of March 14, 1831, entitled, “To Incorporate the Original
The legislative enactment under that constitutional provision, as above designated, provided that “each and every denomination of religious societies, after giving themselves a name, shall apрoint an agent who shall produce to the trustees a certificate containing a list of their names and numbers, specifying that they aíre citizens of said township; and the agent shall pay over an equal dividend of the rents within three months after they shall have been received, to be appropriated to the support of religion, at the discretion of each society.”
That case was an action in mandamus to compel the defendants to pay over to а church of Delhi Township an equal dividend of the rents of section 29 in the township in proportion to the members of the church who were ‘ ‘ citizens ’ ’ of the township.
Judge Peter Hitchcock, a most able and honored member of this court, in thе course of the opinion, said: . .
“Here a question is raised as to the meaning of the word “citizens,” as used in this connection. That this word does not always mean one and the same thing is clear. Thus, we speak of a person as a citizen of a particular place, when' we mean nothing mоre by it than that he is a resident of that place. When we speak of a citizen of the United States, we mean one*296 who was born within the limits of, or who has been naturalized by, the laws of the United States. It can hardly be believed that the Legislаture, in using the word ‘citizen,’ in this statute, intended to make a distinction between native or naturalized citizens, and resident aliens. Why should such distinction be made? Is there not as much need of religious instruction in the one case as the other? To me it seems clear that the word citizen, as here used, should be held to be synonymous with the word resident. The Legislature did intend that, in ascertaining numbers, none but such as were residents of the township should be included. But if there is any doubt upon the subject, that doubt must be removed upon reference to the Constitution. We are bound so to construe every law, if possible, that it shall not conflict with the Constitution.
“If it can not be so construed, then it must be rejected, for a legislative act which is in violation of the Constitution can be of no binding force. The provision of the Constitution, as already cited, is, that laws shall be passed, securing to each and every denomination of religious societies ‘an equal participation, according to their number of adherents, of the profits arising’ from these lands. If a person who is not a citizen can be an adherent of a religious society, this section of the Constitution has secured to him a participation in the profits of these lands. It is clear, then, that this law is not such as is required by the Constitution, unless we hold the word citizen, as here used, to mean the same as resident.”
The decision of the court in that case is persuasive authority in the determination of the issues in the instant case, since in that case, as here, there was involved a privilege or gratuity as to which the plaintiff was seeking to qualify as a “citizen,” although under а strict construction he was a mere resident.
That case adds weight in an interpretation of the
“Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, that it is the true intent and meaning of the said thirteenth section, that each and every denomination of religious societies, after having given themselves a name, shall appoint an agent, who shall produce to the trustees a certificate, containing a list of the names, and number, оf all persons, over fifteen years of age, who belong to such religious societies, as members, and are citizens of such township.”
It is significant that, in view of the discussion of the question and the decision of the court as to the meaning оf the term, ‘ ‘ citizens of such township, ’ ’ the General Assembly in the corrective legislation continued to use the term, “citizens of such township,” thereby necessarily adopting the court’s definition of the term in question.
Other acts of the General Assembly show that it was careful to designate “citizenship of the United States” when it intended to include that category in reference to any specific act. For example, in Section 4785-29, General Code (Section 3503.01, Bevised Code), it is рrovided that every citizen of the United States who is of the age of 21 years or over and who has been a resident of the state for one year shall have the right to vote; in Section 8623-4, General Code (Section 1701.06, Bevised Code), it is рrovided that any number of natural persons, not less than three, a majority of whom are citizens of the United States, may form a corporation; in Section 6064-17, General Code (Sec
The University of Cincinnati is a public institution organized for the purpose of rendering a public service to the residents of the city of Cincinnati. It is supported in part by public taxation and in this respect stands in the same category as the city’s water service, garbage-collection service, fire-department service, and its public-school service. For the support of these services, even though they be aliens, the parents of the plaintiff are required, and if plaintiff were a property owner he would be required, to pay property taxes in the same manner as other residents of the city. In these respects alien residents are entitled to the same privileges as are other residents of the city.
In the opiniоn of this court, the fact that the plaintiff, as well as other residents of the city, must be a citizen of the municipality in order to qualify, for free tuition to the academic department of the university can not disqualify him because he is not a citizen of the United States.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the Common Pleas Court affirmed.
Judgment reversed.