Mаrtha Hal, Appellant-Appellant, v. State of Ohio Department of Education, Appellee-Appellee.
No. 18AP-301 (C.P.C. No. 17CV-4132)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
December 10, 2019
2019-Ohio-5081
BRUNNER, J.
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on December 10, 2019
On brief: Farlow & Associates, LLC, and Beverly J. Farlow, for appellant. Argued: Beverly J. Farlow.
On brief: [Dave Yost], Attorney General, Mary L. Hollern, and Hannah Stoneburner, for appellee. Argued: Hannah Stoneburner.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
{¶ 1} Appellant-appellant, Martha Hal, appeals from a decision and entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas affirming the resolution of the State of Ohio Board of Education (“Board“) which determined that Hal had engaged in conduct unbecoming to the teaching profession, in violation of
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} Hal was employed by Columbus City Schools (“CCS“) as a teacher and administrator beginning in 1989. During the 2010-2011 school year, she was employed as a leadership intern assigned to Walnut Ridge High School, which involved duties similar to
{¶ 3} On June 2 and 10, 2011, Hal‘s computer username was used to makе changes to the grades of eight freshman students, five of whom participated in the FFP. Hal admitted making 7 of the 29 changes for those students because she argued the changes were the result of the FFP and permissible changes. The changes are as follows:
{¶ 4} June 2, 2011 changes:
- 2:49 pm, Student 1 - final mark in Exploration Lit & Comp 9 was changed from “F” to “D.” Appellant admitted making this change.
- 2:48 pm, Student 1 - first grading period mark in Exploration Lit & Comp 9 changed from “F” to “A.” Appellant denied making this change.
- 2:46 pm, Student 1 - first grading period mark in Physical Science was changed from “F” to “B.” Appellant denied making this change.
- 12:40 pm, Student 2 - final mark in Exploration Lit & Comp 9 was changed from “F” to “D.” Appellant admitted making this change.
- 12:44 pm, Student 2 - final mark in Physical Science changed frоm “F” to “D.” Appellant admitted making this change.
- 12:36 pm, Student 2 - first grading period mark in Physical Science was changed from “F” to “B.” Appellant denied making this change.
- 12:39 pm, Student 2 - second grading period mark in Exploration Lit & Comp 9 changed from “F” to “B.” Appellant denied making this change.
- 12:37 pm, Student 2 - second grading period mark in Physical Science changed from “F” to “D.” Appellant admitted making this change.
2:53 pm, Student 3 - final mark in Physical Science changed from “D” to “C.” Appellant denied making this change. - 12:28 pm, Student 3 - final mark in Algebra 1 changed from “F” to “D.” Appellant admitted making this change.
- 12:27 pm, Student 3 - first grading period mark in Algebra 1 changed from “F” to “B.” Appellant denied making this change.
- 2:54 pm, Student 3 - third grading period mark in Physical Science changed from “F” to “B.” Appellant denied making this change.
- 12:32 pm, Student 4 - final mark in Physical Science changed from “F” to “D.” Appellant admitted making this change.
- 12:31 pm, Student 4 - first grading period mark in Physical Science changed from “F” to “B.” Appellant denied making this change.
- 12:07 pm, Student 6 - final mark in Physical Science changed from “F” to “C.” Appellant denied making this change.
- 12:06 pm, Student 6 - second grading period mark in Physical Science changed from “F” to “A.” Appellant denied making this change.
- 12:19 pm, Student 7 - final mark in Physical Science changed from “F” to “D.” Appellant admitted making this change.
- 12:17 pm, Student 7 - grading period one mark in Physical Science changed from “F” to “A.” Appellant denied making this change.
- 12:24 pm, Student 8 - final mark in Physical Science changed from “D” to “C.” Appellant denied making this change.
- 12:12 pm, Student 8 - grading period one mark in Physical Science changed from “F” to “A.” Appellant denied making this change.
(Ex. 11.)
{¶ 5} Appellant denied making any changes on June 10, 2011:
- 8:21 am, Student 5 - final exam in French 1 changed from “D” to “B.”
- 8:22 am, Student 5 - final mark in Exploration Lit & Comp 9 changed from “C” to “B.”
- 8:21 am, Student 5- final mark in Physical Science changed from “F” to “C.”
- 8:19 am, Student 5 - first grading period mark in Physical Science changed from “F” to “C.”
8:20 am, Student 5 - second grading period mark in Physical Science changed from “F” to “C.” - 8:20 am, Student 5 - third grading period mark in Physical Science changed from “F” to “C.”
- 8:22 am, Student 5 - final mark in Exploration Lit & Comp 9 changed from “D” to “A.”
- 8:21 am, Student 5 - fourth grading period mark in French 1 changed from “F” to “B.”
- 8:21 am, Student 5 - fourth grading periоd mark in Physical Science changed from “F” to “C.”
(Ex. 11.)
{¶ 6} The Board caused Hal to be notified of its intention to determine whether to deny or permanently deny her pending applications on account of alleged violations of
{¶ 7} Hal filed objections to the report and recommendation. At its April 11, 2017 meeting, the Board issued a resolution in which it accepted the hearing officer‘s report and recommendation and denied Hal‘s applications until on or after April 11, 2022, requiring her to submit evidence that she completed 16 hours of ethics training. Hal filed a notice of appeal to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas under
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶ 8} Hal appeals and assigns the following six assignments of error for our review:
[1.] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT ODE‘S RESOLUTION WAS SUPPORTED BY RELIABLE PROBATIVE, AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
[2.] THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE HEARING OFFICER DID NOT CRAFT
[3.] THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT‘S BEHAVIOR CONSTITUTED CONDUCT UNBECOMING TO THE TEACHING PROFESSION.
[4.] THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN STATING THAT RELIABLE, PROBATIVE AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS A QUESTION OF THE ABSENCE OR PRESENCE OF THE REQUISITE AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE.
[5.] THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THAT THE SANCTION IMPOSED BY THE BOARD IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.
[6.] THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT‘S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 9} When hearing an appeal from a state administrative agency, a court of common pleas “may affirm the order of the agency complained of in the appeal if it finds, upon consideration of the entire record and such additional evidеnce as the court has admitted, that the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.”
(1) “Reliable” evidence is dependable; that is, it can be confidently trusted. In order to be reliable, there must be a reasonable probability that the evidence is true. (2) “Probative” evidence is evidence that tends to prove the issue in question; it must be relevant in determining the issue. (3) “Substantial” evidence is evidencе with some weight; it must have importance and value.
{¶ 11} The issue on appeal is whether the common pleas court abused its discretion or committed a legal error when it found that there is reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supporting the Board‘s resolution. Pons; Lorain City Bd. of Edn. at 261. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court‘s judgment is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. McCann v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 155 Ohio St.3d 14, 2018-Ohio-3342, ¶ 12. Even under an abuse of discretion standard, however, “no court has the authority, within its discretion, to commit an error of law.” Shaw v. Underwood, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-605, 2017-Ohio-845, ¶ 25; State v. Akbari, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-319, 2013-Ohio-5709, ¶ 7. Thus, ” ‘[a] court abuses its discretion when its ruling is founded on an error of law оr a misapplication of law to the facts.’ ” Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga Cty. Exec., 142 Ohio St.3d 125, 2014-Ohio-4650, ¶ 49 (O‘Donnell, J., dissenting), quoting Doe v. Natl. Bd. of Med. Examiners, 199 F.3d 146, 154 (3d Cir.1999).
B. First Assignment of Error
{¶ 12} In her first assignment of error, Hal contends that the common pleas court abused its discretion by finding that the Board‘s resolution was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. Hal argues that the evidence offered by appellee-appellee, Ohio Department of Education (“ODE“), is inadequate because ODE did not definitively demonstrate that Hal was the person that changed the students’ grades.
{¶ 14} Hal argues that Exhibit 11 does not constitute competent evidence and does not satisfy the rules of evidence. “‘Although administrative appeals to government agencies are required to comport with fundamental aspects of due process, they are not judicial proceedings.’ ” MNH Truck Leasing Co., LLC v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-301, 2017-Ohio-442, ¶ 12, quoting Rudd v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2d Dist. No. 2015-CA-9, 2015-Ohio-3796, ¶ 13. “As a general rule, administrative agencies are not bound by the strict rules of evidence applied in court.” MNH Truck Leasing Co. at ¶ 12, citing H.K. Trading Ctr., Inc. v. Liquor Control Comm., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-293, 2010-Ohio-913, ¶ 41.
{¶ 15} Hal contends that since Exhibit 11 was altered after Ziemba created it by replacing the students’ names with numbers, it could not be considered an original.
{¶ 16} Hal further argues that the evidence demonstrated that the computer passwords were not secure and, thus, the evidence adduced at the hearing was not reliable. Hal testified that other employees used her computer and she saved her username and password in the system. She generally left her office door unlocked. She had seen someone using her computer remotely a couple times. Further, she believed once reassignment to a different building took place, all access to the student information from the formеr building was denied. Thus, once she transferred to Whetstone on June 6, 2011, she no longer had access to the information at Walnut Ridge. Finally, she testified that the principal at Walnut Ridge during the 2010-2011 school year admitted changing students’ grades because the building was in academic distress and he had access to her computer.
{¶ 17} The hearing officer found that the testimony regarding the accessibility of usernames and passwords was such that it is possible that someone else made the changes on June 10, 2011. (Report and Recommendation, Findings of Fact No. 16.) And it appears the hearing officer concluded that the evidence was not reliable, probativе, and substantial in order to find that Hal made the grade changes on June 10, 2011. However, the hearing officer found that regardless of the security of the computers, usernames, and passwords, Hal‘s testimony denying she made the grade changes on June 2, 2011 “is not credible.” (Report and Recommendation, Findings of Fact No. 15.) Credibility determinations are within the province of the trier of fact because the trier of fact is in the best position to take into account inconsistencies, witnesses’ mannerisms and demeanor, and to determine witness credibility. Kabeer v. Purakaloth, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1122, 2006-Ohio-3584, ¶ 12. Thus, the fact that the username and passwords were not secure does not dictate an improper inferеnce or a finding that the evidence at the hearing was unreliable.
{¶ 18} Hal also argues that the citation in the hearing officer‘s report and recommendation incorrectly cites the record of that hearing. The hearing officer‘s findings include:
On or about June 6, 2011, Ms. Hal was reassigned to Whetstone High School. Ms. Hal testified that she would not have had
remote computer access to Walnut Ridge records to make any grade changes in June 10. However, because Ms. Hal‘s user ID was used to change grades, Ms. Hal clearly has access regardless of the building she was assigned to. Based on the testimony regarding the accessibility of user names and pаsswords, it is also possible that someone else made the changes. The changes made on June 10 were to Student 5‘s grades. The June 10 changes did not appear to follow the same pattern of changes made on June 2 to all of the other students’ grades. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 82; ODE exhibits 11, 11a.
(Report and Recommendation, Findings of Fact No. 16.)
{¶ 19} The above quote of the hearing officer‘s Report and Recommendation refers to Hal‘s testimony about her own Exhibit BB. Exhibit BB is a computer document that Hal created on June 10, 2011, while at Whetstone High School. Hall offered in support of her assertion that she was present at her new assignment at Whetstone on June 10, 2011 and that she did not have remote access to Walnut Ridge student information after being transferred to Whetstone. However, we view the transcript reference as reflecting that the hearing officer believed that Hal was at Whetstone on June 10, 2011, and that someone else may have made the changes on that date. But even if the hearing officer made reference to that specific page in the transcript in error, we cannot conclude that the record shows the evidence at the hearing was unreliable. Moreover, Hal testified it was necessary to complete a Change of Location form in order to gain access, but such a form she states she completed on her first day at Whetstone was not produced during trial.
{¶ 20} Finally, Hal takes issue with the statement of the hearing officer that Hal had access to a CCS computer on June 10, 2011, because there was no evidence of which computer Hal had access to on that date. We note that Hal‘s own Exhibit BB, submitted in an effort to demonstrate that she had access to a computer at Whetstone on that date, shows she had access to some computer in the school system on that date, which may have had an effect on the hearing officer‘s judgment of Hal‘s credibility. But as for the hearing officer‘s findings, Findings of Fact No. 16 and Conclusion of Law Nо. 6, contain this statement: “Based on the foregoing findings of fact, Ms. Hal‘s misconduct on June 2, 2011 violated Principles 1 and 3 [of the State Board of Education Licensure Code of Professional Conduct for Ohio Educators in 2008].” (Emphasis added.) Thus, it is clear that the hearing officer
{¶ 21} In her second assignment of error, Hal contends that the common pleas court abused its discretion when it found on the one hand that the hearing officer did not craft her own definition of what grades mean but on the other hand found that ODE offered probative, reliablе evidence to establish the meaning of grades and to explain what constitutes accurate grades. Hal‘s argument is essentially that ODE did not present any evidence regarding what the students’ grades at issue should have been in order to demonstrate that their recorded grades were not accurate.
{¶ 22} Despite Hal‘s contention, a CCS employee did testify at the hearing about grades. Laura Commodore, a CCS administrator, testified that CCS did not have a policy stating that grades could not be changed. However, she testified that there were reasons for permitting grade changes, such as the teacher had inputted an incorrect gradе, missing grades from the condensed grade report from transfer students, and changes to align the students’ grades with policy where the students’ grade calculations did not add together properly. Hal highlights Commodore‘s testimony on this point to argue that grades are changed to “align with policy” in an effort to argue that there was no set policy and grades could be changed, therefore, ODE did not demonstrate what constitutes accurate grades. However, Commodore testified that changes could be made to align with policy, but that was when the mathematical calculations were not accurate. Commodore described the mathеmatical calculation for determining grades by assigning a number to the letter grade for each grading period (four points for an A, three points for a B, two points for a C, one point for a D, and zero points for an F). The final grade was calculated by doubling each grading period, adding the points earned on the final exam and dividing the total by nine. See also Exhibit 10.
{¶ 23} Hal testified that she believed it was important for grades to be accurate and to reflect what students have learned, to demonstrate what the student has mastered in the subject and to indicate such to the student, parents, and future teachers. Hal further testified that the classroоm teacher is the person responsible for determining a student‘s grade. Hal also testified about what she understood to be “impermissible reasons” for
{¶ 24} Given this testimony, the common pleas court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the hearing officer did not craft her own definition of what grades mean and that ODE offered probative, reliable, and substantial evidence to establish the meaning of grades and to explain what constitutes accurate grades. Hal‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 25} In her third assignment of error, Hal contends that the common pleas court abused its discretion in upholding the finding that Hal‘s behavior constituted conduct unbecoming to the teaching profession. Hal argues that the penalty she received was an arbitrary application of the law.
{¶ 26} The hearing officer, the Board, and the common pleas court relied on
{¶ 27}
(A) The state board of education shall consider, but not be limited to, the following factors when evaluating conduct unbecoming under division (B)(1) of section 3319.31 of the Revised Code:
* * *
(3) Crimes or misconduct involving academic fraud.
{¶ 28} The hearing officer specifically found that Hal‘s conduct on June 2, 2011, violated Principles 1 and 3 of the Licensure Code of Professional Conduct for Educators. Principle 1 provides that an educator serves as a positive role model to both students and adults аnd is responsible for preserving the dignity and integrity of the teaching profession
{¶ 29} The hearing officer specifically relied on these factors when evaluating Hal‘s conduct. Hal‘s argument is thus not meritorious that the hearing officer‘s finding was arbitrary, that is, that Hal engaged in conduct unbecoming in an arbitrary manner. Nor can we find that the common pleas court erred in affirming that finding. In the course of hearing the evidence at Hal‘s hearing, the hearing officer made a credibility determination, finding Hal not to be credible. As a result, based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the hearing officer found Hal changed the grades on June 2, 2011, finding that behavior to constitute misconduct involving academic fraud and conduct unbecoming to her position as a teacher. Hal‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 30} In her fourth assignment of error, Hal argues that the common pleas court erred as a matter of law in stating its review standard-that reliable, probative, and substantial evidence is a question of the absence or presence of the requisite amount of evidence. Hal contends that the common pleas court only referred to the amount of evidence and not the quality of the evidence and whether the evidence was probative.
{¶ 31} The common pleas court stated, “[d]etermining whether an agency‘s order or resolution is supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence is a question of the absence or presence of the requisite amount of evidence. Although this is a legal question, it inevitably involves a consideration of the evidence and, to a limited extent would permit a substitution of judgment by the reviewing common pleas court.” (Apr. 9, 2018 Decision at 16.) The common pleas court used this standard as it was reviewing the hearing officer‘s resolution of the evidentiary conflicts.
{¶ 32} This Court previously stated in Beeler v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff, 67 Ohio App.3d 748, 753 (10th Dist.1990), citing Andrews v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 164 Ohio St.
{¶ 33} In Gallagher, this Court stated that “a trial court‘s role in an administrative appeal ‘is to determine whether the agency‘s decision is supported by a preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.’ ” Gallagher at ¶ 16, quoting Mathews v. Ohio State Liquor Control Comm., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-46, 2004-Ohio-3726, ¶ 11. In Collins v. Ohio State Racing Comm., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-587, 2003-Ohio-6444, ¶ 23, this Court stated:
“[T]he key term is ‘preponderance.’ If a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence exists, the Court of Common Pleas must affirm the agency decision; if it does not exist, the court may reverse, vacate, modify or remand.” Dudukovich v. Housing Auth. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 202, 207, 389 N.E.2d 1113.
{¶ 34} The common pleas court appropriately stated and applied the standard of review to the hearing officer‘s determinations as adopted by the Board and found them to be supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. The common pleas court examined the evidence and its probative value and did not simply find there was a certain amount of evidence as Hal suggests.
{¶ 35} Hal also argues that the hearing officer cited Pang v. Minch, 53 Ohio St.3d 186 (1990), and that it is not relevant to the facts in this case. While the facts in Pang are not similar to the facts in this case, the hearing officer cited Pang for the proposition that a preponderance of the evidence required that ODE must prove that it is more likely than not that the misconduct occurred and that the misconduct constituted conduct unbecoming a teacher. In Pang, the Supreme Court of Ohio quoted the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, 442, Section 433(B)(1), Comment a (1965), holding the meaning of the preponderance of the evidence to be that ” ‘it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.’ ” In light of this, we find that the hearing
{¶ 36} In her fifth assignment of error, Hal contends that the common pleas court erred as a matter of law in finding that the sanction imposed by the Board is in accordance with law. In support of this, Hal argues that the hearing officer provided no legal basis for the conclusion that Hal‘s actions violated Principles 1 and 3 of the Licensure Code. Hal‘s argument is not clear. The hearing officer found that under the facts of this case, Hal‘s actions violated those principles. The hearing officer concluded that Hal‘s actions violated
{¶ 37} The real crux of Hal‘s fifth assignment of error is her argument that there is no justification for such a severe penalty as was imposed on her by the Board. The Board denied Hal‘s applications for a 5-year professional principal license and 5-year professional special all grades teaching license. The Board ordered that Hal is ineligible to reapply for any license issued by the Board until on or after April 11, 2022 and only after Hal submits evidence that she has completed 16 hours of ethics training.
{¶ 38}
{¶ 39} It is well-settled that the reviewing court may not modify a sanction that is authorized by statute if the agency‘s order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. Henry‘s Café, Inc. v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 170 Ohio St. 233 (1959), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. “As a practical matter, courts have no power to
{¶ 40} Statute (
{¶ 41} Hal further argues that the Board was required to consider all mitigation factors listed in
If the state board finds that a person has engaged in conduct unbecoming as described in paragraph (A) of this rule, then the state boаrd may take the following mitigating and aggravating factors, as applicable and appropriate, into consideration when determining a final action under division (B)(1) of section 3319.31 of the Revised Code:3
{¶ 42} This administrative code section lists 14 factors. The hearing officer specifically considered some of the factors, such as, “the nature and seriousness of Ms. Hal‘s conduct,” finding her conduct to be “serious.” (Report & Recommendation, Conclusions of Law at ¶ 8.) The hearing officer also considered the aggravating factor that Hal did not disclose her misconduct to the Board.
{¶ 44} We already addressed the issue that when an administrative board‘s action is based on reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, and in accordance with law, a reviewing court may not modify the imposed sanction if it is authorized by law. In Wolfe v. Accountancy Bd. of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-453, 2016-Ohio-8542, this court stated that “[t]he determination of the appropriate sanction in an administrative hearing is strictly for the agency.”
{¶ 45} Hal attempts to distinguish Henry‘s Café on the basis that her professional license is at issue and education has been her passion and livelihood. However, this Court has applied Henry‘s Café in the arena of professional licenses. See Shah v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-147, 2014-Ohio-4067 (upheld permanent revocation of medical license); Kellough v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-419, 2011-Ohio-431 (upheld permanent revocation of teaching license); Wolfe (upheld revocation of a Certified Public Accountancy certificate).
{¶ 46} Further, in Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970), superseded by statute on other grounds, the United States Supreme Court held that due process in the administrative context requires, “[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” (Citations omitted.) Hal was afforded a hearing in this case.
{¶ 47} This Court previously addressed a due process argument regarding the failure to modify or overturn Henry‘s Café, as follows:
As a court inferior to the Supreme Court of Ohio, we are bound by and must follow the decisions of that court. State ex rel. Abrusci v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-756, 2009-Ohio-4381, ¶ 5; State v. Mickens, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-743, 2009-Ohio-2554, ¶ 21; State v. Worrell, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-706, 2007-Ohio-2216, ¶ 10. Ohio appellate courts have no authority to declare unconstitutional a decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio. State v. Howard, 7th Dist. No. 08-MA-121, 2009-Ohio-6398, ¶ 49. Consequently, this court has
repeatedly rejected appellants’ requests that we modify or overrule Henry‘s Café. Auchi v. Liquor Control Comm., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-493, 2006-Ohio-6003, ¶ 8, fn. 3; Gehad & Mandi, Inc. v. Ohio State Liquor Control Comm., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1181, 2006-Ohio-3081, ¶ 7; Goldfinger Enterprises, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm., 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1172, 2002-Ohio-2770, ¶ 22; Lindner v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm. (May 31, 2001), 10th Dist. No. 00AP-1430, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2447. We do so again in this case.
Kellough at ¶ 58.
{¶ 48} We hold that the common pleas court did not err in relying on Henry‘s Café in Hal‘s case and Hal therefore was not denied due process. Hal‘s sixth assignment of error is overruled.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 49} For the following reasons, Hal‘s six assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
DORRIAN and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur.