*1 Michael F.
v. Company, Insurance et al. Record No. 962214 12, 1997 September Carrico, C.J., Present: Hassell, Keenan and Koontz, JJ. Compton, Lacy, Stephenson,* of his retirement on tive date [*] Justice Stephenson participated July 1, 1997. hearing and decision of this case prior to the effec- *2 Gallalee; Williams, (W.F. A. Satterwhite Mul-
Kimberly Drewry Dobbins, len, Christian & brief), on for appellant. Moudilos; (Vasiliki L. Williams Williams &
Roger Lynch, on brief), for Insurance Co. appellee Heritage or oral behalf of Tina L. Price.
No brief on argument appellee JUSTICE HASSELL delivered the of the Court. opinion an
In this we consider whether Code 38.2-2204 requires appeal, insur- which had issued an automobile company, full and to its ance to provide separate policy, entrustment of vehi- insured who was allegedly guilty cle, the insurer had the insurance already policy even though paid on behalf of a user who negligently operated limits permissive insured vehicle.
Michael F. filed a motion for Haislip judgment against Raymond L. Goode and L. Tina Price to recover he incurred damages as result of an automobile accident. that Price alleged Haislip entrusted her car to gently who negligently operated vehicle.
At the time of the Price’s car was under insured an issued to her liability policy Insur- Heritage ance Goode did Company. Apparently, not have an automobile liabil- and Southern ity settled policy, claim against Goode and issued a settlement check to in the amount Haislip $25,000, which Southern maximum believes is the amount of insurance available to under the terms of of insurance.
Subsequently, filed a motion for declaratory that the judgment, asking trial court declare that: the maximum amount of coverage $25,000; available to under the had been exhausted reason of the settlement on *3 and; behalf of Goode Southern has no to defend or duty any amounts related to the claim made Haislip against Price. Haislip filed a motion for summary that judgment, asserting the maximum amount of available coverage to him under the insurance is policy $50,000. The trial court considered of counsel and entered argument an order denying motion for and summary judgment grant- ing motion for Heritage’s The declaratory judgment. trial court entered a judgment that the insurance declaring avail- coverage able to under the insurance had been exhausted the policy by $25,000 of payment to him in settlement of his claim Goode. against Haislip appeals. that even the
Haislip argues though liability $25,000 occurrence, contract of provided coverage per Code 38.2- § $25,000 2204 requires of cov- provide liability $25,000 erage Goode and another of to Price. coverage contends that Goode and Price are insured within the mean- persons and, result, of the ing aas policy is required $25,000 a maximum of to Price for her coverage gent entrustment of the vehicle and another Goode for his negligent of the insured operation vehicle. Continuing, Price asserts that Code 38.2-2204 that all contracts of “provides § bodily injury liability must contain a provision insuring insured, as well as other any the motor vehicle person using with the or consent of the express implied named insured.” however, that Code 38.2-2204 “was
Southern Heritage argues, § insured, it created in order not created for the benefit of the nor was to the who has suffered damage by to allow double recovery party use of the insured’s car when another with operated asserts that the owner’s Southern Heritage purpose permission.” of Code 38.2-2204 is to who has suffered injured protect party § that under the insured’s damage “by allowing party single recovery policy.” clause, 38.2-2204,
Code referred to as the omnibus commonly states in part: or dam-
“A. No or contract of bodily injury property insurance, from the own- age liability covering liability maintenance, . . be or use of motor vehicle . shall ership, issued or delivered in this Commonwealth to the owner of such vehicle ... or shall be issued or delivered insurer by any in this motor vehicle . . . that licensed Commonwealth upon any docked, Commonwealth, or used in this garaged, principally unless contains provision insuring insured, for the or use using person responsible of the motor vehicle . . . with the or consent expressed implied of the named for death or sus- injury tained, of the or loss or incurred within damage or contract as a result of or negligence operation ... the named insured or such by any use of such vehicle person.” added).
(Emphasis statute, In of the we must consider deciding meaning that the General when enact Assembly language employed plain Country For stated in Barr v. Town & this statute. we ing example, 292, 295, (1990) (quoting 240 Va. Properties, *4 Hall, 924, 930, 445, (1934)): Va. S.E. 447 Watkins v. 161 172 “ the in the construction of statutes constant ‘While the to ascertain and effect to give endeavor of the courts is must be from gathered intention of the that intention legislature, used, would involve a the unless a literal construction words of a has used words manifest Where absurdity. legislature them a the courts cannot and definite put upon plain import did not holding legislature which amounts to construction ” actually mean what it has expressed.’
269 88, 91, 528, Accord Abbott 253 Willey, (1997); v. Va. 479 S.E.2d 530 Given, 221, 225-26, 502, v. Weinberg 252 Va. 476 S.E.2d 504 Co., 393, (1996); Dominion Trust Co. v. Constr. Kenbridge 248 Va. 396, 659, (1994). 448 S.E.2d 660 38.1-381, in
Additionally, Code interpreting predecessor § statute, to the current omnibus we stated that the omnibus statute “is force of its made a of a provisions and is to part liability policy, However, be construed to its intended liberally accomplish purpose. ... we must look to the words used in the statute to determine its and meaning, of the statute only meaning as determined should Co., 753, be effect.” given Mutual v. Grange Criterion Ins. 212 Va. 756, 91, (1972); 188 S.E.2d 93 City accord v. Ingram, 235 of Norfolk 433, 437, 725, Va. (1988); 367 S.E.2d 727 Storm v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 130, 135, 199 Va. (1957). 762
We are of that the opinion contained in Code plain language 38.2-2204(A) $25,000 Southern to requires § of Heritage provide insurance for claim or coverage any that Price be judgment may to legally obligated to for claims out of underlying even Southern has though Heritage $25,000 already to settle paid claims Haislip’s against Goode. The contained in plain language the omnibus clause the Southern requires insured, contain “a the named provision insuring and ... the motor person using vehicle. ...”
The General use of the “and” Assembly’s word in Code 38.2- § 2204(A) means that Southern is insur- required provide Price, ance insured, to both who who was the motor driving vehicle with Price’s consent. The word “and” is unambiguous. “And” means with or “along together with . . . added to or linked to.” Webster’s Third New International Dic- (1986). tionary, Even Southern p. though Heritage’s $25,000 occurrence, contains a limitation of that limita- per tion, if would violate the omnibus clause applied, because once $25,000 Heritage paid settle claims Goode, Price, who policy premiums, would Thus, not receive any coverage. Heritage’s its and the omnibus interpretation clause would render the word “and” used in the statute meaningless.
Accordingly, we will enter a declaration here that Code 38.2- maximum requires in for claim that make may against Price in
addition to the that Southern has already paid settle claims Goode.
Reversed and judgment. final COMPTON, JUSTICE with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO and JUSTICE STEPHENSON join, dissenting. case,
The issue in this involving allegations negligent opera- tion user and of entrustment a named negligent by permissive insured, is whether the limits are to be for each policy’s liability accident or for each act of that result in negligence may injuries the claimant. clause, course, 38.2-2204(A),
Of
under
omnibus
Code §
in
must contain a
the named
insuring
question
provision
insured “and”
the insured’s motor
using
vehicle
person
with the
or
consent of the named insured against
expressed
implied
for
sustained as a result of
liability
negligence
injury
operation
Price,
or use of the vehicle.
“and”
Manifestly,
user,
were “insured” under the
permissive
policy;
insurer
defense to both Price “and”
was
obligated
and,
exhausted,
if the
limits had not been
Goode
policy’s monetary
the claimant’s
establishment of
damages
legal liability.
upon
But
of the
“and” in the
word
omnibus clause does
employment
not mandate or
of the
limits for
require
liability
payment
policy’s
is,
each act of
that
both
negligence,
negligent driving
The
that “the
entrustment.
insurer’s policy unambiguously provided
limit of
. . .
to ‘each
bodily injury liability
applicable
person’
limit of the
for all
. . .
out of
company’s liability
damages
sustained
one
as the result of
one occur-
bodily injury
person
rence.”
in the omnibus clause annuls that
Nothing
policy provision.
act of
limits are
not
per
“Simply put,
per
would be
language
gence. Any contrary interpretation
Jones,
1994);
(W.
unfounded.” Helmick v.
Va.
Shutt,
1993).
(Kan.
Ins. Co. v.
Accordingly, $25,000. Thus, affirm contract is I would recover under the insurance trial court in favor of the insurer. of the judgment