Matthew HAIMAN, Appellant,
v.
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Bill Ullman, Miami, for appellant.
David W. Molhem of Strickland, Molhem & Fraley, P.A., Tampa, for appellee.
WARNER, J.
In appellant's suit to pay an insured loss of a watch, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee insurance company on two grounds: (1) that appellant made a misrepresentation of material fact related to the claim; and (2) that he failed to comply with document production demanded by appellee prior to instituting suit. Because an examination of the record reveals that there are disputed issues of material fact as to both issues, we reverse.
As to the first issue, materiality is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. See, e.g., Silverman v. Pitterman,
As to the second issue, there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether certain documents requested by appellee were in fact produced. Appellant's affidavit states that they were. Moreover, while appellee cites to Goldman v. State Farm Fire General Insurance Co.,
In this case, the policy contained a similar "examination under oath" provision, which required the insured to "produce all records we required." Not only did appellant appear for a examination under oath, but he produced volumes of documents for the insurance company. We agree with Diamonds & Denims, Inc. v. First of Georgia Insurance Co.,
[a] total failure to comply with policy provisions made a prerequisite to suit under the policy may constitute a breach precluding recovery from the insurer as a matter of law. If, however, the insured cooperates to some degree or provides an explanation for its noncompliance, a fact question is presented for resolution by a jury.
(Citations omitted).
In this case, appellee's affirmative defense stated that the failure to produce documents was a material breach of the policy. Whether the failure to produce documents requested is a material breach would be a question of fact for the jury. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
POLEN, C.J. and GUNTHER, J., concur.
