Case Information
*1 Before P OSNER , T INDER , and H AMILTON , Circuit Judges .
H AMILTON , Circuit Judge . Haichun Liu, a 50-year-old native and citizen of China, came to the United States over a decade ago after protesting the loss of his job at a state-owned factory. He petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals upholding the immigration judge’s denial of his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United *2 Nations Convention Against Torture. Because the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, we deny the petition.
Liu arrived in the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor in 2000 and overstayed. He came to the govern- ment’s attention while working at a restaurant in Wis- consin. The government began removal proceedings against him in 2008, charging him with overstaying and violating the conditions of his admission. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), (C)(i). Liu conceded removability but sought asylum and withholding of removal based on political opinion, as well as relief under the Convention Against Torture.
At a hearing before the immigration judge, Liu — who is from the large industrial city of Fushun (Liaoning Province) in China’s northeastern rustbelt — testified that he was persecuted after protesting layoffs at Huafeng, a state-owned machinery factory. Liu worked at Huafeng as a welder from 1980 until 1999, when he and half the workforce were laid off because of the factory’s restructuring. Liu met with a company manager three times to ask for his job and benefits back. At the third meeting, Liu brought along sixteen co-workers and pled that they had to “get back our insurances and bene- fits” to survive. Liu testified that he became “very emo- tional” during the meeting and used “aggressive” language and swear words. The manager accused the group of making trouble. After the meeting devolved into “verbal quarrels,” Liu testified, security personnel handcuffed him and brought him to the police station, where *3 officers accused him of “interfering with the social or- der.” The next day jail inmates interrogated Liu. When he refused to answer, the inmates beat him — kicking him, pulling his hair, hitting him with a belt, and knocking his head against a wall — for ten minutes until he lost consciousness.
Liu was released from the police station five days later after he admitted to wrongdoing and, he testified, promised not to “make such a scene again” or to “report on the company anymore.” He went to the hospital for an x-ray and medications. (Liu testified that he did not know the x-ray results, but that his body was bruised and swollen and he had internal injuries in his lower back.) Later Liu wrote an anonymous letter to the civil complaints department of the municipal gov- ernment complaining, he testified, about “how corrupted the company leadership was” and how “despite the hardship of the worker’s life,” they still laid off many workers. He did not keep a copy of the letter because, he said, he feared revenge. Presumably because the letter was anonymous, Liu received no response to it. He testified, however, that the municipal government knew the letter was written by “one of the people who was laid off by this company.” Public officials later told Liu’s wife that he would face “serious consequences” if he continued to make trouble. Five months later, Liu left China for the United States, but he learned from his wife that officials often came by their home asking about his whereabouts. At the hearing, Liu testified that he never belonged to any political organization in China *4 or the United States, and he acknowledged that he “didn’t do anything to protest or criticize the govern- ment of China.”
The immigration judge found Liu removable and denied his applications for relief. Liu was ineligible for asylum, the judge found, because he filed his applica- tion eight years after arriving in the United States and failed to show that he fell within an exception to the one-year filing deadline. Liu was ineligible for with- holding of removal, the judge determined, because his alleged persecution did not occur on account of a political opinion: Liu did not engage “in political agitation against state corruption,” the judge explained, and “did not publicly express any opposition.” Although Liu sent an anonymous letter about corruption, he offered no evidence that authorities knew he wrote it. Ultimately, the judge found, Liu was a “private actor” whose “emo- tional outburst led to his detention.” The judge also said that Liu’s medical treatment after the beating sug- gested only “superficial injury.” And although his testi- mony was credible, the judge noted, Liu did not corrobo- rate it with letters from family or friends. The judge found that the police visits to Liu’s wife did not establish a clear probability of future persecution because his family remained unharmed. Finally, the judge found Liu ineligible for Convention Against Torture protection because he failed to show that he would likely be tortured upon returning to China. The Board of Im- migration Appeals agreed with the judge’s rationale and upheld the decision.
In his petition, Liu first asserts that the immigra- tion judge wrongly dismissed his asylum application as untimely and insists he provided a “legally sound reason to establish an exceptional circumstance” to the one-year bar. But Liu does not identify why extra- ordinary or changed circumstances excuse his late filing, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D), so his undeveloped contentions are waived. See Raghunathan v. Holder , 604 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2010); Wang v. Gonzales , 445 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006). Because Liu did not discuss the Convention Against Torture claim in his opening brief, he has waived it as well. See Haxhiu v. Mukasey , 519 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2008); Huang v. Gonzales , 403 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir. 2005).
Liu focuses on the denial of his application for with-
holding of removal, arguing that the record compels
the conclusion that he was persecuted because of a
political opinion that he held. Specifically, he argues
that his efforts in organizing sixteen co-workers in
“waging the protests” at Huafeng constituted a “matter
of public concern.” He contends that the immigration
judge “ignored” both his anonymous letter in which
he “expose[d] the corruption of the leadership” and the
fact that public officials told his wife to forward warnings
to him. He identifies the correct legal standards: to
qualify for withholding of removal based on political
opinion, Liu had to show a clear probability that his life
or freedom would be threatened on account of political
opinion if he returns to China. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A);
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b);
Prela v. Ashcroft
,
The factory closures, mass layoffs, and labor unrest
in China’s northeast region in the 1990s — like those
described in Liu’s petition — set the stage for large-scale
political protests condemning official corruption. See
Reforming the north-east: Rustbelt revival
, The Economist
(June 16, 2012),
available at
http://www.economist.com/
node/21556988; U.S. Dep’t of State, 2002 Country Report
on Human Rights Practices: China (Mar. 31, 2003),
avail-
able at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18239. htm.
Courts have granted petitions for review of laid-off Chi-
nese workers who publicly condemned government
misconduct during this era. See generally
Hu v. Holder
,
652 F.3d 1011, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2011) (granting petition
where petitioner organized 100 laid-off workers to
protest in front of city government building, was accused
of acting against Communist party, and was detained
and beaten);
Bu v. Gonzales
,
In Liu’s case, however, the record does not compel
the conclusion that he was mistreated because of his
political activities in arranging his protest at Huafeng,
as required for withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A). A political opinion is “one that is ex-
pressed through political activities or through some sort
*7
of speech in the political arena.”
Li v. Gonzales
, 416 F.3d
681, 685 (7th Cir. 2005). Campaigning against the govern-
ment, writing op-ed pieces, urging voters to oust corrupt
officials, founding an anti-corruption political party,
actively participating in an anti-corruption party’s activi-
ties, or speaking out repeatedly as a “public gadfly” are
classic examples of political speech. See
Musabelliu v.
Gonzales
,
Liu’s testimony that he composed an unsigned letter asserting corruption in the layoffs does not transform his economic protest into a political one. He never publicly acknowledged writing the anonymous letter or testified that anyone knew he wrote it. Cf . Hu , 652 F.3d at 1018. Although at oral argument Liu’s counsel insisted that Chinese officials knew he wrote the letter because they could identify his handwriting, Liu never *8 testified to that effect. Nor does any other evidence in the record support this assertion. Liu testified that officials knew only that some laid-off worker from Huafeng wrote the letter, not that he wrote it.
The lack of compelling evidence that Liu was mistreated because of his political opinion is “a more important consideration in an evaluation of [his] claim of persecution” than the severity of his injuries following his beating and detention. See Zheng v. Holder , 666 F.3d 1064, 1066 (7th Cir. 2012). The mistreatment must be on account of his political activity, and as we have explained, the judge did not err by finding that Liu’s activity was economic, not political. For this reason, we must deny his petition for review.
We are troubled, however, that the immigration judge
and Board concluded that Liu did not experience past
persecution because, in their view, the beating and deten-
tion caused only “superficial injury.” The Board has not
defined persecution, and although in the past we have
determined that evidence of government-sanctioned or
tolerated beatings did not necessarily compel a finding
of past persecution, see,
e.g.
,
Mema v. Gonzales
, 474 F.3d
412, 416-18 (7th Cir. 2007);
Zhu v. Gonzales
, 465 F.3d 316,
318-20 (7th Cir. 2006);
Dandan v. Ashcroft
,
In this case, Liu testified that he was struck with a belt
until he fainted, his body was bruised and swollen, and
he had internal injuries in his lower back. He did not
have medical records of the x-ray results, but he was not
required to document organ damage to prove that the
beating amounted to persecution. See
Bu
, 490 F.3d at
427, 430 (beating constituted persecution where peti-
tioner testified that beating by inmates caused bleeding,
vomiting, lost consciousness, and blood clots on peti-
tioner’s body). Nonetheless, even if the beatings were
carried out, approved, or tolerated by the government,
the ground for the beating must be one of the grounds
listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
Zheng
,
Liu also argues that he established a clear probability
of future persecution on account of his political opinion
because the police occasionally visit his wife’s house to
ask where he is. But inquiries about his location, without
any threats to his “life or freedom,” do not compel a
conclusion of future persecution on account of political
opinion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).
Moreover, the mistreatment that Liu experienced
occurred over a decade ago, and despite the police in-
quiries, his family in China has never been harmed.
See
Marquez
,
Finally, Liu maintains that because the immigration
judge found him credible, the judge erred in requiring
corroboration of past or future persecution with letters
from family and friends. But because the REAL ID
Act applies to Liu’s case, once the judge determined that
he should provide corroborating evidence, he was
required to do so unless he showed that he could
not reasonably obtain that evidence. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(ii), 1229a(c)(4)(B), 1231(b)(3)(C), 1252(b)(4);
Krishnapillai v. Holder
,
For these reasons, the petition for review is D ENIED . 8-31-12