5 A.2d 605 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1939
Argued March 6, 1939. This action to recover for hospital service, including nurses and medical attendance, was begun by a writ of foreign attachment in assumpsit. The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $807.78.
The sole question presented by defendant's appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's specific finding of fact that W.S. Freudenfels, defendant's secretary, had "apparent authority to bind the Golo Slipper Company for professional nursing and hospital services rendered to Herman Kravis."
On December 1, 1936, Kravis, a travelling salesman for defendant, a New York corporation, became ill with pneumonia at a hotel in Scranton where he was engaged *400 on defendant's business. He sent a telegram addressed to "Golo Slipper Company," informing them that he had the grippe and that the doctor advised him to stay in bed for two or three days. On December 2d, the following telegram was sent to the hotel where Kravis was stopping: "Mr. Freudenfels arrive your hotel six o'clock tonight. Have doctor attending Kravis present. Golo Slipper Company, Inc."
Freudenfels, in company with one of defendant's New York salesmen, arrived at Scranton that evening and said to Dr. Goldstein, the attending physician: "I represent the Golo Slipper Company, and we will take care of everything, and I want you to give him everything." Dr. Goldstein testified: "I asked Mr. Freudenfels who was going to take care of the expense, and he informed me that the Golo Slipper Company would take care of all expenses and that I was to spare no expense to get this man better, but to get him better as quickly as possible; that he would take care of all expenses, his company would." Kravis was thereupon removed to the hospital where for some weeks he received medical treatment.
On December 4th, Dr. Goldstein received a letter on defendant's stationery, signed "Golo Slipper Company, Inc. By W.A. Freudenfels, Sec'y," stating: "You will oblige us greatly if you will drop us a short line telling us how Mr. Kravis is getting along." This was followed by another letter on December 8th, similarly signed, which read: "We have not heard from you in reply to our letter of December 4th as to how Mr. H. Kravis is getting along. We enclose herewith a self-addressed postal card and would consider it a favor if you would be good enough to write us a few lines as to his condition and how long you think it will be necessary for him to remain at the hospital. Thanking you in advance for your prompt reply, we are. . . . . ."
The superintendent of the hospital, also, was assured *401 by Freudenfels that the Golo Slipper Company would pay Kravis' bill and at that time he gave his personal check covering charges for the first week in advance.
The defendant did not disavow Freudenfel's authority and it could be fairly assumed that it intrusted its secretary to incur reasonable expenses for the care of Kravis and that it knew of, and acquiesced in, his action: Edwards Strong v. Power Co.,
In Wagner v. West Penn Power Co.,
The cases from all jurisdictions dealing with the various phases of the questions here raised are collected, extensively reviewed, and annotated in 71 A.L.R. 638, 660. The agent's or officer's authority to bind a corporation seems to depend, inter alia, upon (1) the alleged agent's position with relation to the company or employer; (2) the time, place and manner of the injury or illness as bearing upon the existence of an "emergency"; (3) the position of the injured person with relation to the company.
The evidence in this case shows that Freudenfels was an executive officer of the company and that he unequivocally held himself out as having authority to bind the company. Kravis was shown to be a valuable employee of the defendant. When he became suddenly ill while on the business of the defendant, an emergency situation was created which was recognized by it. His notification addressed to the defendant was promptly answered by its secretary who came immediately and expressly agreed on behalf of the company to pay the hospital and medical expenses.
In Stewart v. New York Central Hudson River R. Co.,
We recognize the emergency rule is more generally *403 applied to railroad cases. Because of hazards incurred and the necessity of immediate action, the courts have frequently been more liberal in passing upon the sufficiency of the proof of authority of an officer or agent to contract for medical services. For cases in other jurisdictions where general officers and agents of a corporation other than a railroad have been held to have implied or presumptive authority to engage medical services, see 71 A.L.R. p. 656.
Corporations are necessarily required to conduct their business through agents. Their liability is not limited to such acts of their agents as are expressly authorized or necessarily implied; it also embraces all acts of agents within the apparent scope of their authority: Murphy v. Beverly Hills Realty Corp.,
We rest our decision mainly on the ground that the evidence was sufficient to show implied authority in Freudenfels to contract for the services plaintiff rendered. The general rule may be stated that where the authority of an agent is to be implied from the conduct of the parties, or established by witnesses, the fact and scope of the agency are for the jury: Singer Mfg. Co. v.Christian,
Taking into consideration all the circumstances disclosed by the record, and giving plaintiff the benefit of all inferences favorable to it, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Freudenfels lacked implied or apparent authority to bind the defendant for the payment of its employee's medical and nursing expenses, for which judgment was recovered.
Judgment is affirmed.