*448 OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a former chairman of the Republican State Committee, brings this action against nine defendants whom he alleges acted individually, or with varying degrees of cooperation, to deprive him of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The nine defendants and the positions they held during the period of time covered by this complaint are:
Francis W. Sargent, Governor of Massachusetts ;
Robert H. Quinn, Attorney General of Massachusetts;
William I. Cowin, Secretary of Consumer Affairs;
John G. Ryan, Commissioner of Insurance;
John J. Irwin, Assistant Attorney General;
Harvey F. Rowe, Assistant Attorney General;
Wendell Berman, Holder of the Controlling Interest, Rockland Mutual Insurance Company; 1
Alan G. Miller, General Counsel, Rock-land Mutual Insurance Company;
Alex Prasinos, Trial Counsel, Rock-land Mutual Insurance Company.
Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Each of the amended complaint’s four counts alleges violation of a different section of Title 42 of the United States Code (viz: §§ 1983, 1985(2), 1985(3), 1986). The defendants have each moved to dismiss the amended complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. On December 13, 1974, after an extended hearing, defendants’ motions were taken under advisement. 2
According to the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff was elected Massachusetts Republican State Chairman in November, 1971. In mid-February, 1972, he met at least once with the defendant Commissioner Ryan to express his interest in a pending application of the Rockland Mutual Insurance Company to write bodily-injury automobile liability insurance in the Commonwealth.
On February 28, 1972, following his meeting with Ryan, plaintiff and Attorney James T. Kirk, now deceased, reported to the defendant Berman, of Rockland Mutual, that the company’s application prospects appeared favorable. Berman, however, had never requested that plaintiff intercede with respect to the company’s application and reported plaintiff’s activities to defendant Miller, Rockland’s General Counsel.
On March 2, 1972, Miller received a copy of Ryan’s tentative decision granting the Rockland application, subject to a number of conditions. 3 The next day, Miller met with Ryan and expressed his distress at the activities of Hahn and Kirk. Ryan reported this conversation to his superior, Secretary Cowin, who met personally with Miller and Berman on March 16. During that meeting, Miller and Berman claimed that plaintiff had demanded Berman pay him $75,000.00 in cash and also purchase $5,000.00 worth of tickets tо political fund-raising events, apparently as compensation for his services.
A few weeks later, on March 31, 1972, Ryan re-opened the hearing on the Rock- *449 land application. 4 At this hearing, Cow-in testified as to his conversations with Miller and Berman. Final approval of the Rockland application was announced by Commissioner Ryan on May 31, 1972.
Sometime after his meeting with Berman and Miller, but before Ryan re-convened the Rockland hearings, Cowin submitted a written report on the alleged activities of plaintiff and Kirk to Governor Sargent who, in turn, transmitted the information to Attorney General Quinn. After an investigation by the Attorney General’s office, plaintiff and Kirk were indicted in mid-June, 1972 by a Suffolk County Grand Jury for their alleged activities in connection with the Rockland application. Both were acquitted on March 5, 1974, following a Superior Court bench trial.
Plaintiff was defeated for re-election as Republiсan State Chairman in May, 1972.
Plaintiff now brings this action charging that the activities of the defendants which led to his indictment constituted violations of his constitutional rights. He broadly alleges that he was the victim of malicious prosecution, knowing use of false and perjured testimony, deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence and “intentional conspiracy.” He seeks $6,000,000.00 compensatory and $2,000,000.00 punitive damages, as well as costs.
I
Eаch defendant seeks dismissal of counts 3, 2 and 4 (for purposes of convenience they will be discussed in that order) on grounds that the plaintiff is not within the class of persons protected by the provisions of the Civil Rights Act cited therein. This court agrees.
Count 3 alleges that the defendants’ activities give the plaintiff a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). In order to come within the terms of that section, however, plaintiff must allege that the defendants did (1) “conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another” and (2) did so “for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” Griffin v. Breckenridge,
Indeed, the basis of count 3 is that the plaintiff as an
individual
was singled out for harm by these defendants because of his “militant republicanism” as opposed to any allegation that the dеfendants’ activities were based upon racial or “otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.”
Count 2 also fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. It alleges that the defendants conspired to obstruct justice in order to deprive the plaintiff of equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). The courts which have faced the question, however, have recognized thát § 1985(2) and § 1985(3) are “kindred sections of a common statutory scheme” (Phillips v. Singletary,
Count 4 alleges a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. That section creates an additional cause of action for refusal to take affirmative action in certain eir
*450
cumstances to prevent the commission of an act giving rise to a claim under § 1985. No claim lies under § 1986, however, except on the basis of a valid claim under § 1985. Johnston v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc.,
II
Count 1 alleges that the defendants deprived the plaintiff of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is broader in scope than section 1985 in that it affords protection against violation of any rights secured by thе Constitution, not merely those stemming from racial or other types of class-based discrimination. Hoffman v. Halden,
It is sufficient for us in this case to say: that, as other courts have done, we disregard, as mere conclusions, the loose and general, the factually unsupported, characterizations of the complained of acts of the defendants, as malicious, conspiratorial, and done for the purpose of depriving plaintiffs of their сonstitutional rights; that [if] the things defendants are alleged to have done, as distinguished from the conclusions of the pleadings with respect to them, do not constitute a deprivation of the civil rights of plaintiffs, [they] do not give rise to the cause of action claimed ....
In the instant ease, the charges against the individual defendants vary. Out of necessity, therefore, the court will examine the things which each defendant is alleged to have done in order to determine whether the allegations agаinst that defendant are sufficient to survive the pending motions.
See
Symkowski v. Miller,
JOHN J. RYAN
The complaint alleges that Ryan (1) held a hearing on the Rockland application for the purpose of airing false charges made against the plaintiff; (2) permitted testimony at that hearing which he knew to be false; and (3) gave false testimony to the Suffolk County Grand Jury when that body was investigating charges against the plaintiff.
*451
Assuming
arguendo
that Ryan’s activities were done under color of state law,
6
plaintiff has not cited, nor has this court found, authority for the рroposition that the convening of an administrative hearing by a Commissioner of Insurance under these circumstances violated plaintiff's civil rights. The hearing was not called to initiate action against plaintiff. No charges were filed against him, nor was his name mentioned at any stage in the proceedings. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly,
Moreover, there was ample cause for Ryan to convene the hearing.
See
Pierson v. Ray,
Plaintiff next charges that Ryan “raised no protest” when Cowin testified falsely at the Commissioner’s March hearing. Here again the plaintiff has not cited any authority for the proposition that this alleged nonfeasance rises to the level of a violation of constitutional rights. Nor has the plaintiff explained why the defendant in this situation should be subject to civil liability. The integrity of the fact-finding process was amply protected by the opportunity for Ryan to weigh the evidence before him and report possible irregularities to the Attorney General.
Morеover, neither the complaint nor the plaintiff’s supporting affidavits specify those statements of Cowin’s which were allegedly false.
7
See
French v. Corrigan,
Finally, plaintiff alleges that Ryan perjured himself before the Grand Jury, although here too he fails to cite what portions of Ryan’s testimony were false. Even if this allegation had been pleaded with particularity, however, it would also fail to state a claim under section 1983.
*452
Under Massachusetts law, a witness who give's false testimony before a grand jury is liable in a criminal action for perjury. Mass.Gen.Laws.Ann. ch. 268, § 1. He is not, however, liable for the same testimony in a civil suit since testimony in a judicial proceeding is privileged against defamation suits as a matter of public policy. Aborn v. Lipson,
WILLIAM I. COWIN
The allegations against Cowin are listed chiefly in paragraphs 24-35 of the amended complaint. Essentially he is charged with: (1) damaging the plaintiff’s reputation by testifying falsely before Ryan as well as preparing an inaccurate report on the Berman/Miller allegations to Sargent; and, (2) testifying falsely before the Suffolk County Grand Jury.
The first set of allegations represents a claim for defamation. Section 1983, however, does not provide a remedy for defamation claims. Gorman v. Lukowsky,
The second set of allegations represents an allegation of perjury. As mentioned above, § 1983 provides no remedy for that type of claim. Bryant v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
FRANCIS W. SARGENT
The complaint alleges that Sargent, having received information concerning “a shakedown attempt by plaintiff” (Amended Complaint ff 29), requested the official who first reported the incident to him to conduct an investigation ([[[[ 26-27); and that after receiving the report, Sargent forwarded it to the Attorney General. The complaint alleges that by his actions Sargent harmed the plaintiff’s reputation and instigated criminal prosecution by the Attorney General.
The allegations against the Governor make out possible claims for defamation and malicious prosecution. Neither, however, are actionable under the Civil Rights Act. Curry v. Ragan,
ROBERT H. QUINN
JOHN J. IRWIN '
HARVEY F. ROWE
Plaintiff alleges that these defendants deprived him due process by: (1) maliciously instituting criminal proceedings against him; (2) deliberately using false and perjured testimony in state criminal proceedings against him; and (3) deliberately suppressing exculpatory evidence in the course of these proceedings.
A charge of malicious prosecution does not state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.
See, e.g.,
Yglesias v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n,
*453 The gravamen of the plaintiff’s allegation agаinst the prosecutors is that in the course of their investigation, they developed “serious contradictions” in Berman’s story. Plaintiff argues that these contradictions required the defendants to conclude that there was no probable cause on which to proceed against the plaintiff. This court disagrees.
Plaintiff’s characterization of the evidence developed during investigation as contradictory impliedly acknowledges that the state investigators had uncovered inculpatory evidence. Thus the plaintiff is really arguing that prosecutors, faced with conflicting evidence, are constitutionally required to disregard incriminating evidence and resolve all doubts in favor of the plaintiff. Unless a prosecutor knows inculpatory testimony to be false, the Fourteenth Amendment makes no such demand. Napue v. Illinois,
Moreover, the allegations of the сomplaint show that a grand jury found probable cause to indict Mr. Hahn. Viewing this factor against the background of the “prevailing view of tort law,”
(see
Pierson v. Ray,
Plaintiff’s second allegation against these defendants is that they knowingly procured perjured testimony in presenting the Commonwealth’s case to the Grand Jury. The complaint, however, sets out neither the contents of the allegedly perjured testimony, nor the basis for the defendant’s belief that any of it was false. Absent such factual allegations, the complaint contains only self-serving characterizations and conclusions which are insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.
8
Powell v. Jarvis,
The final claim against the Attorney General and his assistants is that thеy deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence relevant to the plaintiff’s criminal trial.
9
See
Brady v. Maryland,
According to the complaint, the information which the plaintiff alleges was withheld was made available to the plaintiff nine days before the trial was completed. During that pеriod, plaintiff and his counsel “had the use, knowledge and probative value of these reports for cross-examination of defendant Berman as well as for examination of other wit
*454
nesses” (Amended Complaint ft 43). And, of course, plaintiff was acquitted of all charges against him. Accordingly, he has failed to show any prejudice or due process violation resulting from the defendant’s alleged actions. See United States v. McGovern,
WENDELL BERMAN
ALAN G. MILLER
ALEX PRASINOS
Dеfendants Berman, Miller and Prasinos are named in the complaint presumably because of their alleged fabrication and dissemination of a false story accusing the plaintiff 'of an attempted shakedown. The plaintiff, however, has not alleged facts which show that the actions of any of these defendants were either done under color of state law
(see
Adickes v. Kress & Co.,
Ill
Finally, the plaintiff alleges that the individual defendants conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See
Birnbaum v. Trussell,
In analyzing conspiracy claims, courts must be cautious in labeling allegations of conspiracy as mere conclusions. Moran v. Bench,
In' the face of defendant’s affidavits denying that a conspiracy existed here, plaintiff’s complaint clearly fails that test. It alleges only that the defendants cooperated or “acted in concert” to harm the plaintiff in order to serve their own disparate aims. No facts are alleged which show that (1) a combination or agreement among any of the defendants was actually formed at any time or (2) that any of the defendants acted knowingly or willingly in furtherance of that agreement. Indeed, at oral argument before this court, the plaintiff maintained that it was sufficient to make out a conspiracy claim merely if the combined effect of the individual actions of the parties was harm to the plaintiff. Such an argument is without merit.
In conclusion then, this court holds that the plaintiff has failed to state a *455 claim upon which relief can be granted against any of the named defendants, Defendants’ motions to dismiss counts 2 through 4 and for Summary Judgment as to cоunt 1 are therefore allowed. 11
So ordered.
Notes
. There is some confusion in the record as to Mr. Berman’s position. At this stage in the proceedings, the court accepts the factual allegations of the comxdaint on this and other points as true.
. At an earlier hearing, the plaintiff moved to amend his complaint after some of the defendants had mov^ed to dismiss. The court allowed plaintiff’s motion to amend (Fed.R. Civ.P. 15(a)), but then rescheduled the hearing in order to give the defendants additional time to consider their motions in light of the amended complaint. In the period between the hearings, the pending motions were filed.
. There is no indication that the Commissioner’s decision resulted from plaintiff’s intervention. Indeed, a review of the uncontradicted Grand Jury Testimony of Commissioner Ryan reveals that the decision on the Rockland application had been made before plaintiff сontacted Mr. Ryan.
. A previous set of hearings had been held in January, 1972.
. Nor does section 1983 require a showing of conspiracy, although a conspiracy to violate section 1983 is actionable under the statute.
See, e. g.,
Birnbaum v. Trussell,
. This court will also assume
arguendo
as well that the alleged activities of defendants Cowin, Sargent, Quinn, Irwin and Rowe were done under color of state law.
See
Wall v. King,
. Plaintiff mentions Cowin’s testimony about a March 3 meeting with Miller and Ryan. At the hearing, Cowin testified as to his impression of Miller’s mood at the March 3 meeting (“upset”) as well as to his own, Cowin’s, characterization of Rockland as an “innocent victim” which was also made at that time. Plaintiff alleges that Cowin’s testimony as to his earlier characterization of Rockland was false and that Ryan knew that testimony was false. The alleged basis for Ryan’s knowledge, and therefore plaintiff’s claim against him, is that when Ryan testified about this same meeting before the Grand Jury, he made no mention of Cowin’s characterization. Ryan’s uncontradicted affidavit as well as a certified transcript of his Grand Jury testimony reveal, however, that Ryan was never asked about how Cow-in had characterized Rockland at the March 3 meeting.
. It is worthy of note that the plaintiff had access to the Grand Jury testimony both prior to and during his trial. According to the uneontradicted affidavit of defendant Rowe, neither the plaintiff nor his counsel called the trial judge’s attention to any testimony which was allegedly false.
. The defendants argue that because of various rulings by the state trial court, the plaintiff is now barred by principles of collateral estoppel from claiming that evidence which was allegedly withheld at the earlier proceedings was exculpatory. Mastracchio v. Rico,
. Private persons who would not be liable under section 1983 if acting alone, come within this section’s purviеw once they conspire with others who clearly are acting under color of state law. Gillibeau v. City of Richmond,
. In memoranda accompanying their motions, defendants Ryan, Cowin, Sargent, Quinn, Irwin and Rowe discuss at some length the common law doctrine of executive immunity and its possible application to this case. In view of this court’s holding, there is no occasion to consider the immunity defense as such. Of course, the application of that defense to § 1983 claims against state executive officials has yet to be “definitively explored” by the Supreme Court. Scheuer v. Rhodes,