35 A.2d 201 | Conn. | 1943
The plaintiff brought this action to recover for injuries suffered when she fell just inside the entrance to a building leased by the defendant to the state of Connecticut for use as a public office in administering unemployment compensation, the trial *443 court directed a verdict for the defendant, and from the court's denial of a motion to set that verdict aside the plaintiff has appealed. The question then is, was there evidence before the jury upon which they could reasonably find facts furnishing a basis for holding the defendant liable?
The jury could have found these facts: On June 9, 1939, the state entered into a written lease of the building for a period of two years from July 1, 1939, at a monthly rental of $100. The lease contained an agreement that the defendant, before that day, would make certain repairs and alterations in accordance with plans and specifications submitted by the state, and this was done. It also contained a covenant that the state would not "assign this lease, nor underlet a part or the whole of said leased premises, nor make alterations in said leased premises, nor use the same for any purpose but that hereinbefore authorized, without written permission from" the defendant, with a further provision that if the state violated this covenant the lease would thereupon terminate. It also contained a provision giving the state an option to extend the lease for a further period of two years or any part thereof on the same terms and conditions, provided notice was given thirty days before the termination of the tenancy; but there was no evidence that such a notice was given. On August 22, 1941, a further written lease of the premises for a period of two years from July 1, 1941, was executed. This lease contained the same provisions as the first one except that it omitted the agreement by the defendant to make repairs and alterations.
During the occupancy of the building by the state, a large number of persons were continually visiting the office in connection with unemployment compensation. The building had two entrances. At first the door *444 within which the plaintiff fell was used as an exit, but from a time a few months before the accident it was used principally for entrance to the building. The threshold of this door was higher than the level of the floor of the office. Some time before the accident the defendant had sent a carpenter to the premises who constructed just inside the door a platform about four feet square, with its top five or six inches above the floor of the office and with railings along the sides at right angles to the door but with the side opposites the door left open for use in stepping from the platform to the floor. Thereafter several people stumbled in stepping down, although a sign giving warning of the step had been posted. A representative of the defendant was informed of this; the assistant manager of the office suggested to him that the entrance be changed so as to eliminate the need of stepping down after entering the building; and another member of the office staff suggested the substitution of a ramp for the platform. The defendant sent a carpenter to the premises who changed the railings of the platform so that there was one across the side opposite the door but none on the right of the entrance, and persons entering the building would cross the platform and step down on that side. People continued, however, to stumble in stepping down to the floor. The attention of the defendant's representative was called to this fact two or three weeks before the accident occurred, and he said he would remedy conditions. Some time after July 1, 1941, the defendant caused a ramp to be built in place of the platform. On that day the plaintiff had occasion to visit the office in connection with a claim for unemployment compensation. She entered the door, turned to the right, took two or three steps and, stepping off the edge of the platform, fell *445 to the floor. The defendant concedes in its brief that the entrance to the room was adequately lighted.
In Webel v. Yale University,
Ordinarily a landowner, at least where he has made no agreement to repair, is not liable for injuries due to defective conditions arising upon the leased premises during the tenancy; he has surrendered possession and control of them to the tenant and has no right to enter to abate the conditions; and it is the tenant who is liable for injury arising from them. Chambers v. Lowe,
In Chipman v. National Savings Bank,
It is true that the plaintiff was injured on the day after the first lease expired and before the second lease was executed. That the state was on that day still a tenant of the premises is admitted in the answer, and the jury could reasonably have found that it was continuing to occupy them and carry on its business there. Whatever the nature of its tenancy on the day of the *448
accident, it was occupying the premises on which the defendant had created a condition which might reasonably be found to be dangerous, and the nature of its tenancy is immaterial as regards the principle we are discussing. There was some hearsay testimony to the effect that the change in the platform previous to the plaintiff's fall was made as a result of consultation between the office manager and the carpenter sent by the defendant, but even if the jury had found this to be so that would not necessarily make the work that of the state and not of the defendant. There was evidence that the defendant paid for it, and the jury could reasonably have found that, in making the change, the carpenter was solely the employee of the defendant. See Tierney v. Correia,
There was evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found that the defendant knew that the purpose for which the premises were leased involved a visit to them by many persons who had business with the unemployment compensation office of the state; that the defendant, by its employee, at the express or implied request of the state, built the platform and later changed the railing on it; that it was not reasonably safe for the use of visitors to the premises; and that the defendant knew or should have known that the state could not reasonably be expected to make any changes in the platform or take any other steps which would be effective to guard visitors to the premises against danger from it. Indeed, the fact that the state could make no alterations in the premises without the consent of the defendant would in itself go far to establish that the latter could not reasonably expect the former to attempt to remedy the dangerous condition by changing the platform. Calway v. Schaal Son, Inc.,
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to set the verdict aside.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.